Cross-Border Governance in the European Union

Edited by Olivier Kramsch and Barbara Hooper

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The term *governance* has become a catchword, designating contemporary shifts in power and rule 'beyond' the nation-state, up to supra-national institutions – such as the European Union, and the World Trade Organization – and down to sub-national territorial units of cities and regions.

This volume attempts to draw debates on governance, at both of these levels, into the spaces of cross-border regionalism in Europe today. Embodying both supra-national and sub-national dynamics of contemporary forms of governance, cross-border regions (or *euregions*) enable observation of the fitful progress and contradictions of the multi-level polity that is contemporary Europe. Presenting case studies from throughout the EU as exemplars of wider 'border regimes', the volume identifies the practical and theoretical stakes involved in governing Europe's new cross-border territories as part of a newly reinvigorated 'regional question'. In Europe's *euregions*, it is argued, issues of democracy, identity, sovereignty, citizenship and scale must be re-thought, when 'a border runs through it'.

This book utilizes a diversity of perspectives and a range of case studies to examine modes of governance emerging across the nation-state borders of Europe. It will interest students and researchers of European Union borders, as well as those working on issues of transnational governance generally.

Olivier Kramsch is Lecturer at the Nijmegen Centre for Border Research, University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands. **Barbara Hooper** is currently Research Fellow at the Nijmegen Centre for Border Research, University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands.

Transnationalism

Series editor: Steven Vertovec

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'Transnationalism' broadly refers to multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation-states. Today myriad systems of relationship, exchange and mobility function intensively and in real time while being spread across the world. New technologies, especially involving telecommunications, serve to connect such networks. Despite great distances and notwithstanding the presence of international borders (and all the laws, regulations and national narratives they represent), many forms of association have been globally intensified and now take place paradoxically in a plant-spanning yet common arena of activity. In some instances transnational forms and processes serve to speed-up or exacerbate historical patterns of activity, in others they represent arguably new forms of human interaction. Transnational practices and their consequent configurations of power are shaping the world of the twenty-first century.

This book forms part of a series of volumes concerned with describing and analyzing a range of phenomena surrounding this field. Serving to ground theory and research on 'globalization', the Routledge book series on 'Transnationalism' offers the latest empirical studies and ground-breaking theoretical works on contemporary socio-economic, political and cultural processes which span international boundaries. Contributions to the series are drawn from Sociology, Economics, Anthropology, Politics, Geography, International Relations, Business Studies and Cultural Studies.

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Contributors

Jouni Häkli is Professor of Regional Studies at the Department of Regional Studies and Environmental Policy, University of Tampere, Finland. Professor Häkli's areas of research include European integration and border regions; regionalization and the production of geographical knowledge; professional discourse and urban planning; political geography. His recent publications include 'In the territory of knowledge' *Progress in Human Geography*, 25(3): 2001 and *Boundaries and Place* (co-edited with David H. Kaplan), Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002.

Odile Heddebaut is a Researcher in the Research Centre for Socio-economics of Transportation and Regional Planning (TRACES), French Institute for Transport and Safety Research (INRETS) since 1992. Her work involves the assessment of large-scale transport infrastructures, with applications to the Channel Tunnel and the North European TGV, and the evaluation of public transport policies. She is the author or co-author of 25 articles in journals or collective volumes, the editor of two INRETS ACTES and has presented more than 35 papers at various international colloquium and symposia.

Barbara Hooper is currently Research Fellow at the Nijmegen Centre for Border Research, University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands. Her research interests range widely but all have been concerned with issues of power, difference and identity as these relate to constructions of corporeality, temporality and spatiality.

Ann Kennard is Associate Head of European and International Studies in the Faculty of Humanities, Languages and Social Sciences at the University of the West of England, Bristol. She has been engaged in research on border cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe since the early 1990s, after the emergence of the 'new' nation-states to the east of the EU. She has given conference papers and published regularly on the subject throughout the intervening period.

Olivier Kramsch is Lecturer at the Nijmegen Centre for Border Research, University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands. His work examines contemporary patterns of governance and institution-building within the cross-border

regions (or euregions) straddling The Netherlands, Germany and Belgium. He is co-editor (with Henk van Houtum and Wolfgang Zierhofer) of *Bordering Space* (forthcoming).

Enza Lissandrello is a PhD student in Planning and Public Territorial Policies at the University of Architecture in Venice (IUAV). She is studying the activation of territorial policies on the borderland through trans-border cooperation. In this context, her interests are linked to multi-level governance, Europeanization and new processes of 'territorializing'. In the past she has participated in the INTERREG trans-border cooperation projects on environmental problems between Italy and France.

James Wesley Scott is Assistant Professor of Geography at the Free University of Berlin. Research areas include urban and regional development, and transboundary regionalism. Professor Scott's publications in this field include *Border Regions in Functional Transformation: European and North American Perspectives* (with Paul Ganster, Alan Sweedler and Wolf-Dieter Eberwein), Erkner: Institute for Regional Development and Structural Planning, 1996.

James Derrick Sidaway is Associate Professor in Geography at the National University of Singapore. He has previously taught geography at the Universities of Birmingham and Reading in the UK and held visiting positions at the University of Groningen and at the University of Seville. He is the author of *Imagined Regional Communities: Integration and Sovereignty in the Global South*, London: Routledge.

Anke Strüver is currently affiliated with Nijmegen Centre for Border Research and Department of Human Geography, University of Nijmegen. She is completing a PhD thesis with the title 'Stories of the boring border: The Dutch–German boundary in people's minds' and her research focuses on borders, identity, trans-nationalism and everyday life.

Henk van Houtum is co-founder and director of the Nijmegen Centre for Border Research, University of Nijmegen, and co-editor of *Journal of Borderlands Studies*. His current research focuses on the (strategic) construction, claiming and governing of territorial borders and identity. His recent publications include *Borders, Regions and People* (co-edited with Martin van der Velde), London: Pion and *Routing Borders Between Territories, Discourses and Practices* (co-edited with Eiki Berg), Aldershot: Ashgate.

Martin van der Velde is lecturer in the Department of Human Geography and co-director and co-founder of the Nijmegen Centre for Border Research, University of Nijmegen. His research mainly deals with borders and border-related issues. Within this broad theme he is especially working on labour-market issues and consumer-behaviour.

Noralv Veggeland is Professor in Planning and Political Theory at Lillehammer University College, Norway, and former research and managing

director of the Nordic Institute of Regional Research, Denmark. Professor Veggeland's main fields of research are planning theory, European integration and organization of sub-national administrative levels, and distributed public governance and new democracy concepts. His latest books include *The New Regionalism: European Integration and Multi-level Governance* (in Norwegian), Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, 2000 and *The New Democracy: A Political Laboratory for Partnership* (in Norwegian), Kristiansand: Norwegian Academic Press, 2003.

Petri Virtanen is a researcher and project co-ordinator at the University of Joensuu, Finland. He is currently writing a dissertation on the border policy of the European Union and its impacts/reflections on the EU's eastern border.

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Olivier Kramsch and Barbara Hooper
Nijmegen, 2003

Introduction

Olivier Kramsch and Barbara Hooper

> In a few hours I encounter once again that Europe 'of ancient parapets', that Europe in crisis, as one says: logos in decline, France and the continent heading towards their destiny. This destiny, hasn't it been, since the beginning, to make empty space? Where do you see living and creative forces ...?
> [Fragment of letter, Henri Lefebvre to Octavio Paz, written on board plane returning from visit to Chiapas, never mailed.]
>
> (Lefebvre 1980: 10; translated by editors from French original)

Each July, and then for only four days, Nijmegen, a city of 150,000 located on the Dutch side of the border with Germany, swells to over one million inhabitants. During these heady days trains and buses enter Nijmegen's central station from every conceivable direction in Europe and elsewhere, disgorging hundreds of thousands of visitors, young and old, who in turn occupy what appears to the local *Nijmegenaar*[1] as every last piece of available open space. If you look closely, these visitors, having traveled from afar, have a special gleam in their eyes, a purposeful 'something' one doesn't come by very often these days, certainly not among such a varied and motley cross-section of Europeans. What briefly unites such a disparate group is participation in a four-day walk-a-thon, or more properly, a march (colloquially referred to in Dutch as *de Vierdaag*), on the terrain of a wide inter-city loop demanding between 30 and 50 kilometers per day, depending on level of fitness. Not a particularly spectacular event on the face of it, compared, say, with the Boston or New York marathons, or currently fashionable expressions of 'extreme sport', but one with a particularly deep resonance for Nijmegen – and indeed Europe's – recent past: for many, still, the lived experience of wartime and devastation, that has catalyzed in part Europe's will to govern cooperatively.

The presence of the military of many European nations in the march and during the accompanying festivities serves as a reminder of the city's origins as one of the northernmost garrison towns of the Roman *imperium*, and reproduces a certain space of internationalism harkening back to those early days. For our purposes, however, given the European Union's goal of cross-border integration, it is significant that the route of the march, while circumnavigating several Dutch

border towns, never crosses the border with Germany. If a *Vierdaagesloper*[2] were by chance to become lost and wander off the prescribed track of the march, she might find herself crossing into Germany indeed undisturbed by visa and passport controls, but neither would she be aware that this particular stretch of the Dutch–German border has been officially institutionalized as a cross-border region, that it has been equipped with its own politico-juridical competencies in charge of administering large sums of funds from the European Commission, nor that it has been burdened with the task of creating a European identity 'in miniature', in this case by fostering heightened cross-border relations between a putatively 'Dutch' and 'German' population. Rather, she would more than likely stumble upon a German village, where she would be informed in halting and broken English at a local Balkan restaurant improbably named 'El Toro' that she had accidentally crossed the border, and must return now by such and such a path to the 'other side'.

Unbeknownst to her, we suggest our inter-*loper* would have stumbled upon a primary and unresolved contradiction vexing the current project-that-is-Europe. For, contrary to her experience, the European project is increasingly conscious of itself as uniting, integrating, networking, and ineluctably on its way to becoming borderless. Indeed, since the early 1990s, following the demise of the Soviet regime and the Ur-border that was the Iron Curtain, Europe – as if seizing on the opportunity to leap over the shadow of its all too territorialized past while consolidating a workable self in the conjuncture of a rapidly globalizing present – has rushed to transform itself into an a-historical and functional space located within and across that of its constituent member states. Thus, in the recent period the European Commission has become the primary sponsor of a range of trans-national and cross-border institutional initiatives, ranging from the planning of large-scale macro-regions encompassing two or more nation-states – the 'Northern Dimension', the 'Central Adriatic and Danubian South Southeast European Space', the 'Mediterranean Arc' – the development of inter-regional and trans-boundary urban networks; and the support of pan-European high-speed transport infrastructure aimed at moving Europeans further and faster than heretofore across 'friction-free' European space (CEC 1999; Faludi and Waterhout 2002). Working through the principles of 'partnership' and 'subsidiarity', trans-national spatial planning, operating within an inter-governmentalist framework, is meant to usher in a Europe conceived as a purported 'multi-level polity', guided by a multiplicity of actors including the European Commission, national governments, urban and regional administrators, public/private partnerships, universities and elements of civil society (Hooghe and Marks 2001; Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999).

Within the context of these broader European-wide planning initiatives, the establishment of cross-border administrative *regions*, of substantive concern to the contributors to this volume, signals the emergence of a potentially new but contradictory policy domain. Composed of the territorial units of two or more contiguous European member states, cross-border regions – alternately labeled 'euregios', 'euregions' or 'euroregions' in Brussels-jargon – represent attempts to bring the current abstraction that is Europe, literally, down to 'earth', in so doing

materializing Jean Monnet's early dream of bringing Europe 'ever closer' to the future European citizen. Building on more than a decade of experimentation in economic and political decentralization at sub-national scales within individual member states, and benefiting over the last decade from an array of new cross-border funding mechanisms emanating from the European Commission (examples are INTERREG, PHARE and TACIS), cross-border regions have blossomed over the face of the continent. Often armed with their own juridical and administrative competencies, the locally institutionalized frameworks for cross-border region-building are charged with creating a coherent trans-boundary identity within their jurisdiction, and on this basis promote trans-boundary networking and flows of all kinds: economic, environmental and cultural. While some euregions, notably within the border areas lining The Netherlands, Germany and Belgium, can draw on decades of institutional experimentation in this respect, others are radically new inventions, at the moment literally mere circles drawn on maps, as is often the case for areas which have previously had no exposure to institutionalized trans-boundary networking of any kind, as in the borderlands of Central and Eastern Europe. Common among all euregional initiatives, however, is an attempt to re-inscribe border areas formerly considered marginal and peripheral to the territorial projects of nation-states to those of centrality and dynamism at the very heart of Europe. It is thus not fortuitous that the Commission itself refers to its trans-boundary regions as 'laboratories of European integration'.

Notwithstanding, or perhaps as a result of the burden of these expectations, a decade of less-than-hoped-for results flowing from institutional experimentation with Europe's cross-border regions has left open the question of how these emergent spaces are specifically to be *governed*. As what a 'first wave' of literature on trans-boundary regionalism has already clearly noted, European cross-border regions face multiple governance dilemmas. Widely acknowledged is the fact that, in many instances, euregions often have merely served as convenient administrative devices for local elites to tap into funding sources from Brussels (Scott 1999, 2000; Church and Reid 1999). Others observe that ties among economic actors do not occur 'naturally' within delimited European border communities, often bypassing them via much vaster relays at national and global levels (van Houtum 1998; Krätke 1999). Additional studies indicate generally diminished levels of public awareness about cross-border initiatives among euregional inhabitants (Strüver 2002), while revealing extremely low levels of cross-border mobility among Europeans generally (van der Velde 1999). Others still point to the ongoing difficulty of establishing effective trans-boundary institutions capable of providing effective democratic 'voice' to the inhabitants of the euregions *vis-à-vis* higher levels of decision-making power, notably member state governments and that of the Commission (Kramsch 2002).

We suggest that to grasp the practical and theoretical stakes arising from the perceived shortcomings of governance in Europe's euregions today requires defining the specificity of trans-boundary regions in the context of a broader and

older debate related to the significance of 'the regional question' under capitalism (Soja 1985). This discussion, regenerated largely in response to the economic crises confronting numerous cities and regions in the metropolitan capitalist core states of the early to mid-1980s, attempted to re-think the regional scale as the relevant site for policy and politics on the basis of a reinvigorated awareness of the spatio-temporal dynamics of the state under capitalism, including a philosophically attuned re-appropriation of 'the spatial' to understand the dynamic of regions – including thinking about regions – as part and parcel of the 'social production of space' (Gregory 1978; Massey 1984; Harvey 1985; Smith 1985; Hadjimichalis 1987). This literature can only be summarized here at our peril. Suffice it to say that, adopting a self-styled 'regional political economy' perspective, one of the signal contributions of such an approach was to grasp the contemporary re-emergence of regions – both as objects of post-war state-led *regionalization* policies and as the spaces for various forms of contestatory social movements, or *regionalisms* – against the backdrop of earlier periods of capitalist restructuring in which the 'regional question' first developed. Thus, the competitive-entrepreneurial capitalism of the mid- to late-nineteenth century was understood to produce a particular regional configuration marked by the heightened separation of city and countryside within the nationally enclosed economies of the advanced capitalist world; the intensification of spatial divisions of labor between a fast-rising bourgeoisie and impoverished proletariat within its large cities; and the subsequent production of uneven development at urban and regional scales, leading to the emergence of new cores and peripheries across the national landscape. The disorientation and anxieties produced by these developments in turn would generate a creative explosion of oppositional social movements, many steeped in the anti-statist politics of anarcho-syndicalism, whose goals centred on the recuperation of the regional scale as the relevant site for an emancipatory, class-based politics.

Contrary to Marxist–Leninist theories of state centralization, regionalists such as Elisee Reclus and Petr Kropotkin believed a first step towards establishing liberty was through the decentralization of the social economy, a dismantling of the central organs of the nation itself, and the institutionalization of regional federalisms governed by various forms of socio-economic 'mutualism.' For anarchists such as Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, regional units would become the largest building blocks of the social republic, providing all the necessary prerequisites for a rounded development of human, social, economic and cultural capacities in an environment free from centralized political and economic coercion (Weaver 1984). The resulting social order was to be spontaneously generated and maintained by enlightened individuals and the self-governing institutions they themselves create (Friedmann 1987). Significantly, capacity for political action was to be founded on three qualities: *consciousness* (of class relations), an *idea* (mutuality) and its *realization* (struggle for regional federation). 'Science' would play a large role in bringing this about, the systematic investigation of things complementing the role of government as the 'administration of things'. Such a heady mix was considered overly utopian by

the more 'level headed' socialists of the time, its idealism considered hopelessly naive to the 'real' workings of capital, the state and power.

The intention here is not to fully recapitulate the manner in which the debate on the 'regional question' succeeded in periodizing the subsequent conjunctures and crises of capitalism under monopoly-imperial and post-war managerial capitalism, the manner in which the 'regional question' was reconfigured anew under successive waves of crisis and restructuring, and the nature of the oppositional social movements spawned in their wake. Suffice it to say that, drawing on an earlier Marxist political economy tradition (notably Poulantzas), debates on the 'regional question' located the capital/labor dichotomy at the very foundation of theorizing the new regionalizing and regionalist tendencies under late-capitalism. In this view, from the exclusive matrix of capital/labor relations flowed all first- and second-order 'patternings' arising from contemporary forms of capitalist restructuring, including the newer variants of geographically uneven development and core-periphery relations visible in the post-Fordist agglomerations dotting the advanced industrial landscape (Scott 1988; Storper 1997; Storper and Salais 1997), the rise of New Regionalisms (Keating and Loughlin 1998; Keating 1997) and, more recently, the emergence of global-city-regions (Sassen 2001; Soja 2000). In theorizing the specificity of the regional, once again, as in prior periodizations of capitalism and capitalist restructuring, the regions 'in question', though obviously never fully subsumed under the dictates of capital, are nevertheless subtly and persistently tied to a logic which grants analytical priority to the state in its attempt to overcome the 'rigidities' of fixed stocks of capital – land, housing, infrastructure, people – by opening up new spaces for capital accumulation (commonly referred to as a 'socio-spatial fix'), this time under neo-liberal guise. In thus theorizing 'the regional' and its articulation with higher and lower scales, an implicit but powerful metaphor operative in this literature has been that of a spatially nested hierarchy, which in turn serves to position the region – as a Russian doll-house – within a set of discreetly bounded territorial units extending from the lived body to the macro-sphere of global relations and flows. Capital, it is assumed, can freely 'jump' these scales, while accompanying modes of social regulation cannot perform this feat so easily. We may quibble about degrees of state 'strategic selectivity' or conjecture on the role of culture and the imagination in shaping the parameters of these contemporary governance dynamics, but in the *longue duree* of the interplay of regionalization and regionalism, the territorial framework of politics – whether in the form of peasant rebellions, urban-based working-class movements or feminist revolts – has been pre-defined as a local (often domestic), or at the extreme a national affair. Paradoxically, then, the most forward-looking spatial theorists of the past 30 years treated borders as they did time and the temporal: as 'the dead, the fixed, the undialectical, the immobile' (Foucault, cited in Soja 1989: 10; on the 'paradoxical neglect' of borders by mainstream twentieth-century social science, see Anderson *et al.*, 2003).

For those who have followed this line of analysis into recent studies of trans-boundary regionalism, the 'fitful' institutionalization of European cross-border

regions is perceived as consistent with the tension-filled logic accompanying wider processes of globalization and neo-liberal state restructuring, an attempt to achieve fresh rounds of accumulation on the back of a capital-centreed 'spatio-temporal fix' not unlike that accorded regionalization logics operative within nation-states (Sparke 2000; Perkmann and Sum 2002; Jessop 2002). The problem of governance in European cross-border regions is thus framed primarily as a response to the partial weakening or 'hollowing out' of the political and economic regulative capacities of the post-war Keynesian welfare state, the distribution of these governance capacities upwards towards supra-national institutions and downwards to the sub-national arenas of cities and regions (Brenner 1999; Jessop 2000). By these accounts, the persistent role of central state policies in establishing the appropriate institutional parameters for cross-border regionalism is acknowledged to be explained primarily in terms of the exploitation of ongoing factor price differences and other locational disparities to be found in border regions. The proliferation of cross-border regions since the 1980s is thus regarded as a 'contingent effect' of globalization, regionalization and the end of the Cold War (Perkmann and Sum 2002: 17). The theoretical specificity of cross-border regions is thus linked to their status primarily as outcomes of higher order objectives of economic governance associated with broader shifts in postwar capitalism (Jessop 2002).

We harbor no fundamental disagreement with the descriptive thrust of this position as it relates to a core dynamic of contemporary trans-boundary regionalism in Europe, although we hold serious reservations as to the capacity of cross-border regions today to become new 'anchorage points of accumulation' within a more fully globalized and knowledge driven economic system. Indeed, and as some of the chapters to this volume make clear, generating positive cross-border regional economies of any sort has been one of the main aspects bedeviling cross-border regional development generally. Of greater concern to us, however, is a tendency within such a political economy perspective to significantly underplay key features of cross-border regions as *border regimes in-the-making*. By this we mean that the regional dimension of cross-border regions and the particular modes of governance that they call for cannot be grasped solely according to the symbiotic or tension-filled dynamic linking a sub-national territorial unit to the next highest and vertically 'nested' scale (i.e. the state, the EU), but must be understood in connection with the logics of wider EU-driven strategies, some impelled by economic motives and some not, regarding the production of a particular space internal to the EU, as well as the 'disposition' of those areas on its southern and eastern flanks that are soon to border onto non-Europe. Viewing cross-border regions as partaking in the logic of such European-wide 'arts of government' (Foucault 2000: 201) thus focuses attention not only on the somewhat banal observation that contemporary modes of governance now cut transversally across the nested spatial hierarchy (i.e., the Russian doll-house has 'burst'), but reveals how older functions traditionally attributed to borderland macro-regions – East-Central Europe, the Mediterranean – are currently being re-mobilized by the EU in the service of newly perceived geo-political and

economic threats. In this view, states undoubtedly continue to wield monopoly control over key functions – war, security, taxation – and while uneven development and core-periphery relations, though widened to a European scale, remain an 'essential feature' of capitalism, the notion of border regime now confers a distinct ontological status to European cross-border regions which cannot be reduced solely to the logics of capital- and state-centric restructurings. As a result – and in a move that problematizes Reclusian and Kropotkian nineteenth-century 'Phalansterian' visions of an enclosed locale – border regions enjoy a partial autonomy from the 'local' which displaces them from prior capital-restructured crystallizations of the state-guided regionalization/regionalism dialectic. Border regions thus offer, at least potentially, always latently, ever provisionally, a space for territorial politics beyond any one single nation, indeed beyond all nations. As to defining the scale and scope of such a politics, recuperating the 'archaic' qualities of borders serves as a corrective to what we consider to be overly 'presentist' and a-historical accounts of globalization and regionalization, recalling that current rounds of capital restructuring can mobilize only a finite repertoire of territorial logics and counter-logics, many of which have roots in pre-capitalist social relations. Border regions thus gesture towards a cautious return of time and the temporal, yet one (we hope) that is far removed from the totalizing historicisms of the last century. We suggest that it is on the canvas of this complex and contradictory European space-time that the topic of governance may now be framed concurrently as a *cross-border regional question*.

In terms of the chapters that follow, we suggest three distinctive border regimes are at work in Europe today: the absent (non-)border, the march and the postcolonial *limes* (this typology is adapted from Walters forthcoming). In characterizing these border regimes as such, we do not want to suggest that they exist in any 'pure' form, nor that they exhaust the logics of individual case studies provided under their rubric. Rather, they are to be viewed as *tendencies* in contemporary European 'arts of rule', only partially capturing modes of governance which in fact may often overlap, producing unpredictable and hybrid formations. As they provide over-arching contexts at once enabling and constraining a range of issues confronting euregions – from the establishment of viable forms of democratic rule, 'radical' place-making, and novel re-articulations of territory and power – they point to variations in forms of cross-border governmentality at work in Europe, highlighting their intersection with discrepant and often conflicting geo-political and geo-economic pressures, desires, and anxieties. In presenting them schematically below, we thus wish to avoid the appearance of 'unmasking' a given set of power relations in order to better reveal an underlying 'truth' about European cross-border governance (in this respect, James Sidaway, this volume, usefully reminds us that the EU 'has no essence'!).

The absent (non-)border

As hinted at in its very title, the ambiguous nature of this border regime derives from a double 'absence', made manifest by the removal of formal border controls

and outposts at physical points of crossing between European member states – consider the image of border guard huts now being re-tooled into gas stations, espresso bars or overgrown 'empty space'. This physical transformation of the border is fully consonant with Europe's attempt to create a more fluid, 'frictionless' and networked space economy, one in which identities rooted in regionally and nationally defined *ethnicities* are replaced by functional inter-relationships and flows of goods, services, capital and ultimately, people. The logic of such a regime is shadowed, however, by a more profound and potentially troubling trend, one which can best be summarized by pointing to a palpable and oft-recorded 'indifference' shown by locals towards their neighbors located on the other side of the former political dividing line. True, the inhabitants of cross-border regions continue to visit, shop and conduct routine, practical errands in their respective neighboring nation-states, but this 'pedestrian' activity somehow does not quite match the momentous historical expectations implied by the Treaty of Rome's early call 'to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe'. Something, then, is obviously afoot in the *euregios* conjoining European member states: the achievement of removing physical borders, those very theaters of tragic confrontation between nation-states bedeviling much of the twentieth century, is met with a kind of thundering silence. As pertains notably with regard to their residential *habitus*, Europeans stay 'put', the border having no visible effect on their lived spaces. It would be a simplification, however, to view this double absence merely in terms of 'failed historical expectations', or within the frame of a neo-liberal integration project passively 'resisted' at the cross-border regional scale. Such absences, and the governance dilemmas they bring in their wake, are actively *produced*.

In her contribution, **Anke Strüver** explores the innovative nature of cross-border governance through the lens of one of the oldest experiments in cross-border institution-building in Europe, the Euregio Rijn-Waal, which connects delimited sections of the Dutch/German border encompassing the cities of Nijmegen (The Netherlands) and Kleve-Emmerich (Germany). Focusing on EU documents, survey work and the narratives of those working or living across the border, she examines a 'double-mismatch' lying at the heart of Rijn-Waal's system of governance, one which increasingly confronts the European Union's functionalist and technocratic rhetoric of 'borderlessness' with the 'structural' reality of 'passive ignorance' towards the border informing the vast majority of the euregion's inhabitants. Drawing on Michel de Certeau's concept of 'practice' to develop her own notion of the 'borderland everyday', Strüver takes pains to emphasize that the strategies of Dutch and German borderlanders, while conceivably linked to tactics of 'ruse', are not necessarily tied to the logics of 'resistant places'. She thus concurs with de Certeau that the borderland everyday, while tactical in character, is 'far from being a local revolt'. In theorizing the preconditions for effective cross-border governance in Rijn-Waal, Strüver argues that, rather than an idea of a cohesive trans-boundary identity, what is needed is an understanding of borders as 'marking and negotiating prejudices and social difference'. In so doing, Strüver implies that in approaching older experiments of

trans-boundary institution-building such as those in Rijn-Waal, it is prudent to compare and contrast current EU-led technocratic and top-down approaches to governance with more informal and grassroots efforts which often precede the former by decades, and far more successfully at that.

In their intervention, **Martin van der Velde** and **Henk van Houtum** alert us to the 'non-existence of a borderless and integrated labor market' spanning the Dutch/German border. Contrasting assumptions underlying the European Union's view of the future Euro-citizen – a fully rational, perfectly informed 'homo economicus' traveling along an isotropic plane of his own making – with the 'socially produced and daily-lived demarcations' separating people on either side of the border, the authors affirm that the European worker, stubbornly recalcitrant to expectation, is 'not particularly nomadic'. This is reflected in the fact that only 2–3 per cent of Europeans choose to live in another country. Critically revisiting neo-classical economic frameworks, and drawing on Bourdieu's alternative concept of '*habitus*', van Houtum and van der Velde call for a necessary and overdue engagement with the 'inherent value attached to immobility' in the explanation of cross-border labor market mobility within the EU. Towards this end, they coin the useful neologism 'thresholds of indifference' to define the socially embedded rationality proscribing movement across European state borders. According to the logics of this rationality, the social construction of nationhood remains a 'vivid and real representation', spatial belonging being ineluctably conditioned by the 'structuring power of the national *habitus*'. Echoing Strüver's findings, the authors argue that indifference – in the form of 'absence, emptiness' – produces its own vital 'difference in space', but one harboring a 'conservative power'. In terms of crafting effective and forward-looking governance mechanisms for Europe's cross-border labor markets, they conclude on the need for 'opening up national confinements', on the basis of a revised national politics.

Focusing on the 'ordinary' administrative activities linking the French and Catalan sides of the border, **Jouni Häkli** examines the *Euroregio Catalunya Languedoc-Rousillon i Midi-Pyrenees*, a high-level governmental network responsible for channeling INTERREG monies into the Franco-Catalan borderlands. Contrasted to the problems of elitism and democratic-deficit stalking the Euroregio, Häkli evaluates more favorably the workings of *Comunitat de Treball dels Pirineus*, a unique experiment in trans-Pyrenean regionalism whose working group acts as a 'cultural bridge' between disparate mountain communities, offering a space for low-level university and inter-municipal networking. Drawing on Lefebvre, Häkli suggests that whereas the Euroregio produces a 'flattened out' spatial representation of the Pyrenees as a functional border of media and communication networks, the *Comunitat* works to reveal the unifying function of the Pyrenees. In so doing, the *Comunitat* produces 'imaginary geographies' that serve to project Catalonia beyond Spain into a wider European sphere. From such a perspective, the Pyrenees are conceived as both a potential physical barrier and cultural link, the latter deriving their sustenance from the early modern history of the mountains as sites for lively exchange and various forms of

transhumance. Trans-Pyrenean collaboration is thus intimately tied to the ability to govern the 'uniting and dividing' function of the mountains, two opposite 'realities' simultaneously present in any attempt to organize trans-boundary networks. Fieldwork interviews reveal, however, the limits of conceiving the Pyrenees as a unified entity, as the social and cultural 'inertia' of modern state-centric identities continues to exert its overwhelming influence on the everyday connection of borderlanders' relationship with territory. In its discursive setting, cross-border governance for Häkli is not only perceived as a set of practices played out upon a previously delineated regional setting, but is also constitutive of 'the regional' in its own right as a field of action and knowledge. Such a formulation preserves a space for individual and collective agency in constructing a 'politics of the bridge' across the scale of the Franco-Catalan Pyrenees which may one day overcome its currently elitist and technocratic nature.

Governing the 'networked border' suggests a border regime in which governing is practiced (theorized, activated) as multi-scalar and multi-leveled with nodes of control operating together in degrees of overlap and interaction rather than a single centre of control. **Odile Heddebaut's** analysis of the EUROREGION, a five-region, three-state governmental entity created in 1991, provides fascinating insights into the mind-boggling, everyday complexity that the willed multiplication of governing presents. If one reads the words of its founders, the formation of the EUROREGION (the joining together of three Belgian regions – Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels Capital; the county of Kent in England; and the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region in France has not been driven explicitly by neo-liberal concepts of a borderless world. However, in the efforts of the five presidents who initially decided to constitute the EUROREGION for purposes of giving their region a greater voice and advancing their economies as a united front, one can in fact read the traces of the EU's particular neo-liberal agenda in which the following two assumptions are present: a 'free' market is more lucrative than one hindered by the impediments and frictions of borders; and that governance – a multi-scalar government that is local, national, and supranational, integrated and self-determined, united and individual, is an improvement upon the singular centralized controls of the diverse European states. The contradictions inherent in this EU vision – the addition of more nodes of government to counter the effects of centralized government – or, 'more' government as a counter to 'too much' government – become exceedingly clear in Heddebaut's case study of the EUROREGION. What is perhaps most revealing about her work, however, is not only the inherent, perhaps heroic 'banality' of governance – the endless conferences and meetings, the successive creation of 'better' practices and plans, the endless generation of reports and analyses, memos, talk – but the continuous and continuously daunting, almost impossible, task of negotiating within and between existing administrative borders (regional, national, supranational, urban, county, community, and so forth) in order that the alternative governmental entity, the cross-border region, now-created, will persist. Heddebaut's contribution makes clear that borders are complexly negotiated and that those who would valorize the region as a site in

which the 'artificiality' of imposed national and international borders is overcome, are lost in 'old' regional ideals (see Virtanen, this volume) of 'natural' historical and cultural affinities. The Schengen *acquis*, which removes national border controls along the adjacent frontiers of member states, apparently producing the entirety of the EU as a 'borderless' cross-border region, does not at the same time delegitimize the plethora of existing sub-national borders. These borders remain complicating the creation of cross-border governance entities such as the EUROREGION. While the EUROREGION's inhabitants appear to have increased their tourist and shopping excursions across each others' borders since the EUROREGION's invention in 1991, it remains to be seen whether, as Heddebaut suggests, the EUROREGION will remain only a mechanism for capturing EU funds whose application consists of the continued making and remaking of plans, or if these plans, conceived as actions that will benefit the regions' inhabitants, will in the future materialize. While there is no guarantee that 'local' or 'regional' government is more just than 'national' or 'supra-national' government, the possibility that the habit of cooperation that Heddebaut suggests may be the legacy of the EUROREGION, is a possibility whose direction can be swerved for the better.

In an attempt to specify emergent territorial processes of 're-bordering' at work in the governance of cross-border regions in Europe today, **Enza Lissandrello** trains our attention onto the slopes of the Mont Blanc mountain, the site of a nominally tri-national institutional entity in-the-making spanning the national borders of France, Italy and Switzerland: *Espace Mont-Blanc*. Established on the basis of long-standing environmental concerns regarding the future of the mountain as a European heritage site, Lissandrello traces the development of coalescing interest groups' struggles over the appropriate representation of the *Espace* (or, EMB) as a site for cross-border solidarity and action. The matter of cross-border institution-building for EMB took on particularly urgency in the late-1990s following a tunnel accident involving lorries in which many lives were lost. This event has prompted heated and ongoing debates at local, regional national and EU levels over the proper use of the mountain, notably pitting environmental NGOs against members of the business community who hold an economic development stake in the Mont Blanc as a site of passage for lorry traffic. Lissandrello explores the political stakes involved in this contestation by focusing on the varied 'meanings' ascribed to the Mont Blanc mountain, as well as the corresponding forms of identification, institutionalization and accountability required of them. Her hypothesis is that interactions and cultural networks can 'converge' in and around a cross-border territory overlapping national boundaries, but must first achieve a threshold of recognition among relevant actors in an internally constituted (local) and externally derived (global) 'project'. These twin processes are creatively explored by Lissandrello by way of a semiotically inflected account of Internet use on the part of a representative sampling of parties involved in negotiating the future of the Mont Blanc. By analyzing the corresponding 'nettiquettes' of interest groups harboring divergent agendas *vis-à-vis* use of the Mon Blanc, and centring her analysis on discussions

over the creation of an international park project, she reveals an arena marked by a plurality of clashing subjects and policy approaches. Despite the inclusive register implicit in its name and its blossoming presence in cyber-space, Lissandrello concludes that the EMB suffers from a low level of institutionalization which cannot yet find a way to effectively mobilize local support against economic imperatives framed from national and EU capitals. Nevertheless, she remains hopeful that in capitalizing on its somewhat peripheral role to national programming agendas, and in accentuating its own role as a 'soft' project kept apart from the 'hard' decisions of state, the *espace* of the Mont Blanc can be best defined in terms of a utopian 'territorial not yet', as it continues to mobilize interests while developing imaginary 'future' cross-border scenarios. By examining current mapping strategies of EMB on the Internet, Lissandrello demonstrates convincingly how the purportedly 'absent' public sphere of the Internet has the capacity to inject elements of the future into a cartographically rendered and spatialized present, with real world effects.

The march

The term 'march', similar to the corresponding German word *Mark* ('border sign'), from which it derives its name, designated a premodern institution on the borders of a state or a feudal duchy. While the political use of this type of fief is generally dated to the Carolingian empire, the institution became extended under Charlemagne, who established marches by setting up military garrisons and walled strongholds throughout his kingdom. Entrusted to loyal vassals who would guarantee armed defense of the border while providing unconditional support for his policies of eastward expansion (*Drang nach Osten*), their primary function would be to serve as a buffer or inter-zone between the king's territories and *terrae incognitae*. In this context, the march is akin to an *espace-entre*, a neutral 'no man's land' between sovereign powers. While the march can be encountered in a diversity of settings, we can see from its history that it has a very long-standing connection with Central and Eastern Europe. We propose that in the current conjuncture the term may be usefully recuperated for this swathe of territory extending from the Baltic Sea to parts of the Adriatic, an area which may be witnessing the birth of a new in-between Europe (complementing an older imaginary: *Mitteleuropa*). The re-emergence of a space between powers in this part of Europe builds on the legacy of the Cold War bipolarity, but is augmented by newly perceived security threats emanating from countries lying beyond the future external EU border. It thus is no longer advancing armies that the EU fears from its eastern flanks but infiltration by trans-border criminal networks and illegal migrant flows. Within the logic of this border regime, the Accession States of Central and Eastern Europe are positioned as newly minted buffer-areas, offering a first line of defense between 'Old Europe' and areas perceived as falling 'off map' or in advanced stages of disintegration. It is here in Europe's new marchlands where efforts to establish cross-border institutional initiatives – from the creation of large-scale trans-boundary networks to 'humble'

euregions – clash most acutely with the exclusionary logics of Schengen. Here too, particularly in the space of Europe's northern 'near abroad', wider geo-political security agendas demand the re-affirmation of decidedly Westphalian sovereignty claims, notably with Russia.

The contributions of **Ann Kennard** and **Petri Virtanen** make clear the continuing relevance in contemporary Eastern and Central Europe of the premodern idea of the 'march' – particularly in its meaning of a buffer-zone insulating Europe Proper, defined as those territories, identities, economies, cultures, and polities inside the present borders of the European Union – from the 'chaotic' post-Cold War, post-communist ruins of the Soviet Empire to the East: i.e., threats to 'internal security' that are sourced in ungoverned cross-border flows of goods (drugs, weapons, various commodities), capital (money laundering, etc.), and individuals (human trafficking, illegal immigration). The EU's intended lesson for the CEEC accession countries, as both Virtanen's and Kennard's papers indicate, is that if these 'improper' nation-states obey the rules set out by the 'WEC' they too will become 'proper' and as such privileged 'members' of the EU's well-policed polity. What this achieved propriety has the potential to activate, however, is a new 'iron curtain', a steely Schengen border whose effects will be to increase, rather than decrease, regional, cross-border disparities. In this the EU speaks with a 'forked tongue'. It presents the Schengen regime and the Committee of the Regions – the latter under whose auspices cross-border regions are developed – as initiatives designed to overcome 'bad' national borders that inhibit integration and cohesion. These include the development of such cross-border ventures as tourism, university programs, and fairs to encourage regional trade. However, as Kennard and Virtanen emphasize, the cooperative work undertaken by such governance regimes as the Euroregio Karelia (Finland, Russia), Euroregion Pomerania (Germany, Poland, Sweden), Carpathian Euroregion (Poland, Ukraine, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania), the Baltic Euroregion, the Nieman Euroregion (Poland, Belarus, Lithuania, part of Kaliningrad), and the Bug Euroregion (Poland, Ukraine, Belarus), may not be enough to contravene the bad effects of the, from the EU perspective, 'good', external borders that Schengen instantiates. If the purpose of the cross-border regions in Central and Eastern Europe is to encourage cooperative efforts to increase political and economic well-being across Europe, then the EU must come to terms with the *exclusive* cross-border qualities of this well-being – or declare openly its willingness to abandon concern for those who lie outside its 'proper' borders. An important, 'post-colonial' point made by Kennard is that the intensified policing of the EU's Eastern borders-to-be is directed toward the prevention of the illegal border-crossings by non-European individuals who might penetrate 'proper' Europe through the inefficient and corrupt border regimes of the East – i.e., the many Chinese, Afghans, Somalis, and Iraqis, for instance, who travel first to Serbia or Ukraine, and then through various accession states to Western Europe. As Kennard suggests, given the impossibility of policing the multiplicity of borders in CEE, many of which are 'wild' and 'remote', the idea of a systematic control of frontiers is 'mythical'.

A further valuable contribution of the Kennard and Virtanen chapters is their insistence upon the historical as well as the geographical complexity of the cross-border regions and the continued influence of 'border-memories' which are not necessarily the same for the successive waves of occupants living in the regions. These memories, as varying interpretations of the regions' rightful proprietors, remain as operative forces influencing cross-border cooperation and the construction of the identities (friends, enemies) and interactions that either favor or hinder it. Virtanen and Kennard demonstrate both the unquestionable 'unnaturalness' of borders – i.e. their historical and cultural construction – and the persistence of their felt importance by the inhabitants of the cross-border regions as something people 'naturally' live: as 'cultural richness' or 'community of fate' (Kennard); or, in the more archaic language of the past, as *Lebensraum*, *Heimat*, or *Volk* (Virtanen). For Virtanen and Kennard the possibility of using cross-border regions as sites or tools to regenerate peripheral regions and thus to decrease economic disparities between Europe's new 'variable geometry' of 'easts' and 'wests', includes the negotiation of the perennially difficult problem of whether a common identity is a necessary condition of acting in common. Kennard and Virtanen each point to the possibility that the 'primordial' linkage of identity and territory, whether inside or across particular borders, may not be the most important 'buffer' in the negotiation of conflicting interests. The march in this case might be reconceived as a governance site in which the logic of the buffer, as a zone separating and protecting pure identities, is perverted into a logic of commingling.

James Wesley Scott provides a succinct overview of attempts by Nordic and Baltic states to create a 'Northern Dimension' to EU policy-making against the wider backdrop of European enlargement. Conceived as a 'vision' for regional stability and peaceful co-development with Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union, Scott underscores the multi-scalar 'dimensionality' of the Northern Dimension's regionalization initiatives. Whereas an older form of Baltic Sea regionalism engaged exclusively with sovereign nation-states, the 'new regionalism' represented by the Northern Dimension, while recognizing the ongoing relevance of states, emphasizes the increased political significance of sub-national and non-state actors; where issues of security dominated previous cross-border agendas, they are now complemented by environmental, economic and social issues articulated at local and regional scales. Within this transformed geo-political context, the Northern Dimension must be understood as an expression of the increasing 'hybridity' of governance modes emphasizing functional international cooperation, including the strengthening of democratic civil society. As it does not involve the creation of formal institutions, geo-political dimensionality is captured as a complex political strategy reflecting 'geographical and cultural differentiation within the EU' while introducing greater geo-political 'sensitivity' with regard to Europe's eastern neighbors. Paradoxically, as a condition of its founding, the Northern Dimension has been deprived of resources so as not to elicit opposition from Southern European member states nor incur Russian resistance to post-Westphalian notions of geo-political

discourse. The degrees of freedom available in the 'selective scalings of 'we' and 'them' categories' at work in post-Cold War Baltic Sea space would therefore seem to remain strongly conditioned by the palpable 'presence' of Europe's South as well as its Eastern 'near-abroad'.

Noralv Veggeland explores the substantive preconditions for the establishment of effective democracy in Europe's cross-border euregions. In so doing, he usefully reminds us that throughout the modern period democratic participation has traditionally been tied to a nationally defined 'demos' by way of 'complex social engineering functions' which specifically tied a 'people' to the 'ethnos' of a culturally and linguistically homogeneous population. Drawing on the works of Stein Rokkan and Albert O. Hirschmann relating to the period of early modern state formation, Veggeland reflects on the perils and possibilities of activating their more dynamic elements – 'boundary-building', 'government performance' and 'internal restructuring' – to the construction of cross-border regions. According to Veggeland, the particular exit, loyalty and voice options flowing from current boundary-building practices in the construction of trans-national regional partnerships may offer new avenues for democratic expression on a post-national basis. In such a context, the classical 'pooling of sovereignty' gains legitimacy not through state governments but through the legality of policies established via contractual agreements. The provision of voice channels via such agreement-based partnerships generates *per se* a democratic deficit problem, however, as the legitimacy of national governments is replaced by technocratic institutional means. To counter this trend, and relying on a Habermasian notion of 'deliberative democracy', Veggeland argues that cross-border partnerships should acquire their legitimacy from a constitutional order where 'equal rights, responsibility and tolerance are the overarching universal principles'. In Sweden, Finland and Norway, where a transitional period is witnessing the replacement of government-based regions with strategic cross-border public–private partnerships and decentralized state development agencies, a resultant rise in the contractualisation of cross-border programs grounded in technocratic sectoral interests and geared primarily to market competitiveness has brought the issue of democratic deficit as a contested political issue to the fore in all three countries. This is illustrated by efforts to provide cross-border democratic institutions for the Skåne area linking Sweden and Norway via the newly created Oresund bridge.

Postcolonial limes

Rome, in its imperial domains, pioneered the art of the *limes*. Whereas the march occupies the space between sovereign powers, the limes is more akin to an edge, fringe or outer limit. It takes its form between a power and its outside, between Empire and the vandal hordes, the virtuous space of the polis and barbarism, and distinguishes those who can and cannot be sacrificed. While the limes may exist as a site of low-grade conflict, its primary role is to create around Empire a zone of stability and peace. This is to be achieved through the institutionalization of political, economic and cultural asymmetries which together form the basis of

an 'order'. The limes is inherently conservative, in the sense that it is first and foremost a means to protect what has already been domesticated inside, while banishing violence, turbulence and instability outside. As Europe expands eastward and develops new partnership arrangements with countries lining the southern shores of the Mediterranean, its norms and forms of engagement with these zones raise the specter of older colonial endeavors. This has been observed notably in the case of eastward enlargement, where stringent EU accession criteria are perceived in terms of postcolonial forms of governmentality imposed on nations all too eager to join the security mantle of West European member states. In this instance, as exemplified by the creation of euregions in East-Central Europe, West Europe has the monopoly on 'best practices'. The relationship of the EU with its eastern and southern neighbors is certainly not occurring in the spirit of a nineteenth-century *mission civilizatrice*.[3] But it may not be unreasonable to claim that as a central repository of power the EU relates to its postcolonial limes on the basis of a calculated strategy of paternal guidance whose primary goal is the articulation of its 'near abroad' into seemingly neutral, technical and universal norms of supranational regulation. Significantly, the ghosts of postcolonial governmentality also appear to be 'haunting' Europe's internal borderlands, interpolating the myriad discourses involved in the negotiation of trans-frontier projects in ways whose effects have only recently begun to be absorbed. In so doing, they remind us of the 'strategic amnesia' that was required at the European Union's territorial founding, established on the basis of forgetting its organic links to colonial *outre-mer*.[4] As the cunning of historical reason would have it, current EU attempts to forge wider spaces of trans-European networking have opened a Pandora's box of bottled-up colonial nostalgia, with deep consequences for its postcolonial borderland present.

Taking us to what may arguably be the longest and poorest borderland of Europe that separates Spain and Portugal, **James Derrick Sidaway** explores the consequences of this postcolonial nostalgia by way of the shifting discursive field within which European governance is 're-envisaged and performed', focusing on the ways trans-frontier cooperation along a particularly fraught section of the border 'is seen to take place'. Drawing upon Foucauldian notions of *governmentality* – which usefully reminds us of an early modern role of nation-state governance as the management of individual and collective *mentalités* – Sidaway examines the complex and multi-layered discursive sphere surrounding an EU INTERREG-funded plan to build what in all appearances is a simple bridge across the Guadiana River separating Spain and Portugal. The seemingly transparent efforts of the EU towards enhanced cross-border networking and improved regional development collide, however, with an enduring Portuguese irredentist movement claiming the municipality located on the Spanish side of the border. Informed by the contradictory legacy of right-wing colonial and fascist sympathies as well as progressive anti-imperialist traditions, members of the irredentist group are united by constructions of Portuguese national identity rooted in the faded glory of maritime primacy over Spain. As long as the bridge lay in ruins, the irredentists could 'play' with the ambiguous nature of this cross-

border space to keep afresh their memories of colonial majesty. Paradoxically, EU attempts to transcend the border by bridge-building would only serve to permanently affirm Spain's jurisdiction over the municipality, thus directly threatening that sense of Portuguese nationhood carefully crafted within the space of this ambiguity. In this context, despite support for the bridge by European and local inhabitants, 'the national-sovereign imaginary' took precedence over a 'visualization of European integration and attendant projects of cross-border or trans-national European regions and spaces'. In grasping these dynamics as contestatory forms of trans-boundary rule, rather than examining the validity of particular discourses Sidaway is keen on investigating the consequences and assumptions flowing from positions leading to new 'spatialities of power' within the EU. Crucially, it would appear that if a European trans-boundary demos is to emerge in this context, it would have to grapple with the unresolved national imaginary of previous colonial empire.

In his contribution to the volume **Olivier Kramsch** wages an explicit and frontal assault on the governance logic of the nation-state and its imperialist, postcolonial legacy: a logic of asymmetry that has been formulated as what occurs between a singular sovereign power, the state, and its constructed outside. Locating his analysis in the broader context of governance literature which emphasizes a theoretical shift away from a fixation on national scales and a move toward the idea of multi-level or networked forms of governance in which cities and regions acquire new significance, Kramsch opens the possibilities of seeing at the 'Mediterranean scale': a scale that sees past and through conventional North–South dichotomies based in ideals of a developed, prosperous 'North' and an underdeveloped 'South' that is lagging behind. This particular way of seeing, Kramsch emphasizes, is part of a (post)colonial inheritance in which, throughout the period of empire, European nation-states viewed themselves as instances of advanced civilization and thus as 'natural' rulers over the 'primitive' or 'barbarian' territories and populations they conquered and colonized. This 'worldview' – *un monde et son contraire* – did not end with formal decolonization, but has continued to influence the production of colonizer-victim scenarios in which those formerly colonized are still constructed as less developed, less advanced, still in need of 'aid'; whose development is viewed as being in response to Europe, and whose own views are regularly marginalized in analyses of *their* conditions and needs.

This state-centred view has encouraged not only North–South polarization but socio-spatial polarization within contemporary Mediterranean societies, a 'state-driven macro-cephalization' which reinforces existing centre-periphery, coast-interior patterns of development, influences a state-oriented distribution of international aid funding, and exacerbates territorial locations of opposed identities – i.e. of interiors constructed as the loci of traditional, 'national' identities, and the urban coasts as the loci of modernized, westernized (more) colonized identities. Kramsch promotes an alternative view, one that builds from a prior non-Eurocentric model of sixteenth-century 'cosmopolitan' Tunisia and then links this precolonial past with the postcolonial present. An important part of this re-visioning is a re-telling of the history of Europe's policy shifts towards its

former colonies on the southern Mediterranean rim, beginning with the 1957 Treaty of Rome. Throughout this governance history, the Mediterranean is seen as an extension of European integration, becoming the application site of a mode of governing named 'global cooperation' but whose particular policies were intended to support the development of Europe and the European Union at the expense of its non-European, Turkish and North African, 'partners'. Kramsch's 'productive de-centring' of this Eurocentric view re-imagines the gradual coalescence of a trans-national twenty-first century *mundus* whose dynamics jump scales, 'interacting with the wider world' to produce 'a novel circum-Mediterranean space' in which diasporic Mediterranean populations existing in the 'heart' of Europe will be included. Animated by a logic that de-links the idea of governance – of polities and politics – from national territories, Kramsch advocates analysis and policy that do not seek to overcome internal societal borders but asks which way the Mediterranean's urban borders can be redrawn to allow for maximum political and economic betterment. Seeing at 'a Mediterranean scale' thus provides a different way to see the borders of Europe, opening the way toward a re-thinking of the Mediterranean not as a buffer-zone, a march, but as an object of struggle which does not reproduce inherited state-centric, colonial logics.

Barbara Hooper embeds contemporary bordering processes in Europe within a more global context that produces distinctions between 'citizens' and 'not-citizens'. In terms of governance, the dynamic of inclusion and exclusion generated by this process occurs by way of the 'administration of difference', a mode of regulation which seeks to suppress categories of non-citizens from the European polity-to-be. This takes a dual-pronged strategy, the first based on the practice of 'citizenship as alterity', the articulation by dominant groups of their identity as citizens and their simultaneous constitution of strangers, outsiders and aliens. The second tactic, drawing upon the European colonial inheritance, is defined by a 'regime of differentiation' between Europeans-as-citizens and Africans-as-subjects. Hooper argues that these two 'border regimes' have been reunited in Europe today in the practice of security governance, a networked form of border control directed at the negotiation of the contradictory tendencies between the EU's long-stated goal of freedom of movement for its citizens and the desire to control the potentially dangerous movement of its non-citizens. Here, government in its various forms is defined as 'borderwork', and the relation between governing and bordering is to be found in the political meaning of the border as an event that 'takes place' but is never 'in place'. In lieu of the strategic fixation of the European Union on the 'local' as an exclusive site for politics, identity and meaning in the context of globalization, Hooper proposes a conceptual frame which apprehends all acts of bordering in terms of an ontologically divergent and ultimately ungovernable remainder that cannot be sequestered and will always escape the rationality of state-centric bounding strategies. This is the space of a fecund 'divergent emergent', both virtual and real, which has yet to be fully actualized in an open-ended multiplicity that cannot be tied to a linear, modernist *telos*. Hooper applies this ontological lens by

illuminating the ways in which Europe's colonial past continues to fester in its postcolonial present. In so doing, she lays bare the logic of Europe's 'inward' turn to its regions and localities in the context of its 'unfinished business' with empire, revealing how Europe's current bordering regimes of identity and difference define anew what properly belongs to Europe and what can be abandoned or discarded, differentiating those who can and cannot have the 'right to be'. Thus pointing to the 'haunted' effects of Europe's colonial past, Hooper gestures at the possibility of recuperating the ghosts of European empire – embodied by today's illegal migrants, asylum seekers and aliens of all kinds – in the service of a 'return' that promises a much more inclusive and expansive politics. In so doing, she recuperates a 'utopics' of borders (and, implicitly, border regions) which may serve to activate their 'in-built wildness'.

The contributors to this volume, working from within their own globally articulated locales, grappling with concepts derived from discrepant national intellectual and policy traditions, and working across the chasms of multiple language divides, enact in their writing the dynamic cross-border spacings and re-borderings we would like to see as a sign for Europe's future. To be sure, in illuminating the complexities required of cross-border governance in Europe today they leave more questions than answers in their wake. Is cross-border governance leading to more economically and politically just outcomes for Europe's inhabitants? Is it providing citizens with greater degrees of democratic empowerment than that provided thus far at regional or national levels? Is the cross-border regional scale the most appropriate for generating alternative modes of regulation to that of currently hegemonic neo-liberal regimes or geo-political power blocs? From the case studies analyzed in this volume, the jury would still appear to be out on most of these issues: the euregions are still in the process of *becoming*. But through their blend of theoretical insight and ethnographic circumspection, the chapters do reveal a very different Europe than that envisioned either through the warped and resentful mirror of Robert Kagan (2003) or the more hyperbolic euphorias of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000). Europe is no 'postmodern paradise'. Neither is there a 'multitude' immanent on Europe's euregional horizon, at least not within its 'boring' everyday contact zones. Viewed through the lens of its cross-border regions, Europe is much more interesting as a result, surprising preconceived formulations at every step. The liberty which lies latent in Europe's *euregios*, as Proudhon might well appreciate, requires 'consciousness', an 'idea' and its *contested* 'realization'. The readers of this volume are invited to join in re-infusing these categories with meaning for our day.

