

# **Handbook of Military Administration**

**Edited by**  
**Jeffrey A. Weber**  
**Johan Eliasson**

# **Handbook of Military Administration**

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**Jeffrey A. Weber**

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# Dedication

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To Dr. Jack Rabin, who encouraged the editors of  
this book and was a teacher, mentor, and  
friend who will be missed



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# Preface

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The purpose of this handbook is to bring together original chapters and other material that address and analyze the basic issues and components of the United States military administration and provide an international comparative perspective. Although the United States military produces numerous “handbooks” by highly competent authors, none of the currently available manuals address the breadth of the subject matter here while simultaneously providing an international comparison.

Open the first issue of *Public Administration Review* and you will find multiple articles addressing the administration of the United States military. Today it has gone out of favor and is not a subject of study. The military is the largest governmental bureaucracy in the United States. The administrative changes that have occurred in the military throughout the nation’s history are responsible for some of the major changes that have occurred in public administration. Today, the administrative changes produced by the *Defense Transformation Act for the 21st Century* are responsible for implementing some of the leading administrative reforms in the areas of personnel management, public budgeting and financial management, contracting, and planning. Despite the major public administration changes being brought about by the Department of Defense, which impact more public employees than any other changes, the public administration academic community appears to be mute, or at least not publishing in the main journals or presenting papers at the annual conferences. It is time for public administration to stop ignoring military administration. Hopefully, this volume is a start in reintroducing this neglected area of study.

Noticeable in this regard is that all across the globe government reforms of the military have often mimicked reforms attempted in civilian administrative bodies. The quest for greater efficiency and effectiveness, higher productivity and technological sophistication in the public sector has frequently found reception among those charged with reforming the military, even if military personnel, like civilian bureaucrats, have sometimes fought to preserve set routines and protect ingrained interests. Governments across the globe have decided to reform their military, making them technologically more sophisticated, increasingly flexible, leaner and more efficient. The similarities in goals and responses only strengthen the need



to examine the transformation in the military in the context of studying public administration.

The wide area of subject matter included in this volume covers: historical perspectives, an overview of defense transformation, planning, budgeting, personnel, weapon systems management, doctrine development, military–civilian relationships, professional education, professional ethics, and overviews of the military administration in the European Union, the Czech Republic, China, and Latin America.

The revolution in military affairs, first adopted as a reform process in the United States, has spread globally, though varying by country and region, with its resemblance to American reforms being influenced by national military culture, history, economic situation, and the regional security situation. A comparison of military administration, including policy goals, decision, rules, and culture sheds light on how traditional allies, regional friends, and a rising international power (China) are modernizing and reorganizing their military.

Many people labored to complete this project. As with so many books in the Public Administration and Public Policy Series, the initial idea for this project came from Jack Rabin. Jack was an incubator of numerous thoughts and ideas and he encouraged so many to accomplish more than they could conceive. Despite his own health problems and difficulties, he never ceased to inquire about the state of the book and encourage us to completion. We deeply regret his passing and recognize this work would not have been possible if it wasn't for him.

We also would like to thank our contributors who present, analyze, and explain the organization, procedures, and processes, as well as reform efforts, of the U.S. military administration and that found in regions and countries around the world. We apologize to those who waited a couple of years due to unexpected delays in this work. We thank all of them for their efforts. Additionally, we also thank two graduate assistants at East Stroudsburg University, Jehan Johnson and Jenna Becker, for their tremendous assistance in formatting chapters and general proofreading.

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Ultimately the responsibility for this volume lies with us as editors and authors, and we welcome any comments and feedback that can help improve future editions.

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# *Chapter 1*

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# Introduction

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Jeffrey A. Weber and Johan Eliasson

Military operations have constantly dominated current events over the past twenty years. Since 1979, the United States military has deployed with increasing frequency, which significantly increased after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The operations span the continuum from war to humanitarian relief. The U.S. military has 450,925 military personnel engaged in global operations in Iraq, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Somalia, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia, Germany, Poland, Philippines, Columbia, South Korea and Japan, just to name a few of the 163 nations with ongoing operations. Additionally, the U.S. military dominates the oceans and air space globally as it seeks to support the ever-growing number of operations. This support is provided not only to U.S. forces, but also to United Nations peacekeepers and the military of other nations.

These global military operations are managed on a day-to-day basis by history's largest bureaucracy, the Department of Defense (DoD). There are 1.3 million men and women on active duty and another 1.1 million serving in the National Guard or Reserve. The forces are supported by 669,281 civilian personnel. Additionally, DoD cares for over 2 million retirees and military personnel's families. All of this is accomplished with a budget of approximately \$500 billion.

Although the conduct of war is the subject of vast literature, administrative aspects of military operations is often lacking. After all, who can become excited about human resource management, budgeting and finance, procurement, and training and development, when one has the lure and challenge of defeat and victory in combat? Yet, the seemingly mundane and boring administrative tasks are what makes it possible to field an effective fighting force.

The human resource management systems are what enables the military to recruit, train and field the personnel who win on the battlefields. The budgeting and finance systems are what makes it possible to purchase the weapon systems, food, materials and, most importantly, pay the troops, provide benefits and take care of them if they are injured or in retirement. Training and development provides our fighting forces with the knowledge, skills and abilities they need to win on the battlefield, conduct operations other than war and to take care of each other and their families. Procurement provides our military with what it needs, when it needs it.

Furthermore, despite the continual argument by some that nation building is not the job of the military, the U.S. military has often found itself engaged in just such efforts throughout its history. The historical frequency with which the military has engaged in humanitarian or nation-building operations makes it surprising that it does not rise in prominence in military doctrine. Consequently, the U.S. military often finds itself conducting public administration operations and relearning lessons from previous operations.

In short, the public administration systems of the DoD are the vital organs and body of the entire military. The conduct of war and operations other than war are the actions or activities of that body. For too long, people who have studied the military have focused on the activities and actions of the body, and have ignored the body itself. This *Handbook of Military Administration* is an attempt to capture the essence of the public administration of the U.S. military and offer a brief comparison to other nations' military administrations.

It is our hope and desire that this volume may serve to generate an interest by others in military administration, both as an academic field and as a manner of public service. General George Patton is often quoted as saying that one cannot administer his way to victory on the battlefield. Although I agree that is true in the heat of battle, I contend that Patton could not have achieved or won anything were it not for the public administrators and their organization and systems which placed Patton on that battlefield and provided him with the tools he needed for victory. Additionally, it was the vast administrative systems and processes which, after World War II, enabled the Marshall Plan to become a reality. The intent of this book is not to promote a bureaucratic mentality over a warrior ethos, but to show that the administrative systems are critical to enabling that warrior ethos to flourish and win on the battlefield.

Because of the lack of attention given to military administration, it is essential to identify this subject matter. Military administration encompasses the functions of planning, organizing, staffing, financing, training, equipping, maintaining and caring for the military bureaucracy. Interestingly, military administration is larger than the actual combat units, typically the ratio is three to one. Overlaid on the different functions of military administration are the concepts of professionalism, accountability, efficiency and effectiveness. Because the stakes are so high in terms of the loss of life and at times the survival of the nation, the military administrative

systems have come under repeated scrutiny. Scandals have focused attention on specific administrative functions for brief periods, which have spurred reform commissions or study groups to recommend reform in whatever is the latest trend of the period.

The study of administrative systems utilizes a range of decision-making, organizational and sociological models or frameworks. Decision-making models focus on the processes used for reaching conclusions, whether sequential or concurrent. Organizational models are used to examine the structures and systems that operate to transform inputs into outputs. Finally, sociological models emphasize the influence of the societal norms, mores and beliefs regarding professional standards and ethics, organizational standards and practices, and placement in society.

The DoD has a well-established administrative system. Its historical development is incremental, but is punctuated with intermitted periods of dramatic change. One of these periods is 1850 to 1900, in which the Civil War produced dramatic administrative changes that would play out over the next few decades. Changes in the organization of the general staff and the adapting of administrative systems to support a large national military all were given birth during this period.

The next major period of change occurred as the result of World War II, when the U.S. military would become global in nature and be involved in large-scale humanitarian operations. The current administrative systems were born during that time and are still in the process of maturing. The DoD was established in 1947 and it has been a constant struggle between the civilian leadership and the military on the meaning of operating as one military system (jointness) and what it means to actually function as the first global military power.

Over the years, systems have developed, such as the Joint Planning System, by which the military focuses itself on the national priorities as established by the civilian leadership; the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System, which seeks to integrate the financial management systems with the plans, programs and operations of DoD; and the National Security Personnel System is the latest effort to organize the approximately 659,000 civilian personnel. Additionally, one of the difficult tasks is the timely procurement of weapon systems to ensure supremacy on the battlefield. Part of this involves military systems managers, who for a short time in their career manage the development, procurement and maintenance of a specific weapon system.

A unique aspect of U.S. military administration is the business of contracting out different aspects of security operations, such as security for service contractors. This has given rise to private military companies. What the relationship of these private companies is to the military and how they operate under the rules of engagement are all areas of concern for military administration.

Development of professional training and the imparting of professional values and ethics is a primary concern of training and development. The military profession is guided by a sense of what it means to serve. Concepts of duty and honor permeate the profession, combined with a mission-oriented and “get the mission

accomplished” attitude. Selfless leadership, with a service-oriented mindset, are some of the values the profession has sought to generate over time.

The U.S. military functions as a global organization. Consequently, it interacts with other countries’ militaries. Having a familiarization with the administrative systems of other countries is essential. As with most areas of social and scientific development, defense structures, organizations and the cultures that underlie, and often shape, military operations change, most often in response to external developments. Most governments agree that they should be adapting to a world where the enemy’s location, character (a state or a terrorist cell) and strength are highly unpredictable. Such adaptation entails maximizing use of information-gathering technology, through satellites or aerial surveillance, and boosting the ability to project power (through missiles, bombers or the rapid deployment of troops and armor) across long distances. The chances of aerial dogfights or naval battles between roughly matched forces are receding; ships and aircraft are more likely to be needed to support a multipronged intervention on land. The environment for such intervention could be extremely hostile, with no friendly ports or land bases and every likelihood of adversaries who are using ballistic missiles, or chemical and biological weaponry.

American cooperation with allies around the world depends on political will, but, in practice, these new scenarios also require compatible equipment. America is ahead of all others, including Europe, in adapting to these new challenges. This is not only because of its forces’ global reach, but also because the sheer size of its defense budget provides great leeway in requesting and choosing weapon systems. The Pentagon is still buying traditional weapon platforms, such as ships, submarines and tanks—even when there seems little reason to do so, besides appeasing political lobbies and maintaining the military–industrial base. But at the same time, it has adopted the rhetoric of the so-called “revolution in military affairs” that promises to use information technology to provide commanders with almost perfect knowledge of the battlefield.

All across the globe governments have decided to reform their military, making them technologically more sophisticated, increasingly flexible, leaner and more efficient. The revolution in military affairs (RMA) has spread, though varying by country and region, with its resemblance to American reforms being influenced by national military culture, history, economic situation and the regional security situation. A comparison of military administration, including policy goals, decision, rules and culture, sheds light on how traditional allies, regional friends and a rising international power (China) are modernizing and reorganizing their military.

In the case of traditional allies in Europe and elsewhere (e.g., Canada and Australia), transnational as well as transatlantic armaments, R&D and procurement are slowly improving compatibility and interoperability between countries; incompatibility due to divergent technology and training hampered cooperation in the theater (Afghanistan 2002–2007 and Iraq 2003–2006 are examples). European and American defense planners have largely abandoned old Cold War assumptions

about the nature of conflicts, and are now rethinking strategy to meet the new threat environment. So is the defense industry. The big American firms have consolidated into five; European firms have been slower, but British Aerospace (BAe) and the European Aerospace and Defense Company (EADC), and Italian Finmeccia are healthy and valuable European competitors to American companies' competitive edge in many areas. This new arms industrial map is thus both the result of new priorities and required weapons, and an influence on allocation of R&D and procurement funds.

The European Union (EU) is an influential international economic force with both positive (development aid, loans, free-trade agreements, potential membership) and negative (embargo, tariffs, withdrawal of aid) means of economic influence; means that are frequently effective in promoting political goals, such as regional stability, democracy and human rights. However, it has not always proven sufficient. The inability of EU members to present common positions and deal adequately with the wider and more diverse set of security threats (humanitarian crises, migration, ethnic conflicts, civil war and various types of terrorist activities) that have come to dominate after the cold war—wreaking havoc also on the European continent—has contributed to the ubiquitous idiom of the EU being “an economic giant but political pygmy.” This has further contributed to criticisms of the paradoxical nature of the union: striving for a strategic impact on Europe and elsewhere without any specific strategy; aspiring to be a powerful international actor without aspiring to become a supra-state; favoring strong Atlantic links, but also autonomous institutions and even independence; and aspiring to prevent and manage crises without acquiring the means to do so (Zielonka, 1998a, 11; 1998b). The development of military capabilities is meant to strengthen the EU's political and economic clout, and as America's longest and closest ally, Europe's endeavors are of great interest to policy makers, as well as military personnel in the United States.

Prior to 1998 the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) consisted largely of rhetoric of future goals, with few common developments or actions and no military dimension. A consensus among the EU's largest states in late 1998 triggered febrile activity and intense focus on developing capabilities to carry out EU-led military and civilian crisis-management operations. The development of the EU Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) is intended to strengthen all aspects related to the security of the EU and enhance its role in international affairs. Notwithstanding some setbacks and remaining problems, this process has come remarkably far in a very short time, and it continues to deepen and widen. There are now permanent EU military structures, an operational chain of command, and an emerging Europe-wide military culture; this on a continent where states turned their guns on each other twice in the last century. The EU has managed to secure a perpetual peace among its members, and military cooperation will further cement this integration process.

Enhancing Europe's military capabilities is thus meant to replace grand rhetoric of European aspirations, diminishing discrepancies between declarations and



empirically verifiable assets and skills. The discerning reader will ask why the focus is on the EU's military structure, organization and culture rather than individual member states. After all, Britain, France in particular, but also Spain, Italy, Poland and Germany all remain respectable military powers, with the first two capable of carrying out elaborate and extensive military operations around the world (in addition to possessing nuclear weapons). Furthermore, the EU's common decision-making structure that applies to trade, labor and certain areas of asylum and immigration does not apply to military matters; European countries remain sovereign on defense and military issues. Most European countries have large standing armies, some have conscription and several European countries have large defense industries. However, along with economic and political integration, common external borders and the dismantling of internal borders, perceived common threats, skyrocketing costs for national defense along with political resistance to increase defense budgets, and the market-driven consolidation of the armaments industry, have promoted closer defense cooperation across Europe. The RMA, which began in the United States in the mid-1990s, has belatedly taken root throughout Europe, and is furthering the realization that European states cannot continue undertaking military reforms or operations independently, but need to cooperate and consolidate resources. This includes everything from R&D to procurement, military training and operations. Based largely on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) standards (which are based on United States standards), training procedures are being harmonized, cross-national brigades bearing the EU flag are in place, and discussions of a future common European army have gained momentum. As of 2007, there have been several military operations with pooled multinational resources operating under common EU command.

In Chapter 16, Johan Eliasson looks at the endeavors of the United States' closest allies and specifically the developing European Union Security and Defense Policy. The organizational structure, capabilities, operations and nascent European defense culture are explained, before some of the many remaining challenges in creating common policies and military standards are highlighted. The European Security Strategy, a European Security Solidarity Clause, and Military Capability and Action Plans are signs of real political will to improve military capabilities. Different military cultures constitute a hurdle in operations. Southern European military commanders, though skilled in tactics, often assume a *laissez-faire* attitude toward strict civilian control over military policy and related protocol, whereas their Nordic and German peers—due, respectively, to neutrality and constitutional restrictions on the military up to 1999—have been criticized for displaying the opposite tendencies, mainly due to their lack of experience with extra-territorial military operations (Interviews of Military Staff, 2001). The military headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, with its military committees and staff, supported by a military college, is a significant source of an emerging European security culture, and European as well as NATO–EU military exercises ensure harmonization of administrative structures.