Notes

1 A native of Nijmegen. Both editors, originally from California, now make Nijmegen their home. Although they don't quite consider themselves having achieved the distinction of becoming *Nijmegenaars*, their current residence explains the starting *place* of the introduction to this volume.

2 Participant in the *Vierdaagse*.
3 The perspective from the Balkans, however, suggests that there is a view other than that proposed by the EU. See in this regard Bjelic and Savic 2003.
4 For a similar kind of forgetting *vis-à-vis* Eastern and Western Europe see Deak *et al.* 2000.

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Part I

Governing the absent (non-)border

1 ‘We are only allowed to re-act, not to act’

Eurocrats’ strategies and borderlanders’ tactics in a Dutch–German cross-border region

Anke Strüver

In summer 2001, I joined a group of sportswomen who go running in the woods around Nijmegen, a Dutch university town close to the German border. We always talk to each other while running, mostly about everyday-issues, but sometimes also about our work. One day in spring 2002 I remember very clearly – less for the reason that it was nice sunny weather, promising summer soon to come, but because it was my turn to ‘discuss’ parts of my current research on the Dutch–German border. I started explaining that there is less cross-border interaction than is expected by the European Union and that I have got the impression that our local euregio-office is not really interested in the region and its inhabitants, nor that these people are concerned about the euregio. At this point, my running partners became somewhat curious about this thing called euregio – of which they had never heard about before. I had to realize that none of them knew what an euregio is, nor was anyone aware that we live (and run) in one. This struck me particularly since we cross the border while running quite often – although we do not make an issue of it (Reichswald, Mookerheide), but also because we plan the races we will participate in by consulting the regional ‘loopgids’ (running companion). This kind of annual running calendar defines our region as a cross-border one, advertises events from both the Dutch and the German side and moreover, it is sponsored by the Euregio Rhine-Waal.

The process of European unification is very much linked to the creation of cross-border regions. In fact, cross-border regions are very popular in the EU – and serve as prototypes for both the idea of a ‘Europe of regions’ and the objective of a ‘Europe without frontiers’. Peripheral borderland areas are supposed to become core regions through lively interactions across borders. But so far, cross-border regionalization seems to be largely a bureaucratic matter, rather than a vivid process.

Against this background of increasing Europeanization and promotion of cross-border regions, this chapter focuses on the special role of this region as new spaces for cross-border governance on the one hand and in terms of local people’s spatial reference for their everyday life on the other. Bringing together ‘bits and pieces’ from a Dutch–German euregio, it concentrates on discrepancies between official objectives and results. For, despite dismantling of formal-institutional

barriers against cross-border interaction and increasing activities, borderless spheres are not reached yet. At the Dutch–German border, cross-border cooperation has the longest tradition within post-war Europe and a more recent and intensified institutionalization. However, the extent and intensity of current 'practised' cross-border interaction has not yet been remarkable. It is a cross-border regionalization from above, not one in which the local borderlanders are part of.

In what follows, different 'politics' are confronted with each other: formal, large-scale policy approaches of the European Commission, related, but smaller scaled euregional ones and local people's informal popular 'politics', i.e. their everyday life. It will be argued that there is not much of communication and exchange between policy-'makers' and 'receivers' when it comes to European cross-border cooperation. Employing the Dutch–German *Euregio Rhine-Waal* as example, the structure of this contribution is one that alternates between 'big stories' and 'small stories'. I will first summarize and criticize the processes of European cross-border cooperation and governance, then turn to the Euregio Rhine-Waal and subsequently to local borderlanders. Finally, I will combine those euregional policies with borderlanders' politics in conceptual terms, in order to *re*-consider European cross-border governance mechanisms.

Cross-border cooperation and euregios

To start with, I will introduce European cross-border regions as organizations in which local and regional authorities cooperate on an institutionalized basis in order to review what they have achieved. In general, European cross-border cooperation encompasses the delivery of European policies, the establishment of new international coalitions in borderland spaces and the accompanying emergence of *new forms* of borderland spaces, defined as euroregions or euregios. As a particular institutional form of cross-border regions, euregios mainly depend on cooperations between neighbouring communities and authorities across a European nation-state border and are driven by policy considerations.

European funding for cross-border cooperation began in the 1970s and was concentrated on the borders between the Benelux countries, France and Germany. In 1990, INTERREG I was launched and now, 'some 10 years after Interreg's implementation, the overall success of cooperation is obvious' (Commission 2002a: 7).[1] Whether this success is really obvious – and for whom it is considered to be a success – will structure the following paragraph, but also the remainder of this contribution. This quote about successful cross-border cooperation was taken from a recent paper of the European Commission (EC), titled 'Cooperation without Frontiers'. It reflects on both targets that were achieved in the past and that are desired to be achieved in terms of cross-border integration in the future and it also outlines a couple of (shining) examples of cross-border projects. One description starts as follows: 'Ask people you know what they think about cross-border cooperation and you will probably find that many of them do not know what you are talking about' (ibid: 33). It refers to a

project that published a page on this matters in regional newspapers once a fortnight – and also to my own experiences running in the cross-border woods of the Euregio Rhine-Waal.

Another example promoted by the EC is the 'High-Speed Train Network', for which the ICE-high speed train line linking Amsterdam and Cologne is one of the pilot projects. Again, this arouses far-reaching interest in the literal sense only, i.e. for people living in and travelling to Amsterdam and Cologne respectively, but it does not meet local people's ideas of (train-)connections, since there are only few stops in-between. What is more, one of the paper's subchapters admits that major obstacles of cross-border cooperation are still effective (such as differences in administration). But conspicuously, it is assumed that mutual prejudices from the past are overcome, i.e. the 'soft cognitive barriers' are gone, while the 'hard structural obstacles' remain so far.

In my view, this points to a 'double mismatch' that can be found along the Dutch–German border: Although it was claimed to overcome hard obstacles to cross-border interaction by European integration, the EC itself admits that they are still not overcome. Second, I argue against the assumption that prejudices and cognitive barriers are overcome. On the contrary, I would rather emphasize that *despite* the reduction of administrative difficulties, prejudices and stereotypes as border reproducing practices remain active in people's minds and lives (Strüver 2002a, 2002b). Keeping this distinction between hard obstacles and soft barriers to cross-border cooperation in mind, I now shift the attention to critical perspectives on official cross-border cooperation and euregional governance as such and then turn to the Euregio Rhine-Waal.

Euregional governance

Miosga (1999: 161f) points out that euregios, in implementing INTERREG and promoting the involvement of both official and non-governmental partners, do follow the 'trend of governance'. Cross-border cooperation in general is praised as an example of institution building and multi-level governance networks. Most of the euregios have indeed developed into highly structured projects that are linked very tightly to supranational EU policy and contribute to new forms of regional governance (Scott 1999, 2000).[2] However, in what follows, I look at definitions of cross-border governance with a critical perspective regarding its effects.

Cross-border governance capacities are described as dual process of *both* formal institutionalization and informal integration. Yet, many have pointed out that cross-border initiatives have not been particularly successful – neither in mobilizing people, nor in constituting new transnational scales of governance. Those initiatives rather remain 'nationally bounded' (Perkmann 2002: 109), 'have not sufficiently motivated local society to participate' (Scott 2000: 106) and represent top-down-models with deficits in terms of democratic representation (Papademetriou and Waller 2001; Clarke 2002). With special reference to European cross-border governance as such, Perkmann (1999: 660) notices that

'there is a tendency to overemphasize CBRs [cross-border regions] as emerging territorial units equipped with self-governing capacities' in addition to the disapproval of the 'top-down strategies of European cross-border governance' on the whole (Clarke 2002: 5).

To supplement this critique on the application of governance in cross-border regions, the euregios' effects in terms of informal cross-border integration are assessed as very limited: Scott (2000) discerns a general lack of interest and identification, as well as a gap between the euregios and their citizens' daily lives. 'Euroregions are technocratic entities. Cross-border cooperation initiatives are rarely linked to projects of popular mobilization' (Perkmann 2002: 108). Moreover, cross-border cooperation in general is perceived as very much top-down, as both policy tool and target of the European Commission – but not as 'serving people'.

In terms of European integration as such, Scott (1999: 607) criticizes that '[t]he gradual creation of an integrated European economic and political space has been and remains, first and foremost, an exercise in supranational institution building'. And the European Commission itself acknowledges in its 'White Paper on European Governance', that 'the Union is often seen as remote', that 'people increasingly distrust institutions and politics or are simply not interested in them' and that the institutions 'must try to connect Europe with its citizens' (Commission 2001: 3). In order to meet and redress people's disappointed expectations in the Union, proposals for change and 'good governance' are outlined, which aim at 'reaching out to citizens through regional and local democracy' (ibid: 12). This includes to get involved local and regional authorities as well as civil society in a multi-level partnership.

It seems that not much exchange between functional cross-border cooperation and processes of social integration exists and moreover, cross-border regions, their structures, procedures and objectives are dominated by public officials. Critically evaluated, European cross-border regions are said to be highly structured political projects with only minor achievements. Scott (2000) and van der Velde (2000), for example, doubt that the institutionalization of cross-border regions actually aims at creating transnational spheres, but argue that it is a way to acquire (EU-)funding. The integration process is therefore understood as a top-down one in which only officials are actively involved. This also meets the general impression that discourses on the 'Europe of regions' are too separate from local people's daily lives (Paasi 2001). And, as Kramsch (2002) points out with respect to Dutch–German cross-border regions, too many people simply do not know that they live in an euregio and are expected to act across the border.

However, if people do not know about the EU, its activities and objectives, they ignore it passively, i.e. they can neither appreciate, nor oppose against its efforts towards integration. This 'passive ignorance' is another dimension beyond the fact that 'formal' and 'informal' spheres remain too separated from each other and will be addressed again further below, after having introduced the Euregio Rhine-Waal.

Euregio Rhine-Waal

As mentioned earlier, cross-border cooperation along the Dutch–German border has a long tradition and in fact, the first European cross-border association was launched between The Netherlands and Germany (in 1958, Euregio Gronau). Since then, four more euregios were established along this border that are said to serve as landmarks, models or blueprints for cross-border regions in Europe (Kaiser *et al.* 1997; Blatter and Clement 2000; Perkmann 2002).

The Dutch–German Euregio Rhine-Waal was informally set up in the 1960s and it was the first euregio in Europe that operated as a public body (in 1993), i.e. that got the juridical status of a cross-border-association under public law. The euregio's work focuses on a range of themes, that are training and labour market, health care, disaster relief, security measures, spatial planning, tourism, sport, economic, environmental and social issues, traffic and public transportation. Its territory stretches over 4,000 square kilometres (encompassing the regions Gelderland, Noord-Oost Brabant and Noord Limburg in The Netherlands and the districts Wesel, Kleve and Duisburg in Germany) with approximately 2.7 million inhabitants. Among the activities promoted on the euregio's web-page, one can find 'representing the border area and its inhabitants towards national and European authorities', 'supporting cross-border contacts' and 'realization of cross-border projects' – next to running of European programmes and general information.

In terms of organizational structure, the euregio includes 60 associates (55 of them Dutch and German municipalities, plus three regional authorities and two chambers of commerce) – complemented by an 'euregio-council' (*Euregiorat*) as executive body. The *Euregiorat* comprises 120 members – nominated representatives of those municipalities and authorities that belong to the euregio – who elect the *Vorstand* (board of directors) (Euregio Rhein-Waal 2001, 2002a, 2002b).

INTERREG

The Euregio Rhine-Waal is subsidized by the Dutch government, the Dutch province of Gelderland, the German state Northrhine-Westphalia and the EU. Since 1989, it has prepared for and carried out INTERREG I, II, III as well as EURES-cross-border (since 1995).[3] The euregio had set up an operational programme for INTERREG I in 1991 and spent the available total budget of more than 7 million ECU for the following seven subject areas: communication and exchange of information (25.7 per cent of the budget), transportation and infrastructure (21.3 per cent), leisure and tourism (22.2 per cent), training and labour market (9.5 per cent), environmental care (6.6 per cent), innovation and technology transfer (4.6 per cent) (Euregio Rhein-Waal 1994).[4] As both Bückert (1998: 62) and Miosga (1999: 111) emphasize, most of the funding related to 'transportation and infrastructure' was dedicated to the renovation of Haus Schmithausen, the euregio's headquarters, located in Kleve (GER) (17 per cent of the total INTERREG I-budget/80 per cent of subject area 2's budget).

Compared with that, labour market activities got a remarkable low share and 'exchange of information with the respective neighbour' was financially rather insignificant (3 per cent of the total budget).

Because of its status as association under public law, the euregio meets the requirements to appear as body proposing and managing INTERREG-funded projects and, in fact, more than 50 per cent of all projects were carried out by the euregio itself. This might make things a lot easier on the one hand, but results in a concentration of power, themes and realization-details on the other. What is more, interviewees quoted by Miosga (people involved in cross-border issues in the Euregio Rhine-Waal; Miosga 1999: 120–4, 169) stress that 'the euregio [as body] is rather concerned about itself as institution than about questions of cross-border cooperation', that 'the euregio's managers depreciate 'trivial matters' such as cross-border bicycle paths' and that 'the euregio reminds one of a (too-)bureaucratically organized authority'. One can summarize here that cross-border cooperation (and INTERREG-funding) is really concentrated in the Euregio Rhine-Waal as body and therefore does not meet the local borderlanders – both literally and metaphorically. On the other hand and although the Dutch–German euregios have benefited a lot from INTERREG, one must not forget that their origins date back decades before the introduction of INTERREG – that they were originally bottom-up driven and not initiated by the EU.

Looking at the borderland atmosphere *predating* European integration, it is first of all striking that there are no archives on cross-border issues before the implementation of the euregio. But in general, relations between people along the Dutch–German border had reached an all-time low during and after German occupation of The Netherlands in the Second World War (1940–1945), i.e. the war resulted in a sharp demarcation of the Dutch and the Germans along the border and a very hesitant revival of cross-border contacts (Kaiser *et al.* 1997; Smit 1999). Furthermore, the lack of cross-border contacts can also be explained by the Dutch claims for post-war annexation in the form of territorial reparation: In April 1949, 69 km of German border territory (with about 10,000 Germans) became Dutch. This kind of frontier revisions took place in three areas of which one (Elten) is in the present Euregio Rhine-Waal. Additionally, there was a dispute about the exact running of the border between Beek (NL) and Wyler (GER; also in the present Euregio Rhine-Waal), which was solved only in 1960 – in a bilateral agreement on the border (which also contained the return of the claimed territories, realized in 1963) (Smit 1999; Wielenga 2000).

Because of the frontier revisions, the post-war socio-cultural contacts in the present Euregio Rhine-Waal were (re-)developed rather late. After the border corrections were solved, first contacts in this region were made. In 1963, a cross-border 'Interest group for the Gelders River Area' was set up and in 1965, a 'German–Dutch Association for Cultural Border Contacts' was founded. Both forms of collaboration have played an important role in initiating both informal and formal cross-border cooperation. With respect to the latter, a working group on cross-border issues along the Rhine was launched and in 1971, the Regio

Rhine-Waal was founded and formally adjusted in a legal sense in 1978. Concerning informal interaction, the number of mutual visits for weekend-distractions grew and since 1979 Dutch–German fishing days, cross-border runs, etc. have become annual events in this region (Höckmann *et al.* 1985; Jansen *et al.* 1989).

However, despite the establishment of the Regio Rhine-Waal in the 1970s, most of the cross-border initiatives remained being controlled by the respective *national* interests. This region has always been of national interest for both Germany and The Netherlands because of the river network and navigation connecting major industrial sites and seaports. And although on the one hand, those national interests require cross-border cooperation, on the other hand they are competing. Generally speaking, both the changing but sharp borderline of demarcation during and after Second World War *and* the post-war economic miracles in either country have resulted in a situation where the German part of the present Euregio was rather orientated to its national centre and the Dutch part to the Dutch one, which means that the 'cross-border ties were for the most part "dried up"' (Smit 1999: 49).

Summarized, the impact of the Dutch–German border as a separating line has changed over time. It grew against the background of wartime and post-war distrust and again, yet in a different sense, with the increasing importance of national(-ized) economic and social policies of the Dutch and German welfare states. The border regions thus focused more on their respective national centres than on the neighbour across the border. Nonetheless, the borderline has diminished with the formal elimination of internal borders in 1993, but remains in difficulties in transborder cooperation due to differences in political, social and cultural structures as well as in conflicting national interests.

The border has thus changed its role from symbolizing 'the end of the world' and being a matter of territorial claims and frontier revisions in the post-war years. But because of these revisions, the two regions along the border are also zones of overlap. And yet, the border influences the affection of citizens and sharply demarcates belonging. This illustrates that the border is a politically and socially constructed process with contested and changing meanings. And this is also in line with a definition of nation-state borders as both institutions and processes, i.e. as institutionally enclosing national territory and citizenry, including the construction of identities. The Dutch–German border thus comprises various 'boundaries', i.e. the legal borderline between the two nation-states and various invisible lines relating to social identifications and Dutch–German relations. In the Euregio Rhine-Waal, all those lines are separating and connecting at the same time.

Euregional labour markets

Taking up the activities and efforts related to EURES-cross-border, i.e. to a cross-border labour market as example, research along the Dutch–German border reveals that there has been very low cross-border labour mobility in recent years

– despite inverted situations in unemployment and wage levels on both sides of the border for the last ten years and improved administrative cooperation for commuters (Strüver 2002b; for figures see Platen and Melzig, 2001). This rather disappointing impression was also confirmed by Euregio Rhine-Waal's EURES coordinator and representative who had to admit that the establishment of a euregional cross-border labour market has not been successful within the last 15 years.[5] Another informant, a labour market consultant to the euregio, proved that there is no euregional labour market yet, but two national ones, separated by the border. And he also admits that this is not only a problem of lack of information, but of getting information (on vacancies, unemployed persons and their qualifications, but also on social security and taxation of cross-border commuters) to the people who are interested.[6]

According to the European treaty on the free movement of people, all obstacles to cross-border labour markets related to administration should no longer be in force within the EU member states. However, in general, difficulties in employment across borders are very much linked to hard and soft obstacles to border-crossings as such. The hard obstacles are related to lack of cooperation between labour offices and of cross-border infrastructure and can be found in different systems of social security and taxation, recognition of educational/occupational qualifications and language skills, as well as in different 'cultures of administration and employment'. The latter includes a lack of common competencies in the neighbouring country, which often results in reluctance to deal with 'foreign' and cross-border bureaucracies (see de Gijsel *et al.* 1999; Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging 2003; Ministerium für Gesundheit 2003). Soft obstacles are the perception, evaluation and experience of the border, but many of the hard obstacles create on top of administrative difficulties the 'soft', but permanent *feeling of being foreign* and not being able to express oneself in a foreign language perfectly. Moreover, cross-border commuting is discouraged by the fact that cross-border social security issues continue to be tricky (Warnes 2002).

But apart from cross-border labour market issues, the euregio's representative also stated that the euregio does not feel responsible for everyday problems of border-crossers, nor does it consider itself a consumer advisory service. Yet, at the same time he also admits that 'we, as euregio, are dependent on people who come with their ideas and proposals *to us*'. . . .[7] Last but not least, the same representative confided that he himself has his doubts as to whether people living in the euregio know about its existence. He referred to a small survey on the extent of the euregio's fame. It turned out that knowledge of the euregio was limited to 'it has something to do with Germany' among Dutch people and 'it has something to do with Holland' among Germans. But quite clearly, this representative was not concerned about improving the general knowledge about the euregio.

Ordinary borderlanders

Having 'deconstructed' some of the formal aspects of cross-border integration, I will now turn to the rather 'informal' parts of this process, to people living in the

borderland, their everyday lives and cross-border 'integration practices'. At first sight, these practices seem to oppose the dominant efforts of the EU. But since most people are not aware of the existence of euregios, they are also not aware that they are in opposition. Local people's 'unconscious counter-practices' are thus not active resistance against dominant EU-discourses. The crucial point is rather that people do not participate because they do not know about cross-border initiatives and ignore them passively. Before reconsidering this passive form of ignorance in conceptual terms, I will first reflect on local borderlanders' 'everyday life' and then shift attention to actual knowledge of their local euregio.

People's everyday lives

Speaking of local borderlanders' everyday life, I refer here to the banal details of social interaction, habits and routine practices, which are not much reflected upon. For de Certeau (1984), the everyday is unconscious in the sense that it is neither fully controllable, nor open to direct observation; it is, rather, somewhat invisible.

Despite the difficulties of researching borderlanders' invisible and unconscious lives and the absence of euregional statistics, there are yet some 'visible facts'. Looking at population statistics, the characteristics of the inhabitants of the Euregio Rhine-Waal are really 'ordinary' – in the sense of mirroring the respective national average with respect to age and gender distribution, as well as proportion of foreigners. And except for the latter, these characteristics are the same on both sides of the border. Concentrating on labour market statistics, however, there are remarkable differences between the Dutch and the German side as well as regarding the respective national average. Whereas the unemployment rate was 8 per cent in the German part of the euregio in June 2002 (German average 10.5 per cent), it was only 4 per cent in the Dutch part (Dutch average 3 per cent). And regarding employment structures, it turns out that the German part is above-average characterized by agricultures (both in relation to the Dutch part and the German average), whereas the Dutch part stands out with service industries (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek 2003; Landesamt für Datenverarbeitung und Statistik Nordrhein Westfalen 2003; Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland 2003).

Next to this general information, I will offer some narratives of local borderlanders here, which illustrate their position towards EU-regional activities. These narratives represent a very small, and even special sample only, but they shed light on concerns of local borderlanders. The first group consists of true 'border-practitioners', of Dutch people who have moved to Germany recently (due to the housing market at both sides of the border and financial advantages resulting from different national tax regimes). But since most of them keep their jobs in The Netherlands, they are cross-border commuters at the same time.[8] However, because of a lack of 'competencies' that require local knowledge of the place, and also because of a new ('strange') 'national culture', introduction meetings for Dutch newcomers were organized by the local authorities – and

what follows summarizes these people's questions and concerns (of the meetings in 2002 and 2003). Most of them are related to the fact that the 'newcomers' still have to settle in their new place and get used to different procedures in organizing a new home (e.g. where to get water, electricity, telephone from, which local taxes need to be paid, how to dispose of rubbish, and so on). And in addition, a lot of administrative paperwork needs to be done in an unfamiliar legislation system (e.g. applications for residence permit, health insurance, international driving licence, etc.), which raises questions of how and where to do this (and why this is necessary in an integrated Europe). But since the Euregio does not consider itself as a consumer advisory service (see above), there is no support for this sort of problem.

A second group of local borderlanders are those who have participated in public discussions on border-related themes. They have mainly complained about bad (and worsening of) local public transport across the border. The already mentioned EU-funded ICE-high speed train line linking Amsterdam and Cologne, for example, hardly ever stops in between and at those stations close to the border. And furthermore, since this train line was set up, there are fewer regional trains connecting places both along and across the border.

Between those places on both sides of the border, where a direct bus connection exists every other hour on weekdays, there are no connections after 7 pm – for 'nobody would go there, this is where the world ends, there is nothing on the other side of the border'.[9] Northrhine-Westphalia's BeNeLux coordinator was also present at two of those meetings and stated that 'the Dutch–German border region is still characterized by a sharp borderline'.[10] And at another occasion he has to admit that the euregios fail to be mouthpieces for the people living along the border. Moreover he criticizes that the INTERREG-projects are of hardly any use for the local people.[11] At the same event, someone in the audience complains that 'as an ordinary citizen of the border region, I am always confronted with *faits accompli* – we are only allowed to *re*-act, not to act'. Again, during another meeting of the same series of events, people in the audience state that 'in Kleve, one feels still closer to Berlin than to Nijmegen', that 'even now, there is an iron curtain between Germany and The Netherlands' and that 'there is a persistent lack of understanding towards the respective neighbour across the border' – 'despite mutual encounters in holidays and local sports events'.[12]

In addition to these critical comments of people who *are* concerned about Dutch–German relations and cross-border integration. I was constantly reminded that my running partners were unfamiliar with the *existence* of the Euregio Rhine-Waal. Moreover, inspired by the literature I read (e.g. Commission 2002a; Häkli 2002; Kramsch 2002; Miosga 1999) as well as by statements of interviewees, I was wondering whether local borderlanders are really not aware of the euregio's existence. I therefore did a small survey in two 'major' cities of this euregio (Nijmegen/NL and Kleve/GER), both of them located very close to the border. For this survey, I chose six days with 'shopping events' that particularly attract people from the neighbouring country in order to test the euregio's degree of familiarity. Each day, about 100 Dutch and Germans

who had a look around the shops were asked at random and in passing whether they know what an euregio is and in the case of a positive answer if they are aware of the fact that they live in an euregio/the Euregio Rhine-Waal.[13] I received a total of 542 answers, of which 457 did *not* know what an euregio is (= 84.3 per cent). Of the remaining 85 persons, 81 also knew that they live in one (= 14.94 per cent of the total). But more than half (44) did not know in which one/the name of the euregio. Also, only 37 persons questioned were aware that they live in an euregio and in which one (= 6.83 per cent). Finally, these 37 were also asked to name activities of, or projects supported by the euregio – and the overwhelming majority could not recall any.[14]

Altogether, and despite its superficial and quantitative character, the results of this survey substantiate the impression that the euregio, its projects and activities are hardly known by the euregio's inhabitants.[15] It is thus no wonder that cross-borders activities do not meet opposition – since they are not known.

'Strategies of information' and 'tactics of ignorance'

Rethinking 'passive ignorance' and elaborating on the euregio's 'activities that are not known', two ways of ignorance or indifference surface here. The first one is that the EU and the euregio are not concerned about their citizens. But secondly and conversely, the local borderlanders do not know about the euregio and its activities. In my view, both forms of ignorance can be approached by de Certeau's ideas on 'practitioners' of spaces and places. Adopting one of his famous essays that opens with the imagination of 'seeing Manhattan from the 110th floor of the World Trade Center' one can easily criticize European and euregional bureaucrats' view from above, seeing the euregio from a distance. The view from above suggests the idea that the complexity of a space is readable – but it turns out to be too remote. And in the case of the Euregio Rhine-Waal, there are (at least) two levels of looking down involved: the view from Brussels 'down' to cross-border regions and the one from the euregio's managers to citizens' everyday lives. On both levels, 'the ordinary practitioners live below the thresholds at which visibility begins (. . .) and make use of spaces that cannot be seen' (de Certeau 1984: 93).

The sheer *existence* of an institution (e.g. an euregio) thus says not much about its perception, its use for and utilisation by 'ordinary people'. The latter are defined by de Certeau as 'a silent and marginalized majority' (ibid: xvii). Marginality in his understanding is a massive, but not homogeneous majority of everybody and nobody. Moreover, he also distinguishes between institutions' 'techniques' on the one hand and people's everyday practices on the other. The former are characterized as *strategies*, exercising power by organizing space: the euregio as institution and its relations to its 'clients'. This strategy 'postulates a place that can be delimited as its own and from which relations with an exteriority can be managed' (ibid: 36). De Certeau finds the opposite to strategies in tactics. Tactics are ordinary people's everyday practices, i.e. people's 'ruses', their tricks, which are not necessarily related to resistance in the sense of being

actively oppositional. Since 'ordinary people' are not a homogeneous group, nor oppressed on principle, these tactics are not *counter*-strategies, but mundane practices by which ordinary people 'reclaim' the space organized by techniques of socio-cultural production.

Conclusion

In this contribution, I have confronted euregional strategies with borderlanders' tactics in order to investigate two ways of ignorance that seem to characterize cross-border governance-structures in the Euregio Rhine-Waal. The first 'ignorance' can be found in the strategies of the Euregio Rhine-Waal – since borderlanders' lives remain mainly invisible from the eurocrats' view from above. In general, cross-border governance in the Euregio Rhine-Waal mirrors those problems reviewed at the beginning. For, although cross-border regionalization is a matter of (formal) institution building *and* (both formal and informal) participation of local people and initiatives, eurocrats from Brussels and euregional managers are too remote from local borderlanders. This euregio is thus both 'anchored' and 'run' rather in Brussels than at the Dutch–German border. Yet, there is also another form of 'ignorance' at work – local people's passive ignorance of the euregio. This refers to borderlanders' mundane routine practices, to unreflexive 'tactics of ignorance' that are not oppositional in character. Local borderlanders' 'politics' towards the euregio as institution can be found in their unconscious everyday practices, reclaiming their (home-)region not necessarily as an eu-regio(n), i.e. not reflecting upon euregional policies, nor agitating against. That is to say, borderlanders are not inevitably resistant because of their everyday tactics and their location on the nations' margins. Similarly, a borderland does not necessarily have more potential for being a kind of *counter*-place, of active resistance against (for example) EU policies, nor for having (more) radical inhabitants.

What is not particularly reflected on in the literature examined above, though, are ways to link formal and informal sphere and to link (and overcome) those two forms of ignorance. In order to rethink new spaces of cross-border governance at the interface of this mutual indifference, the following needs to be taken into consideration: The euregios' governance structures are supposed to install *both* formal and informal cross-border integration. But they fail in terms of the latter – for they do not stimulate community building across the border or at least local borderlanders' cross-border interactions. Moreover, at the beginning of the Euregio Rhine-Waal lie informal contacts, which were only later institutionalized and finally became a legal formal status. Since the Euregio Rhine-Waal is a public body and the European Commission promotes regional democracy by getting local people involved, more democratic participation and representation would and should be possible. But this body is neither democratically elected, nor does it represent the people and their interests. For, the EC limits 'democracy' to the involvement of civil society and in the euregio, not even the *Euregiorat* (council) is elected, but nominated. A commentator states on this development in

the Euregio Rhine-Waal: 'This is strange: a parliament that decides on the expenditure of dozens of millions, but cannot be elected directly by the border region's inhabitants' (Janssen 2000: 17). The euregio thus obviously fails in terms of implementing cross-border democracy. Moreover, euregional managers often do not sense that their bureaucratic procedures demotivate citizens to participate. The euregio runs more than 50 per cent of the INTERREG-projects itself, and against this background the question *for whom* the implementation of INTERREG is a success can be answered with 'for the euregio *as institution* and its own financial interests', not as the true integrated cross-border region. For example, it is very unlikely that the local borderlanders want a renovated Haus Schmithausen. They might rather vote for local cross-border trains, bicycle paths and transnational sport events – and articulating these ideas would be active participation in shaping the euregio – both in institutional and practical terms. If the euregio wants to get closer to its citizens and their interests, they need to be invited and actively involved.

Apart from that, one has to keep in mind that cross-border cooperation should not be a matter of establishing formal institutions only, for cross-border institutions as such do not make a border more porous or open, nor a borderland more interesting and vivid. But they can yet be more open for people's reasons (not) to cross a border (van Houtum and Strüver 2002; Kaiser *et al.* 1997). Governance structures in cross-border regions could comprise more than the current practices of cross-border institution building: they also imply reaching out to the region's inhabitants, being concerned about people's indifference (towards the euregio and towards each other) and being sensitive for an understanding of borders as marking and negotiating prejudices and social difference. Between Germany and The Netherlands, this social difference can be found in the still existing and sharp borderline of prejudices, which is at work in people's everyday lives – and disproves the EC's assumption that cognitive barriers between neighbouring countries have been overcome through intensified cross-border cooperation. Local people's bordered and prejudiced practices are also part of their tactics – but as long as these tactics and euregional strategies do not 'meet' and invite each other to investigate the interests of the respective other, they remain too distant from – and indifferent to – each other.

Running in the cross-border woods of the Euregio Rhine-Waal is fun. For instance, the trails along old railway tracks, connecting Kleve with Nijmegen in the past, but now overgrown with weeds, are nice for running – though running local trains would also be nice.

Notes

1 INTERREG is the largest one of altogether four Community Initiatives. Its main objective is the stimulation of inter-regional cooperation in the EU in order to achieve economic and social cohesion – and its large financial scale refers to the high importance of cross-border regions for European integration. INTERREG is made up of three strands (A: cross-border cooperation; B: transnational cooperation; C interregional cooperation) and comprises three periods so far (I: 1990–1993; II:

1994–1999; III: 2000–2006). INTERREG III has a total budget of €4,875 million (Euregio Rhein-Waal 2001; Commission 2003).

2 For most cross-border initiatives, INTERREG funds are the main source of funding and they are thus dependent on EC policies and regulations. Perkmann (1999, 2002) even states that cross-border organizations are INTERREG-‘projects’ in themselves rather than administrators of the budget.

3 EURES (European Employment Services) is a programme of the European Commission, emplyoment services and other partners (e.g. trade unions), which aims to stimulate geographical mobility in a European labour market by providing information and advice for labour migrants. EURES-*cross-border* focuses on cross-border labour mobility – for which the Euregio Rhine-Waal cooperates with the euregio rhine maas noord (European Employment Services 2002; Commission 2002b).

4 For INTERREG III A (2000–2006), the euregio’s total budget is 27.2 million Euro (Euregio Rhein-Waal 2001: 14).

5 Interview with EURES-coordinator Hans-Joachim Kaufmann (euregios Rhine-Waal and rhine-maas-nord, 14 November 2002).

6 Interview with Lambert Teerling, labour market consultant to the euregio Rhine-Waal (8 November 2002).

7 See above, interview with H.J. Kaufmann (original emphasis).

8 There are at least four prominent examples of this phenomenon along the Dutch–German border – of which the most distinct example (in both total number and percentage) is Kranenburg in the Euregio Rhine-Waal.

9 Personal communication with a local taxi driver (Taxi von Agris, Kranenburg, 26 September 2002).

10 Northrhine Westphalia’s BeNeLux coordinator Bernd Müller, during debate on ‘The border: test site for Europe’, Nijmegen 25 February 2002 (LUX debat).

11 Northrhine Westphalia’s BeNeLux coordinator Bernd Müller, during ‘public talks on future prospects for the border region’, Kleve 25 April 2002 (Klever Zukunftsgespräche).

12 Various people in the audience during a public meeting on ‘reports and comments from the other side of the border’, Kleve 9 April 2002.

13 In Nijmegen, I did this survey on two ‘koopzondagen’ (all-day Sunday shopping, 6 October 2002 and 3 November 2002) and on a public holiday in Germany (when it is likely that Germans go shopping in the neighbouring country; ‘Westfalen-Tag’, 1 November 2002). In Kleve one all-day Saturday shopping (2 November 2002) and also two all-day Sunday shopping events were chosen (29 September 2002 and 10 November 2002).

14 Only four persons could name concrete examples: ‘cross-border horse riding’, ‘Haus Schmithausen’ (the euregio’s office) and ‘consulting hours for cross-border commuters’.

15 These results also mirror the findings of Häkli (2002) who did a similar survey among people in the Catalan borderland and had to conclude that not many people know about institutionalized cross-border cooperation.

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2 De-politicizing labour market indifference and immobility in the European Union[1]

Martin van der Velde and Henk van Houtum[2]

> Some constitutive rules, like exclusive territoriality, are so deeply sedimented or reified that actors no longer think of them as rules at all.
>
> (Ruggie 1998: 873)

> It is impossible to live as an outside observer.
>
> (Hillier and Rooksby 2002: 9)

Introduction

The vast majority of the workers in the European Union are still largely mobile only within their own nationally bounded labour market. In this contribution we wish to focus on the governance of cross-border labour mobility in order to understand the non-existence of a borderless and integrated labour market. In particular, the question that we wish to address is: Why is it that people when it comes to cross-border labour mobility in the European Union are relatively immobile? In scrutinizing this issue, this chapter hopes to contribute to a growing debate on cross-border labour immobility by focusing on the nationally socially constructed attitudes of workers who are supposed to become mobile across national borders, according to the generally accepted goals and policies. In doing so, we will specifically seek attention for the role borders play within the EU as the state-centric confinements or markings of geographical (id)entities.

The chapter continues as follows. In the next section we will first address what we understand as mobility on a cross-border labour market, and second why it is that cross-border mobility and its encouragement in the eyes of European policy-makers is so 'fashionable'. The third section is dedicated to current explanations and theories for the level of mobility. In the fourth section the question is raised whether being spatially mobile should indeed be accepted as the dominant pattern in the labour market. Could it be possible that immobility is a better paradigm? The final section tries to formulate some governance implications both where it concerns the ongoing academic discussion on mobility and immobility as well as cross-border policies aimed at the strengthening of the integration process within the EU and Europe at large.

European governance of cross-border labour mobility

The EU has a long history in governing spatial labour market mobility across national borders. Already in the Treaty of Rome, the free movement of labour, as a constituent of the common market, was seen as a fundamental right for EU-citizens and as such provided a framework for cross-border labour mobility (Vandamme 2000: 438). In accord with this right, citizens of the EU should be able to take up jobs *everywhere* within the EU, be it via commuting or migration. The latest step of the European Commission in putting the labour market at work to the benefit of the member states is the wish to transform the EU-wide labour market into the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world (European Commission 2001a). Increasing cross-border mobility is seen as an important instrument in reaching some kind of optimum in the perceived and desired functioning of the labour market in the EU:

> The creation of more genuine European labour markets – removing barriers, reducing adjustments costs and skills mismatches – will increase the efficiency of labour markets overall. This would in fact reduce pressures to migrate for those *who do not want to move*, while creating genuine opportunities for those *who do wish to be mobile*.
>
> (European Commission 2001a: 5; emphasis by the authors)

To reach this goal the European Commission in their document 'New European Labour Markets, Open to All, with Access for All' (European Commission 2001a), announced the establishment of a 'High Skilled Task Force'. This *Task Force* was installed with the mandate to identify the main drivers and characteristics of the 'new labour markets', particularly focusing on skills and mobility; to identify the main barriers to further development; and to come up with initiatives leading to 'new labour markets, open to all, with access for all'. In itself the fact that this initiative is still necessary after 45 years of 'freedom of movement' within the European Union is remarkable. The *Task Force* took the position that higher occupational and geographical mobility will contribute to three key principles: ensuring freedom of movement, promoting a knowledge-based society and establishing full employment. It does so by enabling the European economy, employment and labour force to adapt smoothly and efficiently to changing circumstances. With regard to geographical mobility the European Commission comes to the conclusion that it is too low:

> . . . due to a number of factors, including cultural, and in particular linguistic barriers, regulatory barriers, insufficient or complex systems of recognition of skills and competences, and an ageing of the labour force.
>
> (European Commission 2001b: 9)

In order to encourage spatial labour mobility the suggestion of the Task Forces that the barriers caused by these factors should be removed, comes as no

surprise. Realizing that in the year 2002, almost 20 years after the launching of the Internal Market in the European Union, this 'mantra' might have lost much of its convincing power, they add to this that enhancing and simplifying the information-supply should be pursued as well. In the subsequent 'Commission's Action Plan for Skills and Mobility (European Commission 2002) this is taken as one of the most important new policy measures. Under the heading of 'Information and Transparency' the following are listed:

- One-stop mobility information site and information on qualification.
- EURES-integration and classification of occupations.
- A mobility information campaign.

Given the fact that information is accredited with such a crucial role, the Commission seems convinced that removing the above listed blocking effects of borders is not enough to get the people 'on the move'. What is striking when reading these new plans is that the implicit belief in the existence of the mobile worker is still dominant. The plans assume a humankind that is inherently seeking the highest profit possible for his/her labour and will move to no matter where to as long as it pays off, an image that represents the classical rational economic man, *homo economicus*.

According to this logic, cross-border mobility is assumed to be held back by (market) imperfections and the lack of transparency and knowledge. As a result, harmonizing and synchronizing the rules and regulations for workers between the member states in the EU has become a top priority.

Establishing an EU-wide acceptance of job certificates and gearing social securities systems towards each other are clear expressions of the ambition to make the labour market more transparent. However, it is questionable whether market harmonization is a sufficient measure for workers to become mobile spatially in corporeal terms across the EU. Despite the marketisation and internalization of labour mobility in the EU, the vast majority of the workers in the European Union are still largely mobile only within its own nationally bounded labour market. The European worker is not 'particularly nomadic' (European Opinion Research Group 2001). Based on their investigation of mobility on the Swedish labour market, Fischer *et al.* identified '. . . immobility as a strong and persistent behavioural strategy for the large majority of the population' (2000: 32); and in a recent Eurobarometer questionnaire among a representative part of the citizens of the EU, no more than 38 per cent of the respondents indicated that they had moved house at least once in the last ten years (European Opinion Research Group 2001). The numbers on cross-border mobility in these findings are almost negligible. Only 4 per cent of the moved respondents had moved to another country within the European Union (European Opinion Research Group 2001). Another representative figure comes from the Labour Force Survey (Eurostat 2002). This source reports that in 2001 the national labour markets of the countries of the European Union accommodated approximately 8.9 million foreign workers of which a little over

3 million come from other EU countries. These 3 million foreign workers appeared to account for less than 2 per cent of the total active population (Eurostat 2002). Although this share has witnessed a steady increase from 1.6 million in 1983 (Kiehl and Werner 1999), partly because of the entrance of new member states, the general level is clearly still not impressive. It must be said that these figures only refer to migration. Yet, including cross-border commuting does not add much to change the general picture. In 1999 only about 0.2 per cent of the total workforce in the EU commuted to other member countries (European Commission 2001c). Even when we confine our focus to border regions, cross-border commuting is not a major factor. When we define the border region as the NUTS-3 regions (the smallest administrative region for which Eurostat provides statistical data) located immediately at a national border only 1.5 per cent of the labour force can be characterized as cross-border commuters. Of a total workforce of 34 million only 500,000 commute to another country (MKW 2001). Despite the policy measures for more information and transparency now taken, it seems unlikely that this picture of low numbers of cross-border workers is going to change radically in the foreseeable future.

The modelling of labour markets and immobility

Explanations for the low spatial mobility figures are predominantly sought in fine-tuning the theories that explain mobility. The dominant economic explanation is the one that is usually referred to as the neo-classical school of thought. The central idea in this influential theoretical framework is that an economic 'system' evolves towards a stage of equilibrium between demand and supply of labour. Disequilibria are to be regarded as temporary: these would ultimately be levelled by some kind of mobility. Starting from the assumption of a rational return-maximizing economic man (*homo economicus*), wage differences would explain to a great extent the willingness of people to move and consequently the actual migration and commuting reasons. Hence, cross-border mobility of workers is seen to be dependent upon national wage differences. The grounding principle for this theoretical framework was already formulated in the 1880s by Ravenstein (1885, 1889). Since then the models have become more and more complex, and have included notions such as human capital (Sjaastad 1962; Becker 1962), risk and the perception of the chance of achieving improvements (Harris and Tordaro 1970), imperfect knowledge and bounded rationality (Simon 1982). Over time, this has resulted in very sophisticated models that try to do justice to the complex nature of mobility by dealing with macro- (economic) and micro-factors (individual decision-making processes), often resulting in a 'push-pull' model of labour mobility. In these models 'push' stands for the negative factors on the domestic labour market, which may include elements such as low wages or economic hardship, and 'pull' stands for attractive factors on the away market, which may include such elements as higher wages and better working conditions. Although the debate on which elements should be included is sometimes rather intense, all models basically start from the assumption that it is

differences in the structure and conditions of the labour market between their country of origin and a possible range of countries of destination that make workers move. In addition, there is some agreement that some of the best estimating models in this conventional school of thought are models based on the classic Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (H-O-S) model, which is a model that incorporates the substitution of labour mobility by capital mobility and trade. This model helps to explain why in the case of the EU the economic integration process is predominantly taking place through the mobility of goods and capital, not workers (Straubhaar 2000). The reason that workers are not mobile across the borders of the member states must hence not be sought in some kind of in- and out-migration equilibrium that apparently has been reached, but can, according to the logic of the H-O-S model, largely be explained by a successful economic integration (policy) in the EU. The differences in wealth between the member states in the EU, which could act as an important push/pull factor for international migration, have decreased to such a level that they hardly act as push- or pull factor anymore (Stark and Taylor 1991; Tassinopolous and Werner 1999). Indeed it seems that trade and capital mobility have substituted for the migration of workers. However, as Straubhaar argues, when compared to existing numbers of labour market migration, despite its estimating power, the H-O-S equilibrium models still structurally overestimate the (potential) mobility of labour and the willingness to move (Straubhaar 2000). Other forces must be at work as well.

For a more inclusive understanding of the persistence of labour immobility we need to have a closer look at the conceptualization of the labour market used in this school of thought. By using the term 'market', implicitly the existence of some level of supply and/or demand of labour is presumed, as well as certain (economic) rules that are supposed to guarantee the smooth and optimal operation of this market. This provides an image of a game on a marked-out playground with more or less unchangeable and 'universal', albeit increasingly complex rules, within which a contest is unfolding. In our opinion it is this all too rigid interpretation and operationalization of the term 'market' in the case of labour mobility that prevents other ways of approaching this theme. We would like to make a plea for the inclusion of the inherent value attached to immobility in the explanation of cross-border labour mobility in the EU. We believe that models that focus on explaining mobility are not necessarily wrong in their internal logic and reasoning, but they are based on a theoretically biased and socially meagre assumption about human beings. The bias derives from an image of an economic society that is intrinsically and necessarily on its way to equilibrium. In such a system-dominated approach of economics, the labour mobility of people is nothing more than an outcome of the logics of the system, a derivate of the inequity between the international demand and supply of labour in the European Union.

Despite all its logical beauty and internal refinements, the debate on labour market mobility is beginning to resemble the classic scientific trap in which the modellers have forgotten about the dominant modes in actual practice. A

European labour market (even when regarding that it is a segmented market) does not exist. It largely consists of nationally constructed and maintained labour markets. When one starts reasoning based on a model of a single European market, what almost inevitably follows then is an overestimation of the potential mobility of workers. This is exactly what has been happening in dominant European policy and academic debates. What has been overestimated and perhaps also overs(t)imulated) is the action, the potential and willingness to move; what thereby is drastically underestimated is the non-action. We believe that starting at the other end of mobility, that is, comprehending the persisting power of international labour immobility, might take us further in understanding and explaining the non-existent cross-border labour market in the European Union.

To begin with, let us start by taking a closer look at the work already done in the field of labour *im*mobility. The seminal work of Straubhaar of 1988 laid down a powerful and interesting groundwork for the value of immobility. He suggested that we should concentrate not on the supply of labour *per se*, nor assume workers to be floating in a societal vacuum, but on the binding power of national societies that made the labour market look inwards rather than outwards. Later, Fischer *et al.* and Straubhaar developed this idea into the 'insiders advantage approach' (Fischer *et al.* 1997, 2000; Straubhaar 2000; see also Tassinopolous and Werner 1999 and Fischer 1999). This approach basically transformed immobility from something irrational and unexplainable into something that could be (bounded) rational as well. In general terms, what this approach does is introduce the location-specificity of labour, meaning that some specific features of the skills and knowledges of workers are not or not easily transferable to other places. These specificities are explicitly tied to the location where the potential migrant/ commuter is residing. Economically, this location-specificity functions as 'sunk costs' for the workers involved. Cross-border mobility would only be net-positive if these 'sunk costs' would be out-valued as well. In this 'insiders advantage approach' immobility is seen as '. . . a utility maximizing strategy to a majority of people *because the loss of location-specific assets and abilities induced by migration would be too severe and because it is immobility which allows individuals to accumulate insider-advantage*' (Fischer *et al.* 2000: 10; emphasis original). Following upon these prominent attempts to open up the research agenda on immobility, we believe the traditional 'push and pull' approach, in which the 'go'-factors are emphasized, should indeed be extended to include the active decision not to 'become mobile'. What results is a powerful scheme that is much better equipped to account for the dominant reality in transnational labour market issues, that is, immobility of workers.

However, we still see two imperative fallacies in the logic of the insider/ outsider scheme. The first is that if the inside/outside logic of this model would be consequently followed, the 'stay'-factors would not only have to take into consideration the keep-factors, like the ones introduced in the 'insider advantage' approach, but also what could be indicated as the *repel*-factors or outsider-disadvantages. By this we understand factors attached to a possible destination region, which prevent workers from going there.

The second fallacy we see is that even such an extended approach still only takes into account those workers that are consciously involved in a process of decision-making. The decisions are all based on some kind of evaluation of national labour market differences represented in the costs and benefits of staying versus going. Despite the richness of such a rational-choice approach we believe that an approach that is focused on the existence and optimization of *differences* as a motivation for people to be mobile or immobile fails to sufficiently explain the dominant form of immobility, that is, the non-action, the passiveness of people. In everyday life, most workers do not make a rational cost/benefit-analysis based on some kind of choice of staying at home versus going abroad. To cope with this second fallacy, we would like to make a plea for the inclusion of the threshold of *indifference* in the explanation of labour immobility.

The threshold of indifference

To explain what we mean by the *threshold of indifference* it is necessary to first reflect upon a re-conceptualization of human rationality. In mainstream neo-classical economics it is suggested that economic agents are best assumed as individual, atomist beings with rational choice preferences and objectives. In view of the presupposed behaviour and preferences, the dominant theories consequently primarily aim at how an allocation of resources leading to a state of equilibrium between economic agents can be achieved most efficiently. The assumption of *homo economicus* in mainstream economics also implicitly reflects a normative view on human behaviour (Sen 1977). For instance, in their international factor mobility model Facchini and Willman (2001) state that a country is populated by domestic residents owning and supplying one type of factor, e.g. labour. In a footnote on this postulation they note that: ‘From a purely technical perspective there is no need to explicitly introduce agents’ (Facchini and Willman 2001: 6). Peculiar and even as sinister as it may sound when one reads such a line, it is this assumption that we see as illustrative of the underlying and often implicit notion in the debate on borders and cross-border mobility in mainstream economics. Leaving out the role of agents ‘for technical reasons’ assumes that agents are autonomous, rational and predictable in their behaviour, thereby neglecting the social and psychological limitations of this economic rationality. The assumptions of the intentions of human beings of rational-choice economic theory have been subjected to much criticism from various quarters of social studies. The dominant assumption on rationality in economics is increasingly regarded as untenable (Nooteboom 1992). Its power is based on an old-fashioned epistemology of exogenous preferences and unworldly human psychology. Much of the critique is focused on this restrictively defined and deterministic image of human behaviour in economic traffic. Economic actors do not behave as atomized individuals outside a social context; their behaviour is no *deus ex machina*. According to Taylor, a theory in which human beings are ‘atomized’, that is, free at will and (boundedly) rational, denies the requirement

of a complex and integrated society that is able to support and promote this freedom and individualism (Taylor 1992). Freedom requires a certain understanding of the self, and this understanding, this identity, is for a large part defined through the interaction with others or through the habitual practices of a society (van Houtum 1998, 1999). What we suggest here is a social contextualisation of the rationality of agents. For, an important question is why do people not migrate or move their 'human capital' massively around the globe? Is that merely a matter of economic calculation or is the non-mobility strictly economically spoken non-rational, but maybe socially rational? Our contention here is that the importance of the social construction of human rationality is underestimated. Hence, we think that critical economic scholars who are pleading for the incorporation of the social in economics, addressed via topics like embeddedness (e.g. Granovetter 1985; Hodgson 1988), trust (e.g. Fukuyama 1995; Hosmer 1995) and 'untraded interdependencies' (Storper 1997), have a point. Human beings are associational creatures, both consciously and unconsciously so. There is no such faculty as pure reason that functions apart from the individual as a detached, objective and dispassionate observer. Therefore we see it necessary to encompass a broader sociologically and geographically inspired vision on the power that spatial belonging (still) has in the analysis of labour (im)mobility.

The contextual 'rationality' of belonging

The principle of situated (socio-)spatial belonging, the longing to be a member of a spatial (id)entity, must primarily be understood as a collectively constructed imagination, a socially produced belief in a common destiny and/or origin, as Anderson (1983) has famously argued (1983). The urge people express and perform to belong, to create (and defend) their 'own space', to separate, to differentiate and to demarcate is understood here as socially constructed (see also Paasi 1996). Shared values, norms and knowledge produce a kind of internalized, normalized and compliant everyday practices (Bourdieu 1990, 2002; de Certeau 1984; Foucault 1991). This is not to say that individual actors necessarily uncritically agree with the practical make-up of these values, norms and knowledge in society. Yet, much internalization and habitual compliance to societal norms and rules occurs in the absence of manifest obligation or violence. Rather, these values, norms and knowledge attain a taken-for-granted quality. This should be seen as a non-natural, socially acquired, dispositional set of characteristics that are the product of social conditions (Bourdieu 2002). This forms, in the words of Paasi, 'a structure of expectations' that routinises everyday life (Paasi 1996). These structures may be partially or totally common to those who have been the product of similar social conditions (Bourdieu 2002). Social relations among actors are both structured by, and in turn, contribute to the structuring of power (Bourdieu 1990, 2002). This is the basis of Bourdieu's theory of habitus (see also Hillier and Rooksby 2002). In his well-known convoluted style Bourdieu defines *habitus* as follows:

> ... a system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations.
>
> (Bourdieu 1990: 53)

The social (re)production of the nation, so significant still in our era, is a vivid and real representation and possible implication of the power of the bordered and bordering *habitus* of people. The nation (still) functions as an intuitive structure, a practical reaction, an embodied, as well as cognitive sense of place. It is this structuring power of the national *habitus* that (still) contextualises human rationality. It creates a mental distance towards the 'Other side' of the socially constructed border (see van Houtum 1999). By this is meant that the national borders are designed to and still function as a performance, or a display, of a fictitious yet for many appealingly easing purity of, We Here, and Them There. National borders produce an imagined mental nearness to the members of one's nation and an exclusion of and mental distance to non-members, the 'strangers'. This is not to say that the belief in and compliant subjectification to the nation is the same for everyone, but it is fruitless to deny the still prevailing power of the construct of the nation in our daily lives (van der Velde and van Houtum 2002). Apparently, national borders (still) must be seen as one of the most dominant practical territorial efforts of social distanciation, of gaining control in order to achieve comfort, *ease* in one's daily life (van Houtum 2000, 2003). Through this mechanism of distanciation national borders are instrumentalised to construct a social focal point, a selection of social priorities. The nation is produced to create a space of legitimate withdrawal. Indifference, in the sense of absence, emptiness, makes a difference in space, that often has the effect of a conservative power (see also Strüver 2002; Strüver forthcoming): that what is beyond the constructed differentiating border of comfort (*difference*) is socially made legitimate to be neglected (*indifference*) (van Houtum and van Naerssen 2002; van Houtum 2003). The intrinsic implication of such bordering attempts is that the labour market across the border may be physically near, but is perceived as distant and interpreted as there, not here, the 'Other side'. Such reasoning is in sharp contrast with the majority of the literature dealing with migratory and commuting movements on a micro-level which is considering actors that have entered already some kind of decision phase. Here the decision to stay or go is put in a perspective of some kind of cost-benefit analysis with a threshold that has to be exceeded in order to become mobile. As argued above, these approaches run the risk then of overestimating the willingness of workers to move (e.g. de Gijssel *et al.* 1999; Janssen 2000). The activation of seeking labour across the state borders could in theory be triggered by a sizeable gap between the levels of income or amount of employment in another country. But the existence of such a gap may be something that is unknown for the worker, because of a lack of transparency and information and/or, what we address here, because of a certain state of nationally induced mental rigidness (van der Velde 1999). This latter idea runs counter to the above described Cartesian worldview of human

action which has found its present translator in the rational agent in mainstream economics, the *homo economicus* (Bourdieu 2002). The nationally habitualized indifference leads to what we would like to refer to as a *threshold of indifference* in cross-border labour market mobility (see Figure 2.1).

What this scheme tries to elucidate are the spatial 'dynamics' of which one of the possible outcomes is mobility on the labour market. The vast majority of workers in the EU are indifferent about the cross-border labour possibilities, symbolized by the top box of Figure 2.1. First of all because a decision to leave a certain job-position is not made frequently; a second reason being that, if someone decides to take up another job (in other words to become *occupationally* mobile), this does not automatically imply some kind of cross-border *spatial* mobility. In the context of this contribution, in which we focus upon cross-border spatial mobility, the 'Other place', the 'There' across the border might be 'non-existent' in the mindset and therefore not included in the decision process at all. In general terms if there is no active attitude to make and value difference there will be no active decision-making with regard to that specific place.

When the majority of the actors never surpass the threshold of indifference, only a small group will 'enter' the bottom part of the scheme, the active attitude part. This latter part symbolizes what is usually called 'rational' decision-making. Based on an evaluation of the characteristics and opportunities of the present (*home*) and a possible new location (*away*), a decision is made to become mobile (*go*) or stay put (*stay*). What this 'model' emphasizes is, certainly if we realize that so few workers are mobile (2 out of every 100 are transnational migrants and only 2 out of every 1,000 cross-border commuters), that being immobile is the rule and mobility is the aberration.



Figure 2.1 The threshold of indifference.

Concluding remarks

What we bring forward in this chapter is that cross-border labour immobility is not so much a rational or irrational choice. To a large extent, it escapes such a strict economic choice-reasoning. Not-commuting or not-migrating across a border is not merely a matter of failing to recognize opportunities because of existing differences, but must rather be considered as a matter of *in*difference towards the 'Other side', the 'market' across the border; certainly not as some kind of 'cheap' or irrational sentiment. Hence, spatial job-immobility rather then mobility must be understood as the dominant spatial practice of people. The dominant rational-choice-based view of the labour market is not doing justice to what is the dominant practice: 'non-playing'.

Feelings towards 'Them' and 'Us' and consequent practices or non-practices are crucial in understanding the attitude towards labour mobility. In this sense borders play an important role as socially constructed frameworks of familiar habitualized locales where possibilities on the 'Other side' are for most people of no importance in the decision to get mobile on the labour market. With respect to a durable place of work, the nation is often still conservatively and defensively incorporated in our minds; in our bodies, it is our practical logic, our *modus operandi*. We (still) act according to this structure and hence we tend to reproduce this structure (Bourdieu 2002). The importance of transparency of (nationally differing) rules and harmonization on the labour market, one of the essential focus-points within the European Union, is put in a different perspective. Rules' transparency and harmonization then may be important but certainly not sufficient to change the attitude on cross-border mobility.

We support the already existing tendency to extend the set of variables important for the outcome of an active decision process to include and elaborate 'stay'-factors. There are already some scholars that explicitly take into account (non-economic) factors that cause immobility as a result of a decision not to move. These efforts are certainly contributing to a further understanding of labour mobility. But what might be even more important is the recognition that only very few people are entering the phase where a decision with regard to the 'Other side' is made. For an in-depth understanding of mobility, we plea for a renewed thinking on the concept of immobility that may contribute to fully comprehend the role of the indifference-factor in labour *im*mobility.

It can be ascertained that over the past decade or so in the EU, despite, or maybe even because of, the urge that is felt to integrate, the national political sensitivity and inclination towards and practices of bordering, have been put more fiercely on the agenda. National governments are in the process of encouraging nationalism, when strategically promoting their (id)entity. When put in the perspective of supply and demand on the labour market, this promotion is among others aimed at attracting possible employees, which could resolve the bottleneck of the postulated mismatch between demand and supply at the labour market. One of the goals of stimulating labour mobility in the EU is a better performing and functioning labour market. In the process of cheering one's own nation,

however, the national worker is immersed in a sea of nationalistic rhetoric, which might cause an even greater indifference with regard to the difference over There and of the Other. National (and regional) policies aiming at increasing mobility could result in exactly the opposite. This is not to say that individual actors necessarily uncritically agree with the discursive make-up of society. Yet, by publicly accepting the political emphasis and importance of (new) national and (regional) identities in an evermore-integrating European Union, the There might become less important and the habitualization of the Here becomes more important, where it concerns individual decision-making processes. Hence, policies of national (and regional) governments may very well have an unintended counter-effect where it concerns the goals of overarching EU-policies. Therefore, it is not a further politicizing of the European harmonization of presented and performed differences from which we expect the highest results in terms of cross-border labour mobility, but a de-nationalization, and especially a de-politicization of the issue of labour-market differences on the national (and regional) level. It is precisely because of the national emphasis on differences, i.e. by underlining the national and regional advantages compared with other places, and stressing national cultural differences, that locals are encouraged and legitimised to neglect other places in favour of their home-place. We help to produce the differences and thereby the indifferences, in the sense of mental distances, ourselves. For a true border-transgressing European labour market to perform more effectively, we need to revise our nationalistic difference politics. Policies aiming at encouraging mobility should not stress the specificity of the home region, but first of all be aimed at opening up national confinements and at downplaying performative national differences. Borders are more than performative lines of differences, more than dark ends of the Here-land, and more than representations of the either/or politics. Borders are also metaphors of the crossing, the de-fencing, the el(ev)ation, the expectation, the amalgamation, and the additional. We aim and hope for such a transient labour politics. More than political bridges, a politics based on harmonizing differences, we need truly open mental doors, to overcome the self-constructed gap.

Notes

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3 Governing the mountains

Cross-border regionalization in Catalonia

Jouni Häkli

Introduction

Since roughly the late 1980s, the political and economic regulation in Europe has moved progressively from state-centred government to *governance* based on multiple partnerships across the public–private divide, and bringing together both governmental and non-governmental organizations. This trend is reflected empirically in the proliferation of projects directed at local and regional development across various territorial scales (Jessop 2002: 43). Among such projects are the many processes of regionalization, in which new transterritorial and international mechanisms of governance are created through political and economic networking (e.g. Delli Zotti 1996; Éger and Langer 1996; Perkmann and Sum 2002).

Probably the most challenging new forms of governance are related to *cross-border regionalization* where, ideally, different national political, legislative and administrative cultures should act together and enable the actors involved to assess trajectories of development, envision common goals, and determine means of achieving these (Perkmann 1999; Scott 2000).

It may be feasible to explain the shift from government to governance with reference to the major political-economic trends of the past three decades; globalization, supranational integration, the end of the 'cold war', and general rescaling related to the 'hollowing out' of the nation-state (e.g. Swyngedouw 1992; O'Dowd and Wilson 1996; Keating 1997). However, when assessing the rapid growth of the number of European cross-border regions since the early 1970s, it is important to realize their resonance with European Union policies, particularly the EU regional policy programmes. In most cases the 'Euro-regions', or 'Euregios', that now count more than 70, have remained rather technocratic entities through which local and regional goals are pursued (Perkmann 2002: 121). Often these cooperative networks have been set up mainly to exploit new opportunities for funding and political activity that the European institutions have promoted. With their focus on ordinary aspects of administrative activities in local authorities, the cross-border cooperation represents a less radical development in the European polity than first may seem to be the case.

Nevertheless, cross-border regionalization is part of the development of the European polity that will bring about a more polycentric Europe. The European Union has launched policies which actively foster cross-border initiatives and regional cooperation both within the EU and across its external borders. Numerous economic, political, and cultural actors involved in cross-border cooperation have seized these opportunities in attempting to expand their capacity to govern on various scales (Häkli 1998a; Perkmann and Sum 2002).

This is also the case in Catalonia, where numerous forms of cooperation exist across the national boundary, giving rise to multiple, more or less institutionalized settings for governance based on complex transboundary networks. On both sides of the Franco-Spanish boundary politicians and economic actors are willing to seize opportunities to form new regional alliances, utilize the funding provided by the EU programmes, and to enhance their capacities through strategic networking.

However, while cross-border cooperation in Catalonia certainly is characterized by technocratic goals, its social and cultural context makes any 'bridge-building' across the Franco-Spanish boundary politically tension-laden. Catalonia is a region in Spain, but also a nation with a history of struggle for political autonomy. The consolidation of the Spanish and French kingdoms during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries left Catalonia without political and cultural sovereignty, and the Treaty of the Pyrenees 1646 divided the Catalan homeland *Els Països Catalans*[1] between France and Spain (Pi-Sunyer 1980; Brunn 1992).

Today, the Catalan culture and politics enjoy increasing leeway in France and particularly in Spain. This has paved the way for a deepening cooperation and integration across the Pyrenees between actors in the Spanish Catalonia (*el Principat*) and French Catalonia (*Catalunya Nord*). Several institutional forms of cooperation have been established to initiate and govern projects of cooperation. This chapter examines the new forms of cross-border governance that have emerged in the Catalan borderlands. First, the development of the European polity is outlined to set up the discussion of the social and geographical context of transboundary cooperation. The chapter then looks at the existing forms of cross-border regionalization in Catalonia and contrasts these with the awareness of and attitudes toward the cooperation among 'ordinary' Catalans. The chapter argues that there is yet little awareness among Catalans of institutional activities that are fostering cross-border regionalization in the region, and that this is an issue that will greatly influence the actual outcomes and political potential of cross-border governance in Catalonia.

Governance and the 'regional'

It has become a broadly accepted view among political analysts that the 'Europe of Regions' is a 'rational myth' that mainly functions to legitimate a more autonomous role for local authorities in the implementation of supranational EU policies (Le Galès 1998; Perkmann and Sum 2002). In the context of European policy discourses reference to the regional scale is also in line with the adopted

policy goals and programmes. However, in reality most European regions have not acquired a strong governmental and institutional status. This places much pressure on governmental and non-governmental actors who nevertheless are faced with the task of governance in their efforts to foster local and regional development.

Following Bob Jessop (1995) governance can be understood broadly as attempts to attain collective goals and purposes in and through specific configurations of governmental and non-governmental institutions, organizations and practices. Thus, instead of a coherent and ready-made regional system upon which European policy-making could be built, we should expect to find a more fluid, less systematic, and a highly diversified field of regional governance, where regions perform very differently depending on their ability to mobilize and coordinate both human and economic resources for collective goal-attainment (Le Galès 1998).

On a general level governance as a social practice is certainly influenced by the relative incoherence of the European regional system. However, there is an even more fundamental level on which 'the regional' is related to governance. Instead of being discrete entities of the external social, economic and political reality, regions are now commonly understood as constructs that are created and reproduced in social practices, such as those involved in governance (e.g. Paasi 1991; Häkli 1994, 1998b, 1998c; Jessop 2002). Hence, governance is not only a set of practices played out upon a particular regional setting, but it is also constitutive of 'the regional' as a field of action and knowledge.

This is most apparent in the case of transnational regions that are of relatively recent origin and have emerged as more or less loose concepts in the context of cross-border cooperation. Instead of being entities formed by social processes, these transnational regions are formations – networks of action – consisting of governmental, economic and cultural agents with overlapping interests that can be addressed by defining them in regional terms. These formations are not necessarily institutionally strong, but they may function well as loosely organized passageways for various practices of regional governance (Le Galès 1998; Smith 1998).

The fact that dozens of 'Euroregions' or 'Euregions' have been established in the European borderlands clearly illustrates that institutional stability is much desired as a support for cross-border governance. Euroregions are commonly seen as avenues for better access to the European Commission and EU funding (Perkmann 2002). For individual authorities participation offers, for example, the chance to be prepared in terms of an established partnership, as commonly required by the European Regional Development Fund initiatives and programmes. Furthermore, precisely because it opens direct connections between local and regional authorities and the European Union, Euroregions provide the former with more elbow room in negotiations with their own national governments in issues of regional development, decision making, and representation of interests. Not surprisingly, Euroregions seem to have obtained a permanent place in the contemporary 'multi-level governance' in Europe (Ward and Williams 1997; Ansell *et al.* 1997; Perkmann and Sum 2002).

Also in Catalonia several institutional forms of transboundary cooperation have been established to launch and govern development initiatives and projects. Before assessing how these fulfil their function in terms of governance, as well as in addressing issues relevant to 'ordinary' Catalans, it is necessary to look at the geographical context in which these efforts take place. This will show how aspects of material environment can be intertwined with discourses and narratives that are employed in agenda setting for cross-border cooperation.

Catalans: a mountain people

Catalonia, in her present territorial shape, lies at the south-eastern Pyrenees, the monumental divider between Spain and France. Rather than being merely a physical matter of fact, the mountains represent various aspects that are essential to Catalan history and identity. On the most fundamental level the Pyrenees are connected to struggles against domination by foreign powers. According to tradition, the mountains provided shelter for nobles who took refuge there against the Moorish political power and social organization in the Early Middle Ages (Nogué 1998; Glick 2002).

Later, resistance toward Castilian centralization policies since the early eighteenth century centred at times on the monasteries of Ripoll and Montserrat, both sheltered by mountains. The extraordinary landscape of Montserrat in particular has become a quintessential symbol of Catalan national identity. Moreover, Catalan poets and writers have depicted the mountains as a virgin nature, pure, sacred and intact, reflecting the national character of the Catalan people (Nogué 1991).

In the early decades of the nineteenth century Catalan intelligentzia began to discover the mountain environment. The mountain exploration was motivated by nationalist as much as scientific and artistic curiosity. By the early twentieth century a hiking association, the *Centre Excursionista de Catalunya*, had become one of the most influential societies of civic and cultural character (García-Ramon and Nogué-Font 1994). Hiking at the Pyrenees was associated with discovering the Catalan national character and landscape.

The symbolic value of the Pyrenees for Catalan identity is considerable, but there is also a more practical side to the cultural history of the mountains. Before the ascent of the Spanish and French nation-states and the Treaty of the Pyrenees 1659, the Pyreneans were engaged in lively exchange, including transhumance of herds, pilgrimages, trade and commerce. It was commonplace to find people living and working in the Spanish side of the Pyrenees but speaking French instead of Catalan or Castilian (Laitin *et al.* 1994).

This mountain way of life was disrupted by the Treaty of the Pyrenees that ended the Thirty Years' War between Spain and France in 1659. The treaty resulted in the annexation of the northern part of Catalonia, *Catalunya nord*, to France (García-Ramon and Nogué-Font, 1994). Even though it took two centuries before the boundary actually materialized in the mountain landscape, many village communities in the Pyrenees had begun to insist on their separate

national identities and territories well before the border was delimited in the Treaties of Bayonne (1856/1866) (Sahlins 1998). Hence, the sense of separate nationality was premised more on the emerging ideal of territorial sovereignty and its local experience than the national boundary itself.

The uniting and dividing functions of the Pyrenees represent two opposite realities that are simultaneously present in any effort to create transboundary networks and organize cross-border governance. The mountains are a *physical divider* hindering interaction between the Spanish and French sides of Catalonia and channelling it to few border-crossing points. Unsurprisingly, the Franco-Spanish boundary is demarcated along the highest elevation of the Pyrenees, which in fact makes it a classic 'natural boundary'. However, instead of merely separating people the mountains also represent a *cultural link* between the Spanish and French Catalonias. Hence, as an activity that seeks to overcome the mountains as a barrier, but also utilize the sense of transboundary unity that the Pyrenees represent, cross-border governance in Catalonia means in a sense 'governing the mountains'.

This is the geographical and cultural context that sets the scene for the creation of new forms of governance in the Catalan borderlands. Both Spain and France have a Catalan speaking minority, even though the political and economic position of Spanish Catalonia, *el Principat*, far exceeds that of its northern counterpart (Mansvelt-Beck 1993). In fact, the strength of the *Comunitat Autònoma de Catalunya* (Autonomous Community of Catalonia) among the Spanish regions does not really merit the label of minority for Catalans. In France, the state has pursued centralist policies much more successfully, and consequently the Catalan language and culture have had to make significant concessions to the standard French language, manners and systems of education (Mancebo 1999).

Given the legacy of division of the Catalan homeland, the central role of the Pyrenees as a marker of Catalan identity, and the contemporary EU policies that greatly encourage regionalization, it is no wonder that there are numerous initiatives for cross-border cooperation in Catalonia. Together, albeit not necessarily in a coordinated manner, these processes, projects, organizations and initiatives set up the multi-level cross-border governance as an institutional field.

Cross-border cooperation in Catalonia

In Catalonia transboundary networks are many and involve numerous prominent actors. They also seem to effectively integrate the local, regional and national authorities and non-governmental actors, thus fostering the creation of extensive networks of governance (Genieys 1998). Along with several single issue, fixed scale cooperation projects, there are ones that are explicitly aiming at multi-level governance, such as the Euroregion initiative.

In October 1991 an agreement was signed by the leaders of Catalonia and the two French regions of Languedoc-Roussillon and Midi-Pyrénées. Thus an institutional framework was established for cooperative initiatives that had emerged between the regions since the early 1980s (Euroregió bilan et perspectives

1994). While the *Euroregió Catalunya, Languedoc-Rousillon i Midi-Pyrénées* is not the first official agreement on cross-border cooperation involving regions on both sides of the Pyrenees, it is perhaps the most visible and significant one.

The two main goals of the Euroregion are first, to develop methods for increasing interaction between the economic, social and cultural actors in the region, and second, to strengthen the role of the Euroregion as a motor for the European economy, together with fostering the European integration and strengthening the position of Southern European regions (Euroregió bilan et perspectives 1994). Similar official rhetoric is typical to most Euroregions which seek to stress their pro-European ideology (Kepka and Murphy 2002; Perkmann 2002).

In practice, the Euroregion cooperation aims at concerted action by the constituent regions within the European Union bodies, as well as securing the support and acceptance of the Spanish and French governments to its large-scale projects. The Euroregion has a relatively broad multi-level organization, but little permanent staff. With one full-time secretary it is headquartered in the French Catalan area of Roussillon, in the town of Perpignan. However, as a form of cooperation the *Euroregió Catalunya, Languedoc-Roussillon i Midi-Pyreneés* represents an institutionalized, official, and high governmental level network involving directly only members of the governmental, cultural and scientific elite. There is no directly elected body politically in charge of the Euroregion's activity, but the officials involved are to some degree accountable to their respective regional governments.

Like most contemporary projects for enhanced regional governance (see Le Galès 1998; MacLeod and Goodwin 1999), the Euroregion cooperation becomes visible to the broader public mainly through the media, and to some degree through the realization of concrete projects of general interest (for example, the improvement of roads crossing the border region). Nevertheless, the Euroregion activities are very much characterized by their technocratic overtone, addressing mainly the political, economic and governmental elites that are involved in its functions (see also Perkmann 2002). This is reflected in the official Euroregion documents where the Pyrenees is represented as a space traversed by modern technologies of communication. Instead of showing the mountains as a physical barrier, it is typically flattened out from the mappings of the functional borderland (e.g. Euroregió document estadístic 1993; Euroregió bilan et perspectives 1994).

Along with the Euroregion there exists another broad network for cross-border cooperation in Catalonia, one that explicitly represents the Pyrenees as a cultural link. The Working Community of the Pyrenees (*Comunitat de Traball dels Pirineus*) (CTP) was founded in November 1983 as an organization for cooperation between the Spanish autonomous communities of Aragon, Catalonia, Navarra, and the Basque country, the French regions of Aquitania, Languedoc-Roussillon, and Midi-Pyrenées, and the principality of Andorra (XV Consejo Plenario 1997).

The CTP has the strategic goal of showing ways in which the Pyrenees can function as a uniting rather than separating element between the mountain

communities (Carta d'Acció 1994). In practice, the CTP coordinates projects and often provides them with know-how and partners from the other side of the border, both essential requirements for funding from various EU sources, such as the Interreg, the Leader, and the Feder programmes (Vallvé 1997). In this regard it is a form of cross-border governance that focuses on helping local and regional actors to seize new opportunities that the European Union policy-making has to offer (Perkmann 2002). Like the Euroregion, the CTP is a well-institutionalized, high-level governmental form of activity involving members of the regional elites, but without a directly elected democratic decision-making mechanism.

Together the Euroregion and the CTP frameworks support, initiate and co-ordinate dozens of cross-border cooperation projects ranging from small-scale initiatives, such as the production of basic information about the area for improved communication (for example, Atles de l'Euroregió 1995), all the way to lobbying for large-scale infrastructural projects, such as the high-speed train connection (TGV) from Barcelona to Montpellier (Serratosa 1997). Thus, instead of acting as an organization with clearly defined functions and areal domain, these institutional frameworks are in fact constitutive of the processes of multi-level governance directed at improving the political and economic relations that condition local and regional development; alleviating the problems of communication caused by the Pyrenees figures strongly in official discourses. The mountains are represented either as an abstract functional space, a barrier to be bridged, or as a historical link between mountain communities. While the former mappings seldom show the mountains at all, the latter tend to fully appropriate the mountain landscape in representing shared cultural heritage.

In addition to the Euroregion and the CTP, there are numerous other interregional networks, projects and initiatives actively fostering cultural cooperation across the Franco-Spanish border. Among the most important are the network of Catalan universities based in Perpignan (*Xarxa d'Universitats Institut Joan Lluís Vives*), several projects for professional training funded from the Interreg programmes, cross-border cooperation on annual motor vehicle inspection, and waste water treatment (Banque d'experiences 1996). Additional initiatives for cooperation can be found on the local government level (Häkli 2002). For instance, the Pyrenean mountain municipalities have formed an association for cooperation, the town of Perpignan has established cooperative relations with Figueres, Lleida and Girona, and there are numerous 'sister city' relations between the towns of Catalonia and Catalunya Nord (Roig 1997).

In all, the many initiatives and projects for cross-border cooperation reflect the policy of the Catalan government (*Generalitat de Catalunya*) that stresses the connection of Catalonia to the north, rather than to the rest of Spain (Guibernau 1997: 106). The spatial metaphors of Pyrenees as bridge or link serve to further underline this direction. These imaginary geographies accord well with the ideology that projects Catalonia and Catalanism as a model for Europe, a new concept of nation which perhaps can resolve political tensions caused by the European integration process and the erosion of the sovereign nation-state (Castells 1997). Essential for the realization of this ideology are the networks of

cross-border governance that challenge the traditional models of state-based government (Jessop 2002).

Governance for whom, by whom?

The idea of 'government for the people by the people' is one of the cornerstones of the modern western democracy. The idea implies that there exists a territorial congruence between a constituency (political community as the co-presence of citizens), a system of political representation (politicians as representatives of people living in a particular territory), and the areal extent of a political jurisdiction (the authority of states, regions, municipalities, etc.). Along with territorial congruence, the ideal political order is based on the idea of citizens identifying with the territory as a place, and acknowledging the issues on the agenda in the 'public sphere'. While these principle conditions are rarely met to the full, they have strongly guided the modern political imagination that Low (1997) has aptly characterized 'the politics of place'.

In political analysis the idea of cross-border governance is typically associated with citizen-friendly, 'bottom up', non-bureaucratic administration that is decentring the state government (Leresche and Saez 2002: 88). However, this view is questionable in the light of research that has explored the patterns of identification that characterize transnational regions. The following results of a survey made in Catalonia are compatible with observations made in other European borderlands concerning the slow emergence of cross-border regional identities among the borderlanders (e.g. Paasi 1996; Wilson and Donnan 1998; Kaplan 2000; Éger and Sandtner 2002; Raento 2002).

In 1999 altogether 360 borderlanders were interviewed in Catalonia, 77 on the French and 283 on the Spanish side of the border. The interview charted people's border-crossing frequency and motives, and their opinions on cross-border cooperation and the relaxation of the border control in Catalonia. It also elicited the respondents' future expectations regarding the disappearance of the border, as well as their understanding of the borderlands as a cultural and geographical unity.

The questionnaire interview was carried out in counties (*comarques*) adjacent to the border, and in all major cities. According to the survey border crossing is a relatively frequent activity for many people. Roughly one-third of the respondents said that they cross the state border at least once a month, and some 40 per cent at least once a year. Hence, it is not surprising that the Catalan borderlanders generally view the relaxed border control in positive terms (see Table 3.1). Roughly two out of three respondents on both sides of the border said that the increasing permeability of the state boundary is a favourable development.

The respondents also think very positively about cooperation across the border and know about one or another form of cooperation. Judging from the answers to these two questions it seems that the borderlanders generally support the practices of cross-border governance, i.e. the efforts to attain collective goals

Table 3.1 Results of the survey at the Catalan borderlands

1. How do you feel about the more relaxed border control?

	Posit.	No difference	Negat.	Total (%)
Catalonia	68.5	18.8	12.7	100.0
Catalunya Nord	55.8	27.3	16.9	100.0

2. How do you feel about cross-border cooperation?

	Posit.	No difference	Negat.	Total (%)
Catalonia	80.6	11.3	8.1	100.0
Catalunya	75.3	15.6	9.1	100.0

3. Do you know some form of cross-border cooperation?

	Yes	No	Total (%)
Catalonia	53.7	46.3	100.0
Catalunya	59.7	40.3	100.0

Catalonia (n = 283), Catalunya Nord (n = 77)

4. Do you know how cross-border cooperation is practically carried out?

	Yes	Partly	No	Total (%)
Catalonia	3.7	29.5	66.8	100.0
Catalunya Nord	5.0	25.8	69.1	100.0

5. Do you know how to participate in decision making concerning cross-border cooperation?

	Yes	No	Total (%)
Catalonia	25.1	74.9	100.0
Catalunya	20.8	79.2	100.0

6. What place name do you use on the other side of the boundary?

	Integrative	Segregative	Total (%)
Catalonia	19.8	80.2	100.0
Catalunya	22.1	77.9	100.0

and purposes through the networks of governmental and non-governmental institutions and organizations stretching across the Franco-Spanish boundary.

However, some results of the interview clearly reveal that people do not actually know much about institutional cross-border cooperation. Few Catalan borderlanders could specify an example of existing forms of cross-border cooperation. Also when asked if they knew about the practical functions of cross-border cooperation, and how to participate, the overwhelming majority answered negatively. Thus, there seems to be little in the official cooperation that 'ordinary' Catalans can identify with.

Moreover, on the basis of the survey it seems that the dividing function of the state border between Spain and France is still very much a reality for many Catalans.[2] For example, when asked what place names best describe the borderlands seen from where the interviewee lives, an integrative term was used by only some 20 per cent of the interviewees on the Spanish side, and 22 per cent on the French side. The remaining respondents used a name that continues to recognize the border as a divider. Hence, while border crossing is for many people a part of their everyday activity, this can be done without questioning the relevance of the border or the state-based identities connected to it.

In all, the survey shows that despite the role of the Pyrenees as an element of cultural integration, and the strong historical relations between *El Principat* and *Catalunya Nord,* there is not yet a strong cross-border identity in existence in the Catalan borderlands. Combined with the relative lack of knowledge about cross-border cooperation, the absence of transboundary identity is indicative of a weakly developed sense of political community among the borderlanders. In theory governance may be a bottom-up practice challenging the traditional state-centred government, but as yet the new forms of cross-border cooperation in Catalonia have remained elitist and technocratic, and thus failed to address the broader population. The exact consequences of this are difficult to envision, but it can be argued that without transboundary polity eventually emerging at the Catalan borderlands, the politics of cross-border governance will continue to suffer from democracy deficit. In such case we can hardly find simple answers to the question of 'governance for whom and by whom' (see also Kramsch 2001).

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that social and cultural inertia embedded in people's connection with territory, the sense of place, may be a more powerful intervening force in the development of European polity than the practitioners of cross-border governance may have expected. The era of strong nation-states has left a legacy of statist loyalties at international frontiers, and this should not be underestimated in the analysis of European integration (Donnan and Wilson 1999; Häkli 2001; Häkli and Kaplan 2002; Sidaway 2001, 2002).

However, while the borderlanders may indeed be caught by traditional state-centred loyalties, this is not the case with those actors who are involved in transboundary networks. In the elite discourses the Pyrenees figure as a cultural link, or a barrier to be bridged by various means of communication. There clearly is a 'politics of bridge' at work in the Catalan borderlands, one that seeks to appropriate the unifying rather than the separating aspect of the mountains. This politics, that in Henri Lefebvre's (1991) terms operates in the world of spatial representation, enables the negotiation of goals and aspirations related to cross-border governance. Yet, those who know little about official transboundary initiatives keep negotiating their spatial identities as embedded in everyday spatial practice (Lefebvre 1991). Consequently, a rather traditional understanding of territorial political space remains as the most significant context in which people form their political views and frame issues.

The processes of cross-border cooperation have fostered the development of governance disconnected from politics rooted in national territories. This is clearly the case in Catalonia where the networks of governance bring together actors who basically are in charge of developing the cross-border region as a whole, but still are mainly representing their own municipalities and regions. It is not at all clear how consistent this form of governance is with the citizens' desire for democratic participation (Low 1997). A vast majority of the population of

these border regions remain connected to their local political communities and everyday concerns instead of viewing the development of the cross-border region as a whole.

Another interesting question is the role of shared language and culture in cross-border regionalization. It remains to be seen whether the elite-driven 'politics of bridge' can evolve into a platform for shared political and cultural identity across the Franco-Spanish border. Despite the favourable conditions of linguistic affinity across the border it may well be that territorial congruence between political, cultural, and economic processes can not easily be achieved. In such case we can anticipate that in securing economic and social projects the role of governance is at best complementary to state-based governmental practice. As yet, it seems that cross-border governance in Catalonia is more about the political and economic elites governing the mountains rather than the Pyreneans governing themselves.

Acknowledgement

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Notes

1 *Els Països Catalans*, the Catalan linguistic and cultural area, is a spatial concept that simultaneously points to the shared cultural history of Catalan speakers, and a definite geographical area, underlining the artificiality of the boundary between Spain and France.

2 To avoid predetermining the respondents' answers the interview did not involve direct questions about people's spatial identity. Instead, by asking people to name the borderland regions the interview sought to chart the ways in which people imagine aspects of geographical and cultural unity across the national boundary. People's ability to name a region is highly indicative of the degree to which it is institutionalized in local social consciousness (Paasi 1991).

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4 The EUROREGION from 1991 to 2020

An ephemeral stamp?

Odile Heddebaut

Introduction

The creation of formalized cross-border regional spaces and/or Euroregions occurred ten years ago, along the internal political borders within the European Union. The authorities of these cross-border spaces have conducted actions and developed interactions mainly under European Special Funds such as INTERREG. As suggested by Scott (2000), the achievements of the Euroregions can be problematized: is the creation of Euroregions only an easy way for border regions to obtain European financial support; or, after ten years, have the Euroregions developed specific governance instruments to build planning programmes and policies at a Euroregional level? Five regions – Nord-Pas-de-Calais, on the northern part of France; Kent in the South East of Great Britain; and the three regions of Belgium, Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels Capital – joined together in 1991 to create the 'EUROREGION', a new entity aimed at pooling ideas and actions for territorial planning and economic development. After ten years, how might Scott's questions be answered in this particular cross-border region? Are the obstacles to governance described by Ricq (1992) operative in the EUROREGION? How are mutual discussion and decisions problems tackled in this particular space? Are the different planning strategies in each country and in the five regions, leading to a common development of the 'Euroregional' cross-border space? Questions can also be raised regarding the place and the role of the EUROREGION within other scales of planning. Are the Land and Country Planning visions established at a European level in the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) providing a reference framework for the five regions planning policies (EC 1999), compatible with their respective national planning decisions? What role can this Euroregion play in the works led at the North-Western Metropolitan Area (NWMA), trans-national cooperation structure for spatial development, evolving in European North-Western area (ENO)? Finally, it is important to assess the reality of this special space as experienced by its inhabitants: does it represent a 'contact zone' as described by Ratti (1991)? Are there many people working in another region within the EUROREGION? Are the EUROREGION inhabitants travelling within this cross-border area? Has this EUROREGION found its identity and '*sens*' as described by Kramsch (2001)?

The creation of the EUROREGION

In 1981 a decision was made by French President François Mitterrand and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to study and realize a fixed transport link across the English Channel. This led to the decision by the local governments of Kent and Nord-Pas-de-Calais to meet one another, sponsor a project, and develop links at regional levels. The presidents of Kent, Mr Tony Hart belonging to the conservative wing, and Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Mr Noël Josèphe from the socialist wing, met one other to tackle problems occurring because of the construction of the Channel tunnel. The two were of the same age, had similar ideas about solving questions regarding the tunnel work-sites, and both desired that their region benefit from this project. They immediately developed regional links which encompassed more than the address of issues pertaining specifically to the tunnel.

Launched officially in 1986, the cross-border cooperation between the two regions began to develop an official framework for considering and determining a programme of economic development initiatives in Kent and Nord-Pas-de-Calais (Heddebaut 2001a). This led in April 1987 to the twinning of their regions under the name of *Eurorégion transmanche*, a linkage which initially concerned their coastal areas, territories not previously joined together (Heddebaut 2001b). The two presidents then chose to pursue the institutional rather than the territorial path of organization and administration. While it eventually broadened its scope, the Kent/Nord-Pas-de-Calais Euroregion can be considered, as said by Luchaire (1992), 'the natural child' of the materialization of the tunnel.

Three neighbouring regions in Belgium – i.e. Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels Capital – were eventually incorporated into what then became the five-area EUROREGION. These Belgian regions had been in bilateral cooperation for a considerable time with the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region. As said by Mr Noël Josèphe in 1993:

> We have always had relations with Wallonia. The frontier only exists on maps. We followed the same approach because our economies are interlocked and because Wallonia and the Nord-Pas-de-Calais have both been through the same mill. With Flanders, we were confronted with a region blessed with a powerful coastline. We were both aware that, in a collective Europe, our economies could be best advanced by presenting a united front, and bringing Europe our combined input of a wealth of difference and solidarity. And of course Brussels-Capitals which, as the headquarters of many European institutions and host to influential economic and financial forces, is seen by the world as a city to watch.
>
> (CRNPC 1993: 3)

The presidents of the five regions formalized the creation of the new EUROREGION on 21 June 1991 (see Figure 4.1), issuing a joint declaration



Figure 4.1 The EUROREGION.

Source: Nord-Pas-de-Calais Regional Council, INRETS.

that emphasized their 'concern to strengthen their links of friendship and to favour European integration' (CRNPC 1997).

As stated by Gaston Geens, Minister-President of Flanders Region in 1991, the five presidents wanted to 'speak with a single voice to the European Commission in a better defence of the common interests of the regions involved in the EUROREGION'. Geens added: 'We see our neighbouring regions as partners of choice to achieve that goal. Setting up a Euroregion will be the most eloquent demonstration of our political resolve to give concrete shape to the Europe of Regions' (CRNPC 1993: 42). The presidents also adopted a logo representing a finger mark, an 'ephemeral stamp' without clear delimitation that is suggestive of the idea that the EUROREGION is founded upon the existence of similar cultural and historical identities rather than upon the existing administrative borders between states (see Figure 4.2).

The working groups, set up by the EUROREGION to deal jointly with questions linked to space and territorial planning, economic development, the environment and its general promotion, currently bring together the members of each of the regional administrations as presided over by the Council Presidents (Heddebaut 2001a). This body has managed to establish cooperation at strategic and operational scales, both as regards borders linking two national states and more latterly at the Euroregional level (Church and Reid 1999).

Figure 4.2 The EUROREGION logo.

Source: Nord-Pas-de-Calais Regional Council.

Obstacles limiting governance in the EUROREGION

Governance is a widely used term describing the way a territory is governed by a combination of different levels and types of governmental power operating in the same space. It has led, within the EU, to a multilevel institutionalization where the member states, rather than the European Commission, are in charge of the allocation of funds in accord with the subsidiarity principle (Kramsch 2000). The five regions of the EUROREGION have not yet had the possibility of negotiating 'international' agreements at this scale, but may be able to develop 'governance' as set out by Padioleau, who cites Stocker's definition.

> Governance brings together a group of institutions and actors that do not all belong to the government sphere. Governance expresses interdependence between the powers of institutions associated with collective action; autonomous actors' networks may intervene. Governance supposes it is possible to act without to leaving it to the state power or authority.
>
> (Padioleau 2000: 69)

Is this kind of governance possible in the EUROREGION?

As the European Union expands into Central and Eastern Europe and works to achieve greater integration, it will become increasingly important to develop modes of cross-border cooperation and to address issues on an inter-regional basis: 'The variable social complexity existing in European borderlands

necessitates a deep examination of individual borderlands and rules out a unified explanation' (Häkli and Kaplan 2000). Are cross-border spaces subject to specific obstacles that limit the integration process?

Ricq (1992) has categorized the different obstacles inhibiting cross-border cooperation and the implementation of a new, genuine dimension of shared governance in the Euroregions. His typology describes seven kinds of obstacles. These are related to legal, institutional, administrative and political issues; to financial and budgetary matters; and to socio-economic and cultural problems. In expanding governance across state borders, the ideal is that each region will retain its local identity and work within its own local and national legal and political frameworks, but will have the added benefit of cross-border and Euroregional cooperation. But can the difficulties, as defined below, be overcome?

Institutional and political differences present serious obstacles to common Euroregional governance. Since 1993, Belgium has been a federal state that has devolved progressively its powers to three regions (Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels Capital) in charge of economic problems, and to three communities (French, Flemish and German speaking) that deal with cultural, social and linguistic problems. Each of the three regions has an independent elected government. The Flemish region has also a provincial planning level. Their funding comes mainly from federal taxes awarded on the basis of the number of people living in their regions.

France is a unitary state but the decentralization laws of 1982 have created territorial and local authorities such as the regions. That means that the regions as well as the 'départements' and towns are no longer under the state administrative and financial authority. The executive power is given to the Council presidents that are elected members. The regions are in charge of planning, spatial planning, economic and development actions and lifelong training. If local taxes provide a part of their financial means, the state transfers global budgets to the different regions. They are also allowed to take public loans to finance specific projects (DATAR 2000).

The United Kingdom is a unitary state with local governments composed of elected members in Councils at county, district or town levels. The county is in charge of education, housing, transports and spatial planning. The Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions controls these local authorities. The central government gives some funds and subventions on specific objectives and projects for which counties have to compete to obtain their financial means.

In the EUROREGION the powers' repartition can be located on a scale measuring the autonomy and hierarchy of each level. As described by Denieul (1998), states that share borders can be of different nature. This is the case for the EUROREGION where the different regions experience different degrees of autonomy within states that can be culturally and politically strong – for instance Kent and Nord-Pas-de-Calais – or weak, and that is the case for the three Belgian regions (see Figure 4.3). It means that some regions are able to conduct some bilateral international programmes but they remain under the control of



Figure 4.3 Vision of the state and the regional and local autonomy.

Source: Based on Denieul 1998, p. 26.

the state even if the French regions are more autonomous than the English ones and under a more advanced decentralization process.

Moreover, the number and the size of local and territorial bodies are very different in the five EUROREGION's regions. Nord-Pas-de-Calais is the most fragmented territory and counts about 3,600 municipalities, two départements and a considerable number of inter-municipality bodies. Governance in this territory is also difficult because it does not exist as a hierarchy from one territorial level of government to the other (town, département, region) (see Figure 4.4). Spatial planning at the EUROREGION scale supposes that the different roles of each level of government are well defined and admitted by all the partners. However, the five regions do not have the same freedom to decide shared bilateral actions.

Furthermore, a general agreement or treaty between France and Belgium does not exist. Cross-border cooperation between local and territorial authorities in Europe is conducted under the European Framework of the Madrid Convention (May 1980) that stipulates: 'the States will facilitate and make the promotion of the cross-border cooperation between local or territorial authorities'. An additional Strasbourg protocol (November 1995) clearly identifies the right for territorial authorities to conclude and sign cross-border agreements. But France and Belgium have not ratified this additional protocol.

Spatial planning differences also exist. In Belgium, before the state became a federal one, it existed as a general framework consisting of a hierarchy divided into sectors plans. When the three regions acquired spatial planning competencies, they adopted specific legislation. For the Brussels city region, spatial planning is formulated into a Regional Development Plan and at a more



Figure 4.4 Institutional structure of local authorities.

Source: Based on Denieul 1998, p. 27.

local scale, schemes for town development are elaborated. In Wallonia, spatial planning is described in a Regional Space Development Scheme that provides a developmental vision for the region, covering a ten-year period up to 2010, and taking into account its 'central position' in Northern Europe. It also mentions the supra-regional cooperation structures such as 'Eurocorridors', the EUROREGION, and the NWMA (SDER 1999: 130). Structure plans at municipality levels are also elaborated and must be compatible with the SDER. In Flanders, a Regional Spatial Planning Scheme is also defined but this region has another spatial planning level with the 'Province' level.

In France, in terms of spatial planning, since the decentralization of 1982, the regions have to realize a regional plan and the state a national plan. They write official texts for the 'State-Region Planning Contract' (CPER) representing a common agreement covering a seven-year period. The Act on Spatial Planning and Sustainable Development Policy (LOADDT) of 25 June 1999, obliges the region to elaborate a Spatial Planning and Development Regional Scheme (SRADT) that covers a period of 20 years. The state elaborates eight Collective Services Schemes (SSC) covering the same period, dealing with sectors such as education and research, culture, wealth, sport, energy, transport, information and rural spaces. They must be compatible together and with the CPER. They also must take into account the European spatial planning within the ESDP covering a period over 20 years.

In England, counties have to elaborate Structure Plans expressing a regional spatial planning and development vision. They represent the general regional framework for the local plans established by the district levels. These two planning documents must coincide and be approved by the state level, which

sorts out Planning Policy Guidance and Regional Policy Guidance. But since the 1997 decentralization process, new regional levels have been created as a new and other scale of governance and that can introduce new rules of decision-making for county levels. This can be observed particularly in the County of Kent that belongs to a wider South East region, a new region that seems 'to lack political identity'. For Kent, 'there is no historical-geographical imagination of the region which can glue it together' (John *et al.* 2002: 736).

The lack of a clear concept and of well-developed institutional tools provides further obstacles to cross-border cooperation. As described by Scott a Euroregion 'refers to a generic organizational concept involving voluntary cooperation between local governments supported by quasi parliamentary councils and devoted to the definition of regional transborder policies' (Scott 2000: 105). Acquiring these autonomous powers to plan at the regional level across state frontiers presents difficulties. Cross-border and trans-national programmes are developed under INTERREG. This presents the problem of differing visions: the INTERREG procedure is led by the EU and its member states and projects for bilateral cooperation are often undertaken that are not in line with the Euroregional vision. This dependency upon the different state plans limits the possibility of cohesion within the EUROREGION.

The INTERREG III 2000–2006 new programmes for cross-border actions include the whole Franco-Belgian border. Because of the 2002 Treaty, Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Wallonia and Flanders are now allowed to develop integrated and joint actions. Unfortunately, the same ability does not exist between Flanders and Kent. Nord-Pas-de-Calais is developing some specific programmes under INTERREG III with Kent. These differences contribute to 'undermin[ing] the legitimacy of the Euroregions' (Scott 2000: 114), even if the projects developed over the borders are more integrated than in the INTERREG I or II allocation of funds procedure (see Figure 4.5).

Furthermore, there is not yet a global budget for the EUROREGION covering the financing of Euroregional integrated projects at this specific territorial scale.

Problems have also arisen owing to the manner in which the EUROREGION was founded. As explained by Jef van Staeyen, director of the Permanent Cross-border Intercommunal Conference (COPIT), the EUROREGION did not pre-exist as a concept but only as the willingness of five men who liked each other and wanted to give to their area a new power at the regional level using the lobby pressure of a cross-border body of 15 million inhabitants. This was a strong argument for obtaining funds from the European Commission under the general framework of cross-border cooperation of INTERREG, a strategy described by Church and Reid (1999), and the success of this lobbying power can be seen in the fact that Nord-Pas-de-Calais, always the central pivot region, is now hosting the INTERREG III-A and III-C permanent secretariats. However, the lack of a well-developed concept which exceeds personal visions and endures beyond their tenure can hinder the obtaining of EUROREGION goals. This difficulty can be seen in the change of the EUROREGION's leadership. Each of the five regions



Figure 4.5 The EUROREGION as the sum of bilateral or trilateral cooperation.

Source: Heddebaut (2001), Hypace INRETS.

changed its president from 1992 to 1993 by the way of regional elections. The new presidents did not consider the EUROREGION a priority and because of this it became an 'orphan' having lost its founding fathers.

Nonetheless, the five authorities of the EUROREGION have proceeded and, hoping to augment the EUROREGION's integration, in 1999 developed a Strategic Overview Scheme (SOS) that foresees a growing mobility of persons – for work and tourism reasons – and goods on this territory and wants to solve this problem within sustainable development constraints. It recommends the development and improvement of public transportation, particularly regional rail transports; economic activity and joint promotion in shared markets, including a EUROREGION Pass and the linking of tourism and transport operators, jobs, and the development and preservation of wilderness areas (Vandermotten *et al.* 1999). The five current presidents of the EUROREGION now hope to learn from the experience of other Euroregions like, for example, ØRESUND between Denmark and Sweden, and the EUROREGIO between The Netherlands and Germany for developing new forms of Euroregional governance (CESR, 2001). In June 2002, further planning occurred when two pilot Committees selected 25 projects under the framework of the INTERREG III-A programme between France, Wallonia and Flanders. These projects aim at bringing together people by the mean of a 'cross-border citizenship' and by developing specific cross-border services in health, transport, and labour market domains. They also favour joint sustainable environmental policies, cross-border culture and tourism programmes (CRNPC 2002).

Accessibility differences present obstacles to cross-border cooperation as well. The five regions have differences in their mutual accessibility. Between Kent and the other regions, only the Nord-Pas-de-Calais has a 'physical land border', a border only created by the construction of the Chunnel. This 'specific' link does

not exist between Flanders and Kent, and distances and accessibility remain obstacles between these two regions (see Figure 4.6).

There also remain customs controls for the circulation of persons between Kent and the four other regions of the EUROREGION, since Great Britain does not belong to the Schengen agreement. The latter applies to France and Belgium, and between the French region and the three Belgian regions the land border completely disappeared in 1993. Free circulation of persons and goods is here a reality that can be partly explained by the absence of customs formalities.

Cultural differences also exist. The linguistic barrier remains an obstacle because four languages (English, French, Flemish and German) are spoken in the EUROREGION's area. English is an international and 'vernacular' language shared by a growing number of people. Flemish is spoken in the Flanders region. Young people in this region are no longer learning French, because they prefer keep their own Flemish identity and their language and learn English that is more 'useful' than French (Suire 2000).

In considering the EUROREGION, another obstacle to cooperative governance can be added to Ricq's typology. This is the existence of many other cooperation structures involving parts of the EUROREGION (see Figure 4.7) and the lack of recognition of the EUROREGION within these overlapping structures. The EUROREGION location is described as the 'crossroad' or the 'heart' of Europe (CRNPC 1997). It belongs to NWMA, a larger space, within the European Union, that groups the United Kingdom, Ireland, 13 French regions, the three Belgian regions, Luxembourg, a great part of The Netherlands and of Germany, and a part of Switzerland. This NWMA is the referenced space in European space planning documents such as ESDP and is one of the basic areas and structures for



Figure 4.6 The EUROREGION specific institutional, political, accessibility and cultural contexts.

Source: Heddebaut (2001).



Figure 4.7 Place of the EUROREGION in the North Western Metropolitan Area.

Source: Heddebaut (2001), Hypace INRETS.

the application of trans-national cooperation between state members, the application of operational programmes and the allocation of European structural funds such as INTERREG within ERDF (EC 1999: 39). The European Union recognizes the importance of cross-border and inter-regional cooperation for achieving ESDP goals such as integration and economic development: 'Nearly all of the border regions have taken advantage of the support from INTERREG in order to set up common organizations, structures and networks' (EC 1999: 43). But when this document provides examples of inter-regional cooperation, it refers only to Scandinavia and the Øresund region, the Benelux countries and the German–Dutch border without mentioning the EUROREGION.

The EUROREGION is not well identified, again, in the Benelux attempt to shape its cooperation space. The EUROREGION is partly represented and seen only as the 'Transmanche Eurorégion' with the Channel tunnel as a linkage element (Benelux+ 1996: 162). Another area of cooperation identified is the

European Central Metropolitan Region, which includes the EUROREGION but doesn't mention it.

The Benelux+ 'outline' document delineates another scale of cooperation at the infra regional level such as cross-border metropolitan areas. In the EUROREGION it refers to the COPIT structure that represents a group of associated cities on each part of three regional (Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Flanders and Wallonia) and two international frontiers (French and Belgium) that wants jointly to tackle problems at and of cross-border nature and scale (see Figure 4.8).

In September 2002, these two countries and the three Belgium regions and their communities signed a treaty initiated by the former Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy. It is yet to be ratified. The term of governance, as defined by Padioleau, can be applied to the COPIT because it represents a group of different actors with different stakes that are obliged to work together to fulfil common objectives and achieve specific projects out of their own institutional contexts.

Figure 4.8 The French–Belgian cross-border metropolis.

Source: Cross-border workshop COPIT <http://www.copit_gpci.org> (accessed 10 June 2003).

The EUROREGION's area experienced by its inhabitants

Economic and social networks have taken the opportunity to support the EUROREGION by organizing the third Forum of December 2000 with a new objective that consisted in 'bringing the idea of EUROREGION into the civil society' (CESR 2001). Young people of the five regions were invited to present their vision of the EUROREGION and their ideas to stimulate the feeling of the membership of such an area seen as an essential element by Ricq (1992) to obtain integration.

Some associations have taken the EUROREGION idea to promote their activities, for example, the 'EUROREGION of sport', the 'EUROREGION network of museums', the 'cross-border theatre workshop', the 'Inter Border Trade Unions Council' and the 'Permanent Conference of the French and Belgian Chambers of Commerce and Industry' (Vandeweeghe 2002).

The phenomenon of developing a cross-border workforce is linked to several variables and not only to the bilateral relationship 'unemployment versus jobs'. More secure working conditions and job qualification are obvious reasons to travel to work over the border. As described by Soutif (1997) family links, weddings, the proximity of the foreign country (accessibility, language), housing and the cost of living are also leading these choices. In addition, cultural differences (mentality, habits and language), different systems for social insurances and income tax policies play a role in attracting or repelling cross-border workers. At present, however, few people work in another region within the EUROREGION. On the Franco-British border, in 1999, 241 Nord Pas-de-Calais residents declared that they worked in the United Kingdom, but it cannot be ensured that they work in Kent. Border control statistics in Brussels reveal, in June 2000, an increasing flow of 18,242 workers living in France and employed in Belgium against a relative stable flow of 6,039 Belgian residents travelling to France for work, and 14,392 Nord-Pas-de-Calais residents declared working in Belgium in 1999 (Insee 2003).

The tourist figures for the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region, that is to say persons who spend at least a night out of their home, show a net increase of tourists from neighbouring countries (CRT KCC 2000). The last border traffic survey conducted by the French Tourism Department revealed that in 1996, in the large growth in visits to the region, Belgian tourists were more numerous (4.7 million overnight stays) than British (2.2 million) (Heddebaut 1999). According to the Nord-Pas-de-Calais Regional Tourism Committee (CRT), the coastal area and the Metropolis of Lille are the two main destinations for EUROREGION's foreign tourism (CRT 1999a).

However, the most interesting phenomenon relates to shorts stays and excursions within the EUROREGION. Studies have been engaged in order to better understand travel behaviour relating, first, to persons crossing the Channel and, second, to those persons solely on day trips. They show that most people travel on short visits within the EUROREGION: estimated at 157 million

excursion visits per year that would be made primarily by its own residents. Relating to cross-border movements, the border of the Nord-Pas-de-Calais is the most used. Residents of Nord-Pas-de-Calais visit Belgium more often than they visit Kent, and likewise Belgians visit the neighbouring French region more than they visit Kent. The Nord-Pas-de-Calais region people say their excursions to Kent are the best way to be out of their element. On the other side, Kent excursionists coming to Nord-Pas-de-Calais are giving arguments such as the friendship and different atmosphere they find in the region on the other side. People coming from Kent have as their main destination the city of Calais where they do shopping, taste the French gastronomy for lunch and do a city tour (CRT 1999b). Tourism and excursionist movements are mainly based on the difference between two cultures, two environments that can be interpreted, for the French part, as the 'so close, so French' idea described by Flament (1997: 154).

On the French–Belgian border, movements are most often made on the basis of similar motivations. On each side of the border the Belgian and the French regional excursionists mention shopping activities as a reason to travel to the other region, especially border Sunday shopping on the Belgian side, but also walking in a natural environment with numerous open lands on the French side. They both point out entertainment opportunities and the conviviality of the inhabitants.

All these movements made by the EUROREGION population show that they are actually constructing a new space, a 'contact zone' of mutual understanding as described by Ratti (1991). It is possible that institutional bodies and political structures could be founded upon on this population's desire for travelling over borders and that genuine cooperation programmes based on the facilitation of their access and mobility within the EUROREGION's space could be established. As analysed by Kramsch:

> the task of 'coherence' within this space would appear to be linked to the ability of institutional actors to 'harness' the energy of this mobility in ways which give greater definition to the EUROREGION within a complex matrix of contending administrative units.
>
> (Kramsch 2003: 22)

Conclusion

Ten years after its creation, the EUROREGION seems to be faced with a new future. On one hand it has developed some strong cross-border cooperation links particularly in the tourism and cultural sectors. The fact that the last EUROREGION forum was taken over by the social and economic networks of the five CESR shows a voluntary attitude by political institutions to bring this debate towards the EUROREGION inhabitants. In addition, we have shown that if there is empirical evidence of increased trans-boundary movement within the Euroregional theatre it is based on the search for enrichment of differences that exist within the EUROREGION rather than seeking sameness. This follows the thought of Laïdi (2001) as described by Kramsch (2003): at the local level,

'the Europe of "sens"' would do well to take advantage of adopting an 'identity of the border' rather than a restricted, rigid and exclusive identity. This approach might yield a diversity that would refuse to be reduced to a unity, a felt particularity that would not be necessarily defined: 'The identity of Europe would be lived without having to be stated' (Laïdi 2001: 134).