While Eliasson looks at the European level, MaryBeth Peterson Ulrich, in Chapter 17, looks at reforms and military administration in two EU and NATO member countries, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The East Central European states have faced different obstacles vis-à-vis their Western peers. Following the demise of the Soviet Union, East European states had to either purge their military of corrupt and complacent military staff (e.g. Romania, Bulgaria, Poland) or start from scratch (the Baltic states, Slovak Republic). Reiterating the desire, and need, for the United States to have close allies in a new and challenging security environment, the chapter emphasizes the extent to which domestic reforms have progressed. Although both countries are shown to have undertaken serious reforms and now contribute to EU and NATO operations, Ulrich argues much remains to be done—training of officers, creation of specialized units and improving efficiency in civil–military relations. She specifically argues that Slovakia, after many years of stagnation and lack of political willingness to undertake serious doctrinal, strategic and organizational reform, in 2001 embarked upon a holistic and radical reformation process where the end goal is complete interoperability with NATO military members and organizations by 2010. Recognition of its initial success was Slovakia’s accession to NATO in 2004, the same year it joined the EU. Slovakia continues to have problems organizationally, the Ministry of Defense and the military’s General Staff still have difficulties working together, even as a new 2005 planning, programming and budgeting system is slowly easing cooperation and improving efficiency.

The Czech Republic, although admitted to NATO in 1997 (largely for geopolitical reasons), long remained woefully lacking in military preparedness. The strict hierarchical system left over from the communist era inhibited comprehensive strategic and organizational reform. U.S. Defense Department assessments and NATO reports gave negative evaluations of Czech capabilities in 2001. This year the Czechs decided to embark on a restructuring to a smaller and more efficient military, assisted by American consultants; a reform that has begun improving bureaucratic efficiency and military capabilities.

Interestingly, reforms in both countries are argued to have been shaped more by their NATO membership and accompanying action plans than EU’s military integration. At the same time, both countries have military staff stationed in Brussels, working alongside other EU and NATO member states’ military staff. As argued in Eliasson’s chapter (16), the EU’s security ambitions, carried forth in common military planning and exercises—which are based on NATO’s standards—as well as the socialization process that occurs in any structured institutional setting (Checkel, 2001; Pierson, 1996, 2000; Stone-Sweet, Fligstein and Sandholtz, 2001), will promote further harmonization in all EU states.

Two regions with long histories of American involvement and of contemporary importance are Latin America and Asia. In Chapter 18, Bartosz Stanislawski explains similarities and differences in the military administration among the major states in Latin and South America. The chapter’s main focus is on the organization

and culture of the armed forces in Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and Brazil, which are discussed in detail, but there are also informative sections on other select countries in both Latin and South America. The main countries of interest were chosen due to their importance to the United States and their military potential. The return to democracy in the 1990s throughout the region has meant a normalization of the military. The armed forces are now mostly under civilian control, with structural and functional divisions between the branches, and, like many other countries' forces, peacekeeping has become a main part of many Latin and South American states' military duties. At the same time, there are problems of transparency, visible in reluctance among military officers to have public insight into the military. The latter is largely a combination of the armed forces having historically been the most stable and autonomous of state organizations, and, during dictatorial rule, also one of the most unaccountable. These cultural legacies have hindered more rapid improvements in efficiency and effectiveness. Stanislawski also notes some of the peculiarities to the region, one being that armed forces in, for example, Chile own private companies whose income helps finance arms acquisitions; another that armed forces take part in law enforcement operations (e.g., in Colombia).

The fastest rising power in the East is China, a nuclear-armed state with the world's largest standing army. Hans Stockton, in Chapter 19, provides a comprehensive introduction to the military structure, goals and culture of this rapidly rising Asian power. The RMA "with Chinese characteristics" is a twist on reform that is of interest to outside analysts, as it helps explain the long-term intentions of Chinese policy makers, and the problem facing the Chinese military.

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## Chapter 2

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# Professionals, Bureaucrats and Citizen Soldiers: The Countervailing Patterns of American Military Administration

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Darrell W. Driver

One of the central difficulties in studying military administration is determining the nature of the thing being studied. That is, in terms of its basic character, what kind of organization is the military most like? And what kind of work does military service most resemble? Approaches in the literature have generally provided different answers. For one view, the military is a profession. The complexity of military work in the modern era has resulted in the necessary specialization and professionalization of military activity, where the development of and proficiency in a body of “military” expert, abstract knowledge is the *sine quo non* of success on the contemporary battlefield (Huntington, 1957, 1963; Snider, Nagl and Pfaff, 1999; Snider and Watkins, 2000). Others focus on the military’s formal organization as a large public bureaucracy, with Weberian ideal-typical structures of authority, uniform regulations and defined paths for promotion (Feaver, 1998, 2005). Finally, still other approaches emphasize the military’s status as a national public

institution, highlighting the military's relationship to the social and political character of American society (Bachman, Blair, and Segal, 1977; Moskos, 2001).<sup>\*</sup> This chapter critically reviews these three approaches to the study of military organizations: their differing conceptions of military work, their origins in distinct episodes of political development and their response to the changing military requirements of the post-Cold War security environment. In so doing, the following central arguments are made.

First, each of these models forward differing conceptions of military work, with diverging interpretations of what constitutes accountability, how best to achieve effectiveness and on what basis democratic legitimacy might be derived. The professional model locates accountability in self-policing internal norms of behavior, the bureaucratic model in hierarchical principle-agent relationships, and the public institutional model in the military's social and ideological representativeness. Effectiveness in the professional model is best achieved by granting autonomy to military professionals to develop means-focused expert knowledge and make means-based decisions in military operations. Bureaucratic and public institutional models introduce the subjective and ultimately political nature of measuring effectiveness. In the former, the judgment lies with the principle. In the latter, the judgment is a more complicated process of political contestation and societal validation. Finally, legitimacy for the military profession is a product of its ability to render relevant, responsive and effective service to the state client through the application of expert instrumental knowledge. Bureaucratic renderings find legitimacy more strictly in the degree of responsiveness of agents to principles down the chain of command. Expert domains are less important; what matters is the unbroken path of democratic legitimacy that is achieved by eliminating "shirking" from the principle-agent hierarchy. Public institutional models locate the idea of legitimacy in social representation, the degree of the military's embeddedness in American society, and the military's fealty to broader national purposes and ideals.

Second, from citizen-soldier traditions of the early republic to neutral professional and rational organizing impetuses of early twentieth century America, the present conceptions of military work have their progenitors in important episodes of American political development and civil-military tradition. Citizen-soldier traditions underpin public institutional renderings, and the late nineteenth century

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<sup>\*</sup> These are pure types that have been combined in various ways. For instance, Peter Feaver acknowledges the utility of the professional model in examining the changing character of the "military craft" or in understanding the attitudes and beliefs of those who choose the military vocation. However, for questions of accountability, Feaver contends that principle-agent models are required (Feaver, 1996). Among professional approaches, Samuel Huntington (1957) provides a closed systems approach, arguing that military effectiveness requires insulation from social influences. Conversely, Morris Janowitz (1971, 1973) understands the military as an open system, whose effectiveness is dependent on its ability to adapt to social changes and requirements.

trends toward centralization, expert authority and rationalization variously inform present-day professional and bureaucratic approaches.

Third, Cold War patterns of mission certainty, jurisdictional clarity and settled doctrine have been replaced by the expanding military responsibilities of the post-Cold War period, prompting adjustments and renegotiation in each of these approaches. Professional conceptions are wrestling with the inability to specify professional military jurisdiction; bureaucratic understandings are strained by the increasing potential for agent shirking in more open-ended missions; and public institutional approaches are closely monitoring a military that is smaller, more technology centric—and by some accounts—less connected to American society.

Finally, and most importantly, no single model completely accounts for the often countervailing expectations and requirements in which the military finds itself fully enmeshed. The tensions this poses for military public servants, however, may be unavoidable, given the cross pressures of accountability, the political nature of effectiveness, and the multiple criteria for legitimacy American democracy requires of its military.

## **The Military as a Profession: The Rise and Struggles of Autonomous Professionalism**

“The modern officer corps,” according to Samuel Huntington (1957, 7), “is a professional body and the modern military officer a professional man.” For Huntington, this meant more than the common language distinction between professionals (those who were full-time practitioners of an occupation, usually for pay) and amateurs (those who only dabbled in the occupational tasks, usually unpaid). It was taken to describe a “special type of vocation” or “higher calling” that made its members distinct from other vocations. This, of course, was a normative claim of special social worth, which Huntington rooted in the relatively static criteria of expertise, corporateness and responsibility (Huntington, 1957, 8). In his explanation, expertise was derived from extended education and experience in a significant area of human endeavor. Corporateness implied a consciousness of unity among the practitioners as distinct from the laypersons in society. Finally, responsibility meant the use of expertise and corporate consciousness in ways that are broadly beneficial to society, such that misuse results in the loss of the professional moniker. This latter criterion sought to answer the longstanding problem of civilian control and democratic legitimacy by defining the problem away. A professional military could be counted on to remain responsive to civilian authority, and the professionalism of the military depended on autonomy within a clear “management of violence” jurisdiction. A civil–military bargain was, thus, forwarded: in exchange for military professional autonomy, the military would yield goal-setting and ends-based decisions to civilian authorities. In this way, the military professional ideal

was both a model for the development of a more effective military and a theory of democratic civil–military relations.

There are, perhaps, no claims more central to twentieth century American civil–military relations and professional officer self-concepts than these. With Huntington as their most cogent advocate, what he labels the “objective theory” of civil–military relations was, in essence, an affirmation of the politics–administration dichotomy emerging from Progressive Era development of the American administrative state. Indeed, as historians trace the roots of American military professionalism to their beginnings, the power of Progressive Era arguments for the clear division of political and administrative function looms large in the American military professionalization story. The argument, according to Progressive reformers like Woodrow Wilson, Frank Goodnow and Herbert Croly, was that assigning administrators “clear cut responsibility [...] would] insure trustworthiness” (Wilson, 1887), and that rational efficient governance in the new administrative state meant that democracy would work on Election Day. From the results, the elected representatives would determine the will of the state. That *will* had then to be carried out in a neutral, efficient and professional manner in order for the democratic loop to be completed. As Frank Goodnow put it:

Political functions group themselves naturally under two heads, which are equally applicable to the mental operations and the operations of self conscious personalities. That is, the action of the state as a political entity consists either in operations necessary to the expression of its will, or in operations necessary to the execution of the will. (Goodnow, 2003, 9)

Contemporary military reformers, like Army Colonel Emory Upton and Secretary of War Elihu Root, were not isolated from these new arguments (Karsten, 1972; Gates, 1980; Skowronek, 1982). Military reformers of the Upton and Root ilk—what Peter Karsten called “armed progressives”—sought to carve out a sphere of professional jurisdiction that would protect military autonomy from political encroachment (Karsten, 1972). This civil–military dichotomy viewed the political and military domains as separate spheres of action where elected civilian leaders could simply prescribe a goal and neutral military experts would decide on the means to accomplish that goal. As Elihu Root would remark of important 1903 War Department reforms and the question of military responsibility and civilian control:

It will be perceived that we are providing for civilian control over the military arm, but for civilian control to be exercised through a single military expert of high rank, who is provided with an adequate corps of professional assistants to aid him in the performance of his duties, and

who is bound to use all of his professional skill and knowledge in giving effect to the purposes and general directions of his civilian superior, or make way for another expert who will do so. In this way it is hoped that the problem of reconciling civilian control with military efficiency with which we have been struggling for so many years will be solved. (Root, 1903, 258)

Thus, as military professionalization could be founded on a separate sphere of military expertise, citizen-soldier traditions that emphasized civil–military merging saw their first effective challenge.

The most interesting aspect, however, of the politics-administration dichotomy and its corollary the civil–military dichotomy is not so much their dual births in Progressive Era administrative orthodoxy, but the post-World War II demise of the former and strengthening of the latter. No sooner had the argument for a clear administrative–political separation reached its high-water mark in the 1937 *Report of the President's Committee on Administrative Management* (popularly referred to as the *Brownlow Report*, for committee chairman Louis Brownlow),\* observers of American public administration began leveling fundamental criticisms at the prospect of a clearly defined and apolitical administrative domain (e.g. Appleby, 1945, 1949; Long, 1949; Fesler, 1974; Mosher, 1982; Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984).

Herbert Simon and Dwight Waldo typified the range of these assaults. Intent on instilling in the social sciences the same rigor that characterized the physical sciences, Simon (1947) criticized the existing principles of politics–administration separation as being empirically unfounded. He labeled the “scientific” principles that were supposed to guide neutral administrative experts as little more than contradictory aphorisms that must be discarded if administration was ever to achieve true scientific rigor. Leveling more fundamental attacks on the orthodoxy, Dwight Waldo (1948) dismissed beliefs in distinct jurisdictions for administrative and political decision making, arguing that all administrative action was fundamentally political. The belief that neutral experts could simply execute the will of elected officeholders according to a set of scientific principles that yielded “one best way” was fallacious. As administrative decisions inevitably reflect normative commitments, the hope of justifying a new scientific public administration as separate from politics and deserving of insulated autonomy within a given jurisdiction was

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\* Here again, note the similarity between the language employed by the *Brownlow Report* and that of Elihu Root in his 1903 efforts to justify the consolidation of army control with the newly created Army General Staff: The effectiveness of the executive assistant positions “in assisting the president will, we think, be directly proportional to their ability to discharge their functions with restraint ... They should be men in whom the president has personal confidence and whose character and attitude is such that they would not attempt to exercise power on their own account. They should be possessed of high competence, great physical vigor, and a *passion for anonymity*.” (emphasis added) (Brownlow, Merriam, and Gulick, 1937)



not reconcilable with democratic principles. Determination of public policy could not be held as conceptually or practically distinct from the execution of that policy. Nevertheless, as a vibrant assault on the established administrative orthodoxy unfolded in the broader field of American public administration, mid-twentieth century military professionalism became increasingly defined by the separation assumptions.

By the time Samuel Huntington (1957) had reworked separation assumptions into a comprehensive theory of military professionalism and civil–military relations, Cold War circumstances had lent clarity to the military’s functional domain in ways unparalleled by earlier periods of American military history. Nation building and constabulary missions on the American frontier were long since gone, so too were policing missions in the Philippines, Cuba, and on the Mexican–American Border and domestic recovery missions, like the running of the New Deal’s Civilian Conservation Corps (Killebrew, 1960; Wong and Johnson, 2002). In their place, the army, in particular, prepared for the looming task of sustained combat operations in a large-scale conflict, probably against the Soviet Union and probably on the plains of Europe. Never before had the army’s functional jurisdiction been so clearly specified. It was a clarity that fit well with civil–military dichotomy assumptions. It was also one that would not survive the end of the Cold War and the subsequent proliferation of military missions beginning to challenge the military’s separation orthodoxy.

By the end of the Cold War, military professional self-concepts rested firmly on the idea of a unique realm of military expertise over which military professionals exercised near-complete means-focused autonomy. Nevertheless, as the post-Cold War years got underway, a central difficulty for the existing model was in defining exactly what military professional expertise and jurisdiction should entail. Charles Moskos and his co-authors count fifty-four military operations carried out by Western countries between 1991 and 1999 (Moskos, Williams and Segal, 2000). The United States contribution alone includes such tasks as drug interdiction, restoring domestic order, peacekeeping, infrastructure development, disaster relief and rescuing foreign nationals, along with traditional combat operations. The static model of military professionals operating exclusively in the management of violence sphere would have to be revised.