Based on the EUROREGION experience one can conclude that working in partnership gives a greater voice to the five regions in Europe, both in representing the interests of their peoples and as part of a truly international region. On the other hand, the EUROREGION has not yet found the best mode of governance and the possibility of this remains difficult to assess, as it must negotiate a new path through previous and existing concepts and institutions of government. The idea of regionalization or decentralization has not developed far enough nor has it been sufficiently experienced to provide the EUROREGION with new governance tools. Moreover, it may be that 'big institutional bodies such as the EUROREGION have shown their limits' (Vandeweeghe 2002: 18).

The EUROREGION, in sum, is still in quest of identity and 'sens' as illustrated by its Chairman Daniel Percheron, in 2001:

> At present, when we broach on the topic of Euro-regions, we are still at the stage of incantations. What is a Euro-region? How should we shape it and bring it to life? In reality as Chairman of this Euro-region, my role is closer to that of a figurehead than of someone who sets forth proposals and leads the way.
>
> (Percheron 2001: 2)

Hope for the EUROREGION is to be found in the European Union assertion in the ESDP framework that 'cooperation is the key to an integrated spatial development policy and represent added value over sectorial policies acting in isolation' (ESDP 1999: 35). There is thus a need for close cooperation amongst the authorities responsible for sectorial policies and with those responsible for spatial development at each respective level (horizontal cooperation), and between actors at the Community, trans-national, regional and local levels (vertical cooperation). Nonetheless, it remains difficult to inscribe the Euroregional level as a more autonomous level inside the European and national political and spatial planning schemes. With their many obstacles, it may be that the legacy of trans-frontier initiatives such as the EUROREGION, along with other international networks, is, as Church and Reid (2000) suggest, that they have enhanced the capacity and ability of local government to develop a flexible approach to the construction of cooperative alliances and political spaces.

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5 Cross-border region *Espace Mont-Blanc*

A territorial 'not-yet'?

Enza Lissandrello

The European region-building process is a particularly interesting context in which to observe the transformation of public action on borders. The tradition of Intergovernmental Commissions, followed by the institutionalization of Euro-regions, the Madrid Convention and the introduction of INTERREG, the latter with its well-known implementation phases, has provided both symbolic and functional inputs to the development of patterns of governance resulting in so-called 'laboratories of integration'. In the borderlands separating member states, working communities and agglomerations between micro- and macro-levels are mostly the norm today. Beyond the goal of describing the varied programmes to stimulate flows of goods and people across European member state borders, however – conceived in a vocabulary of de-bordering – this chapter focuses on a range of contemporary territorial projects defined as attempts at *re-bordering*. The term 'cross-border region' identifies such a process; while it is still open to different interpretations, its understanding can open a framework for the study of policy in a unique spatial context.

The specific questions raised by cross-border regions (henceforth, CBRs) are linked to the meanings given the various forms of institutionalization they require, including the kinds of accountability demanded of them. A complex of actors offer possible clues to this dynamic, including levels of governances composed of the European Union, traditional levels of government (national, regional, local) as well as sectoral interests (public, private, third party), all diffused in a global space but linked through democratic processes shared by a plurality of subjects and agents. In this context, this chapter is based on a study of interactions between actors and on the re-composition of a cross-border arena of interest based on territorial identity-building. Interactions and cultural networks can indeed converge 'in' and 'around' a cross-border territory overlapping traditional territorial borders. Thus conceived, identity-building is a process involving the recognition of both an internally constituted (potentially local) or externally derived (potentially global) project of re-bordering. This is exemplified by a cross-border political community in the process of being built between Italy, France and Switzerland on the slopes of the Mont-Blanc mountain.

This chapter proposes two sections and a conclusion. The first section offers an overview of the *Espace Mont-Blanc* project (EMB), while focusing on its

interactions with environmental and infrastructure issues. Analysis of the case-study draws upon a theoretical framework provided by a literature on 'networked governance' and political frontier regimes. The aim of the first section is to reveal how EMB succeeded in triggering a mobilization of actions and actors in a diffused pattern of governance which converged upon this cross-border territory. The following section proposes a reading of screens and netiquettes used by some of the actors involved while navigating the public sphere of the Internet. The objects of this descriptive analysis are the symbols, metaphors, images, maps and slogans which serve to differentiate actors around the EMB. In conclusion, an examination of actors 'in' and 'around' the EMB results in a 'perspective' for apprehending cross-border territorial policies as a utopic space of the 'not-yet'.

Overview of *Espace Mont-Blanc* as policy arena

Perkmann and Sum (2002: 3) define a cross-border region as 'a territorial unit that comprises contiguous sub-national units from two or more nation-states'. This open definition allows problematizing the kind of territorial forms represented by CBRs, while linking such a concept with an actually existing project of tri-national cross-border cooperation on the slopes of the Mont-Blanc mountain. Indeed, the choice of words in such a definition seem particularly fitting in the context of a 'territorial unit' focused on 'a common board of action' within a regional cross-border configuration. Such a sphere is built via an incremental process between micro- and meso-levels, while also involving the conscious pooling of national interests. But what does the term 'region' mean exactly in the case of a *cross-border* region? Perkmann and Sum write that CBRs are governed by partial and irregular structures operating in a network manner, institution-building taking place according to a definition of regions as non-bureaucratic entities (Perkmann and Sum 2002). Such a definition can orient a set of territorial policy problematics for CBRs as forms of institution-building: (1) demanding changes through variable patterns of public action; (2) involving forms of governance which touch upon local scales of action; and (3) whose potentiality is generated by the interaction of multi-level governance networks operating at local, EU and global levels, leading in turn to the re-composition of interests.

The issues just sketched relate ultimately to the institutional meaning and potentiality of actions leading to the interaction and a re-composition of interests, as well as the construction of an identity which converges onto the territory of a CBR. Interaction, re-composition and identity, however, are processes with few elements given 'a priori'. Policy inquiry into a case of cross-border regionalism traverses aggregations of micro- and meso-levels, as well as elements of interest bargaining sustained by a supranational EU voluntary policy aimed at cross-border cooperation, with its open and diffused channels of influence. In this context, the relevant policy questions may very well be: 'Who builds those kinds of institutions, how and when, by what kind of sources, through what kind of

preferences, to guarantee what kind of interests and moulding what kind of collective identity'[1] (Pasquino 2000: 12).

It would seem that the experience of cross-border regionalism in general, and the EMB in particular, do not provide ready answers. The questions of who are the stakeholders in CBRs and what is at stake in a trans-border arena seem, in their very formulation, to clash with a plurality of subjects and policy approaches. The boundaries of the nation-state, that territorial entity which itself represents 'a geographical bounding between those places and actors who are prepared to cooperate *vis-à-vis* certain social requirements and those with whom competition is the determining relationship' (Smith 1995: 61) would appear here to demand reconsideration and re-discussion. In the EU context the emergence of CBRs as political spaces is linked to the emergence of networked forms of governance which provide an alternative framework for states in their role as activators (Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999: 6) including novel expressions of sovereignty related to contractualised forms of governance under the terms of political frontier regimes (Leresche and Saez 2002: 84). The dominant actors here constitute a system of relations among a multitude of stakeholders for institutional forms based on re-composition in partnership, one which, in terms of the scope of relevant political allocations, is preferable to functional agreements.

But how precisely does this re-composition occur, and what kind of results can be expected from building a cross-border territorial common board? Can 'open borders' provide the pre-conditions for shared democratic meaning in such a way as to make 'territoriality' a common denominator in the re-composition of such interests? As Held points out, the very notion of sovereignty, that even can be associated with a traditional meaning of territoriality, is limited in the global era by the plurality of national, regional and international agencies (Held 2000: 352). Such a concept is taken up again and in a somewhat detailed way by Joseph Nye (Nye and Kamarck 2002: 4). His 'model' for a re-composition of interests under a diffused mode of governance refers the concept of democracy in the twenty-first century as shared essentially between three levels (supranational, national, sub-national) and crossing three sectors (private, public and third sector). Can such a re-composition take place in a territory that is cross-border in nature? In what follows, I start from Nye's cross-referencing of levels and sectors to report on the case of EMB as a form of governance.

Governance of the Espace Mont-Blanc: *a policy of the territorial 'not yet'*

The *Espace Mont-Blanc Project* (EMB) and its associated decision-making arena (i.e. Conference Transfrontaliere du Mont-Blanc) (CTMB) began in 1991 as an occasion to manage through cross-border cooperation issues raised a decade prior in the sphere of international non-governmental environmental protection. The previously established International Park of Mont-Blanc and subsequent EMB project are thus both institutional responses to the influence of supranational

cultural flows in a time of heightened environmental and cross-border cooperation. Initial local resistance with regard to environmental protection was replaced in time by an alternative awareness which succeeded in easing the relationship between the local and international spheres, while opening a policy-issue domain supportive of building a CTMB cross-border arena. International NGOs activities, developed within a diffused sphere of consensus, mobilized at a local scale. International influences were also brought to bear upon local political spheres through the preparatory workings of the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, which together pointed to the need for a sustainable development perspective.

During these same years, and within a wider European context, the first period of INTERREG began on the basis of the historical experiences of a few Northwest European Euregions. At a national level the Ministers of the Environment of Switzerland, Italy and France absorbed these varied experiences at cross-border region-building and subsequently placed the issue of the Mont-Blanc Park under their respective institutional agendas. The term *Espace* is therefore an invention, a 'soft' means, a new word, an alternative to the park and its polemics. Espace is a term which thus delimits and singles out a particular place. It must also be grasped as a policy which develops formal agreements within the local public arena and private sector agents, but is also less formally interpellated by trans-national corporations, whose management – through the encouragement of ski-related tourism to increased traffic flows through the Mont-Blanc Tunnel – is bent on the development of the area rather than its environmental protection. The shared need for local and 'regional' representation, the demand for accountability from national governments, and the pressure of NGOs at international, national and local levels find common cause in the building of such a cross-border decision-making arena.

Espace is thus a container term for a perspective on actions. The aim of EMB is to become a regional context to develop a common understanding about sustainable development founded on the basis of informal, tri-lateral agreements. The process started with the incremental involvement of affected municipalities regarding the central themes to be pursued during the project. It has since taken on a plurality of functions – social, technical, re-evaluative – but is not invested with any particular competence or policy instrument. The year 1999 marks another important passage in the development of the EMB Project, as it coincides with the Mont-Blanc Tunnel accident and attendant political dynamics surrounding its future re-opening. An opening provided for the EMB cross-border arena to acquire 'a voice' was provided by the subsequent technical air quality evaluation comparing the tunnel before and after the accident. In the interim, NGOs as well as local and national policy-makers discussed the further protection of this cross-border area. Throughout these debates, EMB was able to capitalize on its somewhat peripheral role to national programming priorities, emphasizing its own role as a 'soft' project kept 'apart' from more 'hard' decisions of state. In this context, EMB can be considered above all a perspective, a policy of the 'not-yet' that, in mobilizing interests, develops imaginary 'future' cross-border possibilities.

Espace Mont-Blanc on the internet: symbols, links and metaphors

The results of inquiries into EMB on the World Wide Web are not far removed from the futuristic forecasts proposed by Mitchell:

> Technological development will interact with social and political interests, economic strategies, and cultural values in a complex and sometimes surprising way to produce a rich diversity of places and neighbourhoods.
> (Mitchell 2002: 72)

Indeed, in virtual and imaginary space *Espace Mont-Blanc* can be interpreted according to a range of different categories: the institutional sphere, the research domain, tourism and the selling of images and environmental protection. EMB 'actors' originate in different and global 'real' places.[2] Technology is thus only one factor in a complex set of social causes (Nye and Kamarck 2002: 10); to the query 'Who speaks of/for *Espace Mont-Blanc*?' on the Internet, hundreds of websites offer an answer.[3] As is revealed in what follows, however, the level of authentic experimentation provided by this medium is circumscribed to a limited number of cases, some of which find their most cogent expression in that policy of the 'not-yet' sketched in the first section. All of the web-based interventions to be examined have become opportunely involved in the identity-building construction of this E-space.[4] In 'reading' them I will offer a set of 'windows' with which to navigate the respective screen's messages.

The third sector: EMB as space for a metaphorical expression

A recent netiquette used by mountaineers and environmental organizations regarding the protection of the Mont-Blanc[5] and its 'pays' claims: 'The Alps and the territory of Mont-Blanc are the one interesting natural and social region, rich but sensitive'.[6]

As agreements and conflicts regarding the very existence of the EMB park have been at the source of many narratives locating EMB's origins, it is fortuitous that this topic is addressed by the largest number of websites. From the initiatives of Mountain Wilderness International (MWI), established as one of the first associations dedicated to the environmental protection of the Mont-Blanc, to more recent actions by groups such as ICONOS,[7] the trajectory of EMB has been split between those who are favourable to and those resistant to the particular mix of NGOs actors and political parties involved in the site's preservation.[8] Reflecting the latter position, the environmental NGO CIPRA[9] introduces this message on its website: 'L'espace around the MB is today in a transformation phase . . .*L'Espace Mont-Blanc*, an alibi?' Indeed, environmental groups have a crucial role to play both in project start-up and follow-up. Demands for the environmental protection of the Mont-Blanc are interlaced with instantiations of the EMB image within an arena of consensus that extends



Figure 5.1 Espace Mont-Blanc on the screens of some non-governmental organizations.

Source: <http://eurenet.com/ctmb/fr/> (accessed January 2003).

beyond the local. Up to a certain point, environmental associations play a parallel role[10] primarily by staging protests,[11] but they[12] also strive to gain a role as observers and influential actors within the EMB project. A common aspect of their websites are images of demonstrations which have succeeded through large-scale mobilizations. Many sites provide a forum for fundraising and issue discussion.[13] In some instances the e-space of the Mont-Blanc region is metaphorically depicted as the summit of the world.[14]

Environmental action on the EMB intensified following the Mont-Blanc Tunnel accident.[15] The tunnel is indeed another strong symbol for the MB region, a symbol of joining but equally synonymous with conflicts.[16] In the aftermath of the accident, the MBT took on a double meaning, representing

both a symbol of local interest and globalizing power.[17] A recurrent website netiquette on the matter is quick to point out that in 1991 more than 750,000 lorries passed through the valley.[18] Recent debates on the re-opening of the MBT have once again ignited a controversial discussion regarding its area protection.[19]

The ARSMB (l'Association pour le Respect du Site du Mont-Blanc) website is equipped with a forum for the exchange of information between users. Other websites offer the means to propose a popular vote in order to a establish quick consensus against re-opening the MBT to lorry traffic. Some of the sites,[20] such as those belonging to the World Wild Fund for Nature or Greenpeace, operate at an international scale, but others are geared towards the national or local levels.[21] They too provide images contrasting beautiful landscapes and smiling people-in-action against that of lorries crowded at the entrance to the tunnel. For them the *Espace Mont-Blanc* is best represented by the metaphorical image of a fragile leaf. Their screens are brimming with news of varied and unfolding protest actions.[22]

The sub-national public sector: EMB as space for an interpretation

The Internet also offers up for interpretation websites of local and regional administrative bodies. Some interpret the EMB project in its essential contents or propose their own mapping. Playing a role in the latter category is the institutional website of the Aosta Valley Autonomous Region and the official website of the state of Geneva.

At first glance the netiquettes of these public sector institutions are inclined to justify the EMB project in terms of local efforts required to place collective actions linked to transport and the environment on the public agenda.[23] Their websites feature curiously personalized screens. The Aosta Valley Autonomous Region, for instance, dedicates a high number of pages to the EMB project.[24] Through their site it is possible to visit or retrieve official documentation or dossiers relating to EMB. The site differentiates itself through its symbols and in the way it produces a representational map of the *espace*. Here the foundational symbol of EMB is found in three multi-coloured dancing sprites (red, blue and white) cavorting about the Mont-Blanc against white and green background. The map clearly demarcates regional and national borders. A slogan appears: 'The stake in EMB is the territory'. The State of Geneva features only one page dedicated to EMB, which briefly explains the project as a partnership between Switzerland (Vallaise), France (Savoie) and Italy (Aosta Valley Autonomous Region). The accompanying map is not contextualised, and it features neither regional nor national borders. No slogan is associated with the project.

The local level of private sector actors: EMB as space of identity

The symbolic appeal of EMB is also tied to its use as a source of commercial information by private-sector firms. In this way, numerous websites advertise



Figure 5.2 Espace Mont-Blanc, as viewed through the websites of sub-national public administrative bodies.

Source: <http://eurenet.com/ctmb/fr/> (accessed January 2003).

regionally based food products featuring maps of EMB as the cross-borderland of prestigious wine and cheese produced via 'local' and 'original' means: 'Nous sommes des explorateurs des territoires qui entourent le Mont-Blanc'.[25] Other screens derive from local tourist services. Indeed, myriad sites crowd this theme,

all offering the image EMB as a space of leisure-time idyll in the mountain air, featuring images ranging from rafting to skiing, hot-air ballooning to ski schools, including technical matters pertaining to high-mountaineering. The Internet also makes available numerous meteorological web-cams informing about the weather on the mountain summit, enticing visitors from all over the globe. Almost all of the tourist-related websites showcase the small villages or *pays* of the EMB as exclusive tourist spaces.

The conference transfrontaliere du Mont-Blanc: EMB as space for incremental institutionalization

Any common search engine reaches the EMB website rather easily. The address, www.espace-mont-blanc.com, doesn't denote any nationally defined paternity, just this institution: *Espace Mont-Blanc*. In its slogan, the term 'Espace' is conjoined to the term 'region': 'The Espace Mont-Blanc exemplifies cross-border cooperation for the harmonious development of a Europe of Regions'. Its home page does not contain any national flags nor any particular European iconography, just one newly invented symbol: three sprites playing ring-a-ring-o'-roses around the mountain. The sprites are coloured blue, red and white,[26] and play against a blue background showcasing the Mont-Blanc Massif.[27]

An accompanying list indicates other links to the physical form of the territory, a short history of the project, as well as the institutional structure of the EMB project.[28] The website is edited in Italian and French, each revealing slight differences. The site's home page contains instructions to access a photograph gallery, available documentation, including other links (websites) and contacts. A news update is also provided.[29] All symbols and writing are visible in the shadow of a metaphorical golden eagle.[30] At the moment this website does not feature any



Figure 5.3 Espace Mont-Blanc, as featured on the CTMB institutional website.

Source: <http://eurenet.com/ctmb/fr/> (accessed January 2003).

indications that it is being updated. Its sole temporal reference is tied to news[31] regarding conference meetings and the publication of an air-quality study conducted on the EMB. A main goal of the website appears to be to present 'what the EMB is' as a project of local cooperation. No database exists, with the exception of a territorial reference map indicating the territorial units and total surface area[32] located around the entire Mont-Blanc. Such a map is removed from any other territorial context and contains a drawing of road infrastructures.[33]

In all the websites shown two maps of the EMB territory[34] stand out. One, physical and static, is named 'territory'; the other is 'political' and active.[35] The latter is labelled a 'municipalities map', indicating where the relevant administrative borders of municipalities are located, but without making reference to national or regional borders. Through this site it is therefore possible to obtain information for each municipality,[36] at least if the municipality is a member of EMB or is likely to become a part in the future.[37] Such an image, illuminating the future embedded in the present of the EMB, may appear a bit odd at first sight, but it represents an attempt to spatially visualize an evolving and conflict-laden process of negotiation in which the relevant stakes are defined by the acceptance or rejection of some municipalities to belong to the EMB.

I suggest this map forms the basis of an ideal and institutional utopia for *Espace Mont-Blanc*, for no distinction is made between the number of municipalities participating in the EMB project and those that could become so in the near future. The map is thus the product as well as medium for the multiple interpretative contexts which give the espace meaning. Through its specific representational cartography, 'Espace' becomes an untranslated word hovering in a virtual world. It is significant that the word 'border' does not appear on any page of the EMB website, cross-border cooperation only being defined vaguely in association with various forms of 'activity'. Here, the national border is banished from the 'municipalities map', and represented on the 'physical map' of the Mont-Blanc summit as a mere line of contact drawn in red.[38] It is a declared general focus of the website to build a common (trans-border) policy for the active exploitation of the mountain, as well as to create a pilot space of experimentation for sustainable development. In addition to such netiquettes other themes are also presented.[39] But the space of such a website lacks any forum for the exchange of ideas or news between users,[40] in this respect it functions much like a uni-directional shop-window.[41] The list of links to other websites are mixed together and not grouped by nationality. With just a few clicks,[42] it is possible to return to the websites of the EMB's respective member states. In a general way, French links pertain to institutional bodies[43]; Italian links are oriented towards environmental and tourist-related issues[44]; and the Swiss site refers above all to territorial management and economic development.[45]

Conclusion

As pertains the site of the *Espace Mont-Blanc*, analysis of websites reveals the complex chain of interests by means of which a variety of networks express the

intentionalities and interactions of actors on a particular cross-border territory. As a means of communication, the Internet is included as one element in a multi-directional governance process, which leads us to suspect that in places such as EMB the building of cross-border territoriality, as supported by virtual means, represents a new kind of demos. An enquiry into Internet screens doesn't necessarily provide us with an exclusive or exhaustive answer regarding precisely which kind of political cross-border space is emerging, however, nor is it helpful in offering a typology of relationships that may be considered opportune or legitimate. Rather, what becomes apparent in the new public space of the Internet is an unsolved conflictuality which converges in such a cross-border territory. In this regard, in the eyes of the new media and in the ideas generated thereby, EMB contributes to our understanding of cross-border politics in terms of a space of the 'not-yet'. As Sassen reminds us; 'new media, new forms of politics and the trend to culturalisation are expressions of and intrinsic to the same profile of epochal change' (1999: 89). Actors who 'talk' about the *Espace Mont-Blanc* on the Internet reveal 'perspectives' that may be characterized as well in terms of policies of the 'not-yet'. Such interpretations take on a 'utopic'[46] meaning to the degree that they are informed by a positive dialectic of cultural contamination and contemporary thinking in the political space.

Notes

1 Translation from Italian by the author.
2 Conducting an enquiry by means of virtual space doesn't mean losing connection with 'real' spaces. This research considers where flows of information originate in real space and how this information contributes to a definition of trans-border space. The analysis of websites was carried out between September 2002 and December 2002.
3 In so doing, I relied upon different search engines (Yahoo, Google, Lycos, Altavista), each in turn leading to national variations (i.e. Google.it, Google.fr, Google.ch).
4 The label 'E-Topia' is an interpretative term suggested by Mitchell (2002) in his study of the networked city of the future. It seems particularly fitting to consider such a term in conjunction with EMB as a place of networking and interactive flows between Internet-using subjects.
5 The Italian version of www.parks.it asserts: 'All those outside Europe have initiated measures to protect parks located on their higher mountains: Kilimanjaro in Kenya, Ruwenzori in Africa, Everest in Asia, Mount McKinley in North America, Mount Java in Oceania . . . [But] Europe is not able to protect Mont-Blanc, [a resource] which is not just the roof of Europe but also one of the relevant monuments of our own continent'.
6 At www.caichatillon.it/SitoCai/relazioni/consigli.htm, advice for hiking up the Mont-Blanc is provided by a check-list of instructions. Its website informs: 'The 'roof of Europe is climbed every day (in all weather conditions) by several hundred mountaineers from all over the world, who more or less prepared for these kinds of activities'.
7 ICOMOS is the competent French entity for registering the Mont-Blanc in the World Heritage of UNESCO. The *Espace Mont-Blanc* project has participated in this initiative in 1999 by preparing a programme for the management of accesses to the Courmayeur valley, using a questionnaire to investigate waiting times for visitors (about 400 interviews). Over 90 per cent declared themselves in agreement with the MB as a UNESCO natural heritage site (Espace Mont-Blanc dossier: Patrimonio Mondiale dell'Unesco). ICOMOS subsequently declared EMB to be subject to human overuse,

declaring that it could perhaps be considered as a 'cultural heritage' territory. The issue remains currently in discussion.

8 Parties to this discussion included local and national interests, such as the *Union Valdotain*, the Regione Autonoma Valle D'Aosta's Centre-Left party.

9 Created in 1952, the *Commission Internationale pour la Protection des Alpes* (CIPRA) is an organization dedicated to the improvement of trans-border exchanges around the Mont-Blanc.

10 For instance, the group Mountain Wilderness France in 1989 established a symbolic rope across the Vallée Blanche, an action which involved 300 persons and climaxed with a public speech concerning the protection of MB in Chamonix. This act represented the first authentic exchange between the General Secretary of MW and the public municipal administration of Chamonix.

11 Since 1988, demonstrations have achieved a crucial pitch in association with the start-up of the EMB project. In 1991 the *Comité International des Associations pour la Protection du Mont-Blanc* (CIAMP) was created, initiating a petition in favour of the International Park of Mont-Blanc signed by 14,000 people. During this phase, environmental groups and institutional bodies were deeply divided over the issue.

12 By 1998 the idea of an International Park for Mont-Blanc seems to have caught the wider public's imagination. After the creation of CTMB (Conference Transfrontaliere du Mont-Blanc) in 1991, three 'text zones' were proposed as a common territorial frame of reference (Montagne de Balme, Col Ferret, Col de la Seigne and Col du Bonhomme). In 1995 the encroachment of sports facilities in one such text area (Tete de Balme) brought environmental groups to lead several initiatives in favour of more effective protection. CIAMP subsequently published 'Project de texte foundateur pour l'Espace Mont-Blanc', a document which underlined the particpation of local associations marginalized by the EMB's respective member states. Concurrently, the Vallaise World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and Mountain Wilderness Italy ignited a debate on the new tourist infrastructure, while producing a manifesto signed by 50 personalities from the cultural, economic and political worlds.

13 Some primarily have e-mail lists, while it is also possible to get new information via postal mail (though often only in French).

14 On this topic there are also electronic news websites, such as those of ALITALIA written in English and Italian.

15 On 24 March 1999, a Belgian lorry transporting margarine and flour caught fire in the MBT and 39 people died. The tunnel was closed for an indeterminate time for restoration. The day after the tragedy the French and Italian governments promised together a new transport policy in the space of the MBT, but time has brought no changes. The *Association pour le Respect du Site du Mont-Blanc* subsequently circulated a petition against the return of the lorries to the Mont-Blanc. The Aosta Valley coordination team, a group which obtained the adhesion of nine associations and groups working in the Aosta Valley, expressed a favourable opinion on reopening the MBT to car traffic, but announced a passive resistance to lorries in the absence of a radical modification to extant 'rules of circulation'. On 9 March 2002, the MBT was re-opened to car traffic. Subsequent demonstrations against lorries led to strong confrontations in the French government between those favourable and those against renewed lorry traffic. In the end, favourably inclined politicians such as Gayssont were invited to assume a position of agreement with the people of Chamonix aimed at a frontal attack on opposing positions both in the central French government and in the Canton of Geneva. In Italy, Cormayeur and Aosta demonstrated against the return of the lorries. The Italian Prime Minister (Silvio Berlusconi) met in Brussels with the EU commissioner for transportation and internal markets, pleading for intervention in the French decision to reject lorry traffic through MBT. On 5 May 2002, the Aosta Valley Region joined protests against the lorries' return. Environmental NGOs working on behalf of *Espace Mont-Blanc* presented findings of their air quality study aimed at a

comparative analysis before and after the accident. In so doing, the EMB maintained a scientific appearance. On 9 September 2002, a petition signed by 120 Aosta Valley citizens forced the relevant regional authorities to recognize the environmentally regressive behaviour of Minister Lunardi and the Motorway Company to allow lorries into the Valley. On 7 November 2002, the Inter-Governmental Italy/France Commission scheduled a meeting to modify the regulation of circulation through the EMB Tunnel.

16 The building of the tunnel was foreseen by a trans-border cooperation agreement in 1955, whose aim would be that of building renewed relationships among former enemies following the Second World War, with a focus on tourism.

17 The global reference is tied to varying forms of state control over the tunnel. The French side of the MBT is state owned. In Italy the situation is much more fluid and flexible. The shared composition of Società Italiana Traforo Monte Bianco at present is as follows: 3.2 per cent to the canton of Geneva; 3.1 per cent to the city of Geneva; 10.6 per cent to the Autonomous Region of the Aosta Valley; 32 per cent to ANAS; and 51 per cent to Autostrade SpA. The majority shareholder is Schemaventotto, 60 per cent controlled by Edizioni Finance, in turn a fully owned subsidiary of Edizioni Holding, the financial group of Benetton.

18 Despite some overlap, from this visual angle the websites share a computed action: to go behind the backs of the lorries in the MB region.

19 The tunnel is thus perceived in terms of a conflict over a public trans-border good: the Mont-Blanc Massif and its territories <http://perso.wanadoo.fr/difesa-montebianco/dossier>.

20 In France, other associations related to the *Espace Mont-Blanc* include Reagir, Vivre en Naurienne, France Nature Environnement and FRAPNA. Italian websites addressing the theme of MBT are the Associazione Difesa MonteBianco, Iniziative des Alpes, Coordinamento Valdostano contro i Tir, Legambiente, the Green party, Rifondazione comunista and the Comité contre les TAV du Val di Susa. The main activists in Switzerland are Mountain Wilderness Suisse, SOS Mendrisiotto Ambiente, Movimiento Moesano Vivibile, Leventina Vivibile and Associazione Traffico Ambiente.

21 Demonstrations are primarily led by localized detachments, often originating from the French side of the border.

22 There are several kinds of electronic news media on this topic, such as the BBC and the website of the Motorway of the MBT, featuring innovative technological safety systems initiated in the wake of the accident.

23 However, planning competencies in the respective member states still differ widely.

24 Available only in Italian.

25 For example, for the site 'www.yndella.com/sito/pag/fr' (based in Aosta, Italy), the Internet represents a means 'de partager avec ceux qui le désirent notre recherche continue sur les produits sains'.

26 This choice has led to a common language being used in the three different local contexts; in the Aosta Valley the official languages are Italian and French, while in the Valaise they are German and French.

27 Four other small photos, all active and linked to the explanation of the EMB project, focus on mountain agriculture, nature and landscape, integrated tourism and transportation.

28 An example is the first Unitarian body formed by the three 'region-countries', with the participation of the National Environmental Ministry.

29 Available only in French.

30 The website was created by a company in Lausanne (CH), but its constant updating is in the hands of a communications agency based in Chamonix. Although the latter should work in close contact with the EMB trans-border secretariat, it has taken on the responsibility of updating only the French version. This explains the numerous discrepancies between the two versions.

31 Dating from 7 May 2002.

32 2,800 km^2.
33 These 'lieux de passage' develop according to four communication lines: Mont-Blanc, Grand S. Bernard, Petit S. Bernard and Monets/Forcaz.
34 Both have a metric scale and orientation.
35 Such a map features the 33 municipalities that actually take part in EMB (15 in Savoie and High-Savoie, 5 in the Aosta Valley, 13 in Vallaise) totalling approximately 100,000 inhabitants.
36 Number of inhabitants (1999), and area in hectares.
37 It is significant, in this context, that EMB's cartographic representation of borders is isolated from other territorial links.
38 This exists to underline *sine qua non* conditions for cooperation.
39 At the least, this addresses the conservation of cultivatable spaces, measurement of different forms of protection with regard to nature and the landscape, the resolution of economic development and environmental protection goals and the compatibility of alternative solutions to differences within the EMB. Disjunctions were produced between the need for the strategic positioning of international traffic and those of the local population.
40 This does not include any visitor counts.
41 Rather, a contact option exists where, from the office of the General Secretary of EMB, someone answers questions by email.
42 One common reference point appears to be the website of the Alpine Convention.
43 At the national level (Ministry of the French Environment); at the regional scale (Region Rhone Alpes), and departmental (Savoie and High Savoie).
44 National (Italian Ministry of the Environment), regional (Regional Department of Aosta Valley for Environment and Territory, Regional Agency for Environmental Protection (ARPA) and Weather Information in VDA); and municipal (tourist information in Courmayeur).
45 Secretary of State for the Economy (SECO), Federal Office of Territorial Development, Federal Office of Trans-border Cooperation, Territorial Management Office in Vallaise Canton, Weather Information in Switzerland, Documentary Centre of Varaldo.
46 The meaning of utopia in terms of the space-time of the 'not yet' appeared in the twentieth century through the works of Ernst Bloch (Bloch, E. 'Geist der Utopie'. Berlin: Paul Cassirer 1923; trad. it. Spirito dell'utopia. Firenze: La Nuova Italia 1980). Bloch believed that the reality already 'given' in the present never gratifies human wishes and is therefore not 'real'. The truth which man strives for is therefore not pre-given but is a 'utopia' in the sense that it transcends the present in a future-oriented direction. In this vein, Bloch worked out an ontology of the 'not yet', which he defined by the human skill to anticipate and focus on the future. For him, reality is in the future and the future is already real as objective possibility. At the centre of his utopian thinking (beyond the scope of this endnote) lies the notion of dialectics as an effective means to connect with the contradictions embedded within the present.

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Part II

Governing the march

6 Cross-border governance at the future eastern edges of the EU

A regeneration project?

Ann Kennard

Introduction

The states which emerged – or re-emerged – in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) after the First World War from the empires of the nineteenth century had varying degrees of success in setting up cohesive political communities. This was because some of the nations involved, far from being 'solid communities moving steadily down … history' (Anderson 1991: 26), had been subjected to many divisions and reorganizations. They entered the Second World War largely as independent states, but the advent of the Cold War left them part of a new empire, whose internal borders became closed and militarized, the whole region at once both compartmentalized and also stifled by a Soviet blanket. The border between this closed world and 'the West' became both a physical barrier and a symbol of the political division between the two. Since the revolutions of 1989–90, a patchwork of contrasting interfaces has now emerged, each with its different meaning, determined by previous and changing historical, political, cultural and other relationships.

This chapter will investigate these changed meanings and relationships in a climate where some of the countries concerned are preparing for entry into the EU, whereas others are likely to remain on the outside of this privileged club, for some years at least. This situation will have a significant effect, both upon the new internal borders and upon those which are to become external borders. Membership of the EU brings with it institutions which generate paradoxical 'us' and 'them' attitudes; this promises to be quite problematical for the new members, who will be abandoning some old associations and links on entry, while also gaining new ones. The regions at the new eastern edge of the EU are today, on the whole, sparsely populated and impoverished, and have shared histories. It is possible for these reasons that there is an opportunity for a 'return to the multiethnic local world of the early twentieth century, in which groups shared spaces while maintaining their own linguistic and religious traditions' (Bialasiewicz and O'Loughlin 2002: 219). A cross-border demos, where people on either side find and solve together common problems not perceived or felt elsewhere in their respective states, may provide an avenue in the direction of a Europe not foreseen as part of the new technocratic world of the EU institutional

agenda. In our boundary-obsessed world (Taylor 2002), it is very possible that re-signification of the border as a space, using cross-border initiatives as a tool, may be used to subvert the borderline, and by extension, 'other borders which are symbolically coterminous with the confines of Central Europe, of Europe, and of the West' (Bialasiewicz and O'Loughlin 2002: 219). The question this chapter asks is whether EU-led cross-border governance can make a useful contribution to the reduction of potential tensions in the border regions shared by the accession states and their eastern neighbours, regenerate these regions and create spaces of activity in which the border itself can become less of a barrier.

Border regions in the past in Central and Eastern Europe

As Anssi Paasi points out, the movement of borders over time means that they have a different meaning for different generations. Each succeeding generation only has its own experience to go on, only knows the border as it has been in its own lifetime (Paasi 1994: 109). Memories of previous situations are passed on from older generations, and aspects of a previous material culture are often evident in border regions, so that a 'community of fate' (Taylor 2002) emerges which may have little in common with the core regions of present (nation-)states.

The cultural richness and overlap in such communities of fate is particularly evident in CEE, where just 100 years ago, the map of this part of Europe looked totally different, dominated as it was by three multi-national empires, and with the absence of, for instance, Poland, and the as yet non-existent Czechoslovakia. Hungary played a much greater role than it does today, as is very evident from the overspill of Hungarian culture outside its current, much more limited, borders. The impact of decisions made after the First World War, when a host of new states emerged from previous powerful empires, are still to be seen literally in concrete form on some of the border markers in the region, and particularly at tri-points, where three of these new countries meet. An example here is the tri-point between former Yugoslavia, Romania and Hungary, where the stones are marked with the date 1922, and the insignia of the three countries represented upon an obelisk. Many of the border markers in the region are similarly dated from the early 1920s, showing the tenacity since this period of the state-centric model in the region, in spite of the attempts by the Soviet Union after the Second World War to eradicate differences between these recently created states, such as those of language and ethnicity, not to mention the banning of the different religious observances.

The extension of the Soviet empire to this region, apart from displacing certain borders to the advantage of the Soviet Union, caused all of these border regions to become zones of secrecy and separation. Not only were physical links of Central European countries with neighbours in 'the West' (Germany, Austria, Italy) severed with the onset of the Cold War, but border links with 'new' Comecon/Warsaw Pact partners in 'the East' were severed also, for a number of years at least, in an atmosphere of military secrecy and political repression.

There was only one crossing from the Soviet Union (Ukrainian Republic) into Hungary at Zàhony (there are now five), mainly for reloading east-west rail shipments between wide and narrow gauge railways. There were two main obstacles to a more open regime on Ukraine's western border in Soviet times: first, there were high concentrations of Soviet troops on this western flank of the Union proper, where it met with the non-Soviet and newer members of the empire; and second, there were and still are large numbers of ethnic Hungarians living on the Ukrainian side of both the Hungarian and Slovak borders, and Poles in the same situation further north. There was a Soviet fear, for instance, of Hungarian propaganda, directed at the 200,000 people of Hungarian ethnic origin living on the Soviet side. The only local relationship-building links were set up as twin cities or twin counties, but these were centrally controlled and did not include border regions, and certainly not, for instance, Hungarian inhabited settlements and counties in neighbouring countries (Hardi and Rechnitzer 2002). In the late 1960s and 1970s there was an easing of certain restrictions and some cooperation took place among the countries of CEE, but very little changed on the borders of these countries with the Soviet Union.

Today these cultural overlaps are much more openly discussed and accepted, so that a Hungarian Catholic church in the Ukrainian town, Užhorod, close to the Slovak border, is well preserved and has pride of place in the centre of town, not far from the more important Uniate cathedral.[1] And a three-generation ethnic Hungarian family, living on the Slovak side of a village divided since 1945 between Slovakia and Ukraine, have Slovak passports, while retaining Hungarian nationality and sending their children to a Magyar-speaking primary school. Travelling to Ukraine to visit relatives is now possible for them, but still difficult as it involves a long journey to a major border crossing, and so family gatherings are few and far between, compensated for these days by telephone communication.[2]

Indeed, crossing the border into Ukraine and other countries not expecting to join Western institutions in the foreseeable future, such as Russia (Kaliningrad) is still as complicated as it was in the days of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately the introduction of the Schengen barrier by the new member states at the new external EU border is likely to make this situation worse. Erected around the perimeter of the EU with the aim of securing the Single Market and allowing freedom of access throughout the Schengen area, the effect for those countries outside is the introduction of an expensive (visas) and discriminatory system. The prospect currently, therefore, is one of opposing bureaucratic systems on either side of the EU's external border, recreating divisions where these had been reduced. Experts both in CEE and in the West are still arguing for a reasonably flexible system, so that at least legitimate border-crossing is still possible for those with genuine 'business' (Buras *et al.* 2001; Fairlie and Sergounin 2001).

Another and more problematical agenda, however, is presented by the waves of illegal immigrants taking the route through CEE to Western Europe, some in search of political or economic betterment, others with more nefarious intent. Similar stories are told by border guards all around the region: groups of 20, 30, sometimes 100 or more Chinese, Afghans, Somalis, Iraqis travel to, say, Serbia or

Ukraine en route for Western Europe, and having handed over money and documents to unscrupulous individuals, they are then taken over the 'green', i.e. remote and unfenced border to, say, Hungary. Here they are told 'this is Germany' and are left to their own devices, without any sort of identification or usually any knowledge of the relevant language. They are eventually picked up by patrolling border guards and taken to the relative security of a holding camp, where their case is processed.[3] Many of these people are either genuine asylum seekers or they are simply trying to find the economic conditions for a better life in the EU – Schengen is not designed to help them. However, not only is it actually impossible today adequately to police the multiplicity of borders in CEE, wild and remote as many of them are, but systematic frontier control may even belong to a mythical past. More and more efforts to control migration may be a blind alley, since people are still getting into the EU even now, despite current precautions (Bigo 1998).

The problem of human trafficking in CEE, including trafficking in women for prostitution, is well known, and too great to be investigated here in detail, but as has been pointed out elsewhere, the increased level of crime in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union is 'symptomatic of the difficult transformation of these countries' and 'the legacy of communism, where corruption and avoiding the state were part of the political culture, had created an environment of institutionalized illegality' (Anderson and Bort 2001: 152). This is perhaps the most difficult border-related issue to solve in the run-up to EU membership for most of the countries concerned, but the implementation of the Schengen regime will need to be handled sensitively.

The EU's regional agenda opens previously closed borders

The borders and border regions of CEE, with their turbulent history and as yet undetermined future, are thus today zones of movement, contact and change. The accession states are directing their reforms towards the West and, relatively speaking, are experiencing an improvement in the investment situation, thus creating asymmetry with their eastern neighbours. Iris Kempe refers to this as a source of conflict potential in terms of the 'direct neighbourhood' which will emerge, due to the absence of a 'moderating inter-region' (Kempe 2001: 108). There is, therefore, reason to think that the creation by the EU of a strategic framework via cross-border, bilateral and European cooperation will provide security and stability between the enlarged EU and its future neighbouring states (Kempe 2001: 112).

The EU has seen fit to commit funding both to the improvement of the border crossings themselves, in order to cope with the dramatically increased numbers of people and vehicles passing through, but also to stimulate cooperative ventures across borders to help the growth and integration of these peripheral areas in an EU context. The combination of INTERREG Structural Funds with a special allocation of the PHARE aid package on current EU borders of CEE countries,

and latterly CREDO funding for the border regions of the accession countries not adjacent to the EU has meant that these peripheral regions have been brought into the mainstream of EU regional policy-making. As part of the pre-accession process, this obviously helps the applicants to adapt their structures and procedures, and thereby gradually to adjust to the system of multi-level governance of the EU. As Marks *et al.* point out, multi-level governance opens multiple points of access for interests, while it also privileges those interests with technical expertise that match the dominant style of EU policy-making (Marks *et al.* 1996: 372).

Cross-border cooperation is also encouraged at national level by intergovernmental commissions, which vary in their remit. Some have responsibility for transboundary cooperation as a whole (e.g. between Poland and its respective neighbours, Germany, the Czech Republic and Ukraine), others have specific responsibilities which impact on the border, such as spatial and regional planning (Poland and Germany). These commissions have sub-commissions also, responsible for such border-related matters as the environment and water.

At local level, cross-border cooperation has been promoted by a variety of organizations, such as universities, environmental groups, cultural associations, chambers of commerce and other non-governmental actors (Scott 1999). However, it is the Euroregions, well-established in Western Europe as a focal point for local cross-border initiatives and supported by Brussels as a significant part of its regional agenda, which have found favour in CEE as an appropriate institution for the achievement of a number of aims, in particular those of economic cooperation, sustainable development and tourism, and 'cultural exchange, based on common traditions, education and communication, forging, or reviving a common regional identity' (Anderson and Bort 2001: 169). Although the Euroregions are voluntary associations without any independent legal identity, they are supervised by local governments, thus giving them a level of legitimacy (Scott 1996) – an important aspect in countries still in the throes of post-socialist transformation.

Transboundary cooperation on a project-led basis, albeit not the first priority of PHARE/TACIS funding of infrastructural change, has nevertheless led to a level of economic, social and cultural integration which is unlikely otherwise to have happened. Euroregions on the German–Polish border have been prime movers in successful transboundary projects such as the establishment of a German–Polish university ('Viadrina') at Frankfurt (Oder)/Słubice, water treatment plants at Guben/Gubin and on the island of Usedom, the organization of regular cultural and sports festivals, and the publication of bi- or even trilingual magazines emphasizing the importance of such links. This has encouraged similar developments on Poland's southern border with the Czech and Slovak republics; and also, less predictably, on the eastern border with Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania and Kaliningrad.

The funding process is slow and the Euroregions, outside mainstream national administrative structures, are often marginalized in the project selection process by central governments, owing to the latter's responsibility for EU funding

distribution. However, the very existence of 14 Euroregions covering almost the entirety of the Polish border (see Figure 6.1) testifies to considerable interest in border regions to participate in the new cooperative agenda. Hungary had early links with Austria and engaged in multilateral cooperation through the Alpen-Adria Community, and has now belatedly set up Euroregions with all seven of



Figure 6.1 Euroregions around Poland's borders.

Source: Euroregiony w nowym podziale terytorialnym Polski, Central Statistical Office, Warsaw-Wroclaw 1999 (English text added).

her neighbours. With national minorities present in all of these countries, Hungary to an even greater extent than Poland must have an interest in such transboundary links, but has not yet seen much in the way of concrete results. In fact, a Hungarian expert maintains that 'it is very pleasant for the leaders of the local authorities, they travel across the border, have dinner with their neighbours, appear in the media, but there are no concrete results. People in general do not know about the Euroregions at all' (Tamás Hardi, Centre for Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences). Dr Hardi does, however, admit that since most of the Euroregions in Hungary were not set up until the late 1990s, there may still be a future role for them to play. Since cross-border cooperation is now both part of the pre-accession process and of the EU's regional policy agenda, institutionalized cooperation across the borders of the countries of CEE can be considered to play a significant role in the process of integration with their neighbours on both the current and the future external borders (Kennard 2002).

Cross-border governance as a tool for regeneration in impoverished and culturally divided regions

Without exception the border regions and towns either side of the eastern and southern borders of the accession countries are poor, and most of them overlap culturally but, paradoxically, these cultures are also divided by borders. In peripheral regions, there is much to be gained from pooling transboundary economic resources and benefiting from common cultural links, especially if advantage can be taken of appropriate institutional funding arrangements.

Once the CEE borders were opened after 1989, one of the first spontaneous cross-border activities was to shop for cheaper goods on either side of a given border. The 'increased mobility of consumers' (van der Velde 2000) had a deeper significance in this part of Europe than in the west, born as it was of pent-up demand on the one side, and the desire for cheaper goods on the other. Thus, the 'emancipation' (van der Velde and van Houtum 2000) of CEE citizens in this regard was something which came suddenly and developed rapidly. Cross-border shopping here mushroomed into what became known as the 'bazaar economy' (Stryjakiewicz and Kaczmarek 1997; Krätke 1999) on the German–Polish border in the early 1990s, and low-level and 'suitcase' trading continues on some level now across all of the borders in the region.

The poverty and unemployment at the eastern end of the region means that smuggling alcohol, cigarettes and petrol or diesel seems to many individuals literally to be the only means of survival. Regular deliveries of Russian vodka into Polish villages near the border with Kaliningrad, and Russian purchases there of goods which are rarely available at home keep many a village shop in business. An unemployed Polish civil engineer finds herself needing to make enough money to support two student daughters, and so becomes involved in smuggling on a small scale, but even that is becoming difficult as the 'payments to the officials continually increase' (Jäger-Dąbek 2001). It is now well known that border personnel are not only conniving in smuggling activities, but also themselves

benefiting from such activities. The author witnessed a passport being submitted with a banknote inside on the Hungarian–Ukrainian border, but further west, on the Hungarian border with Slovakia there are notices to the effect that keeping money in one's passport during a border crossing 'could result in misunderstandings'. Evidently the countries hoping for early entry to the EU are making efforts, at least on their western borders, to ensure that their procedures are above reproach.

How, then, can cross-border cooperation contribute to the elimination of economic dissonance and encourage a transnational demos at and around the borders at the far reaches of the new Europe? It will be important to encourage investment in these regions, so that inhabitants are less likely to be unemployed and inclined to emigrate and to encourage visitors to these less populated regions. Cross-border tourism certainly has great potential here, and is already making great strides on the western borders of the accession countries as more investment becomes possible and the financial returns greater. Some of these holidays capitalize on historical cultural links ('two countries – one culture'), but Schengen will render such activities much more difficult on the new external borders of the EU.

There have been numerous initiatives along the border with the former Soviet Union, discussions in the early 1990s leading eventually in all cases to the use of the Euroregion template due to its apparent success on the borders with Western Europe. Generally speaking, the prime movers in setting up Euroregions have been local authorities, backed by chambers of commerce and regional economic bodies such as banks and other financial institutions, all of whom can see the potential for industrial and commercial cooperation, improved roads and border crossings, as well as enhanced status in the international arena (Holm-Hansen 1999: 56). Any success achieved by such ventures will presumably enhance the visibility of the Euroregions and their acceptability as a vehicle for community-building.

The multi-national *Carpathian* Euroregion, set up in 1993 as the first along the former Soviet border, including parts of Poland, Ukraine, Slovakia, Hungary and, since 1997, Romania, has yet to fulfil its early promise. It was set up on an initiative and with funding from the Institute for East–West Studies, based in New York and with offices throughout Europe. Although this mountainous region has a number of areas of common concern – pollution of the natural environment, great tourism potential, a significant agricultural and food sector, and considerable industrial potential (*Euroregiony . . . Polski* 1999: 257) – there has been little evidence of any real Euroregional progress for much of that time. Although funds were allocated in 1999 from the PHARE/CREDO Small Projects Fund (SPF), the main economic activity seems to have been a number of 'Euroregional Fairs' to encourage regional trade. In the cultural sphere an Association of Carpathian Region Universities was set up in 1994 'to facilitate cooperation between institutions of higher education in the region, to carry out common projects as well as to help in establishing contacts with universities from Western Europe and the USA' (Rębisz 2002: 33). A recent meeting made

reference to the floods in the region in the summer of 2002, but did nothing other than to agree that Hungary and Ukraine would 'have negotiations regarding multilateral cooperation within the framework of a complex and large-scale international flood program' (Minutes of the 30th Meeting . . . 2002: 1).

The enormous size and external stimulus to establish this Euroregion appears to make it difficult for the population to have a sense of ownership. Indeed the evidence is that even now most of the inhabitants are not even aware of its existence (Rębisz 2002), and it is likely that they do not identify with the probable political motive for its original US-inspired establishment: the neutralization of any Balkan-style conflict after the downfall of the Soviet Union (Rębisz 2002).

Poland has certainly been concerned to 'Europeanize' Ukraine (Wolczuk 2002: 175), bearing in mind the possible knock-on effects of problems in Russia, but also the increasing likelihood of its own membership of western institutions. Poland has encouraged Ukraine to join sub-regional institutions such as the Central European Initiative, and has acted as a sort of 'ambassador to Brussels' for Ukraine, although this may not always have been in Poland's own interests (Wolczuk 2002), for instance, in supporting a government which has been involved in major corruption scandals. A number of institutional platforms have been set up, in order to create more economic cooperation, free trade and wider inter-regional relations, with the idea of trying to generate activity in areas which are in dire need of economic wealth creation. The free market is already having a significant effect: with 10 million border crossings in 2001, and with an average spend in Poland by Ukrainian 'tourists' of $400, it is estimated that closing the border to this informal trade as a result of Schengen restrictions could lead to a loss of 60 per cent of jobs in the border towns (Wolczuk 2002: 178).

Further north, the *Bug* Euroregion bestrides today's border between Poland and Ukraine/Belarus, a region which was almost entirely part of Poland before the Second World War. Although it also was rather slow in starting – Poland and Ukraine set up the Euroregion in 1995, Belarus joined them in 1998 – this region has seen major improvements in the border crossing at Dorohusk/Jagodzin, conferences on cooperation, and in 1999–2000 carried out 14 cross-border projects supported by the PHARE Small Project Fund (Projekty Euroregionalne 2002). The significance of these projects lies in their local nature, the trust-building between peoples who have been cut off from each other for at least two generations, but who do have much historical and cultural overlap. The establishment of a Euroregional tourist bureau will encourage interchange, as will a business enterprise in Tarnobrzeg in Poland to support SMEs in the cross-border area as far as Lutsk, L'viv and other towns in the region in Ukraine (Projekty Euroregionalne 2002). In addition to this, many cultural and sporting events are organized and funded through the SPF, which can only be of benefit, both to the generation which remembers this as an integrated, borderless region, and to the younger generations which hope now for a future without tension here.

The *Niemen* Euroregion includes border regions in Poland, Belarus, Lithuania and also, more recently, part of the Kaliningrad enclave. Like the *Bug* Euroregion, it is named after the river which is the main geographical feature of the region,

although in this case the river does not actually reach Poland's borders of today. However, the Niemen River is closely connected with Polish history, among other things through the poetry of Adam Mickiewicz,[4] and use is still made of this fact in the Euroregion literature (Holm-Hansen 1999: 59). This thinly populated region is rich in natural endowments, as it contains the famous transboundary primeval Białowieża Forest, so that the Euroregion's environmental working group is of particular importance. The poverty and geographically marginalized nature of this region has perhaps rendered more interesting an institutionalization process which also brings with it an international dimension. At any rate, there has been intense activity here, with visits from and to sister Euroregions on Poland's western border with Germany, meetings with Danish and Swedish business representatives, discussions with the AEBR and with member countries of the INTERREG IIC Baltic Sea Region about wider cooperative initiatives and also a number of meetings with representatives of the New York Institute for East–West Studies (Kronika wydarzeń Euroregionn Niemen 2002).

The *Baltic* Euroregion is potentially the most problematic of all these border institutions, since as well as two current member states of the EU, Denmark (the island of Bornholm) and Sweden, together with Poland, Lithuania and Latvia, it does also include the Kaliningrad enclave, originally part of East Prussia, later the Soviet Union, and inherited by Russia after 1990. This means that Russian nationals travelling between the enclave and the 'motherland' have to pass through both EU-accession state Lithuania and Belarus. Set up relatively late in 1998, the *Baltic* Euroregion has ambitious aims: to improve living conditions, promote mutual contacts, cooperation and sustainable development, and also the 'elimination of historical prejudice' (*Euroregiony w nowym podziale terytorialnym Polski* 1999: 331). A 'Good Governance' project aims to 'raise the competence and efficiency of public administrative bodies' in the countries of the region, to 'define more clearly the roles and the division of responsibility between politicians and public servants' and to 'develop dialogue with the citizens', etc. A further undertaking, 'Project 2002+', aimed at formulating a tighter cooperation strategy, has already been transformed into an INTERREG IIIB project called 'Seagull', with a much wider remit in the Baltic Sea Region (Euroregion Baltic – Projects 2002). This joint strategy for long-term transnational sustainable development is of the utmost importance to the region as a whole, including as it does all the accession countries as well as the Russian oblast, Kaliningrad. All of Kaliningrad's neighbours are nervous about the coming situation when the district is surrounded by EU member states. Lithuania in particular, sandwiched between the Russian enclave and Belarus and needing good relations with both countries, is in a difficult geopolitical position. This is because Russians will travel between her Schengen borders after accession, and fears of a 'hostile environment' run high in Vilnius currently (Gromadzki 2002: 252). The solution decided upon in Brussels at the time of writing, to introduce a 'Facilitated Travel Document' (a visa by another name, but free of charge) for Russians wishing to travel in the future across EU territory between Kaliningrad and Belarus/Russia is a somewhat awkward concession, unlikely to assuage Lithuanian fears. All the more

important, then, that the institutional environment in the region should be an inclusive one, allowing a positive approach to cooperation.