For this revision, research on military professionalism turned to the sociology of professions for a more dynamic, constructivist account of professional jurisdictional change and stasis (Snider, Watkins, and Matthews, 2002; Snider and Matthews, 2005). In the rendering adopted from Andrew Abbott (1988), professions compete for *jurisdictional* sovereignty, control over *expert knowledge* and, as a result, social *legitimacy*. The lesson was that the military, like other professions, needed to secure its jurisdictional boundaries and control the attendant expert knowledge; at the same time, it must ensure that this jurisdiction does not become inflexible and irrelevant. Professional success, then, depends on the ability to maintain jurisdictional control over *client-relevant* expert knowledge, not simply expert knowledge alone.

Though the “turf war” model of professions has helped the Army to think about the ways in which its professional jurisdiction is changing and might change in the future, it continues to embrace the orthodox lexicon of boundaries and jurisdictions at a time when such clarity appears increasingly unlikely. Changes have extended military responsibilities into areas where other organizations are carrying out similar and overlapping efforts. Internally, the military has been called on to exhibit greater interservice integration in missions where old service jurisdictions are increasingly blurred (Thie et al., 2005). Externally, the call for greater interagency and multinational cooperation (Clark, 2001), increased competition from the private sector (Avant, 2005) and the overlapping efforts of nongovernmental and governmental organizations have all served to confuse the lines of military responsibility (Weiss, 1999).

The separate model of military professionalism, thus, forces the military to decide between stark alternatives when it considers future military roles and responsibilities. First, it can resist acceptance of missions outside of some clearly delineated military sphere. This risks rendering the profession irrelevant to the security needs of the state, which increasingly calls on the military for an expanding list of nontraditional tasks. Or, second, the military can expand the scope of its jurisdiction to include all of the potential tasks that might be required. The latter has been the tact of recent army doctrine that calls for embracing “the full range of military operations across the spectrum of conflict, from sustained land dominance in wartime to supporting civil authorities during natural disasters and consequence management” (Department of the Army Headquarters, 2001). The problem with this approach, as Richard Lacquement worries, is that it provides “limited practical utility as a doctrine for a profession. It glosses over too much. It lacks boundaries” (2005, 214). Without clear boundaries, the worry is that specifying even abstract bodies of knowledge is not possible. The goal, then, has been to try and strike a balance between overly narrow and overly broad conceptions of military jurisdiction and its attendant expert knowledge. Here, an error too far in either direction could result in military officers being “seen either as irrelevant to the needs of the policy-maker, or as having dubious professional credibility” (Nielsen, 2001, 219). In the end, the military’s continued inability to settle on a defined and manageable set of boundaries for its professional jurisdiction has posed a central challenge for the future of the military profession. It is a challenge that may yet untether future military professional models from the conceptual moorings of strict civil–military dichotomy assumptions.

For instance, as task differentiation and jurisdictional permeability across the security continuum have rendered boundary concepts problematic, the army has begun to resort to doctrinal language that emphasizes expertise as clusters of abstract knowledge within which there exist certain core competencies (Fields et al., 2005). It has also begun focusing professional military education on problem-solving skills, creativity and adaptability, where solutions to problems can take a variety of forms (McCausland and Martin, 2001; Shelton, 2001). Moreover, because

stability missions generally take place in areas already populated with a dense set of organizational actors, the need to cultivate professional knowledge on the method and terms of interchange with other actors has become a concern of increasing importance. This has precipitated calls to emphasize joint service and interagency and traditional intraservice career-path experience as equally important components of military professional development (Thie et al., 2005).

In sum, as the merging of political, civil and military functions along with the simultaneous trend toward the outsourcing and subcontracting of traditional military tasks have confounded concepts of a civil–military dichotomy and jurisdictional claim staking, the military has struggled to develop an accurate understanding of its professional responsibilities and the required scope of its professional knowledge. In practice—if not in theory—the army in particular has moved farther from the idea of professional boundary setting toward a more integrative conception of the management of violence spectrum. To borrow the professional analogy forwarded by Dingwall and King (1995, 21), military professionals are becoming less like border guards, concerned with “the rights of an occupation to a piece of territory defined by division of labor,” and more like customs agents, focused on “the terms that govern interchanges among occupational groups and between them.”\* Though this analogy offers a more accurate reflection of the military’s evolving role vis-à-vis the management of violence field, it falls short of providing the clear delegation of responsibility required, if the professional model is to fulfill the dual role as a theory of democratic civilian control of the military. It is increasingly difficult to describe democratic legitimacy or civilian control of the military as dependent on “a clear distinction between political and military responsibilities” (Huntington, 1957, 163). It is a distinction that has always been under some measure of scrutiny (Feaver, 1995), but, in an era of task differentiation, porous jurisdictions, and “operations across the spectrum of conflict” (Department of the Army Headquarters, 2001), the hope that professional boundaries alone might define the civil–military relationship appears particularly misplaced.

## **The Military as a Public Bureaucracy: Rational Structures and Principle Agents**

When asked to comment on the application of the competitive professional model to the U.S. Army, Andrew Abbott responded with some degree of skepticism, arguing that “thinking about [the army] chiefly as a profession involved in jurisdictional

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\* Robert Dingwall and Michael King challenge Andrew Abbott’s conception of professions as vying for jurisdictional control based on the writing of the British sociologist Herbert Spencer. According to Dingwall and King, Spencer’s theory of professional development is a more accurate reflection of the task differentiation and specialization that characterize industrial development (Dingwall and King, 1995).

adventures (over who controls traditional combat, unconventional war, and MOOTW [Military Operations other Than War]) may really capture only a tiny portion of the systems of environing relations that govern it" (Abbott, 2002, 534). Abbott's concern pushes us to see that the military, though displaying many of the characteristics of a profession, is not wholly like the more archetypical professions of law and medicine. To begin with, the military is embedded in the structure of the democratic state, and taking stock of this structure provides a new lens through which to understand the nature of military work and its relationship to important questions of accountability and democratic legitimacy. Rather than simply a client to whom professional services are rendered, this approach brings the state back into the discussion in a much more comprehensive way. According to Robert Dingwall and Michael King (1995, 21), this is a fundamental flaw in the competitive jurisdictional model, a model that "appears uncertain as to where the state as an actor stands in relation to the 'system of professions': is it in the system, intervening in the interactions among professional groups, or is it part of the environment to which the system accommodates itself?"

The military is unique among professions for its dual status as a large public bureaucracy. As early twentieth century reforms embraced concepts of specialization and distinct expertise endemic to what one historian labeled the "culture of professionalism" (Bledstein, 1976), a host of structural reforms would begin to replace an army system of divided command and fragmented bureau responsibility with more rational, hierarchical chains of accountability (Skowronek, 1982). For instance, the 1903 consolidation of army senior command functions under the General Staff mimicked commission-style centralization efforts that had become popular in other aspects of government, including the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), the Civil Service Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Bureau of Efficiency (Weigley, 1969; Rohr, 1986). The same reforms that meritized military promotion and assignments in ways that made professionalism possible also vested the new system in a bureaucratic organization with patterns of accountability and responsibility inconsistent with typical professional renderings. As Don Snider observed, "the continuous challenge for the strategic leaders of the army profession, at least since the latter years of the nineteenth century when the army professionalized, has been to keep these two internal natures in proper proportion" (2005, 13).

The differences in the organizational patterns are significant. Thinking of the military as a profession invites focusing on the military's career-long training in a body of abstract knowledge, internal ethical controls, service orientation and fiduciary responsibility to the client. Control is largely internal, including the decisions to compete for a particular span of functional jurisdiction. However, when one considers the military bureaucracy in which the profession is embedded, control becomes a function of hierarchical structure, with administrative and regulatory uniformity institutionalized in routinized tasks, hierarchical regimentation and rationalized processes.

The tensions between these two divergent understandings are particularly apparent in the military's post-Cold War struggle to redefine its basic missions and responsibility. Ironically, the Cold War mission certainty that clarified professional jurisdiction also pulled the military closer to the bureaucratic pole. Mission certainty offered the ability to routinize professional knowledge and rationalize collective and individual task lists to ever finer degrees of specificity (Blackwell, 2001). The fear was that as knowledge became less abstract it also became less adaptable. What was termed the "McDonaldization" of the military function threatened to undermine the ability of the military to respond to the changing nature of post-Cold War missions (Hajjar and Ender, 2005), prompting Snider and his colleagues to call for a recommitment to professionalization over bureaucratization. The military was, in another sense, caught in a jurisdictional dilemma: Specified jurisdictions promised professional autonomy over expert knowledge, but these well-defined jurisdictions also made possible a rationalization of function that threatened to replace that very professional autonomy with an ever-thickening rule- and task-based doctrine. Indeed, one of the lessons of military training transformation over the last decade and a half seems to be that its professional character—far from being threatened by jurisdictional uncertainty—requires at least some measure of it. The alternative is a regimentation of work more reflective of bureaucratic than professional patterns of administration.

The bureaucratic aspect of military organization also presents a different model of democratic accountability and legitimacy. If in the professional model the military is accountable for its fulfillment of broad civilian policy goals (operating within broad professional boundaries), a bureaucratic model relies more on the transmission of authority, directives and, subsequently, legitimacy down the chain from the National Command Authority to the individual soldier. In this vein, Peter Feaver argues that a principle-agent typology of the military's role vis-à-vis civilian leaders provides more definite lines of authority, particularly in areas where jurisdictional clarity is unachievable (Feaver, 1998, 2005). He avoids problematic reliance on an autonomous professional domain by focusing "on the interaction of political actors played out in the specific institutional setting of government" (2005, 10).

Though this gets around the difficulty of professional boundary setting, it invites many of the typical public sector principle-agent concerns. For instance, as mission ambiguity increases so does the potential for shirking on the part of the military agents. Stability, post-conflict support, nation-building, and peacekeeping operations may offer extreme examples of the kind of problems public sector principles in general face in the principle-agent typology (Moe, 1984): How does one monitor the performance of an agent when common market metrics like profit are not present (Ingraham, 1995; Ingraham and Moynihan, 2000)? Because effectiveness rather than efficiency is often the more pressing goal of military missions (Snider and Watkins, 2000), how does one judge military effectiveness in operations with overlapping jurisdictions where multiple agents (and a number of third-party organizations) share responsibilities toward common objectives? Moreover,

like the larger United States public service, the military is faced with competing principles at the highest levels of government. When goals are not agreed upon by executive and legislative principles or when they emerge as overly abstract, how does one judge the performance of the military agent? In short, principle-agent theory helps to clarify aspects of top-down accountability in the military as a public bureaucratic institution without relying on the internal self-policing of the professional model. However, given the ambiguity surrounding the “military” domain, the information asymmetry that often exists between military agents and civilian principles, and the inability to clearly specify and then measure progress toward agreed upon ends, the principle-agent theory alone falls short of a final, comprehensive accounting.

The inability of agency theory’s bureaucratic lens to offer this final accounting is similar to the reasons that the professional model at last proves incomplete: It cannot fully address the enmeshment of the military in the American political system, a system that variously calls on the military to be both an adaptable profession and a disciplined bureaucracy. The reasons one conception might emerge as dominant in any particular episode of political contestation are many. For instance, siding with the professional model may stem from the fact that information asymmetry between civilian principles and military agents can be high, particularly in more ambiguous stability and support operations. This can create high levels of slack within the principle-agent chain, whereby civilian principles are hindered in their ability to judge performance. The internal ethical controls of the professional model can augment strict principle-agent accountability chains where effectiveness is difficult to monitor. In a, perhaps, more troubling example, political contestation might lead to the emphasis of autonomous professional renderings over strict principle-agent chains when it serves politically expedient goals. Employing rhetoric that consigns “military” operations to a separate, nonpolitical sphere of professional jurisdiction can serve the political goal of insulating selected operations from the full scope of political debate. Conversely, the record is replete with occasions where political actors directed the smallest details of military operations when professional advice was either not trusted or determined insufficient to deal with the gravity of the larger geo-strategic situation.\* The point in these last two instances is that the basic decision as to which organizational model should be employed can itself be fundamentally linked to basic incentives in the realm of political contestation, highlighting the need for professional autonomy in one instance and bureaucratic discipline in the next. This, of course, further confounds attempts to settle on any one understanding of military organizations.

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\* Citing Lincoln’s overriding of General George McClellan’s strategic decisions, Franklin Roosevelt’s “meddling during World War II,” and John F. Kennedy’s establishment of a direct line to the commander of the American convoy sent to Berlin upon completion of the Berlin Wall, Peter Feaver argues that jurisdictional military sovereignty has routinely been ignored, even to the lowest levels of tactical military operations (Feaver, 1995).

What the professional model and the bureaucratic models each highlight, then, are aspects of the military's multifaceted nature. Barbara Romzek and Patricia Wallace Ingraham describe this multicharacter enmeshment as "a complicated web of overlapping accountability relationships that reflect both internal and external control strategies" (Romzek and Ingraham, 2000, 7). Attempts at more parsimonious theories focus on one of these strategies to the detriment of the others. The fact that military leaders manage "under conditions of multiple accountability systems ... [and] work for multiple masters" (Romzek and Ingraham, 2000, 7), however, means that neither alone can fully describe the nature of military work or the full range of accountability systems in which that work is practiced. The discussion to this point has centered on the tension arising from the competing military administrative patterns emerging from twentieth century trends toward an at once more professional model of military service and a more linear military bureaucracy. There is, as yet, an older and still persistent conception of the military as an interdependent public institution that must be considered before concluding.

## **Article I. The Military as a Public Institution: The Long Shadow of the Citizen-Soldier Ideal**

"Foundings," according to John Rohr (1986), "are normative." They create the public life and lend it meaning; they provide the grammar and standards for legitimacy in the subsequent life of the political community. The American military system owes its founding to the citizen-soldier tradition, to the belief that broad social representation is the cornerstone of military accountability and effective civil-military relations. The authors of the Federalist Papers took great pains to link the more centralized military system set out in the Constitution to the broader citizen-soldier ideal, evidenced in Publius's rhetorical "where in the name of common sense are our fears to end if we may not trust our sons, our brothers, our neighbors, our fellow citizens?" (Madison, Hamilton and Jay, 1982, 154). As John Pocock (1975, 410-415) observed, the American republican tradition offered safeguards against tyranny through "the property and independence of the people in arms," and as Stephen Skowronek added, the founders' answer to the civil-military dilemma was to create "a military force that could not act against liberty without destroying itself" (1982, 86). Even as the pace of military professionalization quickened in the early twentieth century, the conviction that the army should remain connected across its breadth and depth to "the thoughts and feelings of the civil fireside from which it had come" persisted (Baker, 1920, 8-9).

Today, we see the echoes of this concern in an eclectic array of approaches that seek to understand the relationship between United States society and its armed forces. For these approaches, the military is a broad public institution whose health is dependent on its connections to its parent society. Likewise, the successes

and failures of societies can be measured in the face of its military. Indeed, much of American military administrative history might be understood as a struggle between these concepts of social-institutional interdependence and emergent efforts towards a more distinct and separate military system. Though concepts like neutral expertise, means-oriented autonomy and top-down hierarchical accountability have at various points predominated, there has, nevertheless, remained a persistent call for lateral military accountability through social representation and ideological connectedness (Janowitz, 1971; Bachman, Blair, and Segal, 1977; Moskos, 2001). In short, as a component of accountability, a source of democratic legitimacy, and a means of fostering a shared national purpose, the citizen-soldier ideal has been a resilient aspect of the American military system.

It is, perhaps, a gross understatement to say that the scope and scale of representation has been a central topic of debate for democratic theory in the age of the administrative state. The question has stemmed largely from the concept of division of labor and to what degree (in an industrializing, specializing and professionalizing society) democratic control can, or ought to, be separated from policy means. Many early proponents of a politics–administration dichotomy saw the burgeoning confidence in scientific forms of knowledge as building a case for a separate instrumental knowledge of government administration. In this way, separating the inefficiencies of democracy from administration was both necessary and, because of the objective rightness of scientific knowledge, democratically legitimate. The advent of “military science,” according to James Burk, was part and parcel of this attempt to locate some aspects of governance in other than politically derived sources. Accordingly, Burk finds in subsequent attention to science’s “non-rational social factors”—forwarded by those like Thomas Kuhn (1962)—the seeds of a military legitimacy deficit (Burk, 2002a).<sup>\*</sup> If, as Robert Dahl (1989, 68) has argued, the “difficult questions are not about ends [but] means” and the execution of such means is influenced as much by normative commitments as objective neutrality, the idea that foreign policy means can be assigned to an unrepresentative expert military few is rendered troublesome for questions of democratic legitimacy. This may be of particular concern in a foreign policy era that Stanley Hoffman (2003, 1) argues gives “military might . . . pride of place among all the kinds of [state] power.” Thus, the often-used “postmodern military” moniker reflects more than just a new era of mission uncertainty and jurisdictional permeability; it implies a criticism of the very foundation of claims for an objective, instrumental and means-focused military knowledge (Snider, Nagl, and Pfaff, 1999; Snider, 2000). Although all professions have had to contend with these trends to various degrees, the public

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<sup>\*</sup> Here, Burk draws on Thomas Kuhn’s criticism of the linear objective model of scientific evolution. As Kuhn’s argument for a more social view of science began to take hold, the idea that “military science” could be socially or politically independent became more problematic (Kuhn, 1962).



nature of military service and the significant implications that accompany military action have posed particularly pressing questions of legitimacy.

One recurring answer to these trends has been to match the functional merging of the civilian and military responsibilities with a concomitant imperative of broad social representation in the military services, to reinvest in a social rather than a separate “objective” basis for military legitimacy (Moskos, 2001). Looking to the broader public service, Samuel Krislof states the argument as such: “The public sector has explicit need for extrinsic validation ... no matter how brilliantly conceived, no matter how artfully contrived, government action usually also requires societal support. And one of the oldest methods of securing such support is to draw a wide segment of society into the government” (2003, 23). Going further, Morris Janowitz worries (contra-Huntington) that social isolation in the form of an “officer and enlisted body markedly unrepresentative of civilian society” could produce an “inbred force which would hold deep resentment toward the civilian society and accordingly develop ... ‘extremist’ political ideology” (Janowitz, 1971, liii). A recent upsurge of literature is replete with these kinds of concerns, labeling the perceived civil–military social and ideological separation as a “great divorce” (Hadley, 1986), a “civil–military gap” (Feaver and Kohn, 2001), or military members themselves as strangers “on American soil” (Ricks, 1996). Janowitz, for one, recommended addressing this predicted separation through a variety of ameliorative measures, including educating all military academy cadets for one year at a civilian university, the development of shorter career options for military officers, lateral entry into mid-level officer ranks, more emphasis on the officer candidate school commissioning source and, most importantly, the avoidance of military “intellectual isolation from the main current of American university life” (Janowitz, 1971, liv).<sup>\*</sup> These types of prescriptions are perhaps predictable. If legitimacy founded on expertise in a separate field of instrumental knowledge is at least contestable, socially derived legitimacy becomes more important. This was the basic solution of the citizen-soldier tradition well before concepts of profession and instrumental knowledge in a separate military sphere arose.

Of course, this approach, too, has not been without criticism, which has generally focused on the dual concerns of accountability and effectiveness. Samuel Huntington argues that social representation, as a method for the “subjective control” of the military, is not well defined (1957, 85). Clear accountability, it may be argued, requires measures of functional responsiveness rather than simple reliance on sociological diversity. Huntington understands the emergence of the military profession, with its internal ethical controls and clear division of responsibility, as bringing

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<sup>\*</sup> Peter Feaver and Richard Kohn make similar recommendations in the conclusion to their 2001 survey of social, political and cultural attitudes of civilian elites and military officers, ultimately determining that “the views of the military officers we surveyed are much more conservative than those of the civilian elite, but not more so than the general public” (Feaver and Kohn, 2001, 459).

this clarity. Peter Feaver (2005), ironically, indicts Huntington for many of the same errors in clarity. Functional separation not being possible, Feaver prefers more precise statements of institutional hierarchical control as the only means of discovering exogenous criteria for accountability. The basic criticism, as the term “subjective civilian control” implies, is that social representation fails to define precisely the accountability relationship between elected representatives and the appointed leaders of the military. Both the professional and bureaucratic models purport to address this deficiency.

A second primary criticism of social representation is that the requirement undermines military effectiveness. Samuel Huntington saw it as destroying the idea of professional autonomy so important for modern armies. Others have, more pointedly, questioned the feasibility of broad representation in a smaller, more technologically reliant and skill-intensive armed forces (Cohen, 2001). To be sure, the idea that the majority of a population can expect to see military service in a mass citizen army appears impracticable in the technology-centric contemporary armed forces.

Nevertheless, proponents of social representation focus on the value of diversity in military formations where problem solving and the application of increasingly abstract knowledge have replaced mission certainty, defined task lists, and clear performance measures. As Mady Wechsler Segal and Chris Bong argue, “With the increasing variety of missions and tasks within the army, the organization and units within it are most effective when they are composed of people with different strengths” (2005, 708). The convergence of civil–military tasks tends to question rather than confirm the need for isolated military training and education. That is, as the military’s jurisdiction is increasingly defined by functional permeability, it is difficult to justify the need for a personnel management system that is not equally permeable, particularly with respect to areas of shared expertise. Moreover, advocates of maintaining a more representative and socially diverse military point to the independent benefits of such a force. That is, to have an army that looks like the general citizenry may hold some independent social and democratic worth separate from its capacity to function as a stand-alone accountability system or increase problem-solving effectiveness.

Though the public institutional rendering brings to the foreground different answers to the persistent arguments over effectiveness, accountability and democratic legitimacy, its greatest divergence is best seen in its more robust understanding of the role of the military in a democratic society. Understanding the military as a national public institution requires careful attention to the myriad social relationships in which it is embedded. As such, military organizations and patterns of civil–military relations are both a dependent and an independent variable for societal change. For instance, early citizen-soldier arguments that linked military service and citizen virtue saw the military as both dependent on and fostering that virtue. Similarly, later-day proponents like Morris Janowitz argued that the military be a component of a broader national service regime that would link individual

citizens to national and, perhaps increasingly, transnational purposes. In James Burk's description of these arguments that "[military] service demonstrated and enhanced one's citizenship and fulfilling the obligation improved democratic life" (Burk, 2002b).

Other observers have focused on the degree to which these obligations and expectations have shaped the boundaries and conceptions of citizenship. Claire Snyder (1999) describes citizenship in the civic-republican rendering as a performatively constructed status, linked irrevocably to military service. For both Snyder and Linda Kerber (1998), the gender-dependent opportunity for military service has had a negative effect on women's citizenship rights. Ron Krebs suggests that military policies—the result of political contestation—are important collective symbols for what constitutes community inclusion, arguing further that "the field of civil–military relations is far richer than the classic matter of who guards the guardians, and it should properly be understood as encompassing a wider range of questions about the relationship between the armed forces, the polity, and the populace" (Krebs, 2004). Professional and bureaucratic models of the military, by contrast, have often sought to separate and study singular aspects of its organizational character, with little attention to its importance as a national institution firmly embedded in debates over the nature of democracy and the boundaries of political community.

## Conclusion

Changing patterns of civil–military relations and military administrative forms have yielded a United States military that is, as Andrew Abbott described, "enmeshed in many different 'ecologies'" (2002, 534). In themes, if not in grammar, this development and enmeshment are not unlike those experienced by the broader public sector. Founding state-builders sought a sociological merging of the civil and military, and early institutional military forms of divided army bureau control mirrored larger power divisions and checks in the fragmented American government (Skowronek, 1982). Early twentieth century reforms were bent on adjusting both of these earlier patterns. Sociological merging could be replaced with neutral professionals and fragmented bureau control with a greater measure of organizational centralization. This developmental legacy continues to define conceptions of the military's role and identity. As a producing organization whose product is state protection, the military is variously described and treated as both a profession and a bureaucracy. The military's public institutional nature reveals a much more sociopolitically embedded organization, one that both reflects and influences the values of the larger political community. Here the military's role is not simply state protection, but the sustainment of democratic values and practices.

Of course, each of these three conceptions describes various aspects of military work and organization. The professional model has provided the military with a

grammar for a system of ethical controls and service orientation. This decreases the likelihood of shirking in the principle-agent paradigm and makes possible a system of intrinsic status and service rewards for its members, improving the military's ability to recruit talented leadership. Additionally, the professional model has created room for the internal development of professional knowledge and fostered initiative and experimentation in areas where set procedures are confounded by new and unique circumstances. Nevertheless, clear lines of authority, established administrative procedures, definite paths for promotion, and uniform regulations make the military organizationally possible. These ideal-typical bureaucratic patterns lend unity of effort and synchronization capacity in ways that loose professional membership alone cannot. They also formalize the military's mandate to remain responsive to the national elected leadership. Finally, the citizen-soldier emphasis on broad social representation continues to be forwarded as a critical component of military legitimacy in a diverse democratic polity. As functional demands on the military increasingly puncture Cold War jurisdictional boundaries and the distinction between the civil and the military grows more obscure, legitimacy founded on neutral expertise in a defined area of responsibility appears less compelling. Future military legitimacy, then, may again rely as much on who the military is as what it does.

Deciphering post-Cold War changes in military administration, then, requires a broader eye than those focused exclusively on the military's internal efforts to match organization and administration to new emerging technologies and threats. How these changes are interpreted by the political system has important implications for whether the military might become more of a public profession, more of a public bureaucracy, or debated more forthrightly as a socially embedded public institution. The real concern, however, may not be that these sometimes conflicting natures will continue to create tensions in the military organization. Perhaps, the real concern for a democratic military is that the debates will settle on some means for organizing military work that forecloses the public nature of the debate altogether. The market as a means for organizing military work is an approach that has not been discussed much to this point. However, the political advantages of outsourcing military risks and distancing political decisions from the vagaries and potential burdens of war are great. A privatized military force could well escape enmeshment in the disparate systems of accountability and means of interpreting effectiveness discussed to this point. However, as Deborah Avant (2005, 3) queries, "How does the private security affect the ability to contain the use of force within the political process and social norms?" And, in the vein of the present discussion, how should we think about democratic legitimacy for such a force? In addition to reinvigorating old disputes, the unsettled nature of our current debates over the organization of military work has opened new—potentially troubling—possibilities.

Finally, it is increasingly popular in critical reviews of this sort to call for a new theory of civil–military relations (Burk, 2002b), one that could, for the present topic of concern, reconcile the competing natures of military work and administration.

Though I, too, would offer my hope that such a theory might yet synthesize these often countervailing patterns into a conceptual whole, of greater interest is the way in which the political system continues to embrace each of these patterns: emphasizing the professional responsibility of the military at some points, highlighting the need for bureaucratic responsiveness at other points and stressing its public institutional obligations at yet others. Americans seem, at once, to want their military to be all of these things. Though these competing natures have and will continue to create tensions in military organizations, it is not clear that a democracy should be altogether willing to give this up.

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## *Chapter 3*

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# **Military Administration 1850–1900**

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Heidi Amelia-Anne Weber

As this phase of military history commenced (1850–1900), the army was preoccupied with the safeguarding of the western acquisitions and the protection of the settlers in these lands from native threats (Report of the Secretary of War, 1850). In the wake of the defeat of our bordering neighbors in the Mexican–American War, the administrative efforts of the military shifted focus. With the close of the century, America had emerged as a world power with the effective defeat of the Spanish on the field of battle (Annual Report of the War Department, 1900). Though the United States remained engaged in the suppression of an insurrection in the Philippines, this new found status would help to usher in yet another phase of administrative changes. Through the years 1850 to 1900, military administration met with unique challenges. The United States engaged not only in her solitary experience of a Civil War and the aftermath of reconstructing the nation into a whole once again, as well as defeating foreign powers, but also brought to rest an issue that had plagued White America from her origins—the systematic demise of the American Indian. The great precedence established by Secretary of War John C. Calhoun (1817–1825) guided American military administration through the remainder of the nineteenth century.

As the American military strategy evolved from peacekeeping tasks into dealing with an internal war during the course of the 1850s and 1860s, administrative policy had to be cultivated to fit the needs as well. Among the first policy issues to be handled in the 1850s was defining the roles that the commander in chief and his

leading men were to take. The newly titled general in chief filled the duties of the former commanding general, minus the exercise of authority over both the outfitting and equipping as well as administrative issues of the army. These tasks were assigned to the secretary of war, who rapidly found himself dependent upon the guidance offered by his departmental leaders (Shrader, 1993).

In the previous era, the U.S. Army had received great internal accolades during the course of its contest with Mexico; Ulysses S. Grant proclaimed that General Zachary Taylor maintained his force "... under the best of drill and discipline" (Grant, 1952, 84). However, general lessons were not learned at the end of the Mexican War, much like in previous eras. Military administration greatly reduced the size of the army because the only deemed threat was the Indian problem. As hostilities escalated in the west against the various Native American tribes, the president evoked his authority to enlarge the overall size of the army to combat this enemy (Upton, 1917). Most of the activities of the U.S. Army and its administration were confined to quelling the western Indians' stance against the encroaching White settlers in addition to the Utah War (1857–1858) until the advent of secession and rebellion (Upton, 1917).

The antebellum era had been rife with struggles that impacted the U.S. military and its overall organization and administration. Though the United States Military Academy at West Point itself was in excellent functional capacity, the feelings among the students did not always coincide with the school's effective output (Report of the Secretary, 1850). Cadet emotions ran high along sectional tides, fostering a hostile and challenging environment for learning. Southern students clamored for support in their quest for separation, leaving large rifts among the corps of cadets (Hammond, 1832).

Controversy with the general in chief and the president, as well as with the secretary of war, was not an unfamiliar event, and would occasionally find a place during the remaining fifty years of the nineteenth century. General in Chief of the Army Winfield Scott, who fostered great animosity toward many presidents, including his former fellow comrade in arms President Zachary Taylor, opted to keep his office a fair distance from Washington, D.C. Remaining in New York City until the commencement of the presidency of Millard Fillmore, at which time the office of the general in chief returned to the nation's capital, Scott operated under his own jurisdiction, away from the president's reach. However, the office would seemingly yo-yo back and forth between the two cities, returning again to New York with the next presidencies until the remaining months of his leadership, where for the last time he returned to Washington, D.C. (Scott, 1864; Sherman, 1990). The precedent established by General Scott, in essence, granted the secretary of war complete authority over the army. In the future, the issue of the general in chief keeping office in the nation's capital was addressed in the *Acts and Resolutions, 39 Congress, 2 Session*, the so-called *Command of the Army Act (1867)*. Through one aspect of this legislation, it was mandatory that the general not move his office outside of Washington, D.C.

With the advent of national crisis, with secession looming on the horizon, the army was faced with new administrative challenges. Though General in Chief Winfield Scott had the foresight of moving the military to strategic Southern forts, he never received approval for such actions. Of the many great “what ifs” of history, the outcome might have been different in 1860 if these locations had been properly refortified (Scott, 1864, 615–616). An intricate set of issues arose with secession and the formation of the Confederate States of America.

The complexities of the challenges that arose with secession manifested themselves in dramatic operational changes within the military system. Replacement of officers who remained with their native states, as well as a substantial call to arms, presented new challenges to the commander in chief, as well as the secretary of war and the general in chief.