Conclusion

Borders and border regions in the central and eastern parts of Europe have undergone many changes in their roles and meanings in the last ten years. So far, the changes have been greatest in the countries adjacent to their future EU partners, which is, of course, to be expected. Relationships with others, however, which are to remain outside, will also continue to be important, if *all* the countries in the region are to flourish. The development of a cross-border demos, where peoples meet on regular basis and with some low-level political remit to solve common problems, can help to generate improved living conditions and promote wider mutual contacts on borders within the new EU. It is important for the quality of life at the new exterior of the Union, that this is possible there also. Cross-border tourism and trade have already contributed to this process; border procedures, including the Schengen regime, need to be clarified and made as flexible as possible, and transboundary cooperative ventures need to be encouraged, both within the future EU and on its future perimeter.

The rapidity with which the borders of CEE assumed new roles after 1989 and adjusted to a totally new arena of activity, has been clear to all. The sheer technological adjustments to the process of crossing these borders has been a significant factor in aligning the countries of CEE with those of their western neighbours. Regulation and transparency have to be the order of the day, if there is to be a reasonable 'fit' between the two halves of Europe in the future. This does mean that as accession comes closer for some, apparent discrepancies between procedures at the borders to the east and west must be seen to be eliminated. The internal freedoms of Schengen will not apply to the newcomers immediately, so border procedures will be a key test of the applicants' ability and willingness to accept this important part of the *acquis communautaire* during the transition period.

The security discourse, linking terrorism, organized crime and illegal immigration has, since the Tampere Declaration of the EU heads of state and government in October 1999, given way to a more positive approach, with renewed emphasis on individual rights and cooperation at the frontiers (Anderson and Bort 2001). Nevertheless, the applicant states are not, as is the United Kingdom, being allowed the privilege of opting out of the Schengen restrictions, and most are already putting in place border structures on the future perimeter, which will inevitably act as a reminder of the Cold War divide. It will be difficult, if not disastrous for many, if the idea of some sort of flexibility of movement is not entertained, such as no-cost or cheap visas for regular and local travellers. In Lyndelle Fairlie's words, 'Schengen is a moving target and border barriers are not inevitable' (Fairlie and Sergounin 2001: 112).

The Schengen regime is certainly the biggest threat to developing transboundary cooperation at the future eastern and southern borders of the EU. In setting up an elaborate patchwork of Euroregions, albeit at least partly in

order to access EU funding, Poland and Hungary in particular have demonstrated their wish to participate in this crucial part of the EU's regional policy agenda. The enthusiasm and achievements of local and regional elites augur well for the setting-up of a cross-border demos and for the regeneration of these forgotten regions, which otherwise may degenerate into areas known only for drug-smuggling, human trafficking, prostitution and other kinds of crime. Indeed, if the outer edges of the new Union are effectively excluded from the EU's policy processes, and become unable to face the new challenges presented by European integration, then the cleavages in Europe will widen and regional polarization increase. The bridge across the River Sava, a tributary of the Danube, at Brčko, between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, was rebuilt after the Balkan Wars with PHARE monies. Perhaps this can serve to symbolize future cooperation in border areas remote from Brussels, so that regional polarization can be reduced, instead of widening the gap between EU member states and the rest of the continent.

Notes

1 This cathedral started out also as a Catholic church during the Austro-Hungarian Empire, a monastery church in fact, set up by the Jesuits in 1644. After the Jesuits were driven out of the Empire, the monastery became a Uniate bishop's residence, and the church a Uniate cathedral.

2 Interview with the Lizàk family in Velke (Greater) Slemence on the Slovak border. The other half of the village, visible over a wire fence, but now in Ukraine, is now called Malyi (Lesser) Solonci.

3 Interview with Hungarian border police commandant at remote tripoint Hungary–Romania–Ukraine.

4 Adam Mickiewicz (1798–1855), born in today's Lithuania, was a symbol of Polish national feeling during the Polish partitions of the nineteenth century, when Poland disappeared from the map of Europe. His epic poem, *Pan Tadeusz*, is revered today as the epitome of Polish patriotism.

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7 Euregios in changing Europe

Euregio Karelia and Euroregion Pomerania as examples

Petri Virtanen

Introduction

During the last decades Europe has gone through several changes. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the fall of the 'Iron Curtain', and the strengthening role of the European Union have brought dramatic changes to developments in different spheres of political and human interaction. One indication of these changes is the changing role of the regions. The view that the nation-state is too small for the big problems and too big for the small problems has led to a growing awareness of the power and potential influence of regions within the European Union (Wagstaff 1994). In the border regions of the European Union the number of Euregios[1] has risen dramatically during the 1990s. These transnational regional bodies have become one major player in the constantly globalizing field of regions. They are, together with other regions, competing for investments and labour force, but simultaneously with the competition they are playing an important part in the border and enlargement policies of the European Union.

This chapter consists of two parts; the first part discusses different large-scale processes that have changed political and geographical European space within the past three decades. First, I will discuss the development of regionalism and compare the differences between old and new regionalism. The relationship of changing regionalism to nationalism and changes in governance are also discussed. After that I will concentrate on relations between the local and the global and discuss the relationship between globalization and regionalism. Finally, I discuss the European Union, emphasizing integration and identification as two bigger processes within the Union. The second part of my article concentrates more deeply on two Euregios on the eastern border of the European Union, i.e. Euregio Karelia and Euroregion Pomerania. First, I describe historical and geographical developments in the regions, then focus more thoroughly on the roles of the Euregios in a changing world and examine how they are involved with the processes discussed during the first part of the chapter. Finally I try to draw some conclusions.

From provincial regionalism to competitive regionalism

When talking about regionalism it is important to make a distinction between regionalism and regionalization. These concepts are often used interchangeably, without respecting their specific features. Regionalism refers to a body of ideas, values and objectives that are aimed at creating, maintaining or modifying different goals within a particular region. It is usually associated with policy programmes and strategies leading to institution building and the establishment of a region as a political unit. Regionalization, on the other hand, refers to the regional processes that lead to different patterns of cooperation within a specific geographical area. These processes, e.g. economic integration and the changing structure of production and power, result in deepening integration in a particular region (Spindler 2000; Söderbaum 2002; Grugel and Hout 1999).

It is also important to notice the problematic nature of the region. It may simply refer to a sub-unit of government, or it can encompass a historic cultural boundary. Furthermore, the concept of regionalism has a two-dimensional nature. For most citizens and many politicians, identification with a region primarily means micro-regions (i.e. sub-national units within existing states), while for new 'Europeanists' it refers much more to macro-regions, notably the EU (Holmes and Murray 1999: 5). It can, thus, refer both to the growing role of sub-state units and to the development of supra-state bodies such as the EU (Holmes and Murray 1999: 21).

Though regionalism is highly stressed in present-day Europe, it is not a new phenomenon. Elements of regionalism and regional consciousness might be traced back all the way to the late Middle Ages. Since that time, and over and above the creation of independent nation-states, regionalism and regional consciousness, which has been based on common historical and cultural traditions as well as very similar social and political institutions, has existed in various forms and quantities (Bodi 1992: 145). This conception refers to the old version of regionalism, which was a state-led process where regions were suppose to provide political support for the states and governments and were represented in state politics. As payment for their loyalty to the state, regions were provided with protection and subsidies (Keating 1998: 78). Thus regions were seen as parts of the body of the state, and the main idea of the development of regions was to protect the aspirations of the state. Rather than develop regions as a part of the global order, the logic of regionalism was the closing off of regions to their international surroundings and the protection of the interests of the state.

The logic of the old regionalism has clear linkages with the ideas related to nationalism. Both are constructed against the same background; both have been seen as the result of a common ethnic, linguistic and cultural background and long traditions (see e.g. Calhoun 1997: 140–2; Taylor 1990: 171, 174; Bodi 1992: 145). According to this logic, regions are seen as primordial and naturally given areas that belong to a certain group of people. One fallacy of this logic is that the further back in history one goes the greater is the degree of mixture and

complexity. This creates a situation where the same region can 'belong' to more than one group of people. There are many different groups of 'us' and 'them' within the same region. The most notorious example of the dangers of misuse of the ideal of inherited region and regionalism was the creation of the image of the 'natural' borders of the German Empire during the Nazi era. The pseudo-religious usage of concepts such as *Lebensraum, Heimat* and *Volk* created an imagined natural 'living space' for the German people. This was seen to justify the expansive foreign policy, as well as the murderous exclusion of anything 'un-German' (Morley and Robins 1995: 96–7).

After the intense regional activity of the late 1960s and 1970s, and the stabilization of territorial politics in western Europe in the 1980s, regions 'struck back' from the late 1980s onwards with the new wave of regionalism. The dyadic exchange between state and region was destabilized by globalization, European integration and the advance of the market. Regions have now emerged as new places for the construction of policies, as systems of action, and as actors themselves in the global order. The state itself is being transformed and in the process is losing its former ability to manage spatial change and development. Its power and authority have been eroded from three directions: from above, by internationalization; from below by regional and local assertions; and laterally, by the advance of the market and civil society (Keating 1998: 72–3). States have lost their monopoly of mediation and their ability to control their own spatial economies. Regions still engage in exchange with their respective states, but are also in direct contact with international regimes, and with the global market (Keating 1998: 78). The new form of regionalism is, thus, based merely on co-operation with other regions and/or supranational organizations.

For example, in the European context, the growing significance of the European Parliament, Commission and judicial system is to an increasing degree questioning national sovereignty. At the same time, tendencies towards regionalism are accommodated in a supranational system of the European Union rather than in nation-states (Castels 1999: 55). Governance is no longer only a state-led process, but has changed towards a more multi-level form. In its simplest form, the idea of multi-level governance straightforwardly suggests that political processes, instead of being shaped at the supranational level between national governments, are shaped in an interplay among supranational, national and sub-national tiers of government (Svensson 2000: 6). Interdependence between public actors of different territorial levels means that European polity is seen as a system of non-nested, interconnected political arenas in which the boundaries between domestic and international politics are increasingly blurred (Perkmann 2002: 107). In many cases the interplay may skip the national level and take place between sub-national and supranational agencies.

In border regions, regionalism often has transnational aspects. Transnational regionalism is driven by a desire to develop new, more responsive and effective forms of government and collective action in protecting the environment, safeguarding peaceful co-existence, promoting economic development, and strengthening the feeling of togetherness across the border, i.e. to fulfil the goals

of regionalism in a multinational sphere. One attempt to strengthen transnational regionalism is the formation of administrative bodies across the border to develop and promote political integration and local level cooperation to solve day-to day problems. On the borders of the European Union the main form of these administrative bodies are Euregios.

Regions in a globalizing world

Hand in hand with the new wave of regionalism, another idea and scale of economic, social and political activities has gained more and more attention. The term globalization has become one of the most popular conceptions when explaining current changes in economy, international politics, changes in structures of society, and so on. The main emphasis has, however, been on economics. Globalization is seen as an inevitable process that takes its form through economic processes. The changing logic of economics, e.g. a shift from Fordism to post-Fordism and the revolution in information technology (see Sum 2002: 52), is seen to weaken the role of political boundaries or even to desolate them totally. Multinational companies and flows of capital have gained more and more power at the expense of political decision-making.

The concept of globalization, too, has suffered from a great variety of diverse and changeable definitions. It has become, as Bob Jessop (1999) states, a 'Chaotic Concept', and it sometimes seems that it is possible to pronounce practically anything on the subject. One way or another, discussions of globalization usually highlight the question of borders, i.e. the territorial demarcations of state jurisdictions, and associated issues of governance, economy, identity and community (Scholte 1997).

Around this theme, Scholte (1997) distinguishes three common and overlapping, yet differently emphasized, notions of the term globalization. First, globalization is seen as an increase in cross-border relations, which is in effect synonymous with 'internationalization'. Globalization is used to denote increased movement between countries of goods, investments, people, money, messages and ideas. Thus the designation, 'global' is nothing more than a synonym for 'international' and therefore a redundant concept. Second, globalization is treated as an increase in *open*-border relations. This notion emphasizes liberalization and describes the creation of a single borderless world. Here 'globalization' is synonymously and unnecessarily used alongside 'liberalization'. The vocabulary of 'liberalization' is perfectly adequate here. The third regards globalization as an increase in trans-border relations. In this most distinctive and useful notion, territorial distance and territorial borders hold limited significance and the globe becomes a single 'place' in its own right (ibid.).

The relation between larger level supranational regionalism (the emergence of regions such as the EU and NAFTA) and globalization has been explained in two main ways. 'Old regionalists' view the regional trading bloc formation as a means to reduce dependence on the wider global economy. This approach presents globalization and regionalism as divergent or even opposed trends. Some 'new

regionalist' scholars, on the other hand, offer a geoeconomic account, which supersedes the 'old' (geo)political view (Sum 2003: 53). Within the framework of smaller-scale regionalism the new wave of regionalism is marked by two linked features: it is not contained within the framework of the nation-state; and it pits regions against each other in a competitive mode rather than providing complementary roles for them in a national division of labour (Keating 1998).

European Union: integration and identity

Since the Schuman declaration, made in 1950, the integration of Europe in order to create an economically, politically and militarily more stable Europe has been one of the guiding principles of the development of the European Union. This process was to be carried out by the High Authority (i.e. the European Union), which is binding on the member countries (European Union 2003a). To further develop the integration of the Europe, the need for smaller administrative units within the European Union has been emphasized from the very beginning of the European Union. In 1957 the countries signing the Treaty of Rome refer in its preamble to the need 'to strengthen the unity of their economies and to ensure their harmonious development by reducing the differences existing between the various regions and the backwardness of the less favoured regions' (European Union 2003b).

Stronger regional emphasis at the expense of nation-states has diminished their role and power in certain situations. This has led to a situation that some scholars have referred to as a 'hollowing-out' of the nation-state. It involves a transfer of certain responsibilities upwards and outwards to supranational organizations and a transfer of other responsibilities downwards and inwards to the grassroots, local or regional level (Painter 1995: 96). It should, however, be emphasized that despite the hollowing out of the nation-state as a political and economic entity, its role as the basis of identity formation for a governing body has not disappeared.

Despite the strong economic emphasis, European integration includes other equally important aspects. The European idea of continental integration has from its very beginning maintained that it should be a political, all-encompassing project (Blatter and Clement 2000: 86). Therefore, the strengthening or creation of a common European identity has also become one crucial element in European Union integration (e.g. Mikkeli 1998). The question of European identity has proven to be a complex concept. Anttonen (1996: 7) has pointed out that local, regional, and national economies, cultures, political structures and spaces of identification are no longer – if they ever were – isolated units, but rather integrated parts in a global system of relations. He also stresses that an increasing flow of people (with various ethnic, religious and political backgrounds) across ethnic, political economic and geographical borders has changed cultural landscapes and turned ethnically more or less homogeneous states into multiethnic and multicultural societies. This has brought a new dimension into the making of state-based, national, regional, local and ethnic identities (Anttonen 1996: 7).

Mikkeli (1998: 20) has stated that the need for European identity can be justified with four arguments. First, it is needed to make European integration something more than just an economic process. Second, European identity is needed in order to minimize the democracy deficit. Third, creation of a European identity would clarify the concept of 'Europe', and, finally, it would also minimize the enchantment of nationalism. Although the European Union has used some of the traditional inventive measures in creating a common European identity (e.g. a flag, Europe day and common currency), it is not likely that European citizens will identify themselves with the European Union, at least not in a traditional way. A citizen of Finland is first and foremost Finnish, and perhaps secondly a citizen of Europe or a citizen of the European Union. Citizens can, however, have multi-level identities, e.g. North-Karelian, Finnish, European and member of the global community. The first two identities are most often based on traditional (or 'natural') identity conceptions, such as place of birth or 'natural' belonging to the certain group of people. The latter two, instead, include more modern (or 'artificial') elements, like the creation of a common set of values, or common understanding of good society. European identity as one of the latter two is based on West-European values such as respect for human rights, democracy, and the rule of law (e.g. Scheider 2002).

From border regions to Euregios

A revival of regionalism and (economic) support for the European Union has increased the number of Euregios, most notably during the 1990s. The tendency has been especially strong in Central and Eastern Europe (AEBR 1999: 13). This is mainly due to the fall of the Iron Curtain and in part to the (pre-)integration policy of the EU. After the collapse of the Communist regimes, new forms of (cross-border) cooperation were founded. Euregios were promoted to organize this cooperation and give it official form.

Euregio Karelia and Euroregion Pomerania have more in common than just the status of Euregios. First, both of them share basic features of border regions, e.g. peripheral location, economic difficulties and underdeveloped infrastructure. In addition, both have a complex history, with conflicts and changes in borderlines. After the Second World War, the Finnish–Russian as well as the German–Polish border changed, and new borderlines were drawn; quite soon after that the 'Iron Curtain' was built, which was to divide Europe for several decades.

The Finnish–Russian border was closed and very strictly guarded up until the collapse of the Soviet Union. The framework of cross-border cooperation was created at the state level, and Finnish–Russian cooperation was guided by the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, concluded in 1948. The agreement was the basic document of post-war foreign policy in Finland, and it controlled Finland's relationship not only with the Soviet Union, but also with the Western countries. After the Second World War parts of Finnish territory were annexed by the Soviet Union and some 400,000 people had to be

evacuated and resettled in other parts of Finland. Because the annexed part of Karelia was emptied of population, people from various parts of the Soviet Union moved to the area during the 1940s and 1950s, and at the same time place-names and other symbols were Russified. The main interest of Russia in the area that had belonged to Finland was strategic, and the territory was, from the Soviet point of view, a military buffer zone, and therefore areas close to the border remained largely unpopulated (Forsberg 1995: 207–9). Demands for returning the annexed regions to Finland have gained some support, especially after 1991, but the Finnish government and leading politicians have not shown much enthusiasm for the return of those regions. The Russian response has been clear and has emphasized that the need for general stability requires stability of the borders (Forsberg 1995: 212–18).

The German–Polish[2] border region also has its complexities. After the Second World War, Poland and the eastern part of Germany were settled under the Communist regime, and the GDR in particular was the model student. Even though both countries were on the same side of the Iron Curtain, relations between them during the Cold War were developed primarily at a state level, and after the events in 1980–1981 the border was closed in order to prevent anti-Communist ideas from spreading to the GDR (Fure 1997). The collapse of the Communist regime and the reunification of Germany changed the situation dramatically. Poland now directly borders the territory of the unified Germany and is to become one of the new members of the European Union in the year 2004. The drawing of new borderlines left open the discussion of the Oder-Neisse territory. Some Germans in the GDR claimed that the Reich, within the borders of 1937, never seized the border to legitimise it for a future united Germany. On the Polish side, the gaining of the Oder-Neisse territory was seen partly as a historically justified return to the old Polish homeland. The debate on the borderlines continued with changing volume until 1991, when in the last treaty of the united Germany borderlines drawn after the Second World War were concluded as being the official and stable borders of the reunited Germany (Fure 1997).

Euroregion Pomerania includes regions from three countries: Germany, Poland and Sweden. The overall area of this region is about 38,000 km^2 with a population of almost 3.4 million. It was founded in 1995 and originally consisted of regions from two countries: the city of Szczecin and 77 municipalities and towns in Poland, two cities and six regions (*Landkreisen*) in the territory of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Brandenburg in Germany. The Swedish partner, i.e. the region of Skåne, joined Euroregion Pomerania in 1998 (Euroregion Pomerania 18 July 2002). Euregio Karelia was established in February 2000, and it comprises 700 km of border between the EU and Russia and has a population of 1.4 million people. The overall area of this region is 263,667 km^2, of which 180,500 km^2 belongs to the Karelian Republic and 83,000 km^2 to Finland. It consists of four regions; the provinces of North Karelia, Kainuu and North Ostrobothnia on the Finnish side and the Republic of Karelia on the Russian side (Euregio Karelia 17 July 2002; Euregio Karelia 18 July 2002).

Figures 7.1 and 7.2 Euregio Karelia and Euroregion Pomerania.

Sources: Euregio Karelia 17 July 2002; Brandenburg 18 July 2002.

Both of these regions include areas from EU-member and non-member countries. There is, however, a fundamental difference between them. Euroregion Pomerania contains areas of Poland, which is a potential member of the EU, whereas Euregio Karelia borders on Russia, which is not a candidate state. Euroregion Pomerania is located in a future internal border region of the EU and can, therefore, help Polish partners in their preparations for EU membership. Euregio Karelia, in contrast, is, at least in the foreseeable future, situated on a permanent external EU border. These geopolitical differences create different bases for cooperation and roles for the selected Euregios.

Euregio Karelia and Euroregion Pomerania in a changing world

In describing goals and historical justification, both Euregios appeal to common history and cultural traditions based on their geographical location. Euregio Karelia is described as 'a continuous process, in which cooperation aiming at a joint goal takes place on a concrete level on both sides of the border' and the main idea of the Euregio is based on the 'regions' long, common cultural and co-operation traditions' (Euregio Karelia 17 July 2002). Euroregion Pomerania region is described as a region where 'historically developed West-East and North-South relations are being re-established within the viewpoint of wider European integration' (Brandenburg 18 July 2002; Euroregion Pomerania 17 July 2002) Regions are willingly seen as transnational regions within the conception of 'old regionalism', with identification of a common region. Considering the complexities in the histories of the regions, the changes in the ethnic composition of the population and the closure of the border until the 1990s, these claims seem to be exaggerated. Instead of being projects of long traditions and a common cultural heritage, Euregio Karelia and Euroregion Pomerania, like Anderson's (1991) nations, appear to be, more than anything, 'imagined communities' brought into existence by human agency. It follows that division of who is 'inside' and who 'out' is, above all, a matter of political negotiation, not the consequence of common heritage (Grugel and Hout 1999: 9).

On the other hand the European Union aims to create a common feeling of Europeanness within the European Union from almost the same point of departure. The European Union includes several nationalities that are living in different nation-states and who speak different languages. There is, however, one contradiction between the EU-identity and Euregio – identity on the eastern border of the European Union. The European Union aims to create a feeling of togetherness inside the European Union, while the Euregio-identity crosses the external border of the European Union. If creation of a transboundary region with a common set of values is one of the goals, then we should note that the process of regionalism – transboundary regionalism in particular – is complex and slow, and that the creation of regional identity across the border is far more difficult.

Is common heritage, then, some kind of prerequisite for creation of a transboundary region and successful cooperation across its borders? The answer

is twofold. If the aim is to create a transnational Euregio in the spirit of old regionalism, i.e. with a strong feeling of togetherness and common identity, common heritage is surely extremely beneficial. Weak common identity and negative stereotypes can be tackled, for example, by arranging exchange programmes for schoolteachers and children, like in Euroregion Pomerania (see Euroregion Pomerania 17 July 2002; Fure 1997). On the other hand, if the aim is to build a more straightforward transboundary region from a functional basis, i.e. to develop everyday cross-border cooperation and administrative structures in the region to help cooperation across the borderline and to improve the economic situation of the region, then common heritage or identity is not necessarily needed. This does not, however, mean that it would not be beneficial to have one. One way to see the foundation of Euregios is, thus functional, where collaboration within the framework of Euregios is reaction to, for example, the peripheral location of border areas. To reduce and avoid negative externalities and to realize the possible advantages of the border regions, cross-border co-operation is developed, for example, by founding administrative units such as Euregios (Blatter and Clement 2000: 87). Euregio Karelia and Euroregion Pomerania are also founded so as to tackle economic problems and in order to improve the competitiveness of the regions. In globalization and regionalization, world regions are not only cooperative partners representing certain nation-states, they are also part of national and international competition. On the national level, border regions have to compete with other regions for investments and an educated workforce. At the same time, they have to struggle with problems like unemployment and insufficient infrastructure. Selected Euregios aim to tackle these problems by supporting the implementation of projects in the economic, cultural, social and educational sectors and developing economic co-operation and developing and adapting the infrastructure. (Euregio Karelia 18 July 2002; Euroregion Pomerania 17 July 2002). One may, of course, argue that the above-mentioned economic and social development could occur without Euregios, and that their role in these developments is minimal or even non-existent and that market forces will take care of the flow of capital and labour.

Euregios do, however, have an important role in the border policies of the European Union as mediators and coordinators of cooperation and funding. With its border policies, the European Union uses monetary measures to diminish economic disparities and to improve the cohesion and integration of the European Union. Euregio Karelia, for example, has set a combination of INTERREG and TACIS-money as one of its main goals and Euroregion Pomerania emphasizes a combination of INTERREG and PHARE-money (Euregio Karelia 18 July 2002; Euroregion Pomerania 17 July 2002). In this role they are working as governing bodies and as a part of the European Union border policies.

Enlargement will create three major challenges for the cohesion and integration policy of the European Union. First, development disparities will be magnified. Second, the centre of gravity of cohesion policy will shift to eastern Europe. Third, the inequalities that already exist in the Europe of Fifteen will not

vanish (European Union 25 March 2003). One way of reducing disparities, especially on the eastern border of the European Union, is (sub)-regional cooperation. Even though the European Union should not expect such cooperation to replace an effective enlargement policy, it should be encouraged because of its ability to lessen political and economic barriers and attract investment (Krenzler 1998).

Concluding remarks

When studying Euregio Karelia and Euroregion Pomerania as representatives of the Euregios on the eastern border of the European Union, three points could be emphasized. First, there is the development of regionalism and globalization and trends towards the Europe of Euregios. It should be noted that the situation on the external borders of the Union derives noticeably from the situation in Euregios located in internal border regions. The governance of Euregios, as well as other regions, is nowadays merely in the hands of local administration. The former state-led governance system has turned towards region-led form. Furthermore, Euregios, together with other regions, are part of the global system of competition. In the cases of Euregio Karelia and Euroregion Pomerania, their geographical location sets limitations on their competitiveness. In addition to their traditional location in their countries, the crossing of the eastern border of the European Union diminishes their economic competitiveness. Particularly in the Euregio Karelia regions economic disparities between the Finnish and Russian side are immense. Economic asymmetries also have other implications besides just the weak economic position of the region. They may cause exploitation and social asymmetries which strengthen negative stereotypes. While both regions are located on the eastern border of the European Union and eagerly advertise themselves as gateways between east and west (Euregio Karelia 18 July 2002; Euroregion Pomerania 17 July 2002), there is clearly a competitive aspect between them. It is likely that in the future the competition between gateway regions will intensify, and Euregio Karelia and Euroregion Pomerania will have to develop new strategies in order to keep up with the competition.

Second, the historical complexity of the selected Euregios has set limitations on the development of transnational identity. Despite action to build transnational regionalism, it is evident that the creation of regionally located multinational and multicultural communities that would include areas on both sides of the border is a complicated and time-consuming process and in the selected Euregios there are many problems to be overcome before we can speak of a real transnational region with a common cultural and idealistic background. Scott's (1999) notions (based on the perspective of political geography and/or geopolitics) that Euregios have thus far only met with qualified success in achieving their ambitious aims, is not surprising. It would be more surprising if Euregios (especially those located on the eastern border of the EU) had been able to create a strong regional sense of togetherness among the people of their areas within just ten years. On the other hand, the lack of 'old regionalism' within

these regions does not necessarily mean that there is also a lack of cross-border cooperation and economic activities.

Third, the eastern enlargement of the European Union has become perhaps its greatest challenge. The introduction and adaptation of new economical, political and social structures to and by possible member countries (most of which are CEE-countries) requires much from both the European Union and the applicant countries. Fulfilment of the political, economic and legal criterion of membership has proven to be more or less troublesome. In addition, regional disparities between the European Union and the applicant countries, and between applicant countries themselves, constitute several problems for the enlargement process. The development of integration and cohesion within the enlarged European Union and its border regions is an immense challenge and requires considerable action. The Union has several funding opportunities, and an enormous number of different cross-border development projects across the eastern border of the European Union have been launched recently. Euregios have their role in this process as mediators and coordinators. A combination of different funding opportunities and the building of an administrative governance structure to help project-based cross-border cooperation is one of the main aims of Euregio Karelia and Euroregion Pomerania. It is important to notice that the roles and influences of the Euregios in border regions of the European Union, and on the eastern borders especially, are not just local scale actors but rather a part of the large-scale processes that are going on in the European Union.

Notes

1 In this paper the term Euregio is used as the common name for these areas. Euregio Karelia and Euroregion Pomerania are the proper names of selected areas.

2 Euroregion Pomerania initially included regions from Germany and Poland. The Swedish partner joined the Euregio a few years after its foundation.

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8 The Northern Dimension

'Multiscalar' regionalism in an enlarging European Union

James Wesley Scott

Introduction

Northern Dimensions and new geopolitical relations

The 'Northern Dimension' is a Nordic/Baltic oriented vision of peaceful co-development within the context of EU enlargement. At its most basic, it is an attempt to develop a long-term partnership with Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union in order to eliminate threats to regional stability. However, both in terms of its substantive agendas and the governance mechanisms on which it is based, the Northern Dimension (ND) represents a significant departure from the confrontational geopolitics that for decades dominated this part of Europe. Since 1990, not only has the danger of outright military conflict between Russia and the EU receded (if not vanished altogether), but the possibilities for political interaction and social exchange have enormously increased. As a result, 'security' in Europe's North (the Baltic and Barents Sea macroregions)[1] appears to be acquiring a new, heretofore unknown, quality: a quality that stems, among other things, from the opening of borders, the decommissioning of nuclear weapons, and the need for economic development and new and effective democratic institutions in the former Soviet 'bloc'.

Finland, an EU-member state since 1995 and a direct neighbour of Russia, originally formulated the Northern Dimension in response to its own changing geopolitical situation. No longer a politically neutral country on Europe's geopolitical sidelines, Finland's ambition was to position itself as a linchpin between the EU and the Russian Federation. From the beginning, however, ND was destined to be much more than the geopolitical vision of a single nation. Since its 'inauguration' in 1997, it has been embraced by a wide variety of actors in the Baltic and Barents Sea macroregions. These include representatives of states, regional authorities, local governments, civil society and the EU itself. Thus, in terms of agendas, ND has also become a more complex vision of future European development.

The Northern Dimension is highly relevant to contemporary discussion on cross-border cooperation and transnational governance because it involves at least three things. First, ND offers a regional security perspective that

complements traditional military defence-oriented policies by focusing on other specific issues of regional importance. These issues include environmental and nuclear safety, combating organized crime, safeguarding the rights of ethnic minorities, economic development and promoting effective local government. Second, and in conjunction with the preceding aspect, ND aims to heighten awareness within the EU of the 'North's' regional problematique. In the specific cases of the Baltic and Barents Sea macroregions, this is characterized by vastness, very low population densities, isolation, deep socio-economic asymmetries between its eastern and western reaches, poor land transportation infrastructures, a series of grave environmental problems, and, ultimately, a tradition of peripherality within the greater European context. Finally, ND does not involve the creation of formal institutions but, rather, promotes a long-term strategy that provides orientation to actors and groups with a stake in cross-border cooperation. It is therefore both multilevel (involving, for example, the EU, states, regions/provinces and localities as partners in many different possible arrangements) and multiscalar (varying in scope from the comprehensive macroregional initiative to the local cross-border cooperation project).

One compelling question that emerges from these observations is the extent to which ND involves a renegotiation of the rules and practices that govern geopolitical policy-making in Europe. McGrew (2000), for example, argues that the Westphalian system of sovereign nation-states enjoying exclusive rights to political coercion within clearly bounded territories is being modified by a proliferation of different spatial levels at which collective action can be organized. This 'relativisation of scale' is evidenced by the emergence of global city networks, cross-border regions, regional bloc formations, international NGOs and other forms of boundary transcending exchange (Jessop 2002). Similarly, a new geopolitical space could be emerging in Europe's North in the sense that it is no longer dominated by any single hegemon or state or by a monolithic security doctrine. As Hettne (1999), Joeniemmi (1996) and others propose, developments in the Baltic and Barents Sea regions exemplify a post-Cold War transition to greater multipolarity in the world-system, characterized by more comprehensive cooperation agendas, multiactor policy arenas and the development of a transnational civil society.

None of this, however, suggests an obsolescence of state power. As Taylor and Flint (2000) point out, the state is constantly adapting to changes in domestic and global conditions; instead of fading away, it is constantly redefining itself. In order to address the significance of ND within the wider European geopolitical context it is therefore necessary to consider the interconnectedness of new spatial contexts for governance (such as self-organizing networks) and hierarchical governance structures of the state. Indeed, much research on transboundary cooperation points to the tension inherent between boundary transcending, regional/local interaction between states and the persistent multifarious nature of state borders themselves (see Perkmann and Sum 2002). Furthermore, while the ongoing construction of a European Union has blurred distinctions between the domestic and international and 'collectivized' many aspects of national security (Telo 2001)

it remains a political community based on national identities and allegiances (Axford 1995).

Taking the above theoretical aspects and especially the shifting geopolitical roles of regions, states and supranational institutions, this contribution will critically assess the putative contributions of the Northern Dimension to European regionalization processes. In doing so I will address the following issues: (1) the development of new security agendas; (2) the encouragement of transnational civil society that involves communities and regional actors both within and outside the EU; and (3) the production of a 'Northern' perspective on European integration and development.

Negotiating political community

Regionalization and 'dimensionality' within the EU

While nation-states remain major players on the geopolitical scene, regions and 'regionalization' are seen as increasingly vital elements of the world system's governance architecture (Mansfield and Milner 1997). These regions can be defined as groups of countries that build associations around a set of common interests. Since 1945, and increasingly in the last three decades, these regions have emerged as crucial players on the global economic and political scene. They include: the European Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), the Organisation of American States (OAS), Mercosur, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). The development of these regional associations has prompted much discussion over shifting scales of governance and the changing role of nation-states in the world-system (see Perkmann and Sum 2002).[2] Since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, state sovereignty and national self-determination have established themselves as dominant principles of socio-spatial organization.[3] The world political map is itself a mosaic of states, their borders, cities and transportation networks. Citizenship rights, legitimacy in international relations and the legality of international agreements continue to be based on the legitimacy of individual states. Thus, at one level, the Westphalian system appears essentially unchanged. Increasingly however, states have been forced to address governance problems that transcend their own territorial contexts and sovereignties. Economic, environmental and political interdependencies at a global scale have clearly challenged the regulatory capacities of nation-states, irrespective of their military prowess (Jessop 2000, Young 1997). As McGrew (2000) contends, a system of 'multilayered global governance' has emerged since the latter half of the twentieth century in which there are many players (e.g. international organizations, multinational firms, NGOs, as well as states) but no clear centre of authority.

The consequences of global interdependence and multilayered global governance for the future of the 'Westphalian' order are anything but clear. There exists, of course, the notion that traditional Realpolitik based on national interests and informed by a 'big picture' or grand design of international

relations continues to be the main organizing principle of the world system.[4] However, the tensions and fractures within the world system clearly do not bode well for a unipolar 'new world order' or one-sided interpretations of regional cooperation that only take the motives and interests of nation-states into account (Agnew and Corbridge 1995).[5] Hettne *et al.* (1999, 2000) have attempted to capture the complexity of present-day geopolitical realities by situating two apparently antagonistic processes, globalization and regionalization, within a larger process of global structural change. In this view of things, globalization is more than a mere extension of international activities. It is, rather, the accelerated economic, political, and cultural interpenetration of societies and nation-states (see Cochrane and Pain 2000: 16) resulting, for example, in a global 'consciousness' in which individuals and groups increasingly orient themselves and their actions towards the world (see Waters 1995: 15).

Regionalization, on the other hand, refers here to a process of increasing interconnectedness between neighbouring states. As a political project, regionalization can be seen as an attempt to make the world more manageable and intelligible by organizing states around a 'regional idea' and common 'regional awareness' (Adler 1997). If regionalization is a response to globalization, it is nevertheless, as Söderbaum (2002) contends, not reducible to mere neoliberal logics of accumulation and regulation, nor is it simply an issue of 'objective' problem-solving in a complex post-Cold War world. Regionalization is rather an expression of the increasing hybridity of governance modes and of new and ever-evolving state-society relationships in the management of political, economic and environmental change.

Björn Hettne (1999: 16) claims that the hybridity of transnational governance is also characterized by a coexistence of 'old' and 'new' regionalisms. While Hettne associates 'old' regionalisms with imperial spheres of influence, the diffusion of European institutions and/or confrontational geopolitics, he sees the 'new' variety more generally as an active response to and modifier of globalization and thus reflective of an increasing global consciousness. Following this line of reasoning, if the old regionalism was a protectionist strategy based on military might, the ideas of elites and a focused but limited agenda, the new regionalism is multilevel, multiactor, comprehensive in its objectives and 'open' to outside influences. In Hettne's opinion, the 'new' regionalism offers an alternative perspective, both analytically and prescriptively, in that it recognizes the continuing importance of the state while emphasizing the increasing political significance of subnational and non-state actors:

> The new regionalism can be defined as a multidimensional process of regional integration which includes economic, political, social and cultural aspects. It is a package rather than a single policy and goes beyond the free trade market idea . . . Rather, the political ambition of establishing territorial control and regional coherence cum identity (in Polanyi's terms: protecting regional civil society) is the primary regionalist goal.
>
> (Hettne 1999: 17)

Importantly, this interpretation of regionalism has important consequences for both state-society relationships and the definition of security. If 'old' regionalism exclusively involved sovereign nation-states, the new version includes subsovereign (i.e. regional and local level) and non-state actors. Similarly, environmental, economic and social issues articulated at local and regional levels appear to have as much bearing on security than any real or imagined threat of foreign invasion (Viktorova 2001). Indeed, a new regionalist approach to security would emphasize its positive connotations by focusing on common interests and motives (cooperative security) rather than on confrontation and divisive issues (Knudsen 1998). Furthermore, according to adherents of the new regionalism, the promise of a more stable, peaceful and equitable world lies not in a comprehensive globalist vision of the future but in a resolution of Westphalian/post-Westphalian tensions through the promotion of border-transcending civil societies (Hurrell 1995, Viktorova 2001). This, in turn, would involve non-exploitative partnerships, a positive understanding of the security concerns of the 'Other', and, most importantly, a process of mutual learning (Langlais 1995). In sum, then, the key difference between old and new regionalisms is that the newer form interconnects identity, civil society, notions of security and political community, creating a 'cognitive regional space' (Adler 1997). Almost by definition, a variety of issues (e.g. environmental, social, cultural) lie at the centre of the new regionalism that cannot be effectively addressed within exclusively national frameworks and which (for a variety of reasons) the UN has little power to affect.

In scrutinizing its progressive and transformative qualities, Mittelman (1999) argues that regionalization should be analysed with regard to the political opportunities it creates for communities and different sectors of society to participate in economic and social development. However, the main challenge facing regional approaches to transnational governance is that of establishing coherence within social and cultural heterogeneity. The emergence of transnational civil society premised on an all-encompassing set of shared values and interests seems highly improbable. As Jessop (2002), Paasi (2001) and others have emphasized, defining regional spaces and scales within which governance takes place are inherently contested processes rather than (over)determined realities. Providing regions with identities, purposes, and the means to meaningfully guide social action is a project that must be negotiated among many various actors and groups as well as between the state and civil society. In addition, the dialectical relationships between formal administrative governance structures of the state and more informal collaborative mechanisms of policy-formulation make for a high level of contingency within different regional contexts.[6] In other words, transnational regionalism is embedded in local political contexts and reflective of differing perspectives on cross-border cooperation that emerge from local experience (Scott 1999, Poon 2001, Sum 2002).

The European Union is an example of the tense co-existence between old and new regionalisms. It has developed from a foreign-policy of nation-states to an extension of domestic policies and involves not only state-driven processes of

integration but also the creation of spaces for multilevel societal cooperation and security. The EU's regionalization project is thus based on a complex approach to regional cooperation and supranational institutionalization. While the EU has borrowed heavily from discourses of competitiveness and adaptability it sees itself, above all, as a political integration project that links economic, social, environmental and, increasingly, cultural issues (European Commission 1997). Importantly, membership to this political community requires adherence to a comprehensive set of political and ethical values as well as membership within a plethora of supranational institutions.[7] However, while the EU forms a political community at the level of nation-states, citizen identification with the European project is fragmented, often tenuous.

As a consequence of this ambivalent state of affairs, the EU must strive to develop coherence within a context of increasing cultural, socio-economic and political heterogeneity; regionalization in this case therefore also involves attempts to make European Union comprehensible at the supranational, national, regional and local levels. The tortuous path towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) indicates that it will be very difficult for the EU to develop a universal, all-encompassing geopolitical vision that all member states and their constituents can identify with. While informed by the political values espoused in the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties and other fundamental EU documents, CFSP will, of necessity, have to be a differentiated process subject to renegotiation (Smith 2000).

The negotiation of political community is thus part and parcel of regionalization processes. While regionalism and regional activism of the Catalan, Basque, Flemish and other localized varieties have been widely covered (and have even been 'awarded' a limited voice in EU issues through the Congress of the Regions), 'mesoregional' agendas have only recently began to attract attention. In addition to the original Atlantic core, these mesoregional conceptualizations (or what for lack of a better term can be labelled as 'Dimensions') include: the 'East' (the future enlarged Europe in societal transformation), the 'South' (the Mediterranean region with its structural characteristics and proximity to Africa and the Middle East) and the 'North' (the intersection of Nordic, post-socialist Baltic and redefined Russian spaces) have gradually been constructed both by national and EU actors as well as actors involved in local transboundary cooperation (see, for example, Decker 2002, Mazur 2002 and Kramsch, this volume). These mesoregions include EU member states as well as countries (and regions) that neighbour the EU and have served to broaden the geopolitical and geoeconomic perspectives of European foreign policy by establishing comprehensive cooperation agendas.

Geopolitical 'dimensionality' as I argue here, is a political strategy that, on the one hand, expresses the geographical and cultural differentiation within the EU while, on the other hand, introducing greater geopolitical sensitivity with respect to the EU's 'near abroad'. Dimensionality is thus indicative of two basic dynamics within the EU: (1) the need for long-term geopolitical strategies with regard to the Baltic, Balkan and Mediterranean[8] areas, and (2) the desire of states

in the EU periphery and those aspiring to EU membership to articulate their own particular interest and perspectives more concertedly within the Union. With the acceleration of European integration and enlargement processes several different 'regional dimensions' have emerged within the EU (Reut 2002).

As stated above, the Northern Dimension is a complex geopolitical strategy, not a policy initiative or programme. Its main *raison d'être* is to provide orientation and coherence to the general goal of development and peaceful co-existence in the European North (e.g. the Baltic, Barents and Arctic regions). It is a political script that reads very different indeed from the confrontational and/or antagonistic logic of militarized security. It is also a political agenda within which a wide variety of state and non-state actors have a role to play. Finally, rather than signify a pilgrimage from the periphery to the 'core', the ND brings Europe (that is, the EU) to its outermost northern regions. For these and other reasons Pertti Joeniemmi (2002) has characterized the cooperative spirit emerging in the European North as indicative of new forms of transnational cooperation that soften hard and fast distinctions between state and non-state domains and blur the notion of 'border'.

As dimensionality is a comparatively recent phenomenon – but one that appears to have a certain degree of influence over EU policies – it is well worth considering its possible contribution to the construction of European political community. In several ways the Northern Dimension (arguably the most ambitious of the dimensional strategies) would seem at first glance to hold out considerable promise for new regionalist policies within the context of EU integration and enlargement. And yet, unsurprisingly perhaps, a more critical scrutiny of the ND reveals several important contextual limitations that hinder its progress. The exigencies of state-centred geopolitics weigh heavily on interregional relationships in the North, impacting even the local level. In the following, the project of negotiating a truly multiscalar Northern Dimension between local, national and European influences will be scrutinized.

The Northern Dimension and northern regionalism

Rationales, agendas and actors

The Northern Dimension is a geopolitical strategy that is simultaneously European, national and local in focus. That the European Union now possesses a 'northern identity' is largely due to Nordic and Baltic Sea regional attempts to manage post-Cold War economic, political and social transformations through multilateral cooperation. The ND, as a complex cooperation strategy, draws much of its impetus from post-Cold War *rapprochement* in the Baltic and Barents Sea regions where, in contrast to NATO's controversial expansion eastward, traditional security issues have been subsumed within a comprehensive regional agenda that emphasizes functional international cooperation and the strengthening of institutions of a democratic civil society Joeniemmi (1999).[9] More concretely, as Finland's former Prime Minister has stated, the ND promotes

security in Europe's North through developing partnerships between the Baltic Sea Area, the EU, and Russia (Lipponen 2002).

The rationale behind developing a 'Northern' conceptualization of Europe is to be found in the specific regional problematiques that characterize the Baltic and Barents Sea areas. As culturally and socio-economically heterogeneous as the North is, EU enlargement and the opening of the former Soviet Union's borders have strengthened a sense of economic, social and environmental interdependence (Tennberg 2002). The protection of the Baltic Sea (one of the world's most endangered waterways) from industrial and urban pollution, the management of nuclear waste and Soviet-era nuclear weapons around the Barents Sea Region, the successful restructuring of post-socialist economies as well as the minimization of ethnic tensions created by the collapse of the USSR are all issues that can only be addressed within an inclusive transnational dialogue.[10] In short, regionalism in the Baltic and Barents Sea regions works against fears of possible instability emanating from Russia's political and economic problems. While these 'northern' concerns are articulated by national governments, local and regional actors are no less cognisant of the issues at stake; sparsely populated and with resource-based economies, much of the vast territory encompassed by the North is peripheral to the greater European economy. Development perspectives for these often far-flung communities will depend on effective networking and thus on the improvement of physical communications and interstate political relationships (Mønnesland and Westlund 2000).

The Northern Dimension had its beginnings in decidedly national geopolitical perspectives and the initial Finnish attempts to create a 'Northern' European agenda began well before that country became a member of the EU. As an early response to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the changing geopolitical situation in the Baltic Sea region, the Finnish government began in 1991 to take advantage of new opportunities for political dialogue. It encouraged multilateral cooperation, focusing on economical development and environmental issues. In this way, for example, concerns over the transboundary impacts of pollution (for example, from mining activities and heavy industry in Russia's Kola peninsula) and subsequent damage to forests in northern Finland could be expressed more openly and forcefully. Other strategic issues that gradually emerged were the development of trust-building partnerships with Russia as EU enlargement progressed and as NATO membership of Poland and the Baltic States became a likely possibility. The conclusion in 1992 of a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Russia provided vital support to Finnish efforts.

Since 1995, and the EU membership of Finland and Sweden, Nordic, Baltic/Barents Sea regional and EU geopolitical initiatives have coalesced. In responding to rapid changes in its internal and external environment since 1989, the European Union is attempting to 'adapt, develop and reform' through developing new avenues of communication and cooperation with countries of the former 'Soviet Bloc' (European Commission 1997: 1). The EU has, furthermore, increased support of a meaningful political partnership and a 'positive, broad and ambitious economic agenda' with the Russian Federation.[11]

The EU's role in the Baltic Sea Region and the wider 'North' increased rapidly after 1992. The official proclamation of the existence of a Northern Dimension of the EU was announced two years after Finland and Sweden became members in 1995. In a now-famous speech at Rovaniemi, during a conference on Barents Sea Region cooperation, Finnish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen (1997) stressed the necessity of an EU strategy addressing the particular regional problems of its northern member states and Northwest Russia.

Lipponen also defined in his speech substantive elements of ND and the first strategic steps that ought to be taken. This initiative met with success: in December of 1997 the Luxembourg European Council agreed to introduce a northern dimensionality into its internal and external policies. Subsequently, an ND 'Action Plan' with regard to external and transboundary policies of the EU was commissioned by the 1999 Helsinki European Council and adopted a year later at the Council's meeting at Feira, Portugal. The Action Plan thus adopted will remain in effect until 2003.

It is important at this point to stress that the Northern Dimension of the European Union is not a regional initiative with its own formal institutional identity or independent budget. It is rather a concept that provides 'added-value' for security politics in the European North through facilitating multilateral consultation and multilevel cooperation (European Council 1998). ND's substantive agenda is defined by the four-year Action Plan which identifies sectors where cooperation is most necessary. These sectors include environmental protection, nuclear safety and nuclear waste management, business development and investment, cooperation in the energy sector (the region has considerable gas and oil resources while the EU's energy needs are likely to increase after enlargement), transportation issues, the improvement of border crossing facilities, crime prevention (in areas characterized by wide gaps in living standards), public health, social programmes, telecommunications, human resource development, protection of indigenous peoples of the North, and finally, the solution of geopolitical and economic development problems associated with Kaliningrad's exclave status (Council of the European Union 2000, 2001).

Actors and instruments

Multilevel, multiscalar

ND operates both in theory and in practice on the basis of multilevel transboundary cooperation and multilateral deliberations between different actors and regions in the 'North'. In terms of the overall agenda-setting, however, national and EU elites maintain a commanding role. The European Council serves, for example, as an intergovernmental and supranational platform with which to focus the various goals and initiatives undertaken within the ND framework. Complementarily, the EU's Partnership and Cooperation process with Russia supports several ND agenda objectives and has recently focused on issues concerning oil, energy, gas and environmental policies in Northwest Russia.

Above and beyond purely state agencies, a variety of regional organizations, financial institutions and the private sector are seen to be important actors whose participation is vital for the success of the ND (European Council 2001). Regional associations that promote multilateral cooperation within a wider Northern context supplement the process of the Northern Dimension. Complementary cooperation focuses on three institutions: the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the Barents Euro Arctic Council (BEAC) and the Arctic Council (AC), whereby cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region, as mentioned above, is itself driven by a plethora of state and non-state organizations.

As the ND itself does not have a budget or a specifically dedicated source of EU funding, project facilities must be constructed through a variety of means, often quite independently, in each of the strategic areas defined in the Action Plan. Since 1995 EU foreign and regional policy initiatives have assumed a much more active role in determining institutional conditions for the development of transnational cooperation in the BSR. These are essentially targeted at bilateral and to a lesser degree multilateral development projects at the regional and local levels. Most prominent of the EU initiatives are INTERREG IIIa and b, which support cooperation in planning and regional development.[12] The PHARE and TACIS initiatives facilitate the participation of EU candidate countries and the former non-Baltic Soviet Union respectively in cooperation projects within the Baltic and Barents Sea Regions. Attempts have been made to harmonize the regulations and financial requirements governing these various initiatives, thereby reducing administrative barriers to common projects. In any case, the primary recipients of these funds are local projects, although the level of local and civil society participation in the designation of programme priorities varies considerably.

International Financial Institutions (IFIs) are also involved in the realization of the Northern Dimension's Action Plan. Among these are the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Nordic Investment Bank (NIB), and the World Bank Group. Smaller public finance institutions, such as the Nordic Environment Finance Corporation (NEFCO) and the Nordic Project Fund (NOPEF) take part as well. The role of IFIs is particularly important in larger environmental projects that cannot be funded out of EU initiatives; these institutions are important actors within the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP), an initiative started in 2001 that enhances the ecological element of comprehensive security. This partnership, coordinated by the EBRD, targets in particular so-called hot spots in the Kola Pensinsula and other parts of Northwestern Russia and seeks to work with IFIs in order to fund regional cooperation projects (Haukkala 2001a). In total the NDEP's Steering Group has, in a 'bottom-up' selection process, listed environmental protection and nuclear safety projects of an estimated aggregate cost of almost €2 billion (Steering Group of NDEP 2002).

Finally, much attention is paid in ND discourse to the municipal and regional levels as these are seen as the basic units where civil society interacts transnationally (Browning 2001). Euroregions, such as the Finnish–Russia Karelia,

have been established in the Northern Dimension area since 1995 in hopes of capturing economic and social benefits from cooperative projects (see Virtanen, this volume).[13] As associations made up of local and regional governments, Euroregions are recipients of EU regional and 'foreign aid' grants. They are attempting to emulate Western European experience in developing strategic approaches to cooperation and in promoting community development. The establishment of the Euroregion Karelia is an interesting case of local cooperation given the extreme peripheral situation of the region and the vast socio-economic asymmetries that characterize it, not to mention the difficult process of regionalization within the Russian Federation (Reut 2000). The attempt to create effective working relationships is daunting, to say the least. Here, INTERREG and TACIS funds create a decisive opportunity structure that maintains project-oriented cooperation, albeit at a very modest level (Eskelinen 2000).

Dimensionality: a counterbalance to core-periphery relationships?

Considering that the countries initially supporting this geopolitical concept are small in terms of population and that a vast part of the North is sparsely settled, the ND can indeed be said to provide a counterbalance to the overwhelming dominance of Atlantic (or core) Europe (Antonsich 2002). Finland, for example, has – at least with regard to its own specific position within the larger European and North Atlantic picture – enhanced its importance by focusing on its proximity to Russia. As Hanna Ojanen (1999) argues, member states have begun to 'customize' the European Union by framing the EU and its policies in a locally intelligible and 'familiar' fashion. It thus comes as no surprise that the Nordic cooperation concepts promoted by the Finns have an inclusive and extensive geographical perspective, in effect putting Finland at the centre of a cooperative mesoregion that includes distant regions of Russia and Iceland (Forsberg 2001). Apart from Finland, the Baltic States are particularly keen to use the ND platform as a means of projecting their own geostrategic voices; in a situation where enlargement has favoured East–West development (along the fabled Paris–Moscow axis) the ND helps, for example, to support visions of a 'Via Baltica' that connects Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to the larger European market (Scott 2002b).

But this success of 'small states' in the North has been attained at a certain price. The ND has been taken up as an element of the EU's Common Foreign and Defence Policy, but it has been deprived of resources – from the very beginning in fact – so as not to elicit opposition from the 'South'. Indeed, initial hostility towards the ND, particularly from the French and Spanish governments was founded in fears that a Northern agenda could detract from the Euro-Mediterranean partnership (the so-called Barcelona process) (Terva 1999). The compromize that was eventually found sustained momentum for ND while giving assurances to the 'South' that no costly programmes or additional initiatives

requiring EU support would be part of the ND's Action Plan. Another possible 'Achilles' heel' of the ND process is the strategic importance and sensitiveness of Europe's relationship with Russia. Under favourable circumstances, the EU-Russian partnership could provide ND considerable political leverage. However, the crises in Chechnya and EU opposition to Russia's handling of this regional conflict have at times negatively affected Northern agendas (Haukkala 2001b).

Multiscalarity and 'post-Westphalian' security agendas

In a new regionalist reading, a 'post-Westphalian' security regime would be centred not on the interests of individual states and on balances of power but on functioning systems of global governance (including an empowered UN), and regional security partnerships. And such a regime would be based on the recognition of interdependence between nations and the necessity of a much wider political agenda of development in order to stabilize the world geopolitical system. Notions of hegemony backed up by military and economic might are thus foreign to this 'security complex'. A post-Westphalian political and security perspective would focus instead on non-exploitational interdependencies (partnerships), environmental issues and, hence, on a 'collectivization' of national security.

These new regionalist tendencies are doubtless present within the ND context and the EU as a supranational institution acts to de-emphasize national particularisms. However, we are far from seeing a 'post nation-state' geopolitics in the Baltic Sea, Barents or other region of the North. One of the main reasons for this can be found in contradictory regionalization logics and simultaneous processes of 'exclusion' and 'inclusion'. The Russian situation is one of a formerly centralized federation that is fragmenting due to a variety of processes that have weakened Moscow's effective control of regions and that have reduced the prestige of federal institutions (Herd 2001). As a result, sovereignty issues have remained highly sensitive, with the maintenance of national integrity the main policy concern of the Federation. Russia's uncompromising stance on Chechnya has, furthermore, alienated many in the EU who had wished to see the development of a more civil and democratic Russia. Sovereignty is not merely a Russian preoccupation. Dealing with Russia's Kaliningrad exclave, for example, opens up many issues of public security and illegal migration for the Baltic States as well as the EU. Lithuania's fear of loss of sovereignty over the issue of allowing Kaliningraders special transit visas has long been a stumbling block to constructive dialogue. In November 2002 a compromize solution was agreed by all parties.[14]

Beyond this, however, there are more subtle issues at play that involve sovereignty and national identity. Iver Neumann (1999) has pointed out that regionalization processes (in his specific case the definition of a post-Cold War Baltic Sea space of cooperation) involve selective scalings of 'we' and 'them' categories based on different levels of regional purpose. By drawing parallels with other contemporary and competing forms of regionalization, the EU in fact

conceptualizes itself as a higher form of political cooperation between states that is not only institutionally sophisticated but more attune to global issues and human and social rights.[15] Antonsich (2002), Joeniemmi (2002) and other scholars have pointed out that the enlargement process is dominated by a geopolitical focus that has emerged since the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, namely on the acceptance of 'common' values as well as 'harmonized' regulatory frameworks in order to institutionalise EU cohesion. This will mean that the resulting 'non-EU' will be pushed eastward both geographically and ideationally. While EU 'westernness' will become the norm for Poland, Estonia, Hungary and other candidate countries, the 'easternness' of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus will be accentuated (Antonsich 2002). This externally applied notion of the 'European Other' – and Neumann argues that the East has been essential to the construction of a 'Western' European identity – is a powerful boundary-shaping discourse.[16] In terms of developing a new strategic development and security partnership between Russia and the EU, this could be interpreted in terms of 'modernist', core-periphery geopolitics. As Catellani states, this relationship 'more closely (resembles) aid-like dynamics (rather than) a partnership based on a balanced exchanges of resources' (Catellani 2002: 17). Russia, despite its internal weaknesses and fractures, and its loss of international political stature, is 'psychologically unprepared for the role of periphery' and can be expected to react negatively to EU condescension (Benediktov 2002: 1).

Transnational civil society in Europe's North?

The development of a transnational civil society capable of dealing with the European North's manifold problems is dependent upon a dynamics of empowerment at mesoregional, national and local scales of cooperation. Ostensibly, the ND appears to have been successful in promoting a multiscalar approach to regional security and development: while larger geopolitical issues remain the domain of nation-states and the EU, successful local and regional cooperation is seen as a necessary requisite for achieving 'positive interdependence' (Sergounin 2001). Since 1990, Baltic Sea networks have established a precedent for international civil society activism in all manner of societal issues. Currently dozens of initiatives involving cities, regions, chambers of commerce, universities, national governments, NGOs and other actors are either underway or in preparation (Scott 2002b). These interorganizational alliances and networks are remarkable in their ability to bring together actors from very different sectors of society and levels of government and to define local/regional development agendas. Their main objective is to introduce alternative regional perspectives into the strategic orientations of the EU and nation-states. Corresponding to new regionalist politics of cooperation, the activities of these networks are not only informed by EU and national priorities but also (even if not in reciprocal measure) influence the policies of senior governments.

However, we also find a highly contradictory situation within the ND context. As is the case with the overlying geopolitical situation of the European North, the

pervasive centrality of the EU-Russia relationship impacts on the local and regional levels as well. Here, the asynchronous and diverging regionalization logics discussed above remain persistent obstacles to more effective 'EU-non-EU' cooperation. Russian regionalization and cooperation is strongly influenced by a 'nation-building' mentality and emphasis on the integrity of state borders that, as Haukkala (2001b) states, reflects geopolitical thinking that is incompatible with the European notion of shared sovereignty and positive interdependence. The EU appears to expect a 'westernization' of the East in the sense that Russia develops a democratic society that shares its core values. While Russia receives assistance from Brussels criticisms of non-fulfilment of EU criteria strain the partnership.

Furthermore, the Russian government's negative interpretation of, and hence unwillingness to accept, 'post-Westphalian' notions entrenched in EU geopolitical discourse (such as 'borderlessness', 'cross-border regionalism', 'multilevel governance') reinforces Russia's preoccupation with sovereignty issues (Makarychev 2001). The basic geopolitical contradiction between an increasingly state-like EU and a marginalized 'non EU-Europe' translates to local and regional levels as well. As a result, asymmetries of interests and cooperation perspectives are a severe problem, for example, for Finnish–Russian Euroregions and the Estonian–Russian border situation. Local projects meant to unite communities along this 'divide' suffer from the paternalistic (if not downright patronizing) decision-making style of Brussels that differentiates between 'western' versus 'eastern' mentalities (Haukkala 2003). The message conveyed is clear: non-EU-Europe, particularly the 'East', cannot be trusted (Cronberg 2001).

Conclusions

The transition, or in the words of Björn Hettne (1999), 'second great transformation', towards a polycentric and regionally – as opposed to nationally – focused world is, even in the European case, at best incomplete and fragmented. As this discussion has illustrated, the Northern Dimension of the European Union is both emblematic of the tensions between Westphalian and post-Westphalian logics of territorial governance and also characteristic of the emerging multilevel spatiality of European Union. It is, on the one hand, embedded in state-centred geopolitics and informed by national interests. Yet, by the same token, much of its impetus as a platform for transnational cooperation derives from local-level initiatives and non-state actors. Symbiotically, EU initiatives already in place and in which civil society is often deeply involved, have served to further the basic objectives of the ND. However, the ND is not exempt from cooperation problems that have plagued the Baltic and Barents Sea regions in the past. Among other things, different regionalization trajectories in the EU and the former Soviet Union, cultural-historical animosities, socio-economic asymmetries and unequal access to resources make for a very complex reality.

This chapter posed the question as to whether the ND is also characteristic of the emergence of a new type of world order such as that optimistically invoked by

Hettne – that of multidimensional and multilateral regionalisms that supplant the instability of traditional power geopolitics based on hegemonies. The basic geopolitical principle upon with the ND has been edified is that of economic, political and ecological interdependence and partnership; it thus coincides with a complex notion of security that has characterized Baltic Sea regional cooperation since 1990. However, as the above discussion indicates, despite its considerable New Regionalist promise the ND has, during the short time it has existed as a concrete notion, failed to live up to many of the expectations it has aroused. State actors remain dominant while diverging regionalization experiences due to socio-economic asymmetries, differing understandings of 'European values' and heterogeneous perceptions of sovereignty create problems for local and regional level cooperation. Similarly, the 'coherence' and 'cohesiveness' of the North can be overstated: while ND serves to strengthen a sense of a 'Northern' contribution to the European construction, it would be a mistake to assume that the Baltic and Nordic areas are monolithic in terms of interests and sense of purpose.

And yet, taking a long-term view of things, the ND appears to be a quintessentially new regionalist exercise with a potential to positively transform international relations within Europe's North. The ND reflects rather markedly the problematic co-existence of Westphalian and post-Westphalian geopolitical logics so typical of the present 'world order'. Indeed, some observers have framed the geopolitical tensions that condition the ND as a clash between state and sovereignty-obsessed Realpolitik and notions of networked interdependent spaces allowing for transnational cosmopolitan identities (Browning 2002). This is not mere philosophical posturing: macroregional spaces, as European and North American experiences aptly demonstrate, must be continuously re-negotiated and legitimated in order that they remain viable and stable communities of nation-states. Because of its multidimensionality and ambitiousness, the European Union is a particularly contested project of political integration: the pursuit of coherence is essential for the political and economic viability of the EU but, at the same time, heterogeneity and diversity are a European reality. Put in other terms, the geopolitical challenges facing the EU thus lie both in the management of the complexities of globalization and in the transformation of political and territorial identities. This is manifested by processes of 'customizing' and 'counter-customizing' EU policies as well as by the 'dimensionality' invoked by EU integration and enlargement.

In concluding, then, the European geopolitical situation is characterized by a highly contested macroregionalization process that has opened up opportunities for small states, regions and communities on the 'periphery' and civil society to voice their interests. However, discourses and processes of inclusion/exclusion can have a decisive impact on geopolitical outcomes and the stability of macroregional spaces. The evolution of a European political community within this context can therefore only be comprehended in terms of gradual institutional shifts, changes in attitudes and the ability not only to tolerate 'otherness' but also to break down barriers between 'East' and 'West'. Defining the borderlines between heterogeneity and coherence is not only the primary challenge of the

Northern Dimension, it is also a central problem that proponents of the New Regionalism will have to grapple with for some time to come.

Notes

1 The Baltic Sea Region as defined within the visionary planning framework of 'Visions and Strategies for the Baltic Sea Region (VASAB)' (see Committee on Spatial Development of the Baltic Sea Region 1997) and the EU's INTERREG programme comprises 11 states in Scandinavia and Central and Eastern Europe. Going from East to West these are: Norway, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, Poland, Belarus, Kaliningrad (Russia), Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland and the Karelian and Russia (St Petersburg and Karelian Districts). The Barents Sea Region is meant here to be coterminous with the Barents EuroArtic Region (BEAR) established in 1993. Members of BEAR include the regions of Nordland, Troms and Finnmark in Norway, Norrbotten and Vasterbotten in Sweden, the Finnish provinces of Lapland and Kainuu and the following Russian administrative units: Arkhangelsk and Murmansk Oblasts, the Republic of Karelia, Komi Republic, and Nenets Autonomous Okrug.

2 The notion of world-system is most often associated with Wallerstein's (1980) perspective on capitalism as a global system that interlinks states and societies and subjects them to practices of capitalist regulation, short and long investment cycles and, ultimately, crises of accumulation. Rather than focus on 'society' as a discrete unit contained within a specific national territory, world-systems analysis treats societies as 'historical systems': because of the tight interconnection between states within systems of production, financial flows and the maintenance of capitalism's social workability, processes such as social change or regionalism can only be understood within their wider international/intercultural contexts (Taylor and Flint 2000).

3 The Westphalian system can be defined as a set of rules, norms and practices that confirm the sovereignty of territorially exclusive nation-states over their jurisdictions and subjects (McGrew 2000: 133). The 1648 Peace of Westphalia was a series of settlements that ended the Thirty Years War; as a result of the Peace the mediaeval concept of the unity of western Christianity, led by a Pope and Kaiser, gave way to the recognition of the rights, guaranteed by treaties and international law, of sovereign states.

4 A powerful strand of geopolitical reasoning interprets post Cold-War regional cooperation as a 'final' victory of Western values supported by an emerging Pax Americana in what can be seen as a largely unipolar security regime (Zakaria 2002). This thinking in fact informs present US neo-conservative strategy and enjoys considerable currency within the International Relations establishment (Ali 2002). Similarly, a 'geoeconomics' perspective, such as that delineated by Edward Luttwak (1990), interprets shifts in geopolitical strategy as a reconfiguration of national security priorities towards economic competition rather than military containment or confrontation.

5 Critics of state-centric and/or unipolar perspectives are many and cannot be lumped together in any specific camp. Söderbaum (2002), for example, offers a critical discussion of different strands of International Political Economy vying for academic and policy relevance with regard to regionalism in the world system. Scholars of 'critical' geopolitics (see Ò Tuathail 1998) openly contest the notion that there can, in fact, be an objective grand view of the world scene; their goal, rather, is the deconstruction of geopolitical doctrine in order to reveal its ulterior motives.

6 Jessop (1997: 575) has suggested that, through a process of 'metagovernance', the state is very much involved in the management of decentralized policy networks. While perhaps not acting overtly, the state (as hierarchy) neverthless promotes the 'rules,

organizational knowledge, institutional tactics, and other political strategies' that guide the 'self organization of governance' (Whitehead 2003: 7). Although developed to capture changes in governance at the level of cities and urban regions, the notion of 'metagovernance'is conceptually very close to the ideas expressed here.

7 A notable element of the Maastricht Treaty was the introduction (in Articles 8–8e) of legal and conceptual elements of formal European citizenship into an integration process hitherto characterized primarily by economic issues. Going a step further, one of the implicit goals of the 1998 Treaty of Amsterdam is the promotion of a European public sphere through the establishment of common (that is unifying) constitutional principles and intergovernmental processes. These arrangements are also intended to support the definition and acceptance emergence of common values such as in the area of human rights, women's rights, democracy, etc. (Pérez-Diaz 1994).

8 The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, for example, was inaugurated in 1995 as a result of the Barcelona Conference of that year. The 'Barcelona Process' is another example, if admittedly a rather modest one at present, of a geopolitical opportunity structure under development by the EU for regional cooperation. See the website at: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/med_mideast/intro/>.

9 Besides the Council of Baltic Sea States, created in 1992, a plethora of *Baltic* organizations have either been newly established or expanded that also fit the New Regionalist mould, among them the Helsinki Commission (for the protection of the marine environment), the Baltic Sea Chambers of Commerce Association and the Union of Baltic Cities. Presently, dozens of initiatives involving cities, regions, chambers of commerce, universities, national governments, NGOs and other actors are either underway or in preparation. Evidence of the transnationalization of the Baltic Sea Region can be found in the rather recent networking of existing institutions and in the emergence of transnational actors, all engaged in furthering cooperation region-wide (Scott 2002a). A recent Swedish survey has established a list of almost 600 Baltic Sea actors with the capacity or purpose to operate across borders (see the online forum, Ballad, at <http://www.ballad.org/actors>).

10 With the collapse of the Soviet Union, large Russian ethnic populations were left 'stranded' in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. These 'expatriates', many of them born in the Baltic States, often had great difficulties to obtain proper resident status or local citizenship.

11 Quoted from a letter written by Pascal Lamy, EU Trade Commissioner, and Chris Patten, EU External Affairs Commissioner, to the *Financial Times* (17 December 2001). Furthermore, the EU pursues a 'Common Strategy', agreed by the European Council in June 1999, in order to develop a comprehensive political partnership with the Russian Federation. This is evidenced, among other things, by EU support of Russian accession to the World Trade Organisation that signals a desire to positively influence institutional reform in that country.

12 As a pilot phase in the development of a European transnational spatial cooperation forum, INTERREG IIC proved exceedingly popular and attracted a total of 120 project proposals, 45 of which were accepted. In total an amount of 45 million Euros were devoted to INTERREG IIC-BSR for the period 1998–2000. The next phase in the programme INTERREG IIIB-BSR is now well underway and will continue to 2006.

13 The Euroregion Karelia proudly announces itself as part of the Northern Dimension (see the website <http://www.karjala-interreg.com/euregio/eng/>).

14 The Kaliningrad dispute was covered actively by the European press. See, for example, Rafael Behr: 'Lithuania may drop support for Kaliningrad plans', *Financial Times*, 28/29 September 2002 and Judy Dempsey: 'The Siege of Kaliningrad, *Financial Times*, 17 September 2002'.

15 A Europe interpretation of North American regionalization stresses, for example that of Zaki Laidi (1998), stresses that NAFTA is less a macroregional political community than a project of continental economic regulation focused on and dominated by

US-American economic power and characterized by highly asymmetric relations between its member states; hence a lack of political institutions with which to widen transnational cooperation, a lack of a truly regional focus and, perhaps most fundamentally, a lack of a focus on society.

16 The Eastern enlargement of the EU is based on the political criteria for accession to be met by the candidate countries, as laid down by the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993. The criteria to be fulfilled are: (1) stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; (2) the existence of a functioning market economy as well as capacity to cope with competitive pressure and the market forces within the Union; (3) the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of the political, economic and monetary union.

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9 Post-national governance and transboundary regionalization

Spatial partnership formations as democratic exit, loyalty and voice options?

Noralv Veggeland

State formation, nation-building and democracy

Europe was the birthplace of the nation-state and modern nationalism at the end of the seventeenth century when the traditional Westphalian state system was established (Krasner 1988). At that time also the notions of nation and democracy were first expressly linked ideologically. On the practical level, so were nationhood, statehood and war. On 20 September 1792, on the battlefield of Valmy, in North Eastern France, the ragtag French army, under fire from the much better trained and better equipped Prussian infantry, held its ground to the revolutionary and symbolic battle-cry of 'Vive la Nation'. This led Goethe, who was present at the battle, to declare 'this date and place mark a new epoch in world history' (Furet and Richet 1965: 185). In Western Europe the dominant idea was born that the only option for emancipation of the people was through nation-state governance.

Briefly, according to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century political theorists, the 'people' of a defined territory, the nation, became the only appropriate foundation for democracy, and the nation-state became the only principal authority with internal sovereignty, with power in some way on behalf of that 'people' (Hobhouse 1968: 39–55). The nation-state was defined as a locked territorial entity for all political, economic and cultural activities of the citizens. But which nation-state people? As pointed out by social scientist, Jürgen Habermas (1992, 1998), historically the term 'demos', the people, was linked to the term 'ethnos', i.e. an ethnically, culturally and linguistically homogeneous people, and applied in the writing of the constitutions of the time. Thereby a new conceptualization of democracy was introduced in the European formation of territorial states. Ideologically, democratic governance, in contrast to other modes of governance, was made only feasible and legal if the nation-state government had its support from a homogeneous people, envisaged as voters in free elections. If such an 'ethnos' was not there, then the elite had to shape a national people to make the state democratic (Reich 1991). From the perspective of the national democratic leadership, mobilization and participation of the people were necessary preconditions for its lasting political power, even though voter participation was

limited via ethnic, gender and property requirements. Thus democratic participation of the national 'locked-in of borders' people was a specifically engineered objective shaped by significant internal and external exclusions.

In order to analyse the main topic of this study, namely the complex social-engineering functions currently underway in the construction of cross-border regions in Europe today as regional partnership constructions, I will comparatively conceptualize further nation-state and region building as engineering processes. My basic anchor will be the theory of the political scientist Stein Rokkan (1973, 1983, 1995) or, more specially, his notions of boundary building, government performance, and internal structuring. As is well known, for Rokkan the formation of the territorial state in Europe began with the structuring of state institutions, boundary drawing and nation-building processes. These processes were dominated by cultural standardization policies; suppression of ethnic minorities; the production of borders splitting regional cultural groups; comprehensive technical, economic and legal action to protect internal national markets; and the founding of nationalism (Rokkan and Urwin 1983). The structuring process ended with the development of the modern welfare state in its latest phase (Ferrera 2000). 'The unitary territorial state' became a notion standing for a 'complete' and fully ended nation-building process, while the federal state was perceived and given a status as 'incomplete', in this context, because of lack of unity (Baldersheim 2000).

The notions of governance and spatial partnership

Ideologically, the year '1992' symbolizes the anticipated death of the nation-states of Europe, or at least a decisive moment in their expected transcendence (Brubaker 1999). Chosen by the former EU Commission president Jacques Delors as the target date for the completion of the Single Market, ideologically, '1992' came to stand for the abolition of national frontiers and the birth of a 'borderless' Europe. The date also came to represent the emergence of European citizenship; and – with signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1991 – the prospect of an arising 'Europe of regions'.

The possibility and desirability of building a Europe of regions, resting on a virtuous combination of sub-national, national and supranational development programmes anchored in partnership formations, is of course a fascinating topic for discussion and speculation. Contextually, the notion or dimension of domestic and cross-border regional partnership seems to arise from the underlying macro process of 'bounded structuring' and regional 'demos-building', i.e. the establishment of governance institutions through negotiations and bargaining processes, agreements and contract planning (Loughlin and Mazey 1995). From a theoretical perspective, sound reasoning about this topic must be anchored in a theory of the specific destructuring effects of the EU on national state institutions. Thus, the theory should go beyond a mere checklist of economic advantages and disadvantages, inconvenient externalities and possible 'quick fixes' in the wake of European integration, but also introduce perspectives concerning the change of democratic order.

For Rokkan the notion of space has two dimensions: a territorial dimension and a 'membership' dimension, involving cultural, economic and political elements. As he puts it 'the history of the structuring of human societies can be fruitfully analysed in terms of the interaction between geographical spaces and membership spaces' (Rokkan cited in Flora *et al.* 1999: 10). In Rokkan's view such interaction can in turn be understood by observing territorial jurisdiction formation and structural profiles, i.e. external boundary drawing and internal structuring of demos as closely related dynamics. Elaborating from Albert O. Hirschman's work (1970), he conceptualized this process as (1) a gradual foreclose of *exit* options for national actors and human resources; (2) the establishment of 'system maintenance' institutions capable of eliciting domestic *loyalty;* and (3) the provision of democratic channels for internal *voice*. Through the voice channels the cultural, social and geographical peripheries attained a democratic option to address political claims to power centres, enforcing the central elite to level out social and economic disparities and design regional development policy measures. By engineering the locking-in of resources and actors in a bounded space, the formation of new organization vehicles for the generation of national loyalty and for the exercise of voice through representatives were encouraged. Rokkan recognized that the three arrangements played a crucial role in stabilizing the nation-state form of political-territorial organization that gradually emerged in Europe.

In contemporary Europe, these nation-state arrangements are weakened, but the Rokkan/Hirschman conceptualization still provides fruitful notions for understanding the institutional transcendence that forms new territorial structuring processes. Actually, the building of the variety of the many transboundary regions of Europe, and obviously the EU itself, have been established as negotiated and agreed partnership institutions providing channels and arenas for comprehensive bargaining processes. Precisely, in accordance with the Rokkanian theory, this process of regionalization has induced new spatial boundaries, which imply gradual foreclosure of exit options for actors and resources. Withdrawal from the partnership will be met by sanctions of different kind. Furthermore, the spatial partnerships established anchored in agreements and contracts do constitute a form of system maintenance capable of eliciting a kind of loyalty. It is so because on the one hand the agreements and contracts enforce loyalty in the sense of duty upon the collaborating actors of the partnership by regulatory means and by legal surveillance. On the other hand the regional partnership institution embodies the potential to reunify historical and regional identity groups, eliminating cleavages caused by national boundaries, and thus may favour loyalty. Loyalty may also be elicited by success stories of prosperous partnerships in the area of economic development (see below the section 'Skåne – a Swedish region'). Lastly, territorial partnership arrangements represent the provision of channels for a diversity of transnational and interregional voices. The concept of partnership encourages regional actors to participate and promote their interests in negotiating and bargaining processes, to work out agreements and contracts, and to implement them when settled by multilevel governance institutions, including themselves. In terms

of the Rokkanian notion of territorial stabilization, the partnership institution stabilizes the region by letting people's life chances be linked to the creation of explicit and positive entitlements to material and cultural resources, a provision of advantage generated by bound collaboration (Flora *et al.* 1999).

However, the new channel for voice, a specifically post-national voice, does not belong to the traditional order of democracy. In European integration, government through national voice arrangements has been replaced partly by negotiated 'agreement-base' governance, i.e. governance as legal acts arising out of rules and target implications from signed Treaties and partnership agreements (Majone 1996). Thus, this study follows the theoretical tradition (Veggeland 2000; Jessop 1994) in which networking territorial entities exercising *governance* on the regional level are seen in relation to *government*. The latter represents the classical form of state government based upon the Rokkanian notion of voice with tier parliamentary decision-making bodies and an institutional hierarchy of bureaucratic rule and regulation performance. On the contrary, regional governance is a form of government where different local institutions, organizations, organs, enterprises and territorial levels work in borderless networks, and make decisions on the basis of public-public or public-private partnership agreements (Jessop 2000; Loughlin and Mazey 1995). In other words it is a complex art of governing interactively by the commitment of a manifold of regional and cross-border regional actors. These actors are operationally autonomous in relation to each other but structurally connected through different forms of mutual dependence, and by the foreclosure of other actors (Amin 1994). Engineering cross-border regional governance through territorial partnership institutions might therefore be seen in the perspective of our elaborated notions of *post-national* mode of engineering foreclosure of exit options, eliciting loyalties and creating new voice channels.

In this context, the nature of the EU performance of power which is captured by the phrase 'multilevel governance' – 'Politikverflechtung' (Scharpf 1994), indicates heterarchic and multipolar organized spatial jurisdictions contrary to the hierarchical mode of organization associated with national 'government' structures (Hooghe and Marks 2001; Neyer 2002). This turnover of the public management 'pyramid' and the shift in functions, according to the principle of subsidiarity, is nonetheless linked to the restructuring processes of the post-national state (Lane 2000). Downwards, and in terms of governance, the regional actors are 'locked-in' and legally tied by agreements and contracts constructed from emerging partnership, in order to guide and promote the development of local resources. Jessop concludes: 'In this sense we can talk of a shift from local government to local governance. Thus local unions, local chambers of commerce, local venture capital, local education bodies, local research centres and local states may enter into arrangements to regenerate the local economy' (Jessop 1994: 272). At the same time, this provision of channels for internal local voice induces and elicits also local loyalty, as indicated by Patsy Healey, because of social obligation and consolidation induced by 'collaborative planning arrangements' and local identity (Healey 1997).

In Europe formal national state sovereignty is partly replaced by an innovation: the pooling of sovereignty mostly upwards to the EU but also downwards to both heterarchic domestic and cross-border regional partnership institutions. Hence, these membership institutions need to be authorized in some way (Anderson 1994). Basically, '*pooled sovereignty*' is established by independent political principals which negotiate treaties, agreements and contracts as legal foundations for the constitution of new partnership authorities, like the EU Commission at the highest European level and regional Boards and Secretariats of the partnership entities at the sub-national and cross-border regional levels. These institutions are authorized to take wide-reaching strategic planning and regulatory action within central areas of society (Føllesdal 1999: 276). In the framework of the principle of subsidiarity introduced by the Maastricht Treaty such upward and downward devolution of sovereignty and authority erects institutions that first and foremost have their legitimacy anchored not in governments and parliaments but in the legality of the policies elaborated from the agreements (Wallace 1998). This produces decision-making competence in Europe as a system of multilevel governance, contrary to constitutional federalism. As Habermas writes: 'Since agreements between member-states will remain a factor even in a politically integrated Union, a federal European state will, in any case, be of different calibre than national federal states; it cannot simply copy their legitimate process' (1999: 58).

Hence, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, devolution upward to the supranational European tier is recommended when greatest policy outcome and effectiveness is expected on that level. Similarly, downward devolution to regional and local authorities and partnership, including transboundary EU regions, ought to be implemented when most effective policy arrangements for regenerating local and regional economy are expected on the lower levels (Veggeland 2000; Majone 1997; Wallace 1998).

Therefore, in the wake of the Maastricht Treaty, 1992 was a decisive moment for making both international and interregional agreement-based governance legitimate. The perspective is that European integration by transnational and interregional network developments may be recognized as institutional integration through widespread and interacting territorial partnerships that function as jurisdictions on different political levels. In this framework the cross-border regional space is structured by the many territorial partnership institutions that *per se* claim commitment and loyalty in relation to binding agreements and objectives from the collaborative members. Additionally, in Rokkanian sense, the territorial partnerships exclude external actors not contracted as political or functional agents. The exit option of the signature parties is defined as a judicial issue. Voice channels are structured as internal and often locked-in arenas for negotiations and power performance.

Externally, the dynamic of spatial multilevel governance formations is structured by both upwards and downwards pooling of sovereignty into vertical EU–state–region partnerships. Internally, the domestic regional tier develops its own local partnerships in a horizontal order. Furthermore, the growing

number of cross-border jurisdictions and transboundary region as partnership constructions, i.e. the EU-regions and the Euro-regions, are organized in a horizontal order. The latter's interregional ability to act and prosper depends fully on the quality of agreements and planning contracts, and the efficiency of implementation acts. As partners, the cooperating regions, the states, the private actors, and the EU, as indicated above, have all subordinated themselves under the legal rules of negotiated treaties, agreements and contracts. Thus, the building of the EU-regions and the Euro-regions are intimately linked to EU governance, to the arising territorial multilevel governance and partnership structures in Europe (Hooghe and Marks 2001; Keating and Hooghe 1995; Veggeland 2002, 2003).

The new European technocracy

Executive policies of cross-border partnership as legal actions and failure of openness and transparency tend to occur as a challenge to representative democratic institutions. It is so because the provision of voice channels through agreement-based partnership institutions generate *per se* a democratic deficit problem (Veggeland 2003).

The political scientist Janerik Gidlund (1993: 37–8) argues that the change from government to agreement-based governance in European integration, and the resulting democratic deficit, takes place as a response to the challenges arising out of borderless globalization processes. In the context, technocratic institutions are needed for regulatory purpose, and for the implementation of pluri-annual cross-border development programmes, in contrast to more short-term and political changing and pragmatic decision-making in parliaments. Euro-regions as territorial partnership institutions are needed for new functional border drawings, and thereby the achievement of stable developments by reducing exit options.

Thus, the problem of a deficit of democratic voice channels seems to occur owing to the following related circumstances (Scharpf 1999; Schmitter 2000; Veggeland 2001, 2004):

1. The elected EU Parliament is still a weak political government institution, and remote from the arenas where the most crucial decisions are made in the polity (Eriksen and Fossum 2000). The EU has gained sovereignty through the different Treaties, but the national governments of the member states are still the central constitutional partners of the system and remain the ratifying bodies. Hence, EU governance depends heavily on the legitimacy of the member states' national and regional Parliaments, which power is crumbling because of 'hollowing out' processes (Jessop 1994). Michael Keating (1998: 33) has put it in this way: 'Perhaps all we can say, rather negatively, is that governance is what exists when government is weak and fragmented' – like in the EU.
2. The EU governance structures, including territorial partnership institutions, tend increasingly to replace the weakened government structure of the

member states and their domestic regions. But the engineered governance structures are all staffed with experts and professions, ruling on behalf of settled Treaties, Agreements and Contracts. Typical are the EU Commission, the growing number of expert committees known under the collective rubric of 'Comitology', or other regulatory agencies as well as regional and interregional partnership secretariats. In this *technocracy replace technocratic voice and rational choice majority voting and 'best value' considerations of* governments (Majone 1997; Pollack 2002). These new institutions are not arenas for hardball intergovernmental bargaining, but rather technocratic arenas in which agreements, internal rational arguments, professional knowledge and legality matter more than democratic discourse and public opinion (Veggeland 2001, 2002, 2003).

3 Implementation of EU regulations, development policies and regional project programmes have become legal acts. Laws, regulations and agreements are not any longer political instruments and mechanisms for territorial governments in order to implement political goals. On the contrary, the governments have become instruments for governance and partnership institutions with adjacent technocracy, when it comes to management and implementation of development tasks and regulations (Majone 1997a).
4 Policies, including cross-border regional policies and planning, tend to be contractualised and thereby submitted legal performance (Loughlin and Mazey 1995). It is said that politics is turning toward legal acts and surveillance, more than being channels for democratic voice.

Resolving the democratic deficit

As first pointed out by Joseph H.H. Weiler (1995, 1999), the EU governance is characterized by fundamental asymmetry. He describes it as a dualism between supranational European law (*acquis communautaire*), whose legitimacy depends for one part on effective policy output of the EU technocracy, and for another part on intergovernmental European decision-making, in principle with legitimacy from the member states' governments. According to Weiler this dualism of the European integration generates a basic democratic deficit dilemma: technocratic output and problem solving efficiency versus a constitutional order of democratic voice input. His tentative proposal to overcome the dilemma is to impose the liberal-democratic principle of openness, transparency, participation, subsidiarity, and public discourse on the EU technocracy and the spatial partnership institutions by law and regulation, thereby fortifying an output democratic order (Dahl 1989; Majone 1997; Whitepaper 2001). Using the Rokkanian notion, the technocratic governance and cross-border partnership institutions of the European integration with locked-in voice channels could be better reformed by making these channels open and public. Ideally, this would happen alongside the strengthening of the input democratic institutions on all the territorial tiers. The result is a dual

order of democracy with implications for how cross-border regionalization should be organized and regulated.

The most prominent participant in this discussion is Habermas. In line with Weiler, and in support of a dual order of democracy, he has provided an alternative answer to the democratic deficit issue, also with implications for the processes of regionalization (Habermas 1992, 1996, 1998). He asserts that the traditional national norm and model for democracy in an era of globalization, in the style of parliamentary democracy, is ineffective and impotent in a European context. In addition he fears a new global market liberalism without political control, leading to uneven regional development, inequalities and disruptions which will cause social disorder, violent regional conflicts and political disintegration. Habermas advocates worldwide partnership institutions, with a politically and economically integrated Europe of states and regions in partnerships as a first step solution.

Toward this end, he proposes anchoring the dual order of EU democracy in a Community of Legal Rights organized around 'universal values' and 'constitutional legacy', rather than the cultural and ethnic nation concept which has characterized the traditional national democracy. Basically, Habermas' intention for the democratic structuring of the EU seems to be the development of strong agreement-based multilevel governance policies to rein in the economic sphere. Cultural and identity performance should not be subjected to political considerations, but only be protected by law and by fundamental rights provided and committed by the European Community. Accordingly, territorial cross-border partnership institutions should gain their legitimacy from a constitutional order where equal rights, responsibility and tolerance are the overarching universal principles. It is in this context Habermas has suggested that the European Union should develop a philosophy and an identity based *not* upon some form of emotional, cultural and ethnic unity but upon what he calls 'constitutional patriotism' and 'deliberative democracy' (1992, 1998). According to Habermas, this is the European dual democratic option for generating loyalty and varied exit and voice alternatives, in a Europe exercising the principle of subsidiarity and the mode of deliberative democracy.

Therefore, the Habermasian prospects should be recognized by regionalists. The building of the Europe of regions as a dual process of organizing regional self-government and forming spatial cross-border partnership accordingly does imply institutional need for voice channels anchored in such a dual option of parliamentary input and agreement-based output democratic governance (Keating 1998; Veggeland 2000, 2001; Charter 2000). In this context, the case of the reformed Swedish region of Skåne, analysed below, may be seen as a dual organizational mode of democratic self-government and multilevel governance, implemented through the building of partnership institutions as exit, loyalty and voice options. But what does this particular regional reform really imply concerning development of local democracy, identity and functionality? (Fernandez 1998; Balme and Bonnet 1995; Keating and Loughlin 1997; Veggeland 2003).

Skåne – a Swedish region

The traditional form of regional order in unitary nation-states may be said to be vertical with the regions subordinated to the state authorities. However, under the umbrella of EU regulations a process of downwards devolution of sovereignty started in the 1980s, generating an at least two-tier domestic government order in European countries. Along with this devolution process the domestic regions entered – and enter – into cross-border collaboration and territorial partnerships, pooling their newly gained sovereignty by establishing horizontal and heterarchic governance structures as institutional interregional arrangements, supported by the EU (Veggeland 2001a).

Traditionally, the Nordic countries are characterized by a combination of regional government structures and territorial state hierarchies, which dominate both domestic and cross-border regional development policy actions (Veggeland 1976, 2000; Baldersheim *et al.* 2001). But recent studies show that the Scandinavian unitary states now find themselves in a transitional period of regional organization that goes somehow in a European direction (Gidlund and Jerneck 2000). From the traditional position of being local government-based regions, now strategic regional public-private partnership, together with decentralized state development agencies, are taking over authority and responsibility for domestic and cross-border regional development (Veggeland 2003). Consequently, the resulting fragmented governance structures imply contractualisation of regional and cross-border planning programmes, which become managed by technocratic-led sector interests in search for market competitiveness. To some extent Denmark can be said to be pursuing a wait-and-see policy by capturing a sort of *status quo* position. The other Scandinavian countries, Sweden, Finland and Norway, got a great push forward for renewal and regional reform when they applied for membership; two of them became members of the EU in the beginning of the 1990s; Norway became a member of the European Economic area (EEA). All three states have acted proactively for engineering the establishment of agreement-based governance structures through cross-border and regional partnership arrangements (Baldersheim and Ståhlberg 1998). Thus, the democratic deficit problem has become a political issue both in theory and practice, provoking forward discussions and efforts targeting the dual order of democracy in the Scandinavian regional polity (Veggeland 2003).

In this context, let us study more closely one of the Swedish regional success stories, the establishment and development of the region Skåne in Southern Sweden in the 1990s as a reorganized unit consisting of two previous existing smaller counties (Gidlund and Jerneck 2000).

In 1991 a 30-year-old discussion about the division of the Skåne region in two counties, Malmöhus and Kristianstad, and the autonomous city of Malmö, re-emerged on the political agenda of the counties' councils. The idea of joining together the three administrative units was launched. The initiative was at this stage aimed primarily at bringing about some kind of order in what was called 'the administrative mess' due to inefficiency and coordination failure of public

service institutions and development agencies (Fernandez 1998: 20). Regional governance structures were needed to overcome the costs of post-national transactions and coordination problems, which Fritz Scharpf has found to grow exponentially with the increasing number of actors involved (the so called Scharpf's law) (Scharpf 1997). Another important impetus for the fusion of counties was the identity issue. Although not as strong as some European counterparts, the unique historical Scanian identity was used as a heavy argument in favour of unification. To explain this cultural and linguistic regional identity, a special reference was made to the past with Skåne as a prominent province in the Medieval and Renaissance Danish Empire. At the beginning of the 1990s Skåne was not prominent but suffering from economic recession. The exploitable link was made to the specific history of the administrative division of Skåne into two counties back in 1719 as a 'divide and conquer' measure of the Swedish nation-state meant to weaken its sub-national identities. However, the Scanian identity had survived the Swedish nation building process due to the remoteness from the political power centre of Stockholm, and the geographical nearness to Copenhagen and the island of Zeeland, Denmark. A third issue of concern implying the advantage of county fusion was the failure of infrastructure and communication linking Skåne to Copenhagen and to continental Europe, barriers which were important to overcome. Also, the Skåne region needed bargaining power, which could be strengthened by unifying the two county administrations. Bargaining power was important for its effort to act strategic in order to develop competitiveness as a region of Europe (Veggeland 2001a, 2003).

The most concrete and symbolic expression of Skåne as a 'region of Europe' is the bridge over the Öresund Belt, constructed in the 1990s. The bridge links the city of Malmö to Copenhagen and the island of Zeeland, placing Skåne only a few hours' drive away from the densely populated areas of North Western Germany (Fernandez 1998). Already from the planning stage, optimistic considerations ruled economists and politicians concerning the expected advantages of this new infrastructure of transport communication for region building. Among others, new options were promoted for; cross-border territorial partnerships with continental regions; corporate developments and realization of a common labour marked with the neighbouring greater Copenhagen area; the formation of strategic partnerships as highly specialized networks of public and private services and universities across the Belt. To some extent these expectations have become materialized as structural realities today (Gidlund and Jerneck 2000).

It was in 1996 that the Swedish Parliament passed a government bill, which implied far reaching changes in the regional organization of Skåne, as well as widely enhanced competencies for a five-year trial period, now prolonged to 2010 before exit option for the county parties. The passing of the bill was the result of a long bargaining process, initiated and driven by the representatives of Skåne (Fernandez 1998), and with the preconditions elaborated above. The competencies were established with the regional parliamentary assembly as the supreme authority (SOU 1995: 17, 1996: 169). It happened in accordance with the EU principle of subsidiarity, and by the enforcement of the democratic authority

through devolution of sovereignty from the national state through negotiated agreements. Thus, in the area of its achieved competencies, the regional government of Skåne became an autonomous principle authority in relation to the central government. The reciprocity established in that way between the two levels made *real* negotiations and bargaining processes feasible on issues concerning development measures, project programmes, and allocation of revenues and expenses. Legal agreements and contracts were signed imposing mutual responsibility for the performance of the negotiated regional policies on both the new democratic Skåne authority and the national state (Regionalproposition 2001).

That was the democratic part of the regionalization process, and a solution intended to overcome the mentioned structural 'administrative mess' problem of the past. However, as elaborated above, once negotiated agreements and contracts on regional developments are settled they determine performance as deflected technocratic acts, and not as political decision-making process. In the Skåne case it meant the establishment of what we have called a dual order of democracy, i.e. legal governance structures which supersede in certain field of competencies the authority of the regional parliamentary assembly. However, the competencies become managed of technocratic organs, and ordinarily they suffering from the failure of output democratic legitimacy in terms of transparency and openness (Veggeland 2003). Accordingly, the region became confronted with the challenge arising out of the new post-national voice channels and in traditional terms the democratic deficit problem. For some reason, this problem has not so far occurred as a great regional issue; rather it has become a topic exposed for considerations of politicians at the national state level because they seem to fear loss of territorial control (Kommunförbundet 2001; Veggeland 2003). Locally there was obviously another reason, for meanwhile, in the Skåne region, the legitimacy of the regionalization process came to rely on an overshadowing great output of prosperous economic development and progress concerning new infrastructure. This output legitimacy was strengthened by the loyalty of the people stammering from the strong Scanian identity.

Anyway, when summing up, in Scandinavia the region of Skåne has become an important symbol of a Swedish contribution to the development of the 'regions of Europe'. The political, economic and geographical conditions of the region became rearranged to make feasible the realization of connected familiar development objectives favouring regional development in that perspective (Gidlund and Jerneck 2000; Veggeland 2000). Among others, the objectives were: (1) Reforming traditional regional bureaucratic government structures into technocratic governance and contract planning in order to get out of the previous 'administrative mess' causing high transaction costs; (2) Restructuring in wide sense the conditions for regional competition to make Skåne to become a strong bargaining political and economic unit of the EU multilevel governance system; (3) Establishing Skåne as a self-regulatory region anchored in government institutions with legal right to negotiate, build and join cross-border spatial partnership institutions in order to achieve increased regional competitiveness; (4) Forming a dual order of democracy (Veggeland 2003). In the Rokkanian sense,

the Skåne case provides a good example of how new post-national voice channels and loyalty may be established; decentralization of self-governance can be realized by bargaining processes; and foreclosure of exit option might be restructured by changing state–region relations and building territorial partnership across borders. Obviously, in this case the main driving force and the bargaining strength of the region versus the national state authorities has been the strong regional identity and the optimistic expectation of corporate and market success derived from the new options of the interstate and interregional Øresund bridge.

Conclusion

In general analytical terms, the European spatial and cross-border partnership institutions are products of complex influences – of 'macro' versus 'micro' interest types of policy (EU governance versus national planning objectives versus self-governing regions), and of sectoral policy versus multilevel territorial policy (centralization versus decentralization by subsidiarity). Hence, and in accordance with other statements made in this study, the conclusions drawn above from the Skåne case on region building processes, most likely have relevance for European processes of restructuring regions as well. Post-national developments challenge European regions concerning both requirements for competitiveness and self-governance. However, which mode of governance? Democratic or just effective? In terms of the Rokkanian notions, people are offered new post-national exit, loyalty and voice options through the establishment of domestic as well as cross-border regional partnership institutions as effective modes of governance. However, the other side of the regional 'coin' is featured by the growing agreement-based and technocratic governance structures, which challenge regional parliamentary and government structures. Today the problem of democratic deficit of sub-national and cross-border regional governance calls for regulations and organizational reforms to be resolved.

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Part III

Governing the postcolonial limes

10 The choreographies of European integration

Negotiating trans-frontier cooperation in Iberia

James Derrick Sidaway

> Paradoxical as it may seem, the emergence over the last few years of a process of political unification in Europe and the debate over the best forms of 'integration' appear to have heightened the uncertainty over the very nature of the European territory ... This uncertainty results above all from an excess of geopolitical scenarios, each of which attempts to project its particular character on European space.
>
> (Boeri 2001: 357)

Introduction

Summarizing the findings of a two-year anthropological study on the ideologies and working practices of EU officials in Brussels, Shore notes that:

> What struck me during many long interviews and conversations with EU officials was the discourse they used to describe themselves and the process of European integration. In their everyday speech, as well as in their official texts, Commission officials continually referred to European unification using journeying motifs and travelling metaphors. The process of European integration was variously characterized as a 'journey', 'road' or 'path' ... Commission officials frequently spoke of their institution as the 'dynamo of European integration' and 'heart of the Community process' ... Equally striking was the way these conceptions had become internalized by officials and had shaped their self-image. ... The Commission and its staff were therefore at the forefront of the project for 'building Europe'. Indeed a common expression used by officials as a shorthand for European integration was '*la construction européenne*', ... a root metaphor of European integration used both to explain the European Union's political objectives and to justify the Commission's role as vanguard and 'agent of history' within that project.
>
> (Shore 1997: 130–1)

Famously, this project is neither clearly defined nor with an agreed end point. Instead, the Treaties of Rome (1957), Maastricht (1991), and Amsterdam (1997) invoke 'an ever closer union' (Church and Phinnemore 2002). These treaties

envisage multiple strands of authority and identity: among them national, supranational, and regional, citing and entangling each other. Barry notes how aspects of the European project may therefore be comprehended as seeking:

> . . . to produce a spatial order which embodies the metaphor of the network and with a heightened emphasis on the political, economic and cultural importance of mobility.
>
> (Barry 1993: 316–17)

Such notions of a connected, mobile or networked European space therefore constitute a *discourse*, which has thereby – following Foucault (1972: 218) – 'sketched out a schema of possible, observable, measurable and classifiable objects'. Drawing on Foucault, Rose and Miller argue that all analysis of government (not only seemingly novel ones such as the EU) ought to take:

> . . . as central not so much amounts of revenue, size of the court, expenditure on arms, miles marched by an army per day, but the discursive field within which these problems, sites and forms of visibility are delineated and accorded significance. It is in this discursive field that 'the State'; itself emerges as an historically variable linguistic device for conceptualizing and articulating ways of ruling . . . Language is not merely contemplative or justificatory, it is performative. An analysis of political discourse helps us to elucidate not only *the systems of thought* through which authorities have posed and specified the problems for government, but also to the *systems of action* through which they have sought to give effect to government.
>
> (Rose and Miller 1992: 177; emphasis original)

It is through such an approach that critical work on European governance has increasingly focused on the shifting discursive field within which European governance is re-envisaged and (p)reformed. In other words, on the ways that the European Union is made meaningful in specific discourses – through which governance is seen to take *place* (Diez 1999; Walker 2001). From this perspective, the European Union (like its member states) has no straightforward essence. In both cases their identity is the sum of discursive traces. They are made 'real' through complex systems of representation. Indeed, that they have no eternal essence is borne out in the open contest between different representations.

In this chapter, therefore, I examine narratives about European society and space as harmonized and *networked* – in particular the European Commission's project of sponsoring local cross-border cooperation and their contrasts with state-centred (nationalist) visions. Drawing on a 'case study' from the Portuguese–Spanish frontier, the chapter explores contradictions related to an unresolved dispute concerning the demarcation of a short section of the border. It then focuses on the ways that EU-funded reconstruction of a ruined bridge across the disputed border is intertwined in competing discourses of integration and national recognition. This leads to a reflection on the way that this borderland

continues to be a space and place where divergent projections of territory and power are enacted and preformed.

Transcending frontiers

One significant way that the vision of European space as connected and harmonized (the 'integration process') finds practical expression is in the funding of infrastructure, particularly when it has a cross-frontier dimension. For the EU Commission this has come to be a significant element of the European project. This is combined with regional aid and an emphasis on fostering trans-European networks of all kinds as well as local trans-frontier cooperation in particular. Therefore, accompanying the *harmonization* project prior to the establishment of a Single European Market (formally realized on 1 January 1992), the EU Commission adopted a programme for border areas between EU members (known as INTERREG). This programme which has run (in two stages) through the 1990s has become the largest single scheme (worth €2.9 billion in its second, 1994–99, phase) in a set of what are termed 'Community Initiatives'. A third stage, running from 2000 to 2006, has a budget of €4.9 billion. Since the early 1990s, therefore, and building on precedents established in the Benelux countries and along the Dutch–German and Danish–German borders as well as lobbying by the Association of European Border Regions [which was established in 1971 and has accumulated 'expertise' on cooperation (see Scott 1999, 2002; Sparke 1998)] EU funding has been allocated to cross-border cooperation. Capital has been made available for infrastructure, social, and 'development' projects in all areas situated on internal and external land borders as well as selected maritime borders (for example, Kent and the Pas-de-Calais), with the criteria that the projects funded must have a central cross-border dimension.

The INTERREG programme operates through a wide range of community and state apparatus: local, regional and national government; planning and development agencies; universities and research institutes; the European Commission, and the Association of European Border Regions. These are incorporated in a formal network of information, expertise and knowledge (funded by the Commission). Thirteen offices for 'Linkage, Cooperation and Assistance' (known by the acronym of LACE) for the European Border Regions are conceived as key nodes in this network. The LACE offices act as consultants and conduits for INTERREG programmes. Border regions are thereby visualized as pivotal spaces of integration. Borders are no longer isolated, liminal or places to be secured and sealed. Instead they are reinscribed as central places of intervention within a project of cohesion, harmonization and integration. A cartoon figure (Figure 10.1) illustrating how bridging borders is about 'Connecting European Regions' thus appears on the home page of the INTERREG programme. And the map (Figure 10.2) accompanying the EU documentation that establishes the third (2000–2006) phase of the INTERREG programme foregrounds border regions in bold. These contrast with the white spaces of the member states linked by the borders. The border lines, so familiar

Figure 10.1 'Connecting European Regions'.

Source: European Commission, 2003. 'Regional Policy – Inforegio'. Online: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/interreg3/index_en.htm> (accessed 18 June 2003).

from conventional cartographic representations of Europe, are more difficult to discern here. Trans-national border regions are emphasized, rather than international border lines. The long and broad Portuguese–Spanish border areas eligible for INTERREG funds are particularly evident. And in terms of frontiers between contemporary EU member states, perhaps nowhere else (with the possible and peculiar exception of the 'inner Irish border' and the isolated Arctic and sub-Arctic Finnish–Swedish border) has the border as a whole been seen as such a mark of relative isolation. Winding through around 1,000 km of relatively remote territory, the Portugal–Spain boundary is the longest internal frontier in the EU. It is also the oldest boundary in terms of relative stability (only minor changes have been registered over hundreds of years), and it is also the poorest, in terms of relative material underdevelopment. Furthermore, despite a superficial political similarity (in terms of enduring antidemocratic right-wing regimes in both countries from the l930s to the mid-1970s) and a 1939 'Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation' between them, the relative underdevelopment of this border area is striking. In the most basic material terms, this amounts to sparse transport connections. The relative lack of Portuguese–Spanish connectivity is well described by the colloquial term *'dar espaldas'* (a Spanish expression which is also intelligible in Portuguese) meaning 'to turn one's back upon'. Referring in part to the Atlantic and imperial projection of Portugal (which retained the last European overseas empire until the overthrow of the old authoritarian colonial



Figure 10.2 Border areas eligible for INTERREG phase 3 funding.

Source: European Commission, 1999. 'Notice to the member states laying down guidelines for a Community Initiative concerning trans-European cooperation intended to encourage harmonious and balanced development of the European territory (INTERREG)'. Online: <http://inforeigo.cec.eu.int/wbdoc/docoffic/official/interreg_en.doc> (accessed 12 October 1999).

order by disaffected army officers in 1974), contrasted with the continental and Mediterranean orientations of Spain (see Sidaway 2000), the term *dar espaldas* is frequently used as a way of summarizing the historical trajectory of the mutual orientation of the Iberian states and of the frontier between them in particular.

More poetically, a classic book of social reportage and travelogue written in 1972 by two Spanish journalists, used the expression *'Telón de Corcho'* (Cork Curtain) to describe the border. Not only are groves of cork trees the dominant

feature of the landscape in much of the central portion of the frontier but, according to the journalists, 'perhaps because cork is a good isolating and soundproofing element', it provides a suitable metaphor for the function of the border (Pintado and Barrenechea 1972: 101). In similar mood, reflecting on the social, economic and demographic environment of the frontier, they also termed it the *'Costa del Luto'* (Coast of Black Mourning Clothes), referring to the relative prominence of women dressed in black to mark deceased or absent husbands:

> In general, black mourning clothes are very evident throughout the fringe of the Spanish-Portuguese frontier, so much so that, bearing in mind the interest that our official bodies have in baptising regions with a name [such as the *Costa del Sol* or *Costa Brava,* terms that were popularized by Franco's tourism and propaganda ministry] with visions of tourist promotion, we thought of proposing *Costa del Luto* for the border with Portugal.
>
> (Pintado and Barrenechea 1972: 54)

They note that, in the preceding decade (1960–70), the frontier areas had lost about 1.5 million people; the highest level of out-migration anywhere in Iberia, representing a decline of up to 25 per cent from areas with already low population densities (20 or 30 people km^2 being typical figures for the entire border provinces). They pointed out too that along the border there were only 13 official crossing posts, none of which remained open day and night (the much shorter and more mountainous frontier with France had 18 legal crossing posts). Today, Spain's (autonomous region of) Extremadura and the neighbouring Portuguese (region of) Alentejo still have the status of being the areas of both Spain and Portugal with the lowest average income per capita (in both cases less than 50 per cent of the EU average) and the part of Extremadura that borders Portugal; the province of Badajoz is the poorest (in terms of income per capita) of Spain's 50 provinces.

Passing through these relatively impoverished areas during their travels of the spring of 1972, Pintado and Barrenechea visited the small town of Olivenza, some 24 km south of the city of Badajoz and 12 km by minor road from a ruined bridge (of which more will be said below) over the river Guadiana which serves to mark the border with Portugal:

> A visit to Olivenza, a town of marked Portuguese flavour, because it was only definitely incorporated into Spain at the start of the last century, after having passed repeatedly, through history, from one sovereignty to the other. . . . In our visit to the town they told us that, up to a few years ago, many Olivencans usually spoke Portuguese at home.
>
> (Pintado and Barrenechea 1972: 61)

But there is more to Olivenza than this Portuguese flavour and the continued use of Portuguese language among older people in the town. Whereas the town and surrounding area have been regarded by Madrid as Spanish territory since it was won from Portugal in a brief border war in 1801, uniquely about 12 km of

border between part of Olivenza district and Portugal are not officially recognized by Lisbon. Moreover, Olivenza (or Olivença as it is named in Portuguese) is the continued subject of colourful, but virulent (in terms of propaganda) claims by a Lisbon-based irredentist movement (Figure 10.3 is a map produced by Portuguese irredentists indicating the territory claimed). All this is documented below, as are its consequences for the formats of transfrontier cooperation. The disputed status of the frontier here is unique. However, some of the disputes around the status of Olivenza share features with other situations where Europeanist discourses collide with renditions of nation–statehood–identity. Moreover, certain debates and strategies articulated around the Olivenza dispute reflect Portuguese–Spanish relations more widely. This chapter will reflect on these and specify how they are deeply entwined with different, indeed contrasting, visions of Europe as well as revealing of some of the contradictory imperatives and consequences of the EU programmes.