The newly formed Confederate States of America also needed to create its own military administration, which was based greatly upon that of the United States. Jefferson Davis had been selected as the one and only president of the Confederacy, a position that he recognized the great complexities of and truly had not desired (Davis, 1861, 1862). Davis’ heart was with the military, and he had sought to command the troops (Glatthaar, 1994). He had a considerable background in the military and in military administration. A graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, he served as a young officer in the Black Hawk War, the Mexican War and later was appointed secretary of war in the 1850s, a position for which he received great accolades (Dupuy, Johnson, and Bongard, 1995; Jones, 2000). In the formation of the Confederate States of America, the states conferred upon their president virtually complete control over all military administration and conduct. Rapidly, the former United States Army officer, senator and secretary of war pronounced the need for one hundred thousand to join the ranks of service in defense of their new government (Upton, 1917). Jefferson Davis, however, took his authority to an extreme, lending a deaf ear to any source of advisement on all military matters. His desire to be an integral part of the war effort in the context of battlefield orders frequently caused dissension in the ranks of officers and led to some inferior acts of judgment. Confederate President Davis reserved most of the war powers for himself, essentially denying his multiple secretaries of war any true jurisdiction (Dougherty and Gruber, 1996).

Military tradition had long been influential in the South. From the nation’s first lieutenant-general and commander in chief George Washington, who was a member of the Virginia planter class, through Secretary of War Joseph Holt, Southerners long held the highest military posts as well as leadership roles in the American military and its administration. Starting in 1849 until the early months of 1861, Southerners exclusively filled the cabinet position of secretary of war, the ranks of which included the Confederate President Jefferson Davis (Kreidberg and Henry, 1955; Weigley, 1967). In command of the American army was General in Chief Winfield Scott, who too was a native of the South. His loyalties, however, remained with his country, not his state (Matloff, 1989).

The War of the Rebellion created a unique phase of military administration, for new complex issues had arisen in many facets. The overall nature of the war itself created opportunities for expansion of ideals and greater options than would have previously been taken under consideration (Cooper, 1986). Of major concern for administrators of the American military was to keep operations successful. Efforts were made to keep forces acting in concert and to keep troop and supply movements in a timely fashion, so as to affect a victorious outcome. As the North struggled to find the right commander, President Abraham Lincoln, who recognized the limitations of his military abilities, conferred great authority upon his secretary of war, opting to mostly defer to his judgment (Doughty and Gruber, 1996). But as the late Russell F. Weigley pointed out in his *History of The United States Army*, “the institutions of the high command remained as unsatisfactory in the Civil War as they had been before. President, Secretary of War, and commanding general continued to play badly defined and overlapping parts” (1967).

The Union army’s administration faced many challenges in their leadership corps. Command of the Army of the Potomac and command of all Union armies passed through various hands before President Abraham Lincoln found the type of fighter he needed to drive the forces to victory. The Army of the Potomac was led by the slow-acting George Brinton McClellan, who was later named as general in chief of the Union armies by the action of General Order No. 94 (Webb, 2002). “Little Mac,” though greatly admired by his men, was not what the military administrators of the war desired and he found himself temporarily relieved of command. Although he was reappointed to the Army of the Potomac, the Lincoln administration found they could no longer tolerate his actions (Commanger, 2000). McClellan was replaced by Ambrose Burnside, who too soon found himself at odds with the president, and even advocated to Lincoln that he remove both the secretary of war and the commanding general to help bring effective and necessary changes to the military and its overall administration (Burnside, 1863). President Abraham Lincoln then proceeded to try his luck with a new commander, Joseph Hooker (Lincoln, 1863; Guerney and Alden, 1866; Commanger, 2000). “Fighting Joe” Hooker challenged Lincoln’s authority and tested him and the overall military administration. His greatest contention came with General in Chief Henry Wager Halleck, which in turn resulted in his dismissal following a direct challenge to President Lincoln. It was then that the last commander of the Army of the Potomac was selected. George G. Meade took command on the brink of the battle of Gettysburg and continued to hold this post through the remainder of the war (Cullen, 1975).

American military administration was also straddled with the problem of finding the right overall commander of the Union armies so as to exact a complete victory over the Confederate forces. With General in Chief Winfield Scott’s health faltering, combined with his natural aging, a replacement was necessary. Scott did, however, outline his “views” on handling the current situation in 1861, which included “conquer the seceded States by invading armies” (Scott, 1864, 626–627).

Winfield Scott did not conduct the operations throughout the entire War of the Rebellion, retiring from service on 31 October 1861 (Scott, 1864, 628–629). President Lincoln sought a young, aggressive officer to take the place of aged Scott and, with the outgoing general's commendation, selected George Brinton McClellan (Webb, 2002). However, the president frequently found himself at odds with his new commanding general, and truly needed great cooperation and guidance in order to run the war more smoothly. In July 1862, Lincoln sought a more aggressive soldier, thus relieving McClellan of his duties. Henry Warner Halleck was named as the new general in chief (Grant, 1952). Halleck sought to restructure the various armies and placed Ulysses S. Grant second in command (Sherman, 1990, 270–271). Halleck made effective changes in the army while he held this post until 12 March 1864. Working with Grant, combined with the efforts made by Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, Halleck executed plans for successfully taking command of the Mississippi (Matloff, 1989). But still, Lincoln and his war administration sought leaders who would take bold initiatives. It was from the western command that these men were found.

Ulysses S. Grant (Hiram Ulysses Grant), although a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, could be classified as a reluctant soldier. At times he was remiss about the army, from his longing for the closure of West Point while he was a student, to his pursuit of a career in business, but he knew how to fight. Having earned the reputation of “unconditional surrender” at Fort Donelson in Tennessee, he had proven his abilities to bring an effective end to many battles by taking great chances (Grant, 1862, 167). Grant, acting in concert with William Tecumseh Sherman, showed Lincoln the type of fighting by which the war could be won. With this, Lincoln revived the rank of lieutenant-general and named the Commanding General of the Armies of the United States, Ulysses S. Grant (Grant, 1952). In Grant, he knew he had finally found the leader he had so long desired. With Grant at the helm, coupled with Sherman's actions in the West, their actions generated the end of the war. All the concerns of military administration were finally met in the final years of the war. Commander in Chief Lincoln effectively relinquished some of his powers, though not officially, when he named Grant. As he expressed in a letter of 30 April 1864 as Grant commenced his great campaign to end the war, Lincoln stated that “... I wish not to obtrude any constraints or restraints upon you” (Lincoln, 1864, 266).

Command of the conduct of the Confederate armies as well as the leadership of the Army of Northern Virginia made three major transitions during the course of the War of the Rebellion. Joseph Eggleston Johnston held the position first and found himself constantly at odds with the Commander in Chief Jefferson Davis, who had wished to command the armies himself. Wounded again at Seven Pines in Virginia, Johnston was relieved and the somewhat obscure Gustavus Woodson Smith was named to this position, for roughly twenty-four hours (Law, 2000). It was then that Davis placed Robert Edward Lee in charge, “to conduct operations” of the Confederate armies (Lee, 1862, 66). As the war started to draw to a close,

Lee was commissioned as the “commander-in-chief of all the military forces of the Confederate States” (Lee, 1862, 144). However, late changes in military direction and administration could not transform dwindling supplies and manpower, coupled with minimal industrial capacities, into victory.

From the time of the Southern states’ secession, the Union army overall was in dire need of alteration. The War Department was technically ill-prepared for a grand confrontation, and the president needed to take quick action in developing a fighting force. At the onset of 1861, the U.S. Army numbered only 16,367. However, by 1 May 1865, after the surrender of the two great Confederate armies, the army tallied over one million (Phisterer, 2002). Abraham Lincoln, relatively new to the office of the presidency in April 1861, recognized the deficiencies and assessed that recruits were necessary to fill the great void of the U.S. Army. Through his *Proclamation Calling Militia and Convening Congress, 15 April 1861*, 75,000 militia were called. Though 75,000 militia would not create an expansive army, it was a starting step in rebuilding. These men had not been called to fight per se, but to protect as well. Lincoln expressed in this proclamation the general belief held by many that this was to be a brief contest by calling for forces to serve only a quarter of a year (Lincoln, 1861). The short sightedness of both North and South’s limited calls represented the lack of understanding of the scope of this war by military administrators as well as their governments in general. On 3 May 1861, another call was made by Lincoln for more volunteers, regulars and naval personnel, thus trying to better prepare the United States for this impending crisis (Upton, 1917).

Military administration also had to keep these soldiers effectively armed. Though the armories contained enough weapons for a force of about five hundred thousand, it would mean severe shortages initially. State militias, however, faced countless shortages (Shannon, 1928). Concerns for arms as well as supplies, uniforms and provisions plagued military administrations on both sides during the course of this war (Shannon, 1928). In the end, though, the Confederate government’s military administration failed at the task of supplying and waging a successful war.

During the course of the War of the Rebellion, military administration also dealt with the evolving naval engineering and strategy. Both the United States and Confederate States secretaries of the navy faced the challenges of creating and outfitting an effective fleet with only limited resources. With the Union’s Anaconda Plan advocating a blockade, a large number of ships had to be assembled in order to undertake this action (Wait, 2000). The Confederacy itself had to completely create a navy, under the auspices of a president who lacked naval vision or interest. Attentions of both sides’ administrations turned to advancing naval technology and the employment of ironclad ships (Howarth, 1991). At Hampton Roads, Virginia, the ironclads, the *USS Monitor* and the *CSS Virginia* (the former *USS Merrimack*), met and engaged in the initial contest of these types of craft (Green, 2000). This battle changed the future of naval engineering and warfare, presenting new challenges for military administration. The War of the Rebellion ushered in another distinct phase of combat on the high seas with the introduction of submarine warfare, with

the Confederate's untried innovation of the *H. L. Hunley*. Though this was an unsuccessful venture, it paved the way and opened the eyes of military administrators to look to the future (Howarth, 1991).

Through 1865, the American army was departmentalized by geographic locations. Five principal armies made up the Union forces, inclusive of the Army of the Potomac, the Army of Virginia, the Army of the Ohio, the Army of the Cumberland and the Army of the Tennessee (Phisterer, 2002). Departmental classifications would change again following the end of the war. In the immediate aftermath of the war, an alternative organization of commands and departments was established. This effectively placed the western part of the country under two regional headings, under the leadership of Sherman and Halleck (Utley, 1973). By 1900, there were fifteen departments, in addition to the specified divisions and departments in Cuba (Annual Report of the War Department, 1900).

The method, mode and style of warfare that was fought in the War of the Rebellion marked the last of its kind. Though issues that were faced in this war would be similar in the advent of the next century's wars, it presented numerous problems in the realm of military administration (Kreidberg and Henry, 1955).

There were many lasting legacies from the War of the Rebellion for the military and its administrative efforts. Frank N. Schubert ascertains in the opening of his *Black Valor: Buffalo Soldiers and the Medal of Honor, 1870–1898*, that “the Civil War spawned two enduring military traditions, the Medal of Honor and the continuous service of black Americans in the U.S. Army” (Schubert, 1997, 1). During the course of the War of the Rebellion, the issue of African Americans in service was contemplated by both sides. The Union army created Colored Regiments in the wake of the Emancipation Proclamation. Though African Americans had served in previous wars in the United States, this time Congress provided for separate regiments, still under the command of white officers. The initial regiment created was the 54th Massachusetts, which held the distinction of taking part in the siege at Fort Wagner and the Battles of Honey Hill and Boykin's Mill, as well as reaping even greater vengeance on the people of South Carolina through Potter's Raid (Hudson, 2002; Stevens, 1999; Thigpen, 1999). The 54th Massachusetts also was the unit in which the first African American, William H. Carney, received the Medal of Honor, albeit many years after his heroic actions. The Confederacy at times contemplated bringing African Americans into service, though President Davis was adamantly against this idea. As the ominous situation for the Confederacy turned more dire, the president relented and signed into law the “Negro Soldier Law.” Though the potential of freedom was offered in exchange for service, by the time the units were assembled, the War of the Rebellion had already been lost (McPherson, 1982).

In the aftermath of the War of the Rebellion, once again military administration was faced with a new set of complex issues. Lieutenant-General Ulysses S. Grant, in the course of correspondence with Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, assessed the current situation and offered his recommendations that “the entire



adjutant-general's office should be under the entire control of the general-in-chief of the army" and that "... orders should go ... through the general-in-chief." He went on to proclaim that clearly "...the general-in-chief stands between the President and the army in all official matters, and the Secretary of War is between the army (through the general-in-chief) and the President" (Grant, 1866, 940).

Reconstruction brought another unique and distinct phase in American history, which held great consequences for the administration of the American military. With the South broken into five military districts, each, under a commander and his subordinate officers, faced a variety of challenges with the attempts to integrate the newly freed African Americans into society as a whole (in addition to protecting their new civil rights as citizens) as well as guide the former Confederate states back into the Union. The men at the helm tended to share somewhat comparable backgrounds (Coffman, 1986). Much like the course of the War of the Rebellion, officers who faced off against each other had, for the most part, been educated together and served side by side during the course of the Mexican War (Grant, 1952). During the course of Reconstruction, these officers frequently found themselves struggling against the combative nature of the relationship between Congress and the president. Military administration further added to the complications with changes in troop numbers and the lack of any real direction, while the forces faced the perpetual political battleground for complete jurisdiction over their authority (Cooper, 1986).

In a contest between Congress and President Andrew Johnson, the lines were drawn as to the commander in chief's exercise of authority over the Army and its overall administration. The *Acts and Resolution, 39 Congress, 2 Session*, commonly referred to as the *Command of the Army Act (1867)*, not only required the general of the Army to maintain his office in the capital, but also technically expanded his overall authority. In a slight toward the president, the general in chief only could present directives and orders to the army. Both the president and secretary of war were ordered to send all directives via the general of the army only, effectively denying the men who held these two offices their powers. Even greater restrictions were placed on the president regarding the military in another stipulation of this act. The commander in chief could no longer remove the general of the army from his post except with senatorial consent (Weber, 2006a). This Congressional act made dramatic changes for overall army administration.

Debates raged over what was the necessary size of the post-war Army. Tempers flared among the army administration and the powers in Washington. The eighty thousand soldiers the commanding general sought were far from the number of troops that were provided for. Although thirty-five thousand were allotted in 1865, within five years, financial provisions were only sufficient to arm and outfit twenty-eight thousand (Walter, 1993).

The officer corps was always under the greatest consideration by the military administration. With the War Department at the helm, new criteria standards were issued during the close of the nineteenth century regarding the potential for moving

up in rank. The adaptation of “a system of proficiency examinations” provided a more organized, and technically fairer, system of promotion (Cosmas, 1994, 4). Though certain officers like John A. Logan (who served in Congress representing the state of Illinois) campaigned against the claimed favoritism that graduates of the military academy received and advocated legislation that both diminished the salary of the general in chief and decreased the total number of men employed in the armed services, this system of promotion seemed to have instituted an ideal system for the times.

Impetus was given to bring greater restructuring of the Army and to impose reductions. Although efforts were undertaken by Senator Ambrose Burnside’s initiative in the 1870s to institute modifications, the legacy of the Union’s victory in the previous war prevailed. Congress sought to keep a force available, though not at the peak strength when the war concluded (Cooper, 1986).

Another major institution of military administration in the post-Civil War era came regarding the status of African Americans in the military. Though not strangers to service, because Negro Regiments had served in the War of the Rebellion, the forces of African American soldiers would be stationed on the frontier and take part in the western campaigns as well. The Congressional Act of 1866 allotted for two separate African American cavalry regiments as well as six infantry. Buffalo Soldiers from the Ninth and Tenth United States Cavalry along with the Twenty-Fourth Infantry gained notoriety for their distinguished service on the frontier, as well as for the eighteen troopers and soldiers who were awarded the Medal of Honor for their distinguished actions in the Indian Wars. Five of these Buffalo Soldiers earned Medals of Honor in the next phase of warfare as well, in the Spanish-American War (Schubert, 1997). Though these forces would remain separated from the rest of the army and they would be commanded by white officers, the men of these commands gained the recognition of army administrators. Another change made in the Reconstruction era regarding military administration and African Americans dealt with the United States Military Academy. In 1877, the first African American was graduated from West Point. The child of slaves, Henry Ossian Flipper defied all odds and became the first African American to successfully complete his education at the academy. He went on to serve as an officer in one of the segregated cavalry units until his dismissal, when he, in all likelihood, fell victim to discrimination in the military (Dupuy, Johnson, and Bongard, 1995).

Though combating American Indians was long entrenched in the history of North America settlers, in the aftermath of the War of the Rebellion, army administration sought to bring this phase of administrative focus to a close. As the debate continued to wage over the necessary size of the post-war army, troops were being stationed out West. President Andrew Johnson enacted the “Congressional Act to increase and fix the Military Peace Establishment of the United States” on 28 July 1866, which actually incorporated additional regiments of both cavalry and infantry, as well as set a fixed amount of time for enlistments (Utley, 1973, 11). This act also provided for the general officer corps to include both a singular general and

lieutenant-general, positions filled by Ulysses S. Grant and William T. Sherman, respectively (Weber, 2006b). As problems escalated with the alleged violation of the *Tenure of Office Act* between Secretary Stanton and President Andrew Johnson, Commanding General Grant found himself caught in the midst of the struggle. He requested the president to “make some order that we of the army are not bound to obey the orders of Mr. Stanton as Secretary of War” (Grant, 1866, 913). Once again, strife remained between the secretary of war and the commanding general as the president left each with somewhat confusing powers and authorities. One other major administrative change for the army that occurred during the course of the post-Civil War era dealt with the position of commanding general. With the ascendancy of Ulysses S. Grant to the White House, his comrade in arms and dear friend William T. Sherman also was elevated in his realm of power. Sherman, once again, took over Grant’s former position as general in chief of the army. With the taking of office and Grant’s orders, which conferred vast powers on the commanding general, Sherman felt confident that the problems of the previous eras had been resolved. However, changes in who held the office of secretary of war quickly rescinded the control that Sherman had been granted over the army and the War Department (Athearn, 1956). In time, much like his earlier predecessor Winfield Scott, who had moved his office to New York when faced with challenges from various presidents as well as secretaries of war, Sherman found himself at odds with secretaries of war John A. Rawlins and William W. Belknap, along with various politicians, and relocated his office to St. Louis, out of the reach of Washington, D.C. (Sefton, 1967).

Though a majority of the troops in the post-Civil War era had been posted in the West, the logistics of getting the forces to the field of battle to combat the American Indian tribes were among the greatest of concerns. In addition to the problems that had to be handled regarding troop movement, concerns had to be addressed regarding the need for additional supplies for the forces as well as for the cavalry horses. In order to keep that infantry moving at an efficient pace, their individual packs were lightened, thus allowing the soldier to carry less with him on his campaign (McDermott, 1998).

Soldiers fighting in the Indian Wars were faced with a distinctive style of fighting different from what was found during the course of the War of the Rebellion. Though administrators were slow to develop an alternative style of tactic in combating, they acknowledged that their method of warfare did not always fit the situation. However, the administrators contended that when the methodized style of warfare that was advocated in the texts of the day was applied in the right circumstances, they were unbeatable (Simmons, 1992).

In the *Report of the Commission of Indian Affairs* of 1874, after outlining the classification of the remaining Indian tribes in North America, the greatest concern plaguing the U.S. government, citizens and military/military administration regarding the native population was addressed. The tribes that were noted to be in the first classification were deemed as the “Wildest tribes,” which included the Sioux, most specifically. The “Sioux Problem” was of the greatest apparent concern,

especially due to the recent findings in the Black Hills (Smith to the Secretary of the Interior, 1874). It was waging war against the Sioux that would capture American attention, particularly that of the military administration. Custer's Last Stand helped push military administration into waging a contest of extermination against the American Indians. In addition to the war of attrition that was being waged, schools were created for the American troops in the West and greater discipline was enacted for the men (Utley, 1973). At Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, "A School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry" was set up in order to provide "practical instruction" (Kreidberg and Henry, 1955, 147).

General in Chief William Tecumseh Sherman assessed, during the course of his survey of the lands surrounding the Northern Pacific Railroad in 1877, that "I now regard the Sioux Indian problem, as a war question, as solved" (Sheridan and Sherman, 1878). Until Wounded Knee on 29 December 1890, the Sioux remained a challenge for the American military because it was here that the wars against the Indians climaxed. The Battle of Wounded Knee (South Dakota) effectively marked the end of struggles between the American army and the Native Americans (Weeks, 2001).

The War Department remained plagued with critical issues that had permeated its overall existence for over fifty years. With the unclear boundary lines on the powers of the commanding general and the secretary of war, the men who held these two positions frequently found themselves at odds. The *Army Regulations of 1895* provided that the secretary of war handle all financial matters and that both he and the president issue their commands via the general (Grant, 1866). In essence, this challenged the *Army Regulation of 1847*, which placed the financial matters of the military under the Department of the Treasury, which received orders from the secretary of war (Grant, 1866). This *Regulation of 1895*, however, really provided no greater clarity for Congress and the secretary of war, who maintained their superior stance over the commanding general, thus effectively diminishing his actual powers through their actions.

As the century drew to a close, the American military system had fallen to the wayside. Once again, it would take the emergence of hostilities to give the much-needed boost to the reorganization and restructuring that was needed (Abrhamson, 1981). As antagonisms grew in Cuba, America watched and waited as aggressions slowly unfolded.

An attempt at revitalizing the somewhat diminished military on the brink of the Spanish–American War was fostered through the so-called "Fifty Million Bill." In this act of legislation, President William McKinley authorized the use of excess funding of the Treasury for expanding the military, under his auspices, in case the tumultuous situation in Cuba escalated into war. This bill gave impetus to a legislative effort at military mobilization.

Military planners assessed the potential situation in Cuba and ascertained that this was to be the navy's war; the army would be more of a supplementary force. Under the influence of Alfred Thayer Mahan and his advocacy of building

a superior navy, planners and administrators had started to undertake the task of revamping the U.S. Navy (Challener, 1973). The Spanish–American War technically commenced with actions of the U.S. Navy—the explosion of the *USS Maine* as well as Commodore George Dewey’s utterance of “you may fire when you are ready, Gridley” aboard the *USS Olympia* to usher in the opening shots of the war (*A Brief History of the Pacific Fleet*, n.d.). But the burden of this war would be shared by both forces.

The specifications of fighting a war in a tropical climate created new challenges for military administration. Again, concerns were placed on transportation of troops to Cuba and the Philippines, but supplies and uniforms presented the greatest of obstacles. The struggles between the army and the War Department remained, however, firmly in place, leading to many problems in logistics, ordinance and planning. Though the war was won, the deficiencies had been revealed in this contest. In the aftermath of the war, the Dodge Commission revealed the need for a more effective military administration. Secretary of War Root accepted the challenge and began the new century ushering in the reforms that the military administration had long been in need of (Matloff, 1989).

A new era of hope was ushered in for military administration with the appointment of Elihu Root as secretary of war in 1899. With the opportunity at the helm to alter the powers and actions of the War Department and its secretary, Root brought about changes to effect a more efficient system (Hewes, 1975). Using the reports of the Dodge Commission, he assessed that the rivalry between the secretary of war and the commanding general had fostered the problems faced by the army. His recommendation was to eliminate the office of the Commanding General and replace it with a General Staff, which would be affected in the next century (Matloff, 1989).

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## Chapter 4

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# Reshaping the Defense Enterprise\*

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Department of Defense,  
Quadrennial Defense Review 2006

Just as we must transform America's military capability to meet changing threats, we must transform the way the Department works and what it works on. We must build a Department where each of the dedicated people here can apply their immense talents to defend America, where they have the resources, information and freedom to perform ... It demands agility—more than today's bureaucracy allows. And that means we must recognize another transformation: the revolution in management, technology and business practices. Successful modern businesses are leaner and less hierarchical than ever before. They reward innovation and they share information. They have to be nimble in the face of rapid change or they die.

**Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, September 10, 2001**

To win the long war, the Department of Defense (DoD) must reshape the defense enterprise in ways that better support the war fighter and are appropriate for the threat environment. Today, the armed forces are hampered by inefficient business

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practices. The DoD's current structure and processes are handicaps in the protracted fight we now face against agile and networked foes. Over the last twenty years, the DoD has increasingly integrated its war-fighting concepts, organization, training and operations to create the world's most formidable joint force. Sustaining continuous operational change and innovation are a hallmark of U.S. forces. The DoD's organizations, processes and enabling authorities urgently require a similar transformation. The DoD's approach is to improve significantly organizational effectiveness, and in so doing, reap the rewards of improved efficiencies.

The 2001 *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR) highlighted the loss of resources, in terms of people and dollars, caused by inefficiencies in the DoD's support functions. The department responded with a comprehensive effort to streamline business and decision-making processes, with the express goal of better supporting the joint war fighter. Since 2001, the DoD has moved steadily toward a more integrated and transparent senior decision-making culture and process for both operational and investment matters. The DoD has made substantial strides in fostering joint solutions, including the creation of new organizations and processes that cut across traditional stovepipes. It has standardized business rules and data structures for common use. Most importantly, the department has made notable progress toward an outcome-oriented, capabilities-based planning approach that provides the joint war fighter with the capabilities needed to address a wider range of asymmetric challenges. Recent operational experiences have demonstrated the need to bring further agility, flexibility and horizontal integration to the defense support infrastructure. The DoD has responded to that need with several innovations in its organizations and support services. Three examples of such innovations are the Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Task Force, the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC) and improved supply-chain logistics.

In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the terrorist weapon of choice remains the improvised explosive device, normally taking the form of roadside bombs, suicide car bombs and a variety of remotely initiated devices. To counter the threat posed by these weapons, the DoD created the Joint IED Defeat Task Force. The Task Force unified all department efforts to defeat IEDs, combining the best technology solutions with relevant intelligence and innovative operating methods. In fiscal year 2005, the DoD invested more than \$1.3 billion in IED Defeat initiatives, including counter-radio-controlled IED electronic warfare, IED surveillance, the Joint IED Defeat Center of Excellence, counter-bomber programs and stand-off IED detection and neutralization. The Task Force has also provided funds for training to military units en route to operational theaters as well as expert field teams that work directly with units in Iraq and Afghanistan. Since the Task Force's inception, the department has decreased the IED casualty rate by a factor of two.

The JRAC is another innovation that grew out of U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. The DoD's standard processes for providing materials and logistics proved too slow and cumbersome to meet the immediate needs of forces in the field. Recognizing this deficiency, the Secretary of Defense established a cell dedicated

to finding actionable solutions to urgent war-fighter needs. The JRAC has supported efforts that provided military personnel key force protection items, such as the Advanced Combat Helmet, lightweight Global Positioning System receivers, improved ammunition packs and individual weapon optics. Working with the military departments and combatant commands, this initiative has accelerated development and delivery of more than a dozen critical programs, from intelligence collection and dissemination to enhanced force protection.

Improved support to the war fighter has occurred in the logistics chain as well. The DoD vested leadership of the complex distribution process in a single owner, the U.S. Transportation Command (U.S. TRANSCOM). Exercising its new role, U.S. TRANSCOM established a Deployed Distribution Operations Center in Kuwait to speed the flow of materials into Iraq and Afghanistan in support of coalition operations. The center quickly assembled a team of logistics experts and gave them authority to direct air and seaport operations and cross-country moves in the theater. Lead times for stocked items dropped by more than 45% since the peaks recorded in 2003. Better synchronization of transportation assets allowed the Army to cut costs by \$268 million in fiscal year 2004. On-time delivery rates are now at over 90%. The center's process innovations improved mission performance at less cost to the DoD and the U.S. taxpayer. Department reforms since 2001, including those innovations born of wartime necessity, represent the types of changes the QDR has sought to accelerate.

## **Toward a New Defense Enterprise**

The DoD's enterprise reforms are guided by a three-part vision:

First, the department must be responsive to its stakeholders. Not only must the department's support functions enhance the U.S. military's ability to serve the president and provide a strong voice for the joint war fighter, it must also provide the best possible value to the U.S. taxpayer. The DoD will work to improve effectiveness dramatically across civilian and military functions as the foundation for increased efficiency.

Second, the department must provide information and analysis necessary to make timely and well-reasoned decisions. The department's culture, authorities and organizations must be aligned in a manner that facilitates, rather than hinders, effective decision making and enables responsive mission execution while maintaining accountability. Improved horizontal integration will be critical to the department's success.

Third, the department must undertake reforms to reduce redundancies and ensure the efficient flow of business processes. As we capitalize on existing transformational efforts across the enterprise, we will continually evaluate support systems and processes to optimize their responsiveness.

To achieve this vision and produce strategy-driven outcomes, the DoD's roles and responsibilities, and those of each of its component organizations, must be clearly delineated. Roles and responsibilities within the DoD fall into roughly three categories. At the senior-most levels, leaders are concerned with *governance*—setting strategy, prioritizing enterprise efforts, assigning responsibilities and authorities, allocating resources and communicating a shared vision. In order to meet the strategic objectives set out by the department's senior leadership, some components act in a *management* role, focusing on organizing tasks, people, relationships and technology. The vast majority of the department's personnel then *work* to execute the strategy and plans established at management level. In the 2006 QDR, the department looked across these three levels of responsibility—governance, management and work—to ensure that organizations, processes and authorities are well aligned.

## ***Governance Reforms***

### ***Senior Leadership Focus***

A key measure of success is the extent to which the DoD's senior leadership is able to fulfill the following functions:

- (i) **Strategic direction**—Identify the key outputs, not inputs, they expect from the department's components and determine the appropriate near-, mid- and long-term strategies for achieving them. Such outputs will be focused on the needs of the president as commander in chief and the joint war fighters.
- (ii) **Identity**—Establish an organizational culture that fosters innovation and excellence. Communicate the department's strategy, policy and institutional ethos to the internal workforce and to external audiences.
- (iii) **Capital acquisition and macro resource allocation**—Shape the department's major investments in people, equipment, concepts and organizations to support the nation's objectives most effectively.
- (iv) **Corporate decision making**—Implement agile and well-aligned governance, management and work processes. Ensure the department has the processes, tools and transparent analyses to support decisions.
- (v) **Performance assessment**—Monitor performance to ensure strategic alignment and make adjustments to strategic direction based on performance.
- (vi) **Force employment**—Determine how U.S. forces are utilized and meet the day-to-day oversight needs of the joint force. Operational matters are the responsibility of the joint war fighters. The department's senior civilian and military leaders ensure that forces are employed in ways that meet the president's strategic objectives.

The department will work to better align processes, structures and, as necessary, authorities to improve its senior leaders' ability to govern in these

core areas. Today, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff perform many functions beyond those identified above, including program management and execution. To ensure that senior leadership can maintain focus on the key governance issues elaborated above, the Department will identify management and execution activities currently being conducted at the governance level and consider them for elimination or realignment.

**(vii) Build Capability to Inform Strategic Choice**

To better support the joint war fighter, the DoD is launching several initiatives to integrate the processes that define needed capabilities, identify solutions and allocate resources to acquire them. The following four interrelated reforms emphasize the need for improved information sharing and collaboration. First, the department will implement a more transparent, open and agile decision-making process. To do this, common authoritative information sources will be identified, department-level financial databases will be combined, and common analytic methods will be adopted. For example, the DoD is testing a number of tools that could provide common capability views using existing resource and programming databases. One such pilot project is a transparent integrated air and missile defense database. Experimenting through such pilots, the department will seek to identify and rapidly develop preferred capability area solutions that will facilitate open and agile decision making.

Second, the department will reach investment decisions through collaboration among the joint war fighter, acquisition and resource communities. Joint war fighters will assess needs in terms of desired effects and the time frame in which capabilities are required. Assessments of potential solutions should be informed by the acquisition community's judgment of technological feasibility and cost-per-increment of capability improvement, and by the resource community's assessment of affordability. These inputs will be provided early in the decision-making process, before significant resources are committed. Once an investment decision has been approved, changes will require collaboration among all three communities at the appropriate decision level to ensure strategy-driven, affordable and achievable outcomes.

A recent, much-needed restructuring of the troubled Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) program exemplifies this collaborative approach. Because the radio system must be interoperable with other systems across the full spectrum of the joint force, decisions regarding the future of the JTRS program had profound effects throughout the DoD. To ensure a solution that will meet the joint war fighter's needs and provide best value to the taxpayer, the war-fighting and acquisition communities worked closely together to develop the investment strategy and the military departments contributed needed resources for the restructuring.

Third, the DoD will begin to break out its budget according to joint capability areas. Using such a joint capability view—in place of a military

department or traditional budget category display—should improve the DoD’s understanding of the balancing of strategic risks and required capability trade-offs associated with particular decisions. The DoD has already developed and tested at U.S. Pacific Command an automated process that maps resource needs to discrete operational plans and missions. For the first time, a combatant commander is able to ascertain the resource requirements associated with particular capabilities, such as striking fleeting targets. The DoD is working to expand on this program to enable department-wide assessment of capability areas and facilitate capability portfolio management and will explore this approach with the Congress.

Fourth, to manage the budget allocation process with accountability, an acquisition reform study initiated by the Deputy Secretary of Defense recommended the department work with the Congress to establish “Capital Accounts” for major acquisition programs. The purpose of capital budgeting is to provide stability in the budgeting system and to establish accountability for acquisition programs throughout the hierarchy of program responsibility from the program manager, through the service acquisition executive, the secretaries of the military departments and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Together, these improvements should enable senior leaders to implement a risk-informed investment strategy reflecting joint war-fighting priorities.

### *Aligning Authority and Accountability through Joint Capability Portfolios*

Most of the DoD’s resources are provided through the military services. This arrangement can lead both to gaps or redundancies within capability areas as each service attempts to supply a complete war-fighting package rather than organize to depend on capabilities provided by other military departments. To optimize the provision of capabilities for the joint war fighter, the DoD will work to reorient its processes around joint capability portfolios. In the acquisition realm, the department has already instituted several joint capability reviews. These reviews look across major force programs to assess needed investments in specific capability portfolio areas, such as integrated air and missile defense, land attack weapons and electronic warfare.

The QDR used such a portfolio approach to evaluate surveillance capabilities. The DoD began by accounting for all of its current and planned surveillance capabilities and programs. This included a transparent review of capabilities at all levels of classification. Viewing capabilities across the entire portfolio of assets enabled decision makers to make informed choices about how to reallocate resources among previously stove-piped programs, to deliver needed capabilities to the joint force more rapidly and efficiently.

The department will build on these initial efforts to integrate tasks, people, relationships, technologies and associated resources more effectively across its many activities. By shifting the focus from service-specific programs to joint capabilities, the DoD should be better positioned to understand the implications of investment and resource trade-offs among competing priorities. As a first step, the DoD will manage three capability areas using a capability portfolio concept: Joint Command and Control, Joint Net Centric Operations and Joint Space Operations. As we learn from experience and gain confidence in this approach, we plan to expand it to other capability areas.

### *Managing Joint Task Assignments*

Effective governance is facilitated by the clear alignment of authority, responsibility and resources at the management level. Some of the most difficult challenges in governance arise when joint management arrangements cut across the traditional and often statutory authority structure of the military departments and defense agencies. The establishment of the combatant commands created new sources of demand for joint capabilities separate from the organizations with responsibility to supply them.

For example, when a program or mission is identified as a priority area, the secretary may choose to direct an organization to manage or resource the joint effort for the DoD. In the past, this has been accomplished by designating a component or activity as the “Executive Agent”—a term the meaning of which varies widely from one arrangement to the next. When the responsibilities for joint management activities are not clearly defined or strategically aligned, implementation is problematic and resources are used less efficiently.

This QDR underscores the need for a better way to organize and manage joint activities to ensure that mission assignment is accompanied by the authorities, resources and clear performance expectations necessary for mission success. Consequently, the DoD is implementing a disciplined process for assigning joint missions and tasks and evaluating their resource priority. The Joint Task Assignment Process will centrally assign and oversee joint management arrangements to ensure joint activities are aligned to the department’s strategic objectives; designated with the proper authorities, responsibilities and resources; effectively structured to minimize overlaps and gaps; established with clear lines of accountability; and continually assessed for performance and need.

### *Driving Business Transformation*

The Defense Business Systems Management Committee (DBSMC) was established to improve governance of the DoD’s business transformation effort. The DBSMC is a top-level, single point-of-decision mechanism that brings together senior leaders



from across the enterprise to drive business process change and improve support to the joint war fighter. The department also developed an Enterprise Transition Plan and associated Architecture to guide transformation of its business operations. The DBSMC will govern execution of the Enterprise Transition Plan by ensuring accountability and increasing senior leadership direction.

To ensure alignment with the business transformation strategy, the DoD has created Investment Review Boards to evaluate programs of record against the Enterprise Architecture. Funds cannot be obligated for any business system investment not certified by the appropriate official and approved by the DBSMC to be in compliance with the Department's architecture.

More recently, the Defense Business Transformation Agency (BTA) was created to integrate and oversee corporate-level business systems and initiatives. The BTA is the management link responsible for integrating work across the Department in areas such as human resources, financial management, acquisition and logistics. It is accountable to the DBSMC governing body for results.

### *Managing Risks and Measuring Performance Across the Enterprise*

In the 2001 QDR, the DoD introduced a risk management framework to enable its senior leadership to better balance near-term demands against preparations for the future. This balanced risk approach has been successfully implemented in a number of organizations throughout the department to guide strategic planning and day-to-day management. The department is now taking advantage of lessons learned from this initial implementation phase to refine and develop a more robust framework to enable decision making.

The DoD will reevaluate its enterprise-wide outcome goals to maintain strategic alignment and ensure its objectives are clearly set forth. The DoD will also evaluate and develop or refine the metrics to measure efforts to implement the strategy to provide useful information to senior leadership. Improved metrics will allow senior leaders at the governance level to manage by exception—monitoring the overall health of the organization and focusing attention on areas needing top-level direction and support. Each level of the enterprise is accountable for measuring performance and delivering results that support the department-wide strategy. Organizations must have the autonomy needed to perform within guidance, but with adequate oversight to ensure strategic alignment.

### *Additional Governance Reforms*

The DoD is considering additional initiatives aimed at improving governance in each of the five corporate focus areas. These include the following:

Designating a single lead advocate for the future joint war fighter in order to improve the department's long-range, joint perspective on the requirements, acquisition and resource allocation processes.

Creating new horizontal organizations to better integrate the department's activities in key areas, including strategic communication and human capital strategy.

Migrating toward a shared services model for support functions, such as administration, management and computer support.

Although reforms cannot occur overnight, the course is clear. The complex strategic environment demands that our structure and processes be streamlined and integrated to better support the president and joint war fighter. The DoD is committed to doing so.

## ***Management and Work Reforms***

Beyond governance, this QDR identified opportunities for continued transformation of acquisition and logistics processes.

### ***Improving Defense Acquisition Performance***

There is a growing and deep concern in the DoD's senior leadership and in the Congress about the acquisition processes. This lack of confidence results from an inability to determine accurately the true state of major acquisition programs when measured by cost, schedule and performance. The unpredictable nature of defense programs can be traced to instabilities in the broader acquisition system. Fundamentally reshaping that system should make the state of the DoD's major acquisition programs more predictable and result in better stewardship of the U.S. tax dollar. There are several ongoing reviews of defense acquisition improvements being conducted both within and outside the department in an effort to address these issues. Their results will inform the department's efforts to reshape defense acquisition into a truly twenty-first century process that is responsive to the joint war fighter.

The DoD is focusing on bringing the needed capabilities to the joint force more rapidly, by fashioning a much more effective acquisition system and associated set of processes. The department is considering adopting a risk-based source selection process in place of the current cost-based approach. Source selection decisions would not use cost as the sole criteria but rather would be based on technical and management risk. Effectively balancing cost, technical risk and management realities would require closer integration of the DoD's joint capabilities identification, resource allocation and acquisition processes, with clear responsibilities defined for each.

In an effort to ensure needed capabilities are fielded rapidly, acquisition development and procurement programs will shift to a time-certain approach. Early in program development, senior leaders will make the key trade-offs necessary to balance performance, time and available resources. Upgrades and improvements can be added in subsequent spirals based on the maturity of the technology. Combining time-certain development and procurement of capability with a risk-based approach to source selection should provide much greater stability in the acquisition system. Stability should allow for more predictable acquisition programs measured by cost, schedule and performance.

### *Managing Supply-Chain Logistics*

In response to the 2001 QDR, the DoD undertook a number of initiatives to improve the effectiveness and efficiency with which it moves and sustains military forces. These initiatives included efforts to improve the deployment process and reduce the logistics footprint and its associated costs. The DoD also worked to provide standing joint force headquarters with an integrated logistics picture and accelerated the creation and use of logistics decision-support tools. In the past four years, the DoD has markedly increased the integration of field exercises and experimentation with the processes for determining logistics systems, doctrine and force structure requirements. In addition, as noted earlier, the DoD is changing its logistics processes and procedures as dictated by the needs of current operations.

As a result of these initiatives, the department has made significant strides in migrating to a capabilities-based logistics approach. In this QDR, the department focused on improving visibility into supply-chain logistics costs and performance and on building a foundation for continuous improvements in performance. The strategy for achieving these objectives starts by linking resources to supply-chain logistics activities in order to understand the costs they entail. The department must also assess commercial supply-chain metrics as potential performance targets to bring down the costs and to speed the delivery of needed items. Promising ongoing initiatives, such as the single deployment process owner, must be continually improved and accelerated. Lastly, there is a need to develop realistic and defensible strategic performance targets for focused logistics capabilities to guide both capital investment and process improvement.

The DoD is implementing a number of specific initiatives aimed at meeting supply-chain objectives. For example, the use of active and passive radio frequency Identification (RFID) technologies will play a key role in achieving the DoD's vision for implementing knowledge-enabled logistics support to the war fighter through automated asset visibility and management. RFID is designed to enable the sharing, integration and synchronizing of data from the strategic to the tactical level, informing every node in the supply-chain network. This information should provide greater insight into the cause-and-effect relationship between resources

and readiness. Such fact-based insights, coupled with the implementation of continuous process improvement tools like Lean, Six Sigma and Performance Based Logistics, will help optimize the productive output of the overall DoD supply chain.

### *Transforming the Medical Health System (MHS)*

New breakthroughs in science and health, and new innovations in prevention and wellness, offer the opportunity to develop a twenty-first century Military Health System (MHS) that will improve health and save both lives and money. This transformation in health and health care parallels other transformations in the DoD. It is the department's goal to have a lifetime relationship with the entire DoD family that maximizes prevention, wellness and personal choices and responsibility. As with other areas related to the DoD enterprise, the QDR recommends aligning medical support with emerging joint force employment concepts. Building on recent improvements in new purchased care contracts and the streamlining of regional TRICARE management structures, the QDR recommends continuing to shift toward a market-driven, performance-based investment program. It also recommends improving planning processes and the transparency of information, while leveraging the recent launch of the department's electronic health record system. This new system is needed to effectively manage MHS by adopting a more flexible financing process. Above all, the department's military and civilian senior leaders endorse the need to modernize the TRICARE benefit structure for those customers who are not on active duty. The intent is to promote longer and healthier retirement lives by encouraging self-responsibility for their own and their family's health and the use of health resources to achieve the longest, healthiest lives at the lowest cost. Doing so will require changes in legislation and rules to adjust TRICARE cost-sharing features so that they restore the balance Congress created in establishing the TRICARE program in the 1990s and also to seek authority for health savings accounts.

### **Summary**

Without a doubt, reshaping the defense enterprise is difficult. The structures and processes developed over the past half-century were forged in the Cold War and strengthened by success in it. However, the strategic landscape of the twenty-first century demands excellence across a much broader set of national security challenges. With change comes turmoil, and achieving a desired vision requires determination and perseverance within the DoD and, importantly, cooperation with the Congress. As we emphasize agility, flexibility, responsiveness and effectiveness in the operational forces, so too must the department's organizations, processes and

practices embody these characteristics if they are to support the joint war fighter and our commander in chief.

## **Developing a Twenty-First Century Total Force**

The Department of Defense is the world's largest employer, directly employing more than three million people. The DoD's Total Force—its active and reserve military components, its civil servants and its contractors—constitutes its war-fighting capability and capacity. Members of the Total Force serve in thousands of locations around the world, performing a vast array of duties to accomplish critical missions.

No prudent military commander wants a fair fight, seeking instead to “overmatch” adversaries in cunning, capability and commitment. The selfless service and heroism of the men and women of the well-trained all-volunteer Total Force has been a primary source of U.S. strategic overmatch in confronting the wide range of threats we face and a key to successful military operations over the past several decades. The Total Force must continue to adapt to different operating environments, develop new skills and rebalance its capabilities and people if it is to remain prepared for the new challenges of an uncertain future.

Recent operational experiences highlight capabilities and capacities that the DoD must instill in the Total Force to prevail in a long, irregular war while deterring a broad array of challenges. The future force must be more finely tailored, more accessible to the joint commander and better configured to operate with other agencies and international partners in complex operations. It must have far greater endurance. It must be trained, ready to operate and able to make decisions in traditionally nonmilitary areas, such as disaster response and stabilization. Increasing the adaptability of the Total Force while also reducing stress on military personnel and their families is a top priority for the DoD. These imperatives require a new strategy for shaping the department's Total Force, one that will adjust policies and authorities while introducing education and training initiatives to equip civilian and military war fighters to overmatch any future opponent.

The DoD and military services must carefully distribute skills among the four elements of the Total Force (active component, reserve component, civilians and contractors) to optimize their contributions across the range of military operations, from peace to war. In a reconfigured Total Force, a new balance of skills must be coupled with greater accessibility to people so that the right forces are available at the right time. Both uniformed and civilian personnel must be readily available to joint commanders.

This operational Total Force must remain prepared for complex operations at home or abroad, including working with other U.S. agencies, allies, partners and non-governmental organizations. Routine integration with foreign and domestic counterparts requires new forms of advanced joint training and education.

Finally, the DoD must effectively compete with the civilian sector for high-quality personnel. The transformation of the Total Force will require updated, appropriate authorities and tools from Congress to shape it and improve its sustainability. Two key enablers of this transformation will be a new *Human Capital Strategy* for the department, and the application of the new National Security Personnel System to manage the department's civilian personnel.

### ***Reconfiguring the Total Force***

Recent operational experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan highlight the need to rebalance military skills between and within the active and reserve components. Accordingly, over the past several years, the military departments are rebalancing—shifting, transferring or eliminating—approximately 70,000 positions within or between the active and reserve components. The DoD plans to rebalance an additional 55,000 military personnel by 2010. The military departments are applying this same scrutiny across the Total Force to ensure that the right skills reside inside each element. The military departments and combatant commanders will continually assess the force to ensure it remains responsive to meet future demands. U.S. Joint Forces Command (U.S. JFCOM), as the joint force provider, is aiding the effort by ensuring the appropriate global distribution of ready forces and competencies. The department plans to introduce a new methodology and review process to establish a baseline for personnel policy, including the development of joint metrics and a common lexicon to link the defense strategy to service-level rebalancing decisions. This process will help synchronize rebalancing efforts across the DoD.

### ***A Continuum of Service***

The traditional, visible distinction between war and peace is less clear at the start of the twenty-first century. In a long war, the United States expects to face large and small contingencies at unpredictable intervals. To fight the long war and conduct other future contingency operations, joint force commanders need to have more immediate access to the Total Force. In particular, the reserve component must be operationalized, so that select reservists and units are more accessible and more readily deployable than today. During the cold war, the reserve component was used, appropriately, as a “strategic reserve,” to provide support to active component forces during major combat operations. In today's global context, this concept is less relevant. As a result, the DoD will:

- Pursue authorities for increased access to the reserve component—to increase the period authorized for Presidential Reserve Call-up from 270 to 365 days.
- Better focus the use of the reserve components' competencies for homeland defense and civil support operations, and seek changes to authorities to

improve access to Guard and reserve consequence management capabilities and capacity in support of civil authorities.

Achieve revision of Presidential Reserve Call-Up authorities to allow activation of military department reserve components for natural disasters in order to smooth the process for meeting specific needs without relying solely on volunteers.

Allow individuals who volunteer for activation on short notice to serve for long periods on major headquarters staffs as individual augmentees.

Develop select reserve units that train more intensively and require shorter notice for deployment.

Additionally, the military departments will explore the creation of all-volunteer reserve units with high-demand capabilities, and the military departments and combatant commanders will expand the concept of contracted volunteers.

## ***Building the Right Skills***

Maintaining the capabilities required to conduct effective multidimensional joint operations is fundamental to the U.S. military's ability to overmatch adversaries. Both battlefield integration with interagency partners and combined operations—the integration of the joint force and coalition forces—will be standard features in future operations. The combination of joint, combined and interagency capabilities in modern warfare represents the next step in the evolution of joint war fighting and places new demands on the DoD's training and education processes.

## ***Joint Training***

The QDR assessed and compared the joint training capabilities of each of the military departments. Although they have established operationally proven processes and standards, it is clear that further advances in joint training and education are urgently needed to prepare for complex, multinational and interagency operations in the future. Toward this end, the DoD will:

Develop a Joint Training Strategy to address new mission areas, gaps and continuous training transformation.

Revise its Training Transformation Plan to incorporate irregular warfare, complex stabilization operations, combating weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and information operations.

Expand the Training Transformation Business Model to consolidate joint training, prioritize new and emerging missions and exploit virtual and constructive technologies.

## *Language and Cultural Skills*

Developing broader linguistic capability and cultural understanding is also critical to prevail in the long war and to meet twenty-first century challenges. The DoD must dramatically increase the number of personnel proficient in key languages such as Arabic, Farsi and Chinese and make these languages available at all levels of action and decision—from the strategic to the tactical. The DoD must foster a level of understanding and cultural intelligence about the Middle East and Asia comparable to that developed about the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Current and emerging challenges highlight the increasing importance of foreign area officers, who provide combatant commanders with political-military analysis, critical language skills and cultural adeptness. The military departments will increase the number of commissioned and noncommissioned officers seconded to foreign military services, in part by expanding their foreign area officer programs. This action will foster professional relationships with foreign militaries, develop in-depth regional expertise, and increase unity of effort among the United States, its allies and partners. Foreign area officers will also be aligned with lower echelons of command to apply their knowledge at the tactical level.

To further these language and culture goals, the DoD will:

- Increase funding for the Army's pilot linguist program to recruit and train native and heritage speakers to serve as translators in the active and reserve components.
- Require language training for Service Academy and Reserve Officer Training Corps scholarship students and expand immersion programs, semester abroad study opportunities and interacademy foreign exchanges.
- Increase military special pay for foreign language proficiency.
- Increase National Security Education Program (NSEP) grants to U.S. elementary, secondary and post-secondary education programs to expand non-European language instruction.
- Establish a Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps, composed of approximately one thousand people, as an on-call cadre of high-proficiency, civilian language professionals to support the DoD's evolving operational needs.
- Modify tactical and operational plans to improve language and regional training prior to deployments and develop country and language familiarization packages and operationally-focused language instruction modules for deploying forces.

## *Training and Educating Personnel to Strengthen Interagency Operations*

The ability to integrate the Total Force with personnel from other federal agencies will be important to reach many U.S. objectives. Accordingly, the DoD supports



the creation of a National Security Officer (NSO) corps—an interagency cadre of senior military and civilian professionals able to effectively integrate and orchestrate the contributions of individual government agencies on behalf of larger national security interests.

Much as the Goldwater-Nichols requirement that senior officers complete a joint duty assignment has contributed to integrating the different cultures of the military departments into a more effective joint force, the QDR recommends creating incentives for senior department and non-department personnel to develop skills suited to the integrated interagency environment.

The DoD will also transform the National Defense University, its premier educational institution, into a true National Security University. Acknowledging the complexity of the twenty-first century security environment, this new institution will be tailored to support the educational needs of the broader U.S. national security profession. Participation from interagency partners will be increased and the curriculum will be reshaped in ways that are consistent with a unified U.S. government approach to national security missions, and greater interagency participation will be encouraged.

### ***Designing an Information Age Human Capital Strategy***

To compete effectively with the civilian sector for highly qualified personnel to build the Total Force, the DoD must have both a modern *Human Capital Strategy* and the authorities required to recruit, shape and sustain the force it needs.

The new *Human Capital Strategy* focuses on developing the right mix of people and skills across the Total Force. The DoD's *Human Capital Strategy* may be considered “competency-focused” and “performance-based.” It is based on an in-depth study of the competencies U.S. forces require and the performance standards to which they must be developed. Each of the military departments will map the array of competencies and performance criteria that constitute its forces and also evaluate and improve personnel development processes to achieve those standards. Advancements, awards and compensation may then be linked to an individual's performance rather than to longevity or time-in-grade. This will better align incentives to outputs and reward excellence.

To execute the *Human Capital Strategy*, the DoD will establish a single Program Executive Office responsible for the consolidated Personnel Reporting/Management System and management of the strategy as a major defense program. Once implemented, the *Human Capital Strategy* will be integrated into a consolidated personnel tracking and management system capable of linking all department competencies to manpower, training and education.

The DoD also needs to ensure suitable promotion and development opportunities are available to attract and retain the best and brightest military and civilian personnel. The department's career advancement philosophy should foster innovation

by encouraging career patterns that develop the unique skills needed to meet new missions such as irregular warfare. New career patterns might include seconding young officers, noncommissioned officers and civil servants to work within allied and partners' militaries or ministries of defense or to serve on long-term assignments in key strategic regions of the world rather than assuming the traditional career path of multiple, short-term assignments. The DoD will provide further incentives and improve advancement opportunities in key career fields, including foreign area officers, trainers, advisors and linguists, as well as in other mission areas that are taking on greater importance, such as unmanned aerial vehicles and information and space operations. In addition to providing incentives for strong performance and continued service, the *Human Capital Strategy's* shaping tools must also enable discrete, necessary force reductions as well as selective accessions when a specific skill is called for and not available within the joint force.

### ***National Security Personnel System***

The DoD's civilians are unique in the U.S. government because they are an integral part of a military organization. Consequently, like the military workforce, the DoD's civilians must adapt to changing mission needs. The new National Security Personnel System (NSPS) is designed to facilitate the effective management of the department's 650,000 civilian personnel in the twenty-first century. The NSPS addresses three major personnel issues the department faces: staffing the enterprise to support twenty-first century missions; using compensation to compete more effectively in the broader labor market; and providing civilian support to contingency operations. The NSPS will incorporate a labor relations system that recognizes the department's national security mission and the need to act swiftly to execute that mission while preserving the collective bargaining rights of employees. The DoD will begin its transition to the new system by training personnel to implement the new procedures. The NSPS also recognizes the importance of defense civilians and the support they provide for contingency operations. It enables civilians to perform inherently governmental functions, freeing military personnel to perform inherently military functions.

Similarly, implementing the new Department of Defense Instruction *Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany U.S. Armed Forces* is another step toward integrating contractors into the Total Force. The department's policy now directs that performance of commercial activities by contractors, including contingency contractors and any proposed contractor logistics support arrangements, shall be included in operational plans and orders. By factoring contractors into their planning, combatant commanders can better determine their mission needs.

Taken together, measures to reconfigure the Total Force provide a continuum of service, build the right skills and design an information age human capital strategy

will yield a Total Force that is better able to meet the diverse challenges the United States will face in coming years.

## **Achieving Unity of Effort**

The Department of Defense cannot meet today's complex challenges alone. Success requires unified statecraft: the ability of the U.S. government to bring to bear all elements of national power at home and to work in close cooperation with allies and partners abroad. During the QDR, senior leaders considered the changes needed to enable the DoD to contribute better to such unified efforts. Just as the Second World War posed immense challenges that spurred joint and combined operations within the military, today's environment demands that all agencies of government become adept at integrating their efforts into a unified strategy.

This requires much more than mere coordination: the DoD must work hand in glove with other agencies to execute the National Security Strategy. Interagency and international combined operations truly are the new joint operations. Supporting and enabling other agencies, working toward common objectives, and building the capacity of partners are indispensable elements of the DoD's new missions.

## ***Why a New Approach Is Essential***

The United States' experience in the Cold War still profoundly influences the way that the Department of Defense is organized and executes its mission. But the cold war was a struggle between nation states, requiring state-based responses to most political problems and kinetic responses to most military problems. The DoD was optimized for conventional, large-scale war fighting against the regular, uniformed armed forces of hostile states.

Today, warfare is increasingly characterized by intrastate violence rather than conflict between states. Many of the United States' principal adversaries are informal networks of non-state actors that are less vulnerable to Cold War-style approaches. At the same time, many partner nations face internal rather than external threats. Defeating unconventional enemies requires unconventional approaches. The ability to wage irregular and unconventional warfare and the skills needed for counterinsurgency, stabilization and reconstruction, "military diplomacy" and complex interagency coalition operations are essential—but in many cases require new and more flexible authorities from the Congress.

Authorities developed before the age of the Internet and globalization have not kept pace with transnational threats from geographically dispersed non-state terrorist and criminal networks. Authorities designed during the Cold War unduly limit the ability to assist police forces or interior ministries and are now less applicable. Adversaries' use of new technologies and methods has outstripped traditional

concepts of national and international security. Traditional mechanisms for creating and sustaining international cooperation are not sufficiently agile to dis-aggregate and defeat adversary networks at the global, regional and local levels simultaneously.

Supporting the rule of law and building civil societies where they do not exist today, or where they are in their infancy, is fundamental to winning the long war. In this sense, today's environment resembles a challenge that is different in kind, but similar in scale, to the Cold War—a challenge so immense that it requires major shifts in strategic concepts for national security and the role of military power. Therefore, the United States needs to develop new concepts and methods for interagency and international cooperation.

### ***Strategic and Operational Frameworks***

Unity of effort requires that strategies, plans and operations be closely coordinated with partners. At the operational level, the United States must be able to prevent or disrupt adversaries' ability to plan and execute operations rather than being forced to respond to attacks after they have occurred. Adversaries using asymmetric tactics are global, adaptive and fleeting, thus analyses, decisions and actions to defeat them must also be swift. But for swift action to be fashioned and effective, it must occur within well-coordinated strategic and operational frameworks. Authorities, procedures and practices must permit the seamless integration of federal, state and local capabilities at home and among allies, partners and non-governmental organizations abroad.

Drawing on operational experience and lessons learned over the last four years, the QDR examined changes within and beyond the DoD to strengthen unity of effort. Improved interagency and international planning, preparation and execution will allow faster and more effective action in dealing with twenty-first century challenges. New modes of cooperation can enhance agility and effectiveness with traditional allies and engage new partners in a common cause. Initiating efforts to better understand and engage those who support the murderous ideology of terrorists and the evolution of states at strategic crossroads will be critical.

### ***Strengthening Interagency Operations***

Increasing unity of effort to achieve the nation's security policy priorities across the agencies of the federal government is essential. Only with coherent, leveraged U.S. government action can the nation achieve true unity of effort with international partners. To address more effectively many security challenges, the DoD is continuing to shift its emphasis from department-centric approaches toward interagency solutions. Cooperation across the federal government begins in the field with the development of shared perspectives and a better understanding of each

agency's role, missions and capabilities. This will complement better understanding and closer cooperation in Washington, and will extend to execution of complex operations. To that end, the DoD supports improvements to strategy development and planning within the department and with its interagency partners. The QDR recommends the creation of National Security Planning Guidance to direct the development of both military and nonmilitary plans and institutional capabilities. The planning guidance would set priorities and clarify national security roles and responsibilities to reduce capability gaps and eliminate redundancies. It would help federal departments and agencies to better align their strategy, budget and planning functions with national objectives. Stronger linkages among planners in the military departments, the combatant commands and the Joint Staff, with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and with other departments should ensure that operations better reflect the president's National Security Strategy and country's policy goals.

### *Learning from the Field*

Closer relationships between parent agencies in Washington and elsewhere support increased collaboration in the field. Solutions developed in the field often have applicability to interagency cooperation at the strategic and policy levels. Long experience shows that operators, regardless of parent agency, collaborate closely when faced with common challenges in the field: they often resolve interagency concerns quickly and seamlessly to achieve team objectives.

For the DoD, joint war fighters—the combatant commanders and leaders of deployed joint task forces—are the primary level at which unity of effort develops. For most other agencies, the U.S. chief of mission in a specific country, leading an interagency country team, has an important field leadership role. Creating opportunities to help enable combatant commanders (whose purview extends across many countries) to work more collaboratively with chiefs of mission (who focus on only one country) is one objective. Currently, personnel in the Department of State and Department of Defense must expend considerable effort, on a case-by-case basis, to act together in support of operations. The result is that commanders and chiefs of mission lose agility in the face of an adaptive adversary, fleeting targets are missed, and risks to U.S. interests and those of our partners increase.

### *Complex Interagency Operations Abroad*

The president's National Security Presidential Directive designating the Secretary of State to improve overall U.S. government stabilization and reconstruction efforts recognizes the challenges of achieving unity of effort for complex overseas contingencies. Although many U.S. government organizations possess knowledge and skills needed to perform tasks critical to complex operations, they are often

not chartered or resourced to maintain deployable capabilities. Thus, the DoD has tended to become the default responder during many contingencies. This is a short-term necessity, but the Defense Department supports legislation to enable other agencies to strengthen their capabilities so that balanced interagency operations become more feasible—recognizing that other agencies' capabilities and performance often play a critical role in allowing the DoD to achieve its mission.

Recognizing that stability, security and transition operations can be critical to the long war on terrorism, the DoD issued guidance in 2005 to place stability operations on par with major combat operations within the department. The directive calls for improving the department's ability to work with interagency partners, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and others to increase capacities to participate in complex operations abroad. When implemented, the DoD will be able to provide better support to civilian-led missions, or to lead stabilization operations when appropriate.

The QDR supports efforts to expand the expeditionary capacity of agency partners. In addition, increased coordination between geographic combatant commands and interagency partners in the field will increase overall effectiveness. The department proposes a number of policy and legislative initiatives to improve unity of effort for complex interagency operations abroad, providing greater presidential flexibility in responding to security challenges. The DoD will:

- Support substantially increased resources for the Department of State's Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability and State's associated proposal to establish a deployable Civilian Reserve Corps and a Conflict Response Fund.

- Support broader presidential authorities to redirect resources and task the best-situated agencies to respond, recognizing that other government agencies may be best suited to provide necessary support in overseas emergencies. This new authority would enable the U.S. government to capitalize on inherent competencies of individual agencies to tailor a more effective immediate response.

- Strengthen internal DoD mechanisms for interagency coordination.

- Improve its ability to assess the relative benefits of security cooperation activities to enable better resource allocation decisions.

- Strengthen its regional centers to become U.S. government assets in support of government outreach to regional opinion makers.

### *Complex Interagency Operations at Home*

Unified interagency efforts are no less important at home. The DoD must work as part of a unified interagency effort with the Department of Homeland Security and other federal, state and local agencies to address threats to the U.S. homeland. Moreover, the response to Hurricane Katrina vividly illustrated the need for the

DoD to support other agencies in the context of complex interagency operations at home.

The QDR recommends several actions to improve unity of effort with other federal agencies, state and local governments to improve homeland defense and homeland security. The DoD will:

In partnership with Department of Homeland Security, develop a National Homeland Security Plan clarifying the optimum distribution of effort among federal agencies for prevention, preparation and response.

Expand training programs to accommodate planners from other agencies and, working with the Department of Homeland Security and other interagency partners, offer assistance to develop new courses on developing and implementing strategic-level plans for disaster assistance, consequence management and catastrophic events.

Partner with the Department of Homeland Security to design and facilitate full-scope interagency