Boundary drawing

Although Alfonso VII of Leon had recognized a 'Portuguese' kingdom in 1143 (roughly corresponding to contemporary Portugal except for the Alentejo and



Figure 10.3 Territory claimed by the Grupo dos Amigos de Olivença.

Source: Boletim do Grupo dos Amigos de Olivença. No. 11/12, p. 36.

Algarve which were then still under Arab–Berber rule), the mutual recognition of the border is usually traced in Spanish, and particularly in Portuguese, historiography to the Treaty of Alcanices signed on 12 September 1297 (in fact, the date on the Treaty is 12 September 1335, but, among other things, our conventions for counting years have altered since). The Treaty has acquired something of the status of a foundational text. For example, an entry in a mid-1930s encyclopedic history of Portugal sees 1297 as:

> . . . one of the most memorable of dates in the history of our Country. Since this distant year, the Portuguese Nation, apart from the movements of expansion in overseas continents, has always inhabited the same sacred parcel of the earth. And of the European nations, no other can pride itself with this glorious title.
>
> (Ribeiro 1935: 273)

However, the actual demarcation of the border had to await the national 'rationalities' of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Two formal delimitation treaties (the first of 1864 for the northern half of the frontier between the Minho river to the Badajoz area, and the second of 1926 for the southern half of the border) set out an agreed frontier and established mechanisms for its physical demarcation on the ground. But there was one striking anomaly in this boundary placement: a short stretch of the border remained outside the terms of the 1864 and 1926 treaties – namely, the section of the border west of Olivenza. Spain captured Olivenza in a border war with Portugal in 1801 (see Black 1975 for historical contextualisation). However, the legality and legitimacy of Spain's control of Olivenza and surrounding territories has long been contested from Portugal. Portuguese irredentist texts began to appear in the 1860s in the lead-up to the 1864 treaty, with a book comparing the 'usurpation' of Olivenza by Spain with that of Gibraltar by England (da Viega 1863). Spanish wishes to include the *de facto* post-1801 river border in the negotiations that culminated in the 1864 and 1926 treaties were rejected by Portugal. Although other irredentist texts, newspaper articles, and occasional diplomatic communications and manoeuvres regarding Olivenza followed, an organized (Lisbon-based) irrendentist movement was not constituted until the second half of the 1930s. The small but active *Sociedade Pro-Olivença* was established in the ultranationalist atmosphere of the emerging protofascist and imperialist *Estado Novo* (New State) established by Antonio Salazar. The *Sociedade* emerged in 1936, around the time of the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, when the future of the unsteady Spanish republic (and, for that matter, of the Spanish state) became uncertain. It was formally constituted in 1938 in the context of expectations that the victorious General Franco might be persuaded to return Olivenza to Portugal as some kind of *quid pro quo* for the aid (and access to Portuguese territory) that he received from Salazar during the Spanish Civil War. In the same expectation, the most significant and enduring of the irredentist movements, the *Grupo dos Amigos de Olivença,* was formed in Lisbon in 1944. With a membership of military figures and conservative intellectuals,

and with branches throughout the country, the *Grupo dos Amigos de Olivença* enjoyed discreet indulgence (but never overt support) from Salazar (who was ever mindful not to upset Franco). Despite failing to make any evident impression on Spanish policies, the *Grupo dos Amigos de Olivença* endured in the reactionary militaristic, imperialist and conservative–nationalist climate of the *Estado Novo*, producing a regular bulletin (12 issues from 1953 to 1969).

Meanwhile, however, in Olivenza itself (and surrounding villages), whatever social–cultural base may have existed in favour of reintegration with Portugal faded in the centralization and capitalist transformation of Spain under the Francoist hegemony of the late 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s. Spanish history now reads these as the *años de desarrollo* (years of development). In this interval, a hitherto starkly underdeveloped Spain experienced one of the fastest economic growth rates in the world (exceeded in these years only by that of Japan). However uneven the transformations (and however far Extremadura from their mainstreams), the capitalist 'modernization' of Spain overshadowed in scale and scope anything going on across the border in Portugal (perhaps with the partial exception of the tourist and associated real-estate boom in the Algarve). Moreover, the 'modernization' connected Olivenza (in part through networks of emigration to the booming industrial and commercial centres of the cities and coasts and to Europe beyond) with a more widely transforming sense of a Spanish society (Holman 1996; Limpo Piriz 1987). Such deepened articulation with the rest of Spain and Europe must be part of the explanation as to why no significant secessionism arose in Olivenza to match or link with Portuguese irredentism. Meanwhile, Francoist education policy imposed a rigid national *Castillian* language curriculum throughout the country, and in Olivenza irredentist literature was confiscated as subversive (Limpo Piriz 1989a: 42). Moreover, in the 1960s, part of the territory of Olivenza district was included in the gigantic modernizing irrigation and settlement project of the *Plan de Badajoz,* which relied on the construction of a series of vast dams and reservoirs upstream on the Guadiana and Tagus and their tributary rivers before they flowed into Portugal. The sum of these 'integrations' into a wider capitalist modernity (Spanish and European) provided fertile ground for embrace of the European project. Given the continued (and perhaps now more acutely felt) sense of borderland marginality and peripherality, the EU project (especially Structural Funds and transfrontier cooperation) offers the prospect of 'development'. This is a prospect in which the nation-state is but *one* reference point amid visions of an array of possibilities, networks, authorities and agents.

This contrasts with an enduring irredentism directed at Olivenza. In the l990s, under a new generation of activists, there was a revival of the *Grupo dos Amigos de Olivença* and an accompanying avalanche of irredentist literature, in particular through the medium of the Internet but also through frequent press releases and newspaper articles. The new series of the bulletin, which has been published every six months since January 1996, is posted on the website of the Grupo, which also has dozens of pages of maps, historical narratives about Olivença, justifications of the basis of the historic claims, messages of support,

press releases and links to other Portuguese sites. Although the Grupo is generally orientated to the Portuguese right, a smaller, but self-proclaimed 'left-anti-imperialist' *Comité Olivença Portuguesa* has been producing periodic literature since the later 1980s from an address in the Alentejan town of Estremoz. Despite the superficial differences between them, both the *Comitê Olivença Portuguesa* and the *Grupo dos Amigos de Olivença* operate within the shared discursive horizons. In particular they rest on constructions of Portuguese nationalism/identity. This is invariably constituted in part through the establishment of a sense of Portuguese singularity which, among other things, is about being 'not-Spain'. Mixed with the dominant construction of Portuguese identity, recalling Portuguese maritime – imperial primacy and subsequent overseas travel, these constitute an effective source of imagined Portuguese national community.

A detailed analysis of the irredentist groups, their relations to wider Portuguese politics and identity questions, is beyond the scope of this chapter. Suffice to say that the *Estado Novo* and Franco may be long gone, but irredentist activity directed at Olivenza continues – and the border remains unrecognized by the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Within this Ministry, and among fractions of the Portuguese right and armed forces, there is continuing preoccupation with the status of Olivenza. All maps produced by the Portuguese *Instituto Geográfico do Exército* (Army Geographical Institute) since its creation in 1932 omit depiction of a frontier line along the disputed section. In their maps, the thick line that traces the continental edge of Portugal is always broken where it meets the cartographic representation of the river Guadiana next to the word 'Olivença'. This cartographic 'empty space' where Portugal and Spain are not properly sealed, remains a source of anxiety. In these circles, the national – sovereign imaginary takes precedence over a visualization of European integration and attendant projects of cross-border or trans-national European regions and spaces. Within such a nationalist narrative of completeness and presence, the 'integrity' of the border remains a particular cause for concern.

Rebuilding a bridge: the story of non-cooperation

In common with many other areas of the border, road or rail travel between Olivenza and proximate Portuguese towns has long required considerable detours. From Olivenza itself, the Portuguese town of Elvas is clearly visible about 20 km away across the *de facto* border of the river Guadiana. However, until recently road travel between Elvas and Olivenza required a detour via the city of Badajoz (through which infrequent connections on one of the two Lisbon – Madrid railways also pass), a journey of over 40 km. The more direct route was cut at the river Guadiana, where the central arcs of the Ajuda bridge (named after a shrine of *Nossa Senhora da Ajuda* on the Portuguese bank) are missing. The ruined unpassable bridge at Ajuda sometimes finds itself appropriated as a metaphor for the wider trajectory of Portuguese–Spanish relations. And in irredentist discourses, its destruction is frequently attributed to and condemned as an act by the Spanish troops who captured Olivenza in 1801. In fact, historical

records, including testimony by a Spanish spy in preparation for the invasion of 1801, indicate that the bridge was already in a ruined state at that time (Limpo Piriz 1989b). Given the 'strategic' significance of the bridge (on which see Limpo Piriz 1999) it has suffered several partial destructions and reconstructions – the last being by Spanish troops in 1709, during the war of the Spanish succession. What is agreed is that construction was ordered by Manuel I and carried out between 1507 and 1514, and that as reconstruction would be a symbolic act. This symbolism provides a focus for discord. For the terms of what such a reconstruction would symbolize and the most appropriate conditions for it are issues where positions diverge. In fact there is an extensive history of *local* proposals to reconstruct the bridge. Despite wider irredentism, formal relations between Elvas and Olivenza have tended to be cordial and the local authorities of both towns have long supported, and several times jointly sponsored, projects for reconstruction. In 1879, the Elvas authorities got as far as appointing a private company (which would have been able to charge tolls) to make plans for the reconstruction of the bridge. But the ambiguous diplomatic status of the frontier intervened and the project was shelved. Reconstruction plans resurfaced in 1909 and 1936, but were both times derailed by wider events, chronic economic and political instability in Portugal after 1910 and the Spanish civil war from 1936. Under the long years of right-wing dictatorship in both Iberian states between the 1930s and the 1970s, the question of Olivenza's status remained frozen and the bridge lay in ruins.

The end of both Iberian dictatorships in the mid-1970s and common adhesion to the EU in 1986 transformed the context. Thus by the early 1990s, the EU Commission discourse about connected and harmonized European space found local expression in a project for bridging the Guadiana and reuniting Elvas and Olivenza; with attendant promises of 'development'. A joint delegation from the Portuguese and Extremaduran agencies and the Elvas and Olivenza authorities duly presented a project (in which the reconstruction of the old bridge for pedestrian use, and a new road bridge running alongside, were specified), in Brussels in March 1991 – the first ever joint presentation by Portuguese and Spanish authorities to the EU Commission. The proposal was approved as a joint Portuguese–Spanish project, with the EU meeting 75 per cent of the cost from the INTERREG programme. But before the finalization of the agreement and the call for tenders (a procedure regulated by EU law) could proceed, polemical notes began to appear in the Portuguese press, written by figures associated with or sympathetic to the irredentist movements. Full of dramatic appeals to Portuguese honour and the fate of Olivença, these articles drew attention to the fact that the reconstruction of the Ajuda bridge as an EU-funded *transftontier* project signified that Portugal would be recognizing the Guadiana as the boundary. The Portuguese ministry of foreign affairs then blocked the project. As a Portuguese journalist explained:

> The Portuguese representative in the meeting of the Commission of Limits between the two countries, ambassador Pinto Soares, declined to discuss the

> dossier concerning the bridge, in practice equivalent to totally blocking the project. [The ambassador's words were] 'For Portuguese diplomacy to participate in this work would be to recognize Spanish sovereignty of Olivença'.
>
> (Julio 1995: 47)

And when a Spanish journalist raised the issue with the cultural attaché of the Portuguese Embassy in Madrid in December 1994, the attaché refused to comment, but recommended the journalist consult article 105 of the [1815] Treaty of Vienna (de Otero-Sevilla 1994), in which – at Portuguese insistence – a clause had been inserted declaring how:

> The [signatory] Powers, recognizing the justice of the claims of H.R.H. the Prince Regent of Portugal and the Brazils, upon the town of Olivença and the other territories ceded to Spain by the Treaty of Badajos of 1801, and viewing the restitution of the same as a measure necessary to insure that perfect and constant harmony between the two Kingdoms of the Peninsula, the preservation of which in all parts of Europe has been the constant object of their arrangements, formally engage to use their utmost endeavours in favour of Portugal. And the Powers declare, as far as depends upon them, that this arrangement shall take place as soon as possible.
>
> (cited in Black 1975: 537)

Spain had delayed signing the treaty until 1817, by which time it was clear that no 'Power' would intervene to restore the territory to Portugal. With the 'return' of 1801 and 1815 haunting and disrupting late twentieth-century EU-sponsored 'integration', the mayor of Olivenza (Ramôn Rocha) told a visiting Portuguese journalist that he 'felt demoralized and unable to do anything for days', and his equivalent in Elvas, Rondão Almeida, declared that 'there is no use discussing if Olivença is Portuguese or Spanish. Today, it is European' (cited in Mario Silva 1994: 15).

Resolution of a kind eventually came through another agreement between the Extremaduran authorities and the local agency of Portuguese Planning Ministry which bypassed the Portuguese Foreign Ministry objection. In this, the Ajuda project was designated as *wholly* Portuguese. The original designs by Spanish architects were partly adopted, but the Portuguese authorities were designated as wholly responsible for Ajuda – with no further Spanish technical, financial, or political involvement. A new bridge would be constructed alongside the ruins of the old one, under sole Portuguese supervision. In return, the Extremaduran authorities would construct another bridge, elsewhere, at an undisputed point on the border; connecting the villages of Cedillo and Nisa around 100 km north-west of Olivenza (these had been cut-off from each other by the creation of a dam on the river Tagus in the 1970s).

With these two bridges – bending the spirit, if not the absolute letter, of the INTERREG criteria – the Portuguese and Spanish authorities could continue to

be eligible to receive funding from Brussels. This sought to accommodate the contrasting claims and discourses of integration and sovereignty recognition. In the end, 80 per cent of the Ajuda project costs would be met from EU sources, with the Portuguese state making up the difference. An equivalent amount would be spent by the Spanish authorities on the bridge at Cedillo. In the context of this resolution, an Extremaduran daily newspaper published an editorial remarking that '... *no hay mal que por bien no venga'* (*Hoy* 1995), which signifies something similar to the English proverb 'every cloud has a silver lining'. In other words, from a situation which initially looked bad (the blockage of the Ajuda project), something positive (the extra bridge) emerged. Not only that but, in November 1998, the Portuguese Minister of Planning signed a convention with his Spanish counterpart 'On improving accessibility between the two countries' which governs any future bridges, ferries, or roads, without signifying recognition or modification of the frontier (República Portuguesa, Reino de Espanha 1998). This convention was a direct response to the Ajuda fiasco and represents an attempt by the ministries concerned to circumvent any similar future reoccurrence. But in the meantime, as moves to finalize the arrangements for work to begin at Ajuda resumed their slow course, another 'cloud' (with origins in the ambivalent histories of Portuguese–Spanish relations and with a link to EU funding and policies) came to cast an ill-omened shadow over Ajuda.

Denouement: Ajuda submerged?

In June 1995 an Extremaduran newspaper reported that one of the effects of what it called the 'pharaonic project' of an envisaged dam inside Portugal at Alqueva on the Guadiana (about 100 km downstream from Ajuda) would, among its 'multiple repercussions', result in the inundation of the old bridge at Ajuda (as well as 35 km^2 of Spanish territory) (Aroca 1995a, l995b). The proposed new dam on the Guadiana was projected to be the biggest (in terms of capacity), not only in Iberia but, at an envisaged 4.1 km^3, would be the biggest in Europe. It would be a third larger than the largest Spanish dam, upstream at La Serana on a tributary of the Guadiana, the existence of which provided – as is detailed below – part of the rationale for the Alqueva dam. Moreover, the envisaged dam was to be financed from EU Structural Funds. A few days after this twist had surfaced in the Spanish press, Portuguese journalists added that:

> The Seia company, responsible for the environmental impact assessment of Alqueva, confirmed that the Ajuda bridge formed part of a list of sites of archaeological or heritage interest that could be affected by the dam. The bridge is considered susceptible to suffering the maximum impact level, in terms of a scale of zero to five adopted by the study to measure the magnitude of the effects of the project. This conclusion leads to the hypothesis, contrary to reason and common sense, of a Portuguese Government project, financed by the European Union, destroying another

> project of the Central [Portuguese] Administration, equally supported by [European] community funds – both still uncompleted *[por concretizar]*.
>
> (Carejo and Garcia 1995: 38)

The Alqueva project was first envisaged more than 40 years ago. Aware that the Francoist state was embarking on the vast dam and irrigation projects and that such Spanish action would have significant downstream consequences, the Estado Novo resolved to commission a series of dams on the Portuguese sections of these rivers. Aside from conversations about the matter between Franco and Salazar, until 1968 (when a partial and preliminary accord was signed), there was no formal general agreement between Spain and Portugal over sharing of water resources in anything other than the stretches of river which formed part of the common border together with a number of partial local agreements. Yet all the major 'Portuguese' rivers begin in Spain, and over 60 per cent of their flow is generated in the Spanish part of the basins. In particular, for the river Guadiana, which is characterized by highly seasonal and variable flows, the Spanish dams would restrict the flow into Portugal in times of drought and Alqueva was hence envisaged as a *strategic* reserve. Alqueva was therefore something of a response to Spain's upstream dam building and not only a basis for the technocratic conservative modernization of the Alentejo region (characterized by low-intensity private estates and a landless rural proletariat), but also potentially an extra water source for the needs of tourists in the Algarve. At this time it was envisaged that construction of the dam would take some 20 years, at a cost which then represented about a quarter of the annual Portuguese state budget (Drain 1996: 45–7). However, in the cautious monetarist climate of the Estado Novo, ongoing doubts about the economic viability of the project had relegated it to the drawing board.

After the fall of the old authoritarian and imperial Portuguese regime in 1974 and the onset of a revolutionary period in Portuguese politics, the Alqueva project took on the status of a 'gift' from the central authorities to the Portuguese Communist Party whose main rural social base was amongst the rural proletariat of the Alentejo. In due course, as the bourgeois order in Portugal was restored after 1977, the original role of Alqueva as a means of agricultural intensification and as partial substitute for agrarian reform, resurfaced. And although the emphasis may have been different, a strong ideology of modernization and 'building productive forces' was shared both by the communists and the mainstream parties, particularly as the revolutionary moment of the mid-l970s subsided and Portugal orientated itself away from the old overseas empire through a discourse of Europeanization and modernization. Moreover, after decades of the delay – owing to the mammoth costs and ever-present doubts about the broader economic viability of the project – Portuguese adhesion to the EU and the prospect of Structural Funds provided scope for a revival of the Alqueva project. Hence after Portuguese entry to the EU, support for the Alqueva dam was sought from the Structural Funds programme administered by the European Commission. Construction began in 1995 and the Commission agreed in July

1997 to finance the project, subject to Portugal and Spain reaching a broad agreement about regulation of their trans-boundary rivers.

Moreover, following the initial revelations about the potential impact of Alqueva on the Ajuda bridge, the Portuguese consultancy who carried out the impact assessment of the project recognized that they had made a cartographic mistake and had miscalculated the altitude of Ajuda, which would in fact be up to 7 m above the highest projected water level of the dam. The Ajuda project has therefore proceeded, and in 1998 initial construction work began on a new road bridge. The long-anticipated new bridge between Olivenza and Elvas was finally inaugurated on 11 November 2000. The ceremony took place on the type of fine winter's day with clear blue skies that is common in the Iberian peninsula. On the resurfaced Spanish approach road there is a new sign marked 'PORTUGAL'. However, unlike other 'international' bridges between Portugal and Spain, no such sign of impending entry into 'ESPANHA' (the Portuguese term for Spain) marks the approach to the bridge from Elvas. Over 300 people attended the inaugural ceremony – accompanied by protesters from the irredentist *Amigos de Olivença*. Since then (on 22 April 2003), the group has lodged a legal case (in Portugal) against the Spanish authorities (naming the Spanish minister of 'infrastructural development' [*fomento*], the Spanish general director of roads and the Madrid offices of the company that built the new bridge as well as those in Portugal whom it accuses of complicity; the president of the Portuguese architectural heritage institute and the major of Elvas). Whilst the new bridge now finds itself the basis for a legal case, the old ruined bridge at Ajuda remains alongside in its current derelict condition: itself cited, debated, disputed and polemicized by (diverse) networks of powers.

Conclusions: Olivenz(ç)a in a European mirror

Although Olivenza constitutes something of a unique and, in many ways, a rather *extreme* case of the complexities of the relationships between Portugal and Spain, it does embody the more general ambivalence that accompanies these relationships: notably the Portuguese wariness of Castillian power and dominance and the Spanish unfamiliarity with and/or disregard for Portuguese subjectivities and sensibilities. The Portuguese national imagination is based in part on opposition to Castille. As Freeland explains, in conceptions of Portuguese history:

> . . . a crucial role is played by Spain. The very origins of Portugal are seen to lie in a process of *separation* from the kingdoms of Leon and Galicia, and the country's subsequent independence involves constant resistance against the threat of being re-absorbed by the *'vulto enorme do Espanha'* [the enormous bulk of Spain].
>
> (Freeland 1999: 105)

Although it may be read in part as a reflection on imaginations of Portuguese and Spanish discourses of identity, this chapter has also indicated how different

visions are formulated and sometimes collide among the discourses about 'Europe'. One way of approaching these is to move beyond the question of the validity or otherwise of particular discourses towards investigation of the *consequences* and *assumptions* that permit and flow from different positions. The relatively good official relations between Elvas and Olivenza, and their common engagement with Europeanist discourse and implementation of 'integration', also provide an example of the way that this difference/distinction is configured differently at different sites and scales. Communities around the border itself have a considerable stake in Europe. For them, integration signifies a reduction in isolation, and possibilities for 'development'. But in Lisbon, in conservative-irredentist and some Foreign Ministry circles, the sovereignty-nationalist rhetoric endures albiet in the context of wider notions of a Europe without (internal) frontiers. The way that local 'border culture' is sometimes at odds with the logic of nation-statehood is a characteristic that anthropological studies from other segments of the Portuguese–Spanish border have emphasized (Périz-Embid 1975; Uriarte 1994; Valcuende del Río 1998). Such heterogeneity and complexity have also been shown to be evident (in many different ways) for other European borders (Berdahl 1999; Paasi 1996; Sahlins 1989; Thuen 1999) and elsewhere (Anzaldúa 1987). In this context, the introduction to a recent collection of diverse border anthropologies describes borders generally:

> . . . as complex and multi-dimensional cultural phenomena, variously articulated and interpreted across space and time. This suggests that *a priori* assumptions about the nature of 'the border' are likely to founder when confronted with empirical data; far from being a self-evident, analytical given which can be applied regardless of context, the 'border' must be interrogated for its subtle and sometimes not so subtle shifts in meaning and form according to setting.
>
> (Wilson and Donnan 1998: 12)

Such 'subtle and sometimes not so subtle shifts' are symptomatic of the project of an evolving and contested ever closer union. In terms of the case sketched here, Portugal and Spain are safely anchored in the deepening and widening project of European Union, but Olivenza testifies to enduring contradictions in and reinvigorated conflicts over the formation of a putatively 'integrated' European space.

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11 Towards a Mediterranean scale of governance

Twenty-first-century urban networks across the 'Inner Sea'

Olivier Kramsch

> Sans égards, sans pitié, sans honte, on a elevé autour de moi un triple cercle de hautes et solides murailles. Et maintenant, je reste sur place, désespéré, ne pensant plus qu'au sort qui m'accable. J'avais tant à faire au dehors! . . . Ah! Comment les ai-je laissé m'emmurer sans y prendre garde? Mais je n'ai rien entendu: les maçons travaillaient sans bruit, sans paroles . . . Imperceptiblement, ils m'ont enferme *hors du monde*.
>
> (Constantine Cavafy, cited in Yourcenar 1958: 82; emphasis in original)

> The Mediterranean will not abide a scale incommensurate with itself.
>
> (Matvejevic 1999: 11)

At the end of his now classic essay, 'Orbits: the Ancient Mediterranean Tradition of Urban Networks', the late Jean Gottman pondered whether 'this ancient Mediterranean tradition [of city networks] express[es] basic curiosity or even more, the impulse to learn how to deal with others, how to overcome distance, and perhaps even how to overcome human diversity?' (Gottman, cited in Gottman and Harper 1990: 34). In exploring this question Gottman counterposed two trajectories of urban Mediterranean civilization, the one Platonic, characterized by small, insular and self-sufficient city-states, the other Alexandrine, marked by vast, poly-nuclear and densely interconnected territories. 'Which is the essential orbit?' (Gottman and Harper 1990: 24). While recognizing the subtle interdependencies linking both patterns of urbanization, from the vantage point of the 1983 Oxford lecture from which his essay derives, Gottman cautiously left the question open.

As conflict engulfs the Mediterranean from the Balkans to the Middle East, with equally intense population movements across its Eastern and Western flanks, Gottman's query once again acquires its full historical weight. In the interim, however, the wider context for understanding circum-Mediterranean urban and regional dynamics has shifted. Whereas at the time of Gottman's writing the urbanized areas of nations lining the shores of the Mediterranean were largely managed by national governments comprising a relatively stable and dependent periphery to Europe, in the current conjunction Mediterranean cities have experienced pronounced forms of socio-spatial restructuring, gaining

varying degrees of autonomy from their respective national encasements, shifting within their state territorial borders and increasingly projecting themselves into wider geographical circuits.

Within a broader political and geographical discourse this transformation has been theorized as part of an epochal transition in forms of territorial rule, one marked by the passage from an exclusive fixation on national scales of regulation to that of an open-ended process of collective interest formation involving elements of civil society and the state operating at a range of geographical scales, extending alternately from small to medium-sized industrial districts (Porter 1990; Storper 1997; Storper and Salais 1997) to networks of globalized city-regions (Scott 1998), including supra-national structures of policy steering and guidance (Jessop 1995; Le Gales 1998; Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999). Within the horizon of what has thus been labeled as a shift towards multi-level or networked forms of governance, cities and urban regions have acquired a conceptual prominence perhaps denied them since the crystallization of the nation-state as hegemonic political form in the late seventeenth century.

Within the developing world, the concept of urban governance has acquired saliency as well in light of demographic realities indicating that over half this area will be urbanized by 2020 (McCarney 1996; Koolhaas *et al.* 2000). The term has also come to prominence as a way of addressing the declining capacity of the state to articulate the needs of domestic constituencies with wider geographical scales, and highlights the growing organizational capacity of civil associations operating outside the bureaucratic terrain of traditional state structures across a wide range of policy contexts, from Asia to Africa to Latin America (McCarney 1996). Over the past decade, the issue of urban and regional governance has therefore increasingly become the target of international donor agencies. As reflected in shifts in policy and programming within the urban sector of the World Bank and other aid agencies, for instance, such changes reveal a progression from projects in housing and infrastructure directed at the poor during the 1970s, to city-wide urban management in the 1980s, to an increasing emphasis on strengthening local governments and creating 'good governance' at the local level in the 1990s (McCarney 1996: 13).

Yet, as the very seedbed of the idea of the urban in human history (Lapidus 1984; Soja 2000), the Mediterranean conceived in its geographical entirety has remained largely missing from the burgeoning literature on emergent modes of urban and regional governance, particularly in light of debates surrounding the emergence of multi-level network society (for a particularly glaring instance, see Castells 1996). Could it be that we have truly reached the limits of our spatial imagination in this part of the world, resigning ourselves to the image of an increasingly widening gap between the northern and southern shores of the 'Inland Sea', to that hole in the 'space of flows' separating a wealthy and integrated Europe with a fast-disconnecting global Mediterranean South? I suggest that the curious absence of the Mediterranean in discussions of multi-scale societal regeneration stems in part from an ongoing intellectual legacy, itself the product of colonialism, that has served to systematically carve up

the space of the Mediterranean into distinct state-centric 'cultural areas' and have largely defined the overall framework for policy intervention in the region (Said 2000; Burke 1995; Clancy-Smith 2001a).[1]

The effect of this view of the Mediterranean, shared, not coincidentally, by promoters of neoliberal adjustment as with nationalist anti-imperialist elites alike, has largely conditioned the nature and intensity of Euro-Mediterranean relations in the post-war period, framed largely in the grammar of asymmetry and uneven development between the nation-states of a highly urbanized North and those of a 'backward', agrarian and dependent Mediterranean South (Clancy-Smith 2001b). What this state-centric epistemology has conveniently served to occlude, however, is the increasingly urbanized nature of the Mediterranean Rim, the gradual coalescence of a transnational twenty-first-century *mundus* lining its shores, whose dynamics, though still shaped by state regulatory frameworks, often 'jump' their scales in interacting with the wider world. I suggest that it is within the tensions produced by these discrepant scales of urbanism that we are currently witnessing the fitful emergence of a novel circum-Mediterranean space, one which fulfills neither the ideal of Gottman's Platonic, insular city-state system nor its fully cosmopolitan, Alexandrine counterpart, but draws creatively on its proto-colonial inheritance as a self-enclosed and densely urbanized 'universe' the better to make its presence felt in the world today.[2]

In order to grasp the logics underlying contemporary trans-Mediterranean governance dynamics, a comparative geo-historical methodology is proposed which attempts to read the post-war trajectory of Euro-Mediterranean relations against the grain of an early modern system of capitalist expansion, urbanization and migration, a process which has the effect of radically unsettling our taken-for-granted assumptions concerning the 'natural' borders of states, economies and cultural systems on either side of the mare nostrum. Such a tactic of productive de-centring, relaying the Mediterranean's post-colonial present with its proto-capitalist and pre-colonial past might open a possibility for rethinking the relevant boundaries of Europe proper, an important step towards reformulating the Mediterranean not simply as a civilizational 'zone of fracture' but as a marshland, a borderland whose appropriate sphere of action, once again, is the object of effort, of struggle, of history (Balibar 2003). Here, while not downplaying the very real materialist constraints on trans-Mediterranean networking today, the idea of the socially produced nature of geographical scale is recuperated, its inherent fluidity and malleability emphasized, and the ideational and representational aspects of urban governance foregrounded as key elements in a strategy of Mediterranean re-*worlding*.

The following section consciously lifts us out of the commonly perceived 'orbit' of Europe, revisiting early-modern Tunisia, whose sixteenth- and seventeenth-century capital became the exemplar of an early form of trans-Mediterranean cosmopolitanism, based on a very specific political-economic and administrative system: privateering on the high seas. The rise and decline of Tunis as worldly *entrepot* is sketched to the period just preceding the advent of the French

Protectorate in the late nineteenth century. The subsequent section jumps to an examination of various European efforts to establish closer trans-Mediterranean integration in the era of post-war decolonization, while highlighting the broader economic and political forces conditioning the relative autonomy of national regulatory regimes in the Mediterranean South. In what follows I attempt to explore the potential degrees of freedom available within this historically over-determined set of relations by focusing attention on processes of urban spatial restructuring in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean today, and on the particular transformation of the urban context of Tunisia as a way to deepen insight into the nature of these impacts. In light of this discussion, and drawing on the Tunisian case, the paper concludes by reflecting on the relevance and ongoing viability of conceiving the 'Mediterranean urban' as an experimental space for novel forms of post-colonial governance and rule. In so doing, it argues forcefully for an intellectual praxis that comprehends contemporary trans-boundary region-building in Mediterranean space in the context of a largely ignored proto-colonial inheritance, including Europe's 'unfinished business' with decolonization (Sparke 2001; Kramsch 2001).

Tunisian cosmopolis, 1600–1880

Incorporated into the Ottoman Empire in 1574, Tunis developed a model of ethnic pluralism and outwardly oriented mercantile dynamism which distinguished it markedly from the North African cities of its time. With the emergence of a monarchical system of rule in the seventeenth century under Muradid Beys, Tunis became transformed into the capital of an increasingly bounded Tunisian territory. The city's wealth rested primarily on artisanal manufacturing, extensive participation in trans-Mediterranean trade and the ability to accumulate large quantities of agricultural surplus from the city's hinterland through taxation on Muslim-endowed lands and properties (Largueche 2001: 117). By the early eighteenth century, Tunis under the reign of the Husainids becomes a pivotal commercial exchange centre between Europe, Africa and the Levant (Largueche 2001: 121). As a result of these activities, contemporary observers began to conceive of Tunis as a 'Mediterranean Shanghai', referring in particular to the vibrancy of its port and its far-flung commercial networks maintained with the port cities of the Western and Eastern Mediterranean.

Tunis resembled Shanghai in another crucial respect. A vital source of its commercial dynamism was rooted in a form of maritime political-economy known as privateering or corsair activity, a Mediterranean-wide system of exchange involving the acquisition of booty on the high seas, including hostage and ransom-taking. Rather than a random outcome of the wayward actions of Barbary pirates, the sophisticated urban-based privateering economy that subsequently developed involved state actors, ship owners, Turkish sea captains (*ra'is*), and an intricate web of business intermediaries who supplied and armed the corsair fleets. Significantly, a large portion of the warrior elements manning the fleets were 'renegades' newly converted to Islam (Largueche 2001: 119).

A distinguishing feature of early modern Tunis was its diverse population, and the complex urban morphology engendered by it. Since the sixteenth century Tunis had attracted migrants and newcomers from throughout the Mediterranean Basin. Already at this time indigenous intellectual elites, such as Muhammad Bayram V, perceived the social space of Tunis as multi-ethnic, something very old and fitting to the region (Largueche 2001: 117). The Tunisian corsair economic and administrative system only accelerated this trend, bringing thousands of Christians – Italians, Maltese, Spanish and Greek – to the city (Largueche 2001: 119). By 1654 Christian hostages alone in Tunis numbered 6,000 out of a total urban population of no more than 100,000. Some eventually managed to buy their freedom and returned to their home countries; others converted to Islam, joined in the privateering themselves, and eventually blended in with the elite segments of the urban populace. Privateering thus drove economic expansion in Tunis and added to the socio-ethnic diversity of the urban population, already enriched by Balkan, Anatolian and Levantine janissaries and civilians sent from the Ottoman heartland, as well as Muslim and Jewish Andalusian communities dating from the late fifteenth-century Iberian expulsions. Under the demographic pressure of this heady mix, and guided by Husainid dynastic rule, the Tunisian capital developed the 'open urban model' of a true *ville ouverte*, thus breaking with an older typology of the North African city closed off behind ramparts and walls (Largueche 2001: 121). The result was an original form of urbanism, leading to an urbanity expressive of the mercantile strategies of the state and its interests.

As the eighteenth century unfolded, the Tunisian regime of accumulation based on privateering and corsair activities was gradually replaced by more 'legitimate' commercial exchange, in tandem with a broader geo-economic realignment of trans-Mediterranean relations in favor of countries located on the sea's northern rim. The 1815 Congress of Vienna and its concomitant gunboat diplomacy brought a definitive end to the corsair activities of Maghribi states, and introduced an entire new diasporic class of European merchants – French, Italian, including Jews from the Leghorn – into the heart of Tunisian urban society (Largueche 2001: 1220). These relatively well-off newcomers to the city would be supplemented by additional streams of subsistence migrants fleeing economic crises from Southern European and Mediterranean island states – Italy, Sicily, Malta (Clancy-Smith 2000). By 1860, Tunis could count, among its more than 100,000 residents, more than 20,000 Jews (notably 1,500 Livornese), 6–7,000 Maltese, 3–4,000 Italians, 700 Greeks and 600 French (Clancy-Smith 2001b). Despite the subsequently rapid deterioration of commercial relations for North African cities involved in trans-Mediterranean trade, along with a crisis generated by plagues and famine, coexistence and ethnic plurality founded on the mutual interests of the different Mediterranean communities residing in the capital became an enduring characteristic of 'Tunisian cosmopolitanism' (Largueche 2001: 122). The Tunisian cosmopolis functioned on the basis of an assimilation strategy which preserved the 'autonomy' of each community, reinforced through the proscription of inter-marriage across religious or confessional lines. Thus, a certain form of differentiation internal to Tunisian

society became the complement to its outward-looking, trans-Mediterranean commercial strategies. Reinforcing borders at home allowed for their transcendence across the wider circum-Mediterranean world.

Representatives of the early French Protectorate, arriving in 1881, to their collective amazement, discovered a profoundly worldly city on the southern rim of their Inner Sea, one that would only be partially displaced through the modernizing wish-fantasies of antiseptic European *villes nouvelles*. By reinforcing the role of Tunis as the primary economic and political centre of national life, subsequent colonial administrations would provide a vital element of continuity with Tunisia's proto-colonial past, but, with important consequences for the way in which urbanization challenges would be handled by indigenous governing elites in the wake of decolonization.

The era of decolonization and unilateral free trade

Towards a 'global' Euro-Mediterranean governance framework

At the time of the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, most countries lining the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean comprised colonies or ex-colonies of European nations. The treaty allowed for the creation of associational relationships with non-member nations drawing on the foundations of this colonial inheritance[3] (Grilli 1993). Association was initially extended to French and Belgian colonies, as well as Somaliland, then an Italian protectorate. Though individual agreements varied, they shared common elements, allowing Europeans preferential access for industrial products originating in non-member nations (Lister 1988). Concessions were also provided for major agricultural exports, such as fruit, vegetables, wines and olive oil. In addition to these forms of preferential treatment, the EC offered financial aid in the form of direct grants and loans from the European Investment Bank (Casella 1995: 181). In principal, labour would be allowed to circulate freely from associated territories to EC countries; similarly, national citizens and corporations would be permitted to establish themselves in associated countries, and vice versa (Grilli 1993: 8).

As Mediterranean policy in this period was shaped by the widely divergent interests of EC members, the overall result was a patchwork mosaic of multilateral agreements with limited coordination (Schlaim and Yannopoulos 1976).[4] Regarding the substance of associational agreements, the dominant paradigm in European policy-making circles stressed aid over trade in spurring economic development in the Mediterranean South (Grilli 1993: 13). The prevalent economic doxa maintained that a lack of savings constituted the primary constraint to growth in the developing countries; external aid would therefore be seen not only as a net addition to domestic savings but could also be directed at the building of much-needed capital investment projects (Grilli 1993). Within the framework of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), most countries of the Mediterranean South concentrated efforts towards international rather than regional economic

cooperation, aiming for a measure of price stability for primary commodity imports through international agreements financed by consuming countries and the attainment of trade preferences for manufactured exports to the EC via industrial import substitution policies (Grilli 1993: 22).

In order to counter various forms of urban and interregional polarization, most Eastern and Southern Mediterranean nations initiated some form of coordinated multi-level planning, the primary objective being the achievement of national territorial 'balance' and the reduction of coastal development and urban macrocephalization, as the interior was charged with the role of preserving the sentiment of national identity *vis-à-vis* a largely colonized and Westernized littoral (Prenant 1991). In this way, Turkey attempted to bring a certain equilibrium to its East–West territorial imbalance, addressing its Kurdish impasse through an ambitious irrigation program; Morocco devoted substantial investments to its peripheral regions; Tunisia called upon various forms of 'citizen solidarity' in soliciting financial resources for the economic development of the countryside; Egypt's Nasser dedicated considerable energy stimulating local economic conditions in the countryside, as well as providing mid-sized cities with adequate infrastructure; Syria progressed in its eastward march in building up its provinces along the Euphrates; and Algeria reinforced its economic planning measures by means of a complex spatial plan redeploying needed resources towards its national interior (Cote and Joannon 1999a).

By the early-1970s, and in recognition of the European Commission's declaration of the importance of the Mediterranean, which came to be viewed as a natural extension of European integration, the EEC began to devise a dual-pronged strategy with respect to the entire Mediterranean Basin under the rubric of a self-defined 'Global Mediterranean Policy' (CEC 1971; Drevet 1986; Grilli 1993). Preferential accords signed in the 1976–1977 period between the EEC and the near totality of countries situated around the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean specifically envisaged tariff reductions (up to 80 per cent) as well as the free entry of manufactured goods into Europe without the constraints of duties, quotas or reciprocity obligations *vis-à-vis* European manufactures. The fruits of these EEC trade preferences would become evident for Turkey, Morocco and Tunisia, each of which witnessed a substantial increase in their share of manufacturing exports northwards. In this way, between 1970 and 1993 the proportion of exported durable goods rose from 13 to 50 per cent in Morocco, expanded from 15 to 58 per cent in the case of Tunisia and surged from 2 to 54 per cent in Turkey (Bensidoun and Chevalier 1996). Such an approach thus sought to engage with Mediterranean nations in a way that reduced dependence, promoted reciprocity and created the necessary financial pre-conditions for a free-trade area encompassing all the nations circumscribing the Mediterranean Basin with the support of the Bank of European Investment (BEI). Within such a policy framework, the new strategy would seek to extend the scope of Euro-Mediterranean integration beyond trade to encompass issues of finance capital, technology transfer, employment and environmental protection, while explicitly respecting the import-substitution developmental models established by

the respective national governments across the Southern Mediterranean (Crouzatier 1988: 207; Grilli 1993: 32).

On the terrain of this transformed global policy landscape, the countries of the Southern Mediterranean were able to draw on prior modes of institutional governance to achieve variable levels of interdependency with the EC. As regards agriculture, for instance, Algeria and Tunisia experimented extensively with cooperative forms of agricultural ownership, while Morocco maintained private ownership in this sector (Grilli 1993: 193). Industrialization was pursued more vigorously and via massive state intervention in Algeria and Egypt than in Morocco, where strategies focused heavily on resource-based and import-substitution models. Only Tunisia appears to have followed the Algerian model in its early stages, shifting subsequently to a more export-oriented, private capital-based industrial strategy (Grilli 1993). Conceived during a period of economic expansion, the 'global' approach to Mediterranean integration would nevertheless be undermined by a series of factors beyond EC control. Primary among these would be the crisis in the Fordist model of industrial development then prevalent throughout the advanced capitalist West (Drevet 1986; Lipietz 1987; Scott 1988; Storper and Walker 1989). The crisis of Fordism in Europe would thus come to place severe constraints on earlier optimistic scenarios of trans-Mediterranean economic networking and partnership. As the textile and apparel industries entered a period of crisis in Europe, northern producers preferred to reinforce existing trans-Mediterranean divisions of labour by subcontracting with suppliers located in the Maghreb, resulting in a low value-added development model for Morocco and Tunisia, as they engaged mostly in the elaboration of imported intermediate goods, with multiplier effects extending solely through a largely feminized low-wage structure. On top of these strictures, and as a condition of export, the EC required Tunisia and Morocco to accept conditions of voluntary 'self-limitation' of output, a demand that only served to lower the amount of textiles exported from the Maghreb to Europe (Khader 1991). The difficulty of achieving a coherent policy framework under these global accords reflected the further problem of reconciling the interests of EC agricultural producers with those of the Maghreb/Mashrek. Since the late-1960s, EC implementation of a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) had effectively sealed off Europe's market for temperate-zone food products. In this context, association agreements with Morocco and Tunisia ensured that almost all industrial exports from the two countries could freely enter the EC, but extended tariff privileges only to a restricted number of agricultural exports (CEC 1982).

Outside the domain of a limited range of goods, then, the countries of the Mediterranean South during this period were unable to take full advantage of open markets promised by an EEC free-trade zone. This condition is starkly reflected by the fact that the commercial deficit of the Mediterranean South *vis-à-vis* Europe doubled in the decade of the 1970s, reaching 9 million ECUs by 1980 (Crouzatier 1988: 57). Similarly, whereas only 2.7 per cent of French exports were directed at countries of the Maghreb in the decade of the 1980s, 35 per cent of exports originating from the Maghreb during this period were destined for

French markets (Khader 1991: 8). In light of these ongoing structural asymmetries, attempts on the part of the Commission to expand the scope of trans-Mediterranean integration during the 1980s similarly foundered (Yachir 1986; Khader 1991).

The heightened trade imbalance between the Northern and Southern Mediterranean shores coincided with a fundamental shift in the European development policy context. Whereas in the 1970s EC trans-Mediterranean cooperation policy explicitly pledged not to influence the industrial development priorities of the Mediterranean South, leaving countries with full decision-making capacity over the final destination of foreign aid resources, in the subsequent decade European governments became much more active in controlling the policy environment governing the use of aid as a principle condition of disbursement (Grilli 1993: 38). This shift in Euro-Mediterranean dynamics largely reflected the impact of EC southern enlargement (Greece became an EC member in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986). As the EC became intent on protecting Southern member's exports, this threatened a key objective of more comprehensive cooperation with the Mediterranean South, centred on economic modernization and the promotion of investments for sectors in which the Maghreb and Mashrek enjoyed comparative advantages. The new policy context also revealed the increasing weight of international development criteria imposed by decision-making fora such as the G7, IMF and World Bank, which, in bypassing European institutions proper, increasingly came to coordinate African relief on a continent-wide, rather than regional, level.

This 'renewed' framework for trans-Mediterranean engagement included support for economic reforms, encouragement of private investments, the easing of access to EC markets through the creation of a bilateral free trade zone and dialogue in dealing with problems of mutual concern. In the absence of other mitigating factors, however, bilateral free trade provides no necessary benefits as compared to unilateral free trade, which does not by itself induce sectoral diversification in the Mediterranean South. This matter is exacerbated by the reluctance of foreign domestic investment in the area, which will be increasingly drawn over the next decade towards the eastern accession countries of the EU (Michalet 1996; Regnault 1997a). Moreover, a Euro-Mediterranean accord on agriculture is not immune to the leveling effects of more global institutional arrangements, such as upcoming WTO measures focused on the world-wide reduction of agricultural trade barriers (Olson 2001). Under the terms of these emergent conditions, it will no longer be suitable for the countries of the Mediterranean South to be competitive at the level of the Euro-Mediterranean region, but must become so at a global scale (Khader 1991; Regnault 1997b: 18).

Beyond state-centrism? The emergence of the littoral Mediterranean

How can we begin to make sense of the variable effects of the shifting macro-policy frameworks of Euro-Mediterranean and globalized trade relations and aid

networks on the margins of maneuver, of adaptability and compromize available to the circum-Mediterranean region? In order to place contemporary trans-Mediterranean governance dynamics in perspective, it is instructive to view the region itself as a highly urbanized area, one currently flanked by 30 cities each containing over 1 million inhabitants. A prominent feature of this pattern of urbanization, particularly accentuated in the recent period, is the heightened concentration of cities and population along the strips of land directly abutting the sea as opposed to the hinterlands of nation-states (the former commonly referred to as 'littoralization'[5]). Measured as a percentage of national population, the countries of the Maghreb in general demonstrate high rates of urban littoralization, striking examples being Libya (85 per cent), Tunisia (70 per cent), Morocco (51 per cent) and Turkey (52 per cent) (Cote and Joannon 1999b: 6). Of the 217 million inhabitants of the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean, 94 million (43 per cent) occupy littoral space. Although the nineteenth-century colonial period can account for much of the acceleration in patterns of ancient littoral urbanization, it is only in the current re-appropriation of that initial context that contemporary urbanization trends can be properly identified (Cote and Joannon 1999b: 7). Situated close to major urban centres as well as maritime ports and airports linked to the wider world, today it is the littoral plains that constitute the zones of privileged agricultural land and tourism around the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean.

Complementing the accelerating trend towards littoralization, urbanization trends around the Mediterranean are currently being propelled by a blurring of the traditional lines separating city and countryside (Cote and Joannon 1999b: 8). As has been documented in the case of Syria and Egypt, this phenomenon is producing new geographical distinctions between, on the one hand, large, macro-cephalic urban areas connected to global flows of capital and investments, and their semi-urban peripheries on the other. A curious but not insignificant exception to these developments is Algeria, whose capital, Algiers, contains only 15 per cent of the national population (Cote and Joannon 1999b: 9). This is largely the product of recent state-led urban and regional planning efforts, which have consciously sought to create regional capitals along the Algerian coast outside the 'shadow' of Algiers (Oran to the West, Constantine Annaba to the East).

Advancing littoralization and macro-cephalization is associated with heightened socio-spatial polarization within contemporary Mediterranean societies. Cairo attracts half of Egypt's students and doctors, Casablanca 61 per cent of total national industrial employment (Cote and Joannon 1999b: 10). Similarly, where the Tunisian littoral concentrates 70 per cent of the national population, it also draws in 82 per cent of the country's industrial employment. And yet, in a country where national policy-making had once made ambitious attempts at eradicating such forms of territorial polarization, the Tunisian government now accepts such disparities as a positive development, in the hopes of achieving further economies of scale (Cote and Joannon 1999b: 12). How to evaluate this emergent Mediterranean spatial order from the perspective of new patterns of urban and regional governance operating across local, regional, national and transnational

scales? How to grasp the normative potential inherent in perceiving the Mediterranean as an increasingly urbanized region in and of itself, animated by a logic partially de-linked from its respective national hinterland(s)?

Urban socio-spatial restructuring: Tunisia

Tunisia would seem to exemplify the urban possibilities and contradictions wrought in the wake of the Mediterranean Basin's insertion into globalizing networks. Historically, Tunisia's internal socio-spatial disparities – derived largely from pre-existing bio-climatic conditions and settlement patterns – were expressed along a north-south axis, the north benefiting from rich agricultural lands and dense hydraulic networks, in contrast to the desertic south (Belhedi 1999: 64). This northern swath of natural resources became the prime centre of activity during the colonial period, thus reinforcing the country's north-south divide until the eve of independence. Tunisia thus inherited from the colonial period an extroverted economy, a legacy that was only strengthened in the post-independence period; as measured in export volume, the rate of economic extroversion grew from 20 per cent between 1957 and 1961 to 43 per cent after 1982 (Belhedi 1992). The intensity of this extroversion can be accounted for primarily by high rates of migration remittances, export-based industrialization and tourism (Belhedi 1999).

Partly as a result of this proto-colonial and colonial sediment, Tunisia exhibits today advanced forms of both macro-cephalization and littoralization. As urban capital and primate city, Tunis is the largest as well as the most sectorally diversified industrial centre, concentrating over half of total national employment as well as one-third of all new jobs created since the early 1970s (Belhedi 1999: 64). The city contains the largest agricultural market, and constitutes the primary centre for the processing of agricultural products, with the exception of olive oil, fish and beet conserves. Tunis is also the country's main financial centre, tying down more than 80 per cent of transactions and credits and is a centre for the tertiary sector, attracting over three-quarters of the national student population. The city is positioned as the dominant node in Tunisia's web of import-export relations and wholesale commerce, its hinterland swallowing up the entire northern portion of the country (Belhedi 1992). Not fortuitously, national state functions are concentrated within Tunis' urban landscape, which contains 37 per cent of all national administrative employment as well as 43 per cent of the public tertiary sector (Belhedi 1999: 64).

In this context, state-driven macro-cephalization has reinforced and exacerbated existing patterns of littoralization. The Tunisian littoral (comprising only 27 per cent of the national territory) now concentrates 85 per cent of the urban population, including the principal urban centres and three-quarters of cities containing more than 50,000 inhabitants. The littoral still constitutes the country's primary agricultural zone, harboring more than 60 per cent of export value-added and 42 per cent of agricultural employment. It also concentrates 90 per cent of industrial value-added within a diversified industrial landscape

containing 83 per cent of automobile manufacturing and 66 per cent of light industry, notably in the *gouvernorats* of Tunis, Benarou, Monastir, Sousse and Sfax. Seaside tourism has remained a key driving force for littoralization (Belhedi 1999: 65); its infrastructure – airports, roadways, water, electricity, telephone services – have had an important impact in stimulating urbanization dynamics along its main urban foci: Jerba, Zarzis, Sousse, Monastir, Hammamet and Nabeul (Miossec 1973; Mzabi 1978; Sethom 1979). The centre of gravity for the country's transportation infrastructure is now focused on littoral space; from here the country opens up to its interior via six commercial ports, four international airports, a petroleum refinery, *marinas* (at Sousse, Monastir, Tabarka and Hammamet), and two customs zones (Bizerte and Zarzis). In this, the littoral concentrates 20 per cent of merchandise traffic, 30 per cent of rail passenger service, all commercial transport and 90 per cent air transport (Belhedi 1999).

Tunisia's littoral has also become a centre of private as well as public foreign investments, absorbing 75 per cent of the former in the recent period. High rates of investment in the littoral have thus occurred despite previous national policies seeking to maintain regional investment equilibrium throughout the national territory. In the wake of the Tunisian government's 9th Plan (1997–2001) – fashioned on the heels of 1995 EU accords (1996–2008) – private investment has largely replaced public industrial expenditures, a shift which will have important consequences for the location of industry, 58 per cent of which is based on manufacturing, with 31 per cent of that centred on textile and apparel production (Belhedi 1999: 70). Rather than imply further macro-cephalization around Tunis, however, empirical studies suggest a gradual de-concentration of industry is taking place away from Tunis towards the small littoral cities of the Northeast and the Sahel (Dlala 1995). This littoral industrialization pattern is dominated by the textile and chemicals sectors. More recently, plans have been under way to create 28 industrial zones in this area covering more than 600 ha, attracting state of the art and internationally competitive industries. Within this logic, high technology firms have settled predominately within the littoral as well, adding to the increasingly urbanized nature of the Mediterranean coastal belt (Belhedi 1999).

'Routes et villes, villes et routes'

Recovering Gottman's orbits

Primarily as a result of these developments, Tunisia's traditional north–south gap has been largely replaced by an east–west divide, revealing a novel socio-spatial fissure between its littoral and its interior. As in many parts of the Mediterranean South, for some observers what has resulted is the production of an urban system nourishing its world-exposed coastal zone to the detriment of its remaining urban hierarchy (Belhedi 1999: 71). In this view, small to mid-sized cities are seen to have been short-circuited by processes of economic globalization; prior national policy arrangements focusing on the amelioration of inter-regional inequalities

are no longer at the centre of government action, replaced now by a discourse which legitimates a form of development based on endogenous capacities intrinsic to each region; and performance principles are seen to be replacing egalitarian principles. Tunisia's economic integration into the world economy would thus appear have a domestic correlate, namely national and local socio-cultural disintegration. In the parlance of French Regulation Theory, Tunisia's post-war national(izing) modes of regulation can no longer cope with a planetary neoliberal regime of accumulation that now far exceeds the scale and scope of the Mediterranean Basin proper.

Indeed, following an analogous though sociologically-inflected reasoning, the writer Sami Nair has argued, '[Westernization] has become global and [Mediterranean] cultures are ineluctably local' (Nair 1992: 16; trns. and what follows by author). For Nair, North–South Mediterranean tensions are thus not civilizational but rooted in the shared material cultural of capitalism. To the degree that the culture of the North draws sustenance from the civilizational matrix of capitalism, the culture of the South, of Islam, is produced by way of a discrepancy with and incapacity to act in relation to this civilization, made manifest in historical patterns of uneven development between Mediterranean shores (Nair 1992). For this writer, tragically, neither cultural nor political modernization, nor the principles of the French Republic, nor democracy have had the chance to develop on the Southern rim of the Mediterranean 'according to their concept . . . as an opening free to the history of the contemporary world' (Nair 1992: 25). A gap has widened within the societies of the Southern Mediterranean, a veritable schism between the believers in modernization 'from above' on the one hand and Muslim fundamentalists on the other. On the basis of a 'radical dualization of society . . . two disjointed worlds, almost two peoples, in reality face one another. Between these two entities, there is no bridge possible for the moment' (Nair 1992: 25). What distinguishes the Mediterranean 'Third World' for Nair today is an absence of development applied comprehensively within each nation-state, the insertion of a fraction of the ruling classes into wider circuits of capitalist consumption, and the marginalization of entire populations. In this context, for Nair if the concepts of development and democracy are to have any sense today they must engage not only with economic growth but in 'societal integration' (Nair 1992: 142). In the face of these challenge, Nair argues for the still 'indispensable public power' (*puissance publique*) of the state to serve in matters of general social security, health, education, employment and housing (Nair 1992: 222).

But in thinking through new modes of regulation and governance for North African states in the present neoliberal conjuncture, I suggest comparison with the earlier period of proto-colonial expansion and decline may offer the imaginative resources for considering urban and institutional forms not wedded exclusively to the logics of a putatively authentic *national* economic or societal integration which only serve to reproduce colonial-era territorial and institutional frameworks. In so doing, we may well ponder in our day the question posed by the Tunisian urban scholar Abdelhamid Largueche *vis-à-vis* Tunisia's

unique brand of eighteenth-century cosmopolitanism: was it responding to the inner logic of a regionally-based (then Ottoman) political-economic system, or did it stem from the external European system of imperial trade and protection? (Largueche 2001: 117) In our day, we may similarly ask to what extent the evolving cleavages at the heart of Tunisian and other North African societies – between fast urbanizing, decentralizing and globally connected coastal zones and increasingly impoverished hinterlands, secular Europeanized elites and the Islamic masses – are themselves rooted in very old, proto-colonial sub-structures concomitant with the rise of these very self-same nation-states at the dawning of the pre-capitalist era. Such a view would certainly problematize the oft-assumed anti-imperialist stance of North African elites, who would attribute such processes exclusively to the incomplete vagaries of post-war decolonization, or the ongoing ravages of Western neo-colonialism.

Seizing the logic of an earlier form of Southern Mediterranean cosmopolitan expansion, in this case that of Tunis, the problem of trans-Mediterranean governance might be re-framed not as one which seeks to *overcome* internal societal borders but as one which asks in what way such urban borders can be re-drawn to allow for society's maximum participation with the political and economic modernity of its time. In this respect, particular attention needs be focused on how contemporary shifts in the urban spatial order of cities and city-systems surrounding the Mediterranean, and the broader territorial realignments they portend, may themselves have had recursive effects on trans-Mediterranean social movements (Burke 1989). Such a strategy would call for a response from 'beyond' the territorial encasements of individual Mediterranean nation-states, indeed from 'beyond' the Mediterranean itself, interpellating diasporic communities now inhabiting the heart of Europe, as well as excavating the myriad bordering practices internal to Europe whose negative effects are pushed outwards into its 'near abroad'. This would not merely resolve the Mediterranean's North–South dialectic on Europe's terms (Nair 1992), as it would seek to imaginatively recast the very borders of Europe. For this, perhaps we still need to develop a theory of 'parasitism' in order to render the complexity of trans-Mediterranean urban and regional dynamics in a way that moves beyond narratives of structurally determined unevenness and asymmetry, of eternal colonizer and victim (Serres 1980). As represented by Naples and Constantinople during the 'long sixteenth century', the task now may be to identify those 'urban monsters, monumental parasites' (Braudel 1972: 345), whose newly invigorated corsair economies feed creatively off the Alexandrine Mediterranean spatial imagination today.

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Notes

1 This state-centric perspectivalism has also largely conditioned social scientific theorizing on the Mediterranean: 'Currently, the anthropology of the circum-Mediterranean area consists of an impressive number of localized, effectively uncorrelated studies largely unresponsive to any theoretical paradigm. The result has been a limited opportunity for effective comparative studies and only limited contribution to the process of theory construction and verification' (Magnarella, 1992: 19).

2 Gottman presents the challenges posed by this Mediterranean legacy for the contemporary social sciences in the following way: 'Still, the geographer must ask one question: Why the Mediterranean and its ancient cities? Why did the tradition of large, far-flung networks of cities originate in that region? It is generally true of cities that each of them works as a hinge between the region of which it is the centre and the outside world, between the local and the external orbits. Mediterranean cities have developed first the latter with impressive scales and consequences. And they taught the rest of the world how to achieve this. There have been other great cultures, just as ancient, with splendid art and techniques, with denser and highly skilled populations, notably in China and India. However, it is the Mediterranean-born culture that has swept around the planet and reorganized it in one orbit, diversified, partitioned, complicated as Mediterranean orbits always were, but now conscious of its unity' (Gottman, cited in Gottman and Harper, 1990: 33).

3 In this way, a colonial legacy is preserved dating from 1875 to the exploration of Central Africa by Pierre Savorgnan de Brazza, who developed the idea of the peaceful French penetration of Africa, as well as the commonwealth of interest between Africans and Europeans (Manning, 1988: 15). The concept was further refined by Jean Harmand, who perceived in associationism a policy designed to 'establish a certain equivalence or compensation of reciprocal services' between the colonizers and colonized, as opposed to assimilation (Harmand, 1919: 160). In the post-war period associationism would be consonant with Socialist and Christian Socialist goals of humanism and solidarity rooted in a moral sense of responsibility for former colonial populations. These sentiments would come to animate postwar governments in Italy, The Netherlands and the FRG in matters pertaining to aid, trade and industrial relations with former colonies. Associationism could be made to fit the ideological programs of both European conservative parties, for whom the former colonies were considered elements of vital national spheres of interest, as well as the various Communist Parties, whose anti-colonialism was tempered by the need not to appear overly 'unpatriotic' (Grilli, 1993: 3).

4 This 'patchwork' approach to Euro-Mediterranean relations would be reinforced by the demise of Toure and Nkrumah's pan-African dream, to be displaced by Houphouet-Boigny, Senghor and Neyrere's 'multiple roads' to political, social and economic development grounded in the territorial framework of the nation-state (Grilli, 1993: 18). Thus, the 'Africa of the Fatherlands' would be affirmed at the 3rd Conference of Heads of States and Governments of the OAU, held in Accra, Ghana (October, 1965).

5 Following Cote and Joannon (1999b: 5), littoralization is defined here as encompassing the first few dozen kilometers of land directly abutting the Mediterranean Sea, with the exception of coastal mountain areas.

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12 Onotologizing the borders of Europe

Barbara Hooper[1]

> Something unique is afoot in Europe, in what is still called Europe even if we no longer know very well *what* or *who* goes by this name. Indeed, to what concept, to what real individual, to what singular entity should this name be assigned today? Who will draw up its borders?
>
> (Derrida 1992: 5; emphasis original)

> The historical and its consequences, the 'diachronic', the 'etymology' of locations in the sense of what happened at a particular spot or place and thereby changed it – all of this becomes inscribed in space. The past leaves its traces; time has its own script. Yet this space is always, now and formerly, a *present* space, given as an immediate whole, complete with associations and connections in their actuality.
>
> (Lefebvre 1991:37; emphasis original)

> The mainstream has never run clean . . .
>
> (Spivak 1999: 2)

From the perspective of the early twenty-first century it appears incontestable that the critical political questions of the 'present' are ontological: i.e. who will and who will not win the right to be, to persist, under the present conditions of neoliberal globalization and neocolonialism. The process of producing the division between who will and will not survive, and the negotiation of various kinds of survival, are the border questions that haunt, both implicitly and explicitly, contemporary geopolitics. Global 'governance', as the reproduction or contestation of this division, ultimately means the accumulation of decisions taken by individuals and institutions across the planet. As a result of the 'accumulation regimes' of the last several decades, indeed centuries, this divide has been steadily increased: in the eighteenth century, the North–South differential was 2:1; at present it is 70:1 and rising. Twenty per cent of human beings now possess 86 per cent of all wealth compared with 70 per cent 30 years ago, while the bottom 20 per cent, concentrated in Africa, Asia, Latin America, hold 1.3 per cent of total wealth (George 2003: 18–19). It is within this 'haunted', 'accumulated' present, as an unbounded global present that is implicated in a future and a past, that I locate 'Europe' and its current border negotiations: Derrida's questions of *who* and *what* will go by the name of Europe, joined to Lefebvre's suggestion of

'a present space', and Spivak's statement that the 'mainstream' never runs clean. The seduction of Europe and the European Union is that they provide for those of use alive and interested in questions of government and power, the opportunity to witness on a day-to-day basis the border maneuverings necessary to the production of any 'imagined community' (Anderson 1991). In the context of re-producing itself as a 'new' supranational identity, and having renounced its ambitions to empire and its internal wars of self-annihilation, what will Europe now become? How will it negotiate the critical geographical and historical borders between its present and its past? What future order, from a diverse multiplicity of emergent potentialities, will it decide to actualize? To what extent will the 'creative destruction' of its past economic and political policies, the linked imperialisms of its various nationalisms and 'civilizing' missions, be repented or repressed?

My investigation of these questions is directed toward contextualizing within an expanded global frame, those of Europe's bordering processes currently underway as concerned with its produced distinction between 'citizen' and 'not-citizen'. The ontologization and administration of this difference has been defined in the European context by Engin Isin as the practice of 'citizenship as alterity' – the articulation by dominant groups of their identity as citizens and their simultaneous constitution of strangers, outsiders and aliens as those who lack the properties defined as essential for citizenship (Isin 2002: ix); and, in the colonial context by Mahmood Mandani as the 'regime of differentiation' between Europeans-as-citizens and Africans-as-subjects that was the key to establishing and institutionalizing the colonial rule named 'indirect rule' by the British and 'association' by the French (Mamdani 1996: 7). I will suggest in this chapter that these two border regimes, in their present variations, have been reunited in Europe today in the practice of security governance, a networked mode of border control directed toward the negotiation of the contradictory tendencies between the union's long-stated goal of freedom of movement for its citizens and the desire to control the potentially too-free movement of its non-citizens. In the Treaty of the European Union, implemented in 1993, the goal of producing an 'ever closer union' between the nationals of member states, came to exist side-by-side with the goal of developing and maintaining the Union as 'an area of freedom, security and justice'. This development, in which 'the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combatting of crime', has meant a decidedly reduced freedom of movement for non-EU citizens. The resolution of the two contradictory endeavors, as a 'regime of differentiation' heavily burdened with centuries of 'internal' and 'external' history that continue to 'live', will be critical in indicating how Europe's selective ontologization of itself will occur.

I approach these issues from a critical ontological perspective in which government in its various forms and modalites (economic, political, institutional, discursive, psychocorporeal, military, etc.) is defined as borderwork and the relation between governing and bordering is to be found in the political meaning

of the border as an event that 'takes place' but is never 'in place'. Bordering, as the productive labour of differing, is the critical political-ontological event *par excellence*: the *per(form)ative socionatural, spatiotemporal, materiocorporeal, morphogenetic event* through which and as which, all matters, discursive and non-discursive, social and natural, are ontologized – i.e., formed, brought into being as bounded, differentiated entities and identities. The ontologized matters – e.g., bodies, cities, texts, words, rocks, gods, telephones, cells, currencies, metals, corporations, thoughts, desires, dogs, economies, chreods and so forth – are not, in this conceptualization, distinct from the productive processes producing them, but *are* these productive processes themselves, deployments of energy through which and as which they not only *come* to be (different) but *persist* in being (different) in a divergent, dynamic, 'borderly' way. What is of importance, both in terms of understanding the ontological status of the border and the *aporia* (from the Greek, 'trouble') attending the government and politics of borders, is precisely this emergent quality. The ontological status of the border is not that of a distinct between, a separate even if oscillatory or dialectical third term between two differentiated entities, but that of the verge, the divergent emergent.

It is this emergent process of differing that Deleuze, in *Bergsonism* (2002) and *Difference and Repetition* (1994), elaborates as the 'divergent actualization' of the 'virtual', with the virtual conceived as a developing form of existence that is fully real, that has its own ontological status, but has not yet been fully actualized. The virtual exists as a fecundity, a hyperpregnant plentitude that is seeded with the freedom of multiple, divergent actualizations: i.e., a 'virtuality that is actualized according to lines of divergence' (Deleuze 2002: 99–100). In the same way that Derrida's concept of difference, as iterative, implies a continuous differing and deferring that 'drifts' or 'plays' and is thus perpetually 'other', the concept of divergent actualization implies an open-ended multiplicity of being, a diverse and heterogeneous becoming that is not preformed nor preordained nor in any way wedded to a *telos*. This means that any produced difference functioning as a regulatory norm – i.e., the conceptual-linguistic-governmental divisions that as the effects of hegemonic power freeze being into distinct localities (there:not-there, here:there), scales (micro:macro, global:local), tenses (past:present:future), teloetics (developed:undeveloped, advanced:primitive) and identities (European, non-European, colonial and post-colonial, and so forth) – *must* be seen as 'under erasure': as modes of governing which succeed to varying degrees but are never completely successful.

As Plato recognized in *Timeaus*, *The Republic* and *The Laws*, and as governments have recognized ever since, becomings and the inherent potential for wildness they contain, exist in aporetic opposition to the fixed laws and virtues of the city, whose government is directed toward a particular persistence. The primary and sovereign goal of government, as the will and the power to remain, is to produce a polity and a society from which all irregularities and excesses have been purged. This ideal, a will-to-order that exists as an 'irrational choice to establish order and structure within a chaotic and manifold becoming' (Karatani 1995: 18), is perpetually plagued by the emergent 'play' of borders. The tension between the

ideality and the reality of borders, which can be seen as a tension between Derrida's 'lines that delimit the right of absolute property, the right to the property of our own life, the proper of our existence, . . . of what, in sum, *belongs to us* [*nous revient*] (Derrida 1993: 3; emphasis original) and Deleuze's 'lines of divergence' (Deleuze 2002: 99–100), produces a specific set of problems for governing that must be continuously managed. While every society values creative change and innovation and will exploit it to some degree, the prospect of ungovernable newness or change, as wild or radical difference, raises border anxieties and, when perceived as present, is typically provocative of redoubled efforts at social control. This is particularly true when the borders producing a society or culture's 'critical' or 'primordial' identities and differences appear threatened – i.e., those identities and differences upon which its 'being' as a self-defined, self-located and self-contained entity depend and which together produce the Great Divide between 'interior' and 'exterior' separating what 'properly' belongs to it from what is intolerable: whose inclusion is seen to pollute and pervert, even to bring 'death', to the defined existence. These historically concern hegemonically produced differences between sexes, genders, sexual practices, ages, religions, races, ethnicities, histories (e.g., the designations primitive and advanced, past and present, developed and undeveloped) and geographies (various territorial possessions and belongings). These 'critical matters', as regulatory ideals bound to earth and flesh, function as an apodictics of order which incarnates and makes visible the forms of a given society's produced *locality* – its selective history and identity – and its *locative order* – its produced 'cosmos' or worldview as an ordered and ranked hierarchy of beings – that together perform its event of governing. It is in this sense that the work of any *socius* or society, as a regulatory body, can be seen as 'borderwork' – i.e., the work of managing the perpetual mutation and transformation of the lived borders circumscribing what properly 'belongs to us'. The choreographic task of government, which is itself an emergent event, consists in its attempts to rule the emergence of difference, operating through its multiple institutionalized and administered modes and forms (political, economic, cultural, psychocorporeal, discursive, military, etc.) to make what is new part of the already known: to integrate it, domesticate it, make it cohere: to pick up the loose lines and threads of divergence and weave them into the existing social fabric. As various arts and practices of difference and division these bordering techniques work to categorize, classify, rank, police, repress, capture and pin down the eruption of any newness that contains the threat of wild difference and thus may force a radical ungovernable transformation.

It is within this critical ontological framework that I return to the subject 'proper' of this chapter and to the questions earlier posed: who and what will go by the name of Europe and who will draw up the borders. It is one of my specific intentions in this return to reunite Europe with the globe, swerving analysis of its present goal of producing 'an ever closer union between the peoples of Europe' away from the 'seductive' local context with which I began and in which assessments of unification most frequently have been isolated. While it has become commonplace to assert that under the present conditions of globalization

the intensification and extension of trans-global flows of information, commodities, capital and people have altered, in diverse, site-specific ways, the production and self-production of difference and identity, in Europe a certain 'structural schizophrenia' (Castells 2001: 354) has tended to keep a second global present at bay. This analytical maneuver, as an exemplary instance of the functioning of borderwork, has operated to fix the 'colonial' globalization story in a separate locale, absenting it from the 'postcolonial' present of Europe. However if we unfreeze the frames in which past and present have been located, bodies frozen in place, sedimented in differing times and place, begin to move, scrambling and multiplying tenses and scales in a miscegenating border-crossing kinetics that opens the potential of a politics founded in spatiotemporal anarchy.

To bring an initial focus to the several issues and questions I have posed, I will utilize the work of Manuel Castells whose analysis of the unification of Europe provides a contextualizing frame for my own. It is important from my perspective that Castells tells the story of European unification as a crisis of borders that is located within a global context, that the creation of European identity figures prominently, that he addresses as well issues of contemporary citizenship and democracy, and that despite his insistence upon an irreversibly networked globe he divides the globe into separate areas that remain analytically distinct.

Writing in 1998 at the conclusion of his three-volume work, *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture,* and in fact deploying 'Europe' *as* a conclusion, Castells declares his intention to be that of 'showing' that the three trends he sees as 'critical' in configuring the Information Age – globalization, identity and the crisis of the nation-state, 'are shaping European unification and thus the world' (Castells 2001: 340). Identifying Europe as 'a new form of state' (Castells 2001: 339), Castells emphasizes both the importance and the innovative qualities of a uniting Europe: 'The unification of Europe around the turn of the second millenium, when and if completed, will be one of the most important trends defining our new world' (Castells 2001: 338). This unification, which for Castells represents the *avant-garde* of emergent forms of networked power, has developed as the direct result of the failure of the 'classic nation-state' to respond to the two 'macro-challenges' of the present world system: i.e., 'the globalization of the economy, technology and communication; and the parallel affirmation of identity as the source of meaning' (Castells 2001: 339). In responding to these 'symmetrical, opposing challenges', and as the result of a half-century's negotiation of conflicting interests and visions, the European member states have been forced to innovate, producing, at national, regional, and local levels, new forms and institutions of governance, including the Union itself as a 'new form of state', i.e., 'the network state' in which there is not a single power centre, but instead the pooling and sharing of sovereignty between networked nodes' (Castells 2001: 362–63). For Castells the evolution of the EU as this state, is both 'a reaction to the process of globalization' and 'its most advanced expression' (Castells 2001: 348). The continued success of the Union depends in Castells' estimation upon the subsdiarity principle and the achievement of European identity. Subsidiarity, based in the idea that the EU only makes

decisions that lower levels of government, including the member states themselves, cannot assume effectively, involves the 'linking up' of EU institutions with subnational levels of government and the development of institutional practices for the multilevel sharing of authority in both flexible and increasingly complex ways (Castells 2001: 362–63). The second 'key element', the achievement of a specifically European identity, is at once more problematic and more important.

> If meaning is linked to identity, and if identity remains exclusively national, regional or local, European integration may not last beyond the limits of the common market, parallel to free-trade zones constituted in other areas of the world. European unification, in the long-term perspective, requires European identity.
>
> (Castells 2001: 364)

In the trilogy's first two volumes, *The Rise of Network Society* and *The Power of Identity*, Castells elaborates the context in which identity, as an issue and an achievement, becomes important – in general and for the EU. This context, which exists as a contemporary instance of the conditions I identified above which historically have activated border anxieties, serves as the setting out of the problem for which the EU will, in the final volume, become the solution. In Castells' analysis *The Information Age*, as the age in which we now live, is characterized by the transformation of 'the material foundations of life', i.e., 'space and time', and their reconstitution as a dehistoricizing, decontextualizing 'space of flows' and 'timeless time' (Castells 2002b: 1). Because of these transformations, which occur as the direct expression of 'the dominant activities of controlling elites', local life is 'superseded' (Castells 2000a: 446) and local democracy is eroded due to the growing inability of nation-states to control capital flows and ensure social security – thus diminishing their relevance for the 'average citizen' and 'weakening the principle of political sharing on which democratic politics is based' (Castells 2002b: 308). In this new world of 'uncontrolled confusing change', one challenged by 'global flows of wealth, power and images', and by 'widespread destructuring of organizations, deligitimation of institutions, fading away of major social movements and ephemeral cultural expressions' (Castells 2002a: 3), identity – particularly 'primary identities' based in the 'localities' of religion, territory, ethnicity and nation – becomes, in Castells' analysis, the 'fundamental source of social meaning', sometimes the 'only' source (Castells 2002a: 3). This has led to a 'surge' of expressions of collective identity, both proactive (e.g., feminism and environmentalism) and reactive (e.g., movements built around fundamental categories such as God, nations, ethnicity, family and locality). These identity politics, as various communalisms, exist in direct contradiction to the conditions in which 'global networks of instrumental exchanges selectively switch on and off individuals, groups, regions, even countries, according to their relevance in fulfilling the goals processed in the network'. The result is a 'structural schizophrenia between function and meaning' (Castells 2002a:13).

This structural schizophrenia, Castells emphasizes, is more acute for some than for others. The same global transformations that have produced network society with its 'space of flows' and 'timeless time', have induced not only a 'systemic disjunction' between the local and the global, but an opposition between 'people' and 'elites' who reside within separate spatiotemporal locales: 'elites are cosmopolitan, people are local' (Castells 2002a: 446). While the 'space of wealth and power is projected throughout the world' producing forms of social organization based upon ahistorical, decontextualized flows which elites manage to manipulate to their advantage, 'people's life and experience is rooted in places, in their culture, in their history' (Castells 2002a: 446). These changes, experienced across the globe as the disjunction between the (global) 'logic of power-making' and the (local) 'logic of association and representation', moves the site of the search for social meaning and identity away from its former site, civil society, to the globally networked, privatized polities of elites, on the one hand, and to communal cultures on the other, local sites around which are constructed 'defensive', 'secluded' identities (Castells 2002b: 11). On the basis of this analysis, Castells suggests, *subjects, if and when constructed are not built ... as the prolongation of communal resistance'* (Castells 2002b:11–12; emphasis original).

These same global forces have brought about the related 'crises' of democracy and the nation-state. While the modern capitalist state was characterized by the fact – and here Castells cites Nicos Poulantzas – that 'it absorbs social time and space, sets up the matrices of time and space that become, by the action of the state, networks of domination and power' (Castells 2002b: 241) – state control over space and time, Castells suggests, is no longer possible, as it is increasingly bypassed by transnational criminal practices, changed ideas and practices of security and warfare, and by global flows of populations, capital, goods, services, technology, communication and information. This loss of control has resulted not only in the primacy of communal, identity politics as a retreat from the state, but in related ways to the state's inability to secure its own legitimacy as the provider and guarantor of Keynesian welfare-state benefits and securities. Because the nation-state, which previously defined the domain, object and procedures of citizenship, no longer has clear boundaries or exists as a 'clear situs of power', it voids the contract between capital, labour and the state and 'sends everyone home to fight for their individual interests, counting exclusively on their own forces' (Castells 2002b: 309–10). Thus while global capitalism thrives and nationalist ideologies 'explode across the globe', the 'space of democratic politics' vanishes (Castells 2002b: 349) and the nation-state loses its power (Castells 2002b: 243). The current 'death dance' between identities, nations and states leaves, on the one hand, 'emptied' nation-states drifting on the 'high seas' of global flows of power; and, on the other hand, fundamental identities, retrenched in their communities or mobilized toward an uncompromising capture of the nation-state. In between these differently scaled maneuvers, the state strives to rebuild legitimacy and instrumentality by navigating transnational networks and by invigorating local civil societies (Castells 2002b: 276). In this arrangement Castells suggests, 'the central functions of the nation-state', which must accept

the 'systematic erosion ... of power in exchange for durability', become 'those of providing legitimacy and ensuring the accountability of supranational and subnational governmental mechanisms' (Castells 2002b: 268, 304). For concerned individuals Castells points to 'potential paths of democratic reconstruction' in which 'the challenges of economic globalization and political unpredictability' can be resisted (Castells 2002b: 350). The three trends Castells identifies as 'promising' and 'already manifest in 'the observed practices of societies' are the use of on-line electronic communication 'to enhance political participation and horizontal communication among citizens'; the development of symbolic politics around 'non-political' or humanitarian causes sponsored by such organizations as Amnesty International, Médecins Sans Frontières and Greenpeace, which receive a wide consensus (Castells 2002: 352); and most emphatically through the 'recreation of the local state': 'the most powerful trends legitimizing democracy... are taking place, worldwide, at the local level' (Castells 2002b: 335).

It is in this situation, and in accord with the theoretical criteria established by Castells, that the European Union, at the conclusion of an enormous investigative effort that includes over 1,500 pages and endeavors to cover the globe from a 'plural', 'interdependent' perspective (Castells 2002a: 27), comes to function for Castells as 'exemplary': as 'the most advanced expression' and 'clearest manifestation to date of the emerging form of the state ... characteristic of the Information Age (Castells 2001: 364), i.e., the '*network state': 'a state characterized by the sharing of authority ... along a network*. A network, by definition, has nodes, not a centre' (Castells 2001: 363). The EU is, for Castells, not a supranational entity, but precisely a 'state': a 'super nation-state ... expressing, in a variable geometry, the aggregate interests of its constituent members' (Castells 2002b: 267) and holding nationalist rather than federalist ambitions.

As a result of its attempts to 'carve out, collectively, some level of sovereignty from the new global disorder', and to negotiate the 'uncharted waters' between 'the high winds of globalization and the warm hearth of locality' (Castells 2001: 361) – and despite the fact that the renewed momentum for integration that emerged in the mid-1980s was the result of the alignment of interest between large European firms struggling to overcome the perceived advantages of US and Japanese corporations in the global economy and of state elites seeking to restore at least part of the political sovereignty lost to increasing international interdependence (Castells 2002b: 266) – the EU has produced a 'novel' principle of 'cooperation and competition', 'a double dynamic of local identity and European networking' in which 'regional and local governments are playing a major role in revitalizing democracy' (Castells 2001: 360, 361). While 'local identity' is working to revitalize democracy, the production of a specifically European identity – Castells' stated condition for the success of unification – is, 'problematic at best' (Castells 2001: 364), given the 'schizophrenia between [European] self-image and the new demographic reality of Europe' (Castells 2001: 354). Nonetheless, Castells also suggests that the elements of a new 'European' identity are already in place. These appear '*in the discourse, and practice, of social actors opposing globalization and disenfranchisement without regressing to*

communalism': the values of liberty, equality and fraternity; a concern for universal human rights and the Fourth World; the reaffirmation of democracy and its extension to citizen participation at the local and regional levels; and the vitality of historically/territorially rooted cultures which 'do not surrender to the culture of real virtuality'. These elements, Castells suggests, are 'the embryos of a European project identity', one which must 'find political expression' if the process of European unification is ultimately to be accomplished (Castells 2001: 365; emphasis original).

While Castells' analysis is neither identical to, nor can it be seen in any way as representative of a singular EU viewpoint, it bears a resemblance to contemporary EU discourse in one very important way: i.e, in its privileging of the local as the site of political action and identity production. To govern well within the context of the 'uncontrolled confusing change' induced by globalization, the 'best practice' is to oppose globalization and to reaffirm democracy and citizen participation at local and regional levels where, *contra* the space of flows and timeless time, the vitality of historically/territorially rooted cultures 'which do not surrender', remain alive. The emphasis upon a strategic localism – i.e., a self-ontologization that is specifically un-networked *vis-à-vis* the global – is visible within the EU, both in the discursive production of itself as a bounded 'locale' – a unified territory which serves as the naturalized geographical-historical source and site of its 'shared' identity and 'common' values – and in its local/regional subsidiarian policies. In the first instance, the EU, whose juridical existence spans half a continent, is re-configured as the 'local' itself using the techniques of 'informationalism' singled out by Castells as the dominant 'mode of development ... operating today' (Castells 2001: 8), and validating his suggestion that the media are 'the space of politics in the Information Age' (Castells 2002b: 313). This use of 'informational politics' (Castells 2002b: 310) is clearly expressed in the EU's production of itself as open (transparent and inclusive), warm, welcoming, pluralist, anti-discriminatory, anti-xenophobic: endless information produced and disseminated; ceaseless pamphlets and papers; the Eurobarometer; no hidden agendas; the web relentlessly bringing government closer to 'the people', uniting them as citizens participating together horizonatally in an electronic, networked, 'local' democracy. The Committee of Regions, with its 222 members representing regional and local governments within the Union, under whose aegis function both the euroregions and structural actions related to cities, is perhaps the most direct institutional expression of the will to govern the identity and the political practices of the local. The EU suggests that it is through these local interventions, as the employment of the decentralizing governance strategies of partnership, proximity, and subsidiarity invoked by Castells, that it will accomplish its goals of reducing the structural asymmetries of uneven economic development and curing what has come to be characterized as its 'democratic deficit' (European Commission 2001). Both strategies, as combinations of discourse production and policy implementation, affirm Castells' perception that in sailing the 'uncharted waters' between 'the high winds of globalization and the warm hearth of

locality', the 'local' is a better choice: one that by implication is closer to 'the people' and thus distant from the chill of elites. In this self-imagining the EU *is* 'the recreation of the local state' as an identity and as a form of communal resistance deployed against the sovereignty-eroding, democracy-destroying forces of economic globalization. The implication is that bad centralized power [classic elite-dominated national and nationalistic potentially violent power with bombs and guns and various other, in the European context, politically incorrect forms of coercion – whether associated with the individual member states or that of the 'Brussels cartel' (Castells 2002b: 266), as an outmoded form of government in the Weberian-Schmittian mode in which power is not shared but accumulated and hoarded] does not inhabit nor infect local environs: people are local, elites are cosmopolitan. In this self-ontologizing logic the EU itself, as an 'imagined community' is not networked into these elites. It is neither a participant in deploying the corrosive, border-eroding forces of economic and cultural globalization that it must defend itself against, nor is it a super-state with the will to dominate or suppress local difference. It is the warm hearth of a 'nice, gentle, and civilized' (Mann 2000: 304) 'local state', a 'supra-*local'* geometry of networked, shared power in which local 'people' participate together in a prolonged communal resistance against ambient global forces and flows and for 'local self-management' (Castells 2002b: 350), the revitalization of democracy and citizenship, and the restoration of social security.

What is going on here? How is it possible that local borders can be retained as containers of sites of resistance against that which has been stated destroys them – i.e., the elite, cosmopolitan forces of globalized power? How, if we return to Castells, in a sophisticated analysis dedicated to an insistence upon a blurring of borders between the local and the global, does it become possible to deploy the local as a 'secluded' site? Why in a context that demands a *more* fluid, *less* rigidly scaled conception of identity – a context in which it has become commonplace to acknowledge that the present is at once relentlessly global and impossibly local – is the privileged ground of the political now contracted to the scale of the local?

All identities are constructed, Castells writes, and all identity construction 'takes place in a context marked by power relationships' (Castells 2002b: 7). Contemporary power, the 'new power relationships' of the globalized present, as 'the capacity to impose a given will/interest/value, regardless of consensus . . . must be understood as the capacity to control global instrumental networks on the basis of specific identities' and 'to subdue any identity in the fulfillment of transnational instrumental goals' (Castells 2002b: 306). Power, in these *Realpolitik* terms, becomes, by Castells' own definition, the capacity to control the borders of identity though the 'arts of government' (Foucault 1991: 201) I have defined as borderwork: a selective suppression and deployment of difference and identity which is not, however, 'marked' by relations of power, but is in fact the *performance of these power relations* as the will to produce and reproduce a bounded identity as a particular existence.

It is in this context, that the local, as the performance of a particular identity, now can be seen in the full instrumental polymorphy of its contradictory

meanings and desires. The local, as a spatiotemporal construct that is protean in its semantic and governmental possibilities, is a discursive, 'informationalist' strategy operating to resolve the tension between Deleuze's 'lines of divergence' and Derrida's 'lines that delimit what . . . *belongs to us'* in a particular way.

In *The Other Heading*, Derrida suggests that a characterizing trait of Europe and Europeans has been its taking of itself as an example – particularly as an example of advancement. 'Europe has . . . confused its image', he writes, 'its face, its figure, its very place, its taking place, with that of an advanced point . . . a heading for world civilization in general. The idea of an advanced point of *exemplarity*, is the *idea of* the European idea, its *eidos*, at once as *arche* . . . and as *telos* (Derrida 1992: 24; emphasis original): a confusion of its 'physical geography' as a 'cape' or 'headland', with its 'spiritual geography' as advanced, a-head, a *cap* (Derrida 1992: 19, 20); as, as has been the case with Castells, 'the *avant garde* of world history and geography'. This has yielded a definition and concept of Europe in which the identity of Europe, as a singular entity, has been confused with, but also precisely coincident with, isomorphic to, its geographical form: its soil, its land, its property, its earth, its *heimat*, its *lebensraum*. While this kind of thinking has been renounced as harboring the archaic dangers of nationalism and nationalist violence that have plagued Europe throughout its existence, there is unfinished business with this 'confusion' that can now be seen to be at work in the revitalization of the regional and the local, a confusion that functions to fix the 'ground' (the territory and the time) and the 'grounds' (the base or foundation) of Europe's identity construction, and thus its produced distinction between citizen and subject, citizen and stranger, to aggressively local site, and thus to recapture the fantasy of the 'local' border controls that have been lost to the 'high winds' and uncharted waters of globalization. The simultaneous binding of the local to a *multiscalar* spatiality (the supranational EU, its subnational regions and locales) – and a *singular* temporality (European history as unilateral line of development) as maneuverings of scale and tense, function as structural adjustments whose intent is to fix, and thus rule, the time and space of European identity through the control of their inherently mobile 'frontiers'.

These spatiotemporal manipulations are occurring precisely as those identified by Castells as the 'new' contemporary modes of domination which are exercised through the selective inclusion and exclusion of functions and people in different temporal and spatial frames' (Castells 2002b: 11; 2002a: 465). This bordering regime, as a selective process of differencing which is not 'new' but represents a general governmental strategy that has been 'afoot' in the West since at least the time of the classical Athenian *polis*, is currently at work in the actualization of the two processes conceptualized by Isin and Mamdani: the development of 'citizenship as alterity' (Isin 2002: ix), and the 'regime of differentiation' that produced the distinction between Europeans-as-citizens and the colonized-as-subjects that was the foundation of 'indirect rule' and 'association' (Mamdani 1996: 7). It is in the enactment and comingling of these two border regimes that these spatiotemporal manipulations, as Europe's work of self-imagining, become manipulations of flesh, in which the names 'local' and the 'global', 'past' and

'present', European and not-European, conspire to incarnate the regulatory identities citizen and not-citizen, citizen and stranger, as identities to which are affixed differing privileges, freedoms and rights. Here knowledge and power collaborate through the strategy of the local, deploying both the ambiguity of its semantics and its emotional charge of *heimat*, *Volk* and *patria*, to produce border regimes whose function is to transform uncharted, potentially ungovernable difference, fluid or 'free' difference discursively produced as the chaotic invasion of European homelands by migrating non-European hordes, the new Goths and Vandals, into stabilized difference through the specifically subsidiarian practices of networked control. The border anxieties identified by Castells as shaping both identity and governance efforts under processes of globalization are operating both to produce the EU as a mode of local-communal resistance within the world at large and within the EU to incorporate the 'local' and the 'communal' into the larger identity project of maintaining Europe as a familiar 'locale'. Or, stated another way, the EU's twinned governance projects of subsidiarity and identity can be seen not only as instances of sovereignty sharing and unification for purposes of achieving a 'common good' – more democracy, less uneven development – but as copresent efforts to turn dangerous difference, difference whose frontiers continue to migrate and multiply outside the spatiotemporal frame to which they 'properly' belong – i.e., the frame in which European history and geography occur onshore and do not cross threatening waters – into administrated, managed difference, a not-too-variable 'geometry of power' in which 'local' difference is both locally celebrated and locally policed. While the success or failure of this project, like all projects of governing, is an open question, it is telling in this regard that in the EU's many subsidiarity projects for cross-border regions and cross-border cooperation (see Strüver, Häkli, Heddebaut, Kennard, Virtanen, Scott, Veggeland and Sidaway, this volume), there are particular borders that are not to be crossed. The cooperating and interacting is viewed consistently as something that is to occur between Poles and Germans, Russians and Finns, Belgians and Dutch, British and French: i.e., between 'proper' Europeans, whose identities 'originate' in 'proper' locales. Focusing the integrative, unificatory gaze upon a definition of 'cross-border' and 'cross-border' movement as something that happens between Europeans, whether they are 'elites' or 'the people', not only leaves the idea of sovereign borders intact as that which must be crossed and whose crossings, as undertaken by citizens and non-citizens must be regulated in specific ways, but accomplishes the continuation of a foreclosed encounter with the more difficult identity problems that have vexed and continue to vex the production of a more democratic, more fluid, European identity and polity: i.e., those which originate in Europe's repressed, renounced, and yet still present, colonial past as a prolongation of a decision not to include the colonized within the category of those to whom will be extended the fundamental European rights of liberty and equality and fraternity upon which its polity has been based.

It is now time to unfreeze the frame and allow the encounter to occur as a muddying of the mainstream in which scales and tenses mutate and commingle.

It is not my intention to be comprehensive but point to three border regimes in which present and past can be seen to miscegenate in coconstitutive and complexly intertwined ways that will bring a more emphatic global recontextualization of present efforts to rule the difference between citizen and subject and to govern at the level of the local. I recall in this context, Etienne Balibar's suggestion that racism as it is emerging in Europe today, is 'bound' to the 'imprint of the [colonial] past' and that there is not 'a *single* invariant racism' but a number of '*racisms*'. As will be the case with all emergences, there is not 'a determinate … configuration' with 'fixed frontiers' but a continuous development of 'latent potentialities' which emerge, in historically and geographically contingent ways, within a 'spectrum of [the] possible' (Balibar 1991: 41, 40; emphasis original).

I turn first to 1957 and the Treaty of Rome, a document memorializing the European Union's invention but which, moved outside the spatiotemporal frame in which it is typically located, can be seen to memorialize as well the latent potentialities from which Europe's present regime of differentiation, as the production of contemporary 'local' forms of citizenship as alterity, has emerged. Stated starkly, if the event of inventing the European Union is relocated within the same spatiotemporal frame as decolonization, it is clear that they occupy the same space at the same time. The invention of the European Union as project dedicated to the unification of Europe and its post-war reconstruction and modernization, was also its invention as a specifically neocolonial project: a relation expressed clearly in the 1956 statement by the French Prime Minister Guy Mollet at a luncheon of the *Association des Journalistes d'Otre-Mers*: 'France can only enter the Common Market with her overseas territories; otherwise there will not be any Common Market' (African Unification Front 2002). The Treaty, signed by France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg, as a statement of their common intention 'to ensure the economic and social progress of their countries' through the elimination of 'the barriers which divide Europe' (Rudden and Wyatt 1996: 22), also contained reference to barriers which were to be kept in place but manipulated to advantage: i.e., those between the European Community and its 'overseas countries and territories' – i.e., the unnamed yet significantly present colonies and former colonies of the signatories. This absenced presence was written both into the Treaty's preamble, in which the nascent EEC confirmed 'the solidarity which binds Europe and the overseas countries' (Rudden and Wyatt 1992: 22); and in Article 3, where, in the context of setting out the development of an internal market characterized by the abolition between the member states of obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital, there is included a statement of 'association' – a direct import, as above, of the French term for the form of colonial domination the British termed 'indirect rule' – between the EEC and 'the overseas countries and territories in order to increase trade and promote jointly economic and social development' (Rudden and Wyatt 1992: 24). The neocolonial intent contained in this innocent language reveals the importance of maintaining post-independence domination and dependency through an economic imperialism that could be continued from

command and control centres 'offshore'. The production of the European Union as an economic entity dedicated to the neoliberal principles of '*Ordoliberalen*' – i.e., government directed toward the ideal of insuring that 'society' does not impede the functioning of the market (see Gordon 1991: 41), as harnessed to Western Europe's post-war modernization and reconstruction efforts, was not an independent endeavor, but one undertaken in dependency upon the continued exploitation of (post)colonial territories and populations. Of the six original members of the EEC, four, France, The Netherlands, Belgium and Italy, had colonies. This fact encourages the analysis made in a 2002 publication of the African Unification Front: i.e., that 'without Africa the European Union would not exist'; that the EU was made possible only through the control of African labour and resources; and that this control was central to the idea and desired structural outcomes of the new order Europe was building (African Unification Front 2002).

The 1957 association arrangements established by the Treaty of Rome, which can be seen as establishing the paradigm for European postcolonial/neocolonial relations with its former colonies – i.e., separate and unequal but above all separate and useful, as based in the 'two pillars' of trade and development 'aid' – were perpetuated by the Yaounde Conventions of 1964 and 1969 and by the Lome Conventions (see Nugent 1999 and Gakunu 1998), the most recent of which, Lome V (2000), included Article 13 on 'Migration'. Article 13 begins with generalizations about 'reducing poverty' and 'normalizing migratory flows' and goes on to establish rules for the repatriation and expulsion of people 'illegally present' in the EU from any ACP country, including nationals, stateless persons and rejected asylum seekers – rules the ACP countries 'chose' to accept in exchange for £8.5 billion in aid and trade (Statewatch News Online: July 2000).

With the idea of 'normalizing migratory flows' I come to the second border regime, turning with this to the most visible expression of Europe's current regime of differentiation, and thus to the most visible expression of how Europe is negotiating its borders today within the parameters of the 'structural schizophrenia' Castells accurately described as being formed by the tensions beween Europe's 'self-image' and its 'new demographic reality' (Castells 2001: 354), but that he failed to suggest are intimately connected not only in the present but in the past. This connection is demonstrated clearly by Saskia Sassen in her 1999 work *Guests and Aliens*. Sassen's extensive and detailed archival work reveals that there are two important mechanisms, frequently overlapping, binding immigration and emigration countries: past colonial or current neocolonial or quasi-colonial bonds; and the launching of organized recruitment by government or government supported initiatives (Sassen 1999: 138–9). At present, 60 per cent of foreign residents in Great Britain are from Asian or African countries which were former dominions or colonies, and almost all immigrants from the Indian subcontinent and from the English Caribbean presently residing in Europe are in Great Britain (Sassen 1999: 138). Similarly, 86 per cent of Greek immigrants in Europe, 80 per cent of Turks, and 76 per cent of Yugoslavs reside in Germany, largely as the effects of former labour recruitment

policies. Almost all Algerians present in Europe reside in France, as do 86 per cent of Tunisians, 61 per cent of Moroccans, and the majority of immigrants from overseas territories still under French control – i.e., the French Antilles, Tahiti and French Guyana (Sassen 1999: 138). The Netherlands and Belgium also received significant numbers from former colonial empires and foreign workers from labour-exporting countries such as Italy, Morocco and Turkey due to organized recruitment (Sassen 1999: 139). A significant new development in the 'trend toward multi-ethnicity' (Castells 2002a: 131), one which has developed both as the result of the lower birth rate of the 'native' European population, and the new waves of immigration triggered by the growing imbalance between rich and poor countries, is that traditional labour-exporting countries around the Mediterranean, predominantly Italy and Spain, have themselves become sites of immigration, frequently desperate, from across the Mediterranean – Europe's 'Rio Grande' (King 2001: 7) – with Italy now receiving more immigrants than any country but Germany.

Concern with 'normalizing' these flows has resulted in the development and rapid expansion of security governance, a border regime that now occupies 40 per cent of the Council's business (Monar 2000: 4) and that is primarily directed toward a multiscalar, networked effort to halt the free movement of these new 'strangers' – i.e., immigrants, asylum seekers, refugees and stateless persons of non-European 'origin' whose movements disturb both the *status quo* of European identity and the EU's neoliberal agenda in accord with which 'productive' highly-skilled individuals are welcomed while those likely to become 'burdens' – i.e., the poor, the unemployed, the homeless, the less skilled in high technology, etc. – are reclassified as security risks (see Donzelot 1991; Procacci 1991; Castel 1991). In this new definition, international security and crime prevention are conflated and the definition of security risk is extended from states to individuals, particularly 'foreign' persons. No longer is it the threat of the invasion by foreign states, then, that defines the security agenda, but the invasion of foreign individuals. Thus security is less an issue of warfare than of policing and managing difference. The 'black' and 'white' visa lists, which determine who must have not only the appropriate passports to enter the EU, but also visas, reveal the logic of this policing as one that is specifically linked to the colonially inflected immigration patterns listed above. These bipolar lists reproduce not only the patterns of immigration listed above but patterns of 'racial' and 'spatial' profiling inherited from the nineteenth century in the era of 'high' colonialism and imperialism as modes of somatotyping and geotyping – i.e., determinations as to which kinds of people, from which kinds of territories, are likely to become poor and/or illegal immigrants, asylum seekers, criminals or terrorists. These determinations – made on the basis of biased perceptions rather than upon the basis of the actual behaviors of individuals – demonstrate clearly a colonial/postcolonial connection. Almost all of Africa is on the black list, for example, and as Elspeth Guild notes, 'Not one country whose population is primarily Islamic is on the white list with the exception of Brunei' (Guild 2001: 38). Two pieces of evidence testify to the fact that these are not the perceptions of 'Brussels' alone

but that many of 'the people' support the EU's 'fortress' principles. A recent Eurobarometer poll of 28,000 persons revealed that fighting illegal immigration is a policy priority for 81 per cent of the citizens of present EU member states (Eurobarometer EB59 – CC-EB 2003.2 (July 2003) and, while involving only a small minority of EU residents, the rise of extreme right in 1990s and of populist concerns with the 'immigrant question' suggest a similar preoccupation with the contemporary version of 'the native question'.

I will now move but with the strong caveat that it would be egregious to make them identical instances, to reunite subsidiarity, as a 'general economy of command' (Hardt and Negri 2000: 201) with its offshore origins, a reunion that occurs in the venerable tradition of learning from the colonies: i.e., of using the colonies not only for the extraction of wealth and exploitation of labour, but as 'laboratories' or '*champs d'experience*' (Wright 1991:12) for experimentation with social engineering – i.e., as the terrain for working out not only solutions to the problems of colonial rule but for solving problems of governing that existed within, and could be reimported back into, the metropoles (see, for example, McClintock 1995; Pratt 1992; Ross 1995; Wright 1991). The specific mode of colonial rule with which subsidiarity can be compared, and can be understood as among its virtualities, is 'indirect rule' as the marshalling of 'the authoritarian possibilities of native culture' in which the British were the innovators but which other colonial powers – e.g., France, Portugal, Belgium – adopted. This mode of governing, pioneered by Lord Lugard in Nigeria as a solution to stabilizing British rule in response to 'the native question' was based in a theory that claimed to be characterized by an enlightened and permissive recognition of native culture: 'Although its capacity to dominate grew through a dispersal of its own power, the colonial state claimed this process to be no more than a deference to local tradition and custom' (Mamdani 1996: 25). The difference between enlightened and unenlightened, and the fatal fallacy of the former, was described by Jan Smuts as having been learned from the past mistake of applying 'the principles of the French Revolution which had emancipated Europe' – i.e. liberty, equality and fraternity – to Africa in efforts to turn Africans into 'pseudo-Europeans' – which resulted in a 'ruthless' destruction of their own political system in the efforts to incorporate them as equals into the white system. The enlightened path was not to force Africans or African institutions into a 'European mould' but to give the freest possible development to native institutions – a principle not of assimilation into a common type, a standardization, but the development of people 'along their own specific lines' as local tribes (Mamdani 1996: 4–5). This was summarized by Lord Hailey as turning on the distinction between 'identity' and 'differentiation'. 'The doctrine of identity conceives the future social and political institutions of Africans as destined to be similar to those of Europeans; the doctrine of differentiation aims at the evolution of separate institutions appropriate to African conditions and differing both in spirit and in form from those of Europeans' (Mamdani 1996: 7). The emphasis on differentiation led to what Mamdani names the 'bifurcated state' and a system of 'dispersed despotism' as the enactment of a policy of separate and unequal. This occurred through border manipulations

which first ontologized multiple 'locals' and 'local' 'native' institutions, and then brought them together as an 'enforced ethnic pluralism' which existed in contradistinction to the singular rule of law, with its principles of liberty and equality, that were the rule for settle Europeans. This bifurcation was the source of the distinction between citizens protected by law and subjects who were abandoned to customary law administered without reprisal by local chiefs under the direction of white administrators. This localism, as the *forced* production of borders between allegedly 'natural' historically and culturally rooted territories and 'tribes', each with its own set of traditions and customary laws to which colonial administrators and Home Offices 'deferred', provided the answer to the 'native question' as a way to weave potentially 'lines of divergence' into the rule of what 'properly belongs to us'. In coming full circle, arriving again at the control of those whose movements threatened to become too-free, an important goal of indirect rule was the control of migrant labour: the seasonal return to the 'homelands' of labourers who were necessary in cities and mines but whose presence, in too great numbers, presented the threat of the ungovernable.

While, as I indicated above, it would be folly to suggest that current EU practices of subsidiarity are the same, in either any absolute or coconspiratorial way, as the practice of indirect rule in the colonies, neither do I think it is far-fetched to claim a shared principle in which the idea of the local is incorporated into a 'general economy of command', and in which the tactic of deferring to local tradition and custom can be seen as having migrated back to its source. The new networked power system of sudsidiarity described by Castells as the sharing of authority in a flexible and increasingly complex way (Castells 2001: 362–3) through decentralized local partnerships and interventions in which power becomes the 'capacity to impose a given will/interest/value, regardless of consensus' through the tactic of manipulating difference and identity, encouraging some identities, subduing others 'in the fulfillment of transnational instrumental', is not a radically different idea from that of indirect rule. Both operate to produce and govern the borders of difference and identity through a strategy of the local.

I have suggested that in actualizing the strategy of a spatially and temporally fixed 'local' it becomes possible to keep European identity unified and particularized through incorporating 'local' rule into the identity project … I further suggested that this mode of rule is not automatically more just or democratic but that it opens the possibility that local and regional autonomy, incorporated in the name of deferring to diversity, will actually reinforce hegemonic forms of rule, reproducing the identities and agendas of elites while marginalizing the potentially 'wild' identities and agendas of social groups viewed as those to be ruled rather than rulers – who are, precisely, located outside the parameters of the local – who originate in an elsewhere and remain in an elsewhere. Through these maneuvers, while the new logic of a networked government replaces the old Weberian logic of sovereign government as the administration and control of all actions occurring within fixed territorial boundaries, the idea of the border itself remains intact – as precisely the privileged site of 'networked' manipulations. What it is important to now emphasize is that

the local, as an identity, is not any more problematic than any other, but that, like all others, it can be used in its binding of regulatory ideals to earth and flesh, to incarnate and make visible the forms of a given society's selective *locality* – the selective tradition of its history, geography, and everyday *habitus* through which it performs, actualizes and governs its borders.

While every society, as the self-imagining and reproduction of its existence, will work to suppress difference in some areas and encourage it in others as the negotiation of 'danger' and 'chance' (Derrida 1992: 5), the actualization of these virtualities as the decision of which differences are to be celebrated and which silenced or subdued, occurs not only in the imaginary of their construction but in flesh as border regimes distinguishing between those who are 'citizens' – in either the narrow sense of a belonging to a specific political community or in broader sense of belonging to the community of humanity – and those who whose presence is perceived as possessing the potential to become ungovernable and thus destructive to the existing community. Those in the latter group, no matter the name by which they are known, which varies historically and geographically, occupy the ontological position of the stranger as defined by Georg Simmel. The position of the stranger is to be distinguished, Simmel writes, from that of the 'wanderer', who comes today and goes tomorrow. The stranger comes today and *stays* on but whose staying remains unsecured, retaining, as a latent possibility, the potential to wander. The stranger is the alien whose position in the group is always determined 'by the fact that he has not belonged to the group from the beginning, that he imports qualities into it, which do not and cannot stem from the group itself' (Simmel 1964: 402). The ontological status of the stranger is, then, the ontological status of the border itself – i.e., an emergent divergent. Thus the stranger, multiply named in various historically and geographically contingent situations – the masses, the dangerous classes, the women, natives, primitives, etc. – is the name of wild difference, difference that disturbs because it appears to harbor the possibility of becoming ungovernable and thus lethal to the group as self-defined.

In Europe today the name of the stranger is the illegal immigrant, the asylum seeker, the criminal, all of whom are constructed as potential 'terrorists' literal and metaphorical, who as originating 'outside' – primarily in the territories of Africa, Asia and the Middle East – carry the latent threat of 'lines of divergence' (Deleuze) that will overwrite the 'lines that delimit what … *belongs to us* [*nous revient*] (Derrida 1993: 3; emphasis original). These individuals, viewed as bodies who infect and potentially destroy hegemonic social and political order, incarnate and perform, in conditions not of their own choosing, an historically vulnerable social and political position: i.e., that of the threshold of tolerance, the limit of what a given polity will tolerate before it experiences 'crisis' and begins its rejection. In performing this border, these individuals also perform the border of society's sacrificable and who as such can be harmed without reprisal (Agamben 1998: 9); who exist in a state of exception outside the law and as the law's shifting negotiation of their exclusion – not only from citizenship in the narrow sense, but in the broader sense of being citizens of humanity and thus determinations of the

kinds of survivals invoked at this essay's beginning. It is though the culling and bordering regimes of identity and difference, as 'governance' decisions taken as to what properly belongs to Europe and what can be abandoned or discarded – that Europe is presently forming its 'new'-'old' being, deciding, choice by choice, and on a day-to-day basis, not only what of Europe will 'live' and what will 'die' but as part of the accumulated totality of decisions made around the globe as to who will and will not win the right to be.

Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985), writing in *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, suggest that democratic polities are constituted through exclusions that return to haunt the polities predicated upon their absence. The haunting, however, can be politically effective, they suggest, insofar as the return forces expansion of the polity. This return, which is an actualization now in progress worldwide, provisions us with the possibility of a future which is utterly 'wild', hopefully forcing the expansion of the formerly known bounds of the time and space of citizenship and well-being. The fecundity and thus the utopics of borders is both that they hold the line and offer, at the same time, the possibility of its 'death'.

Note

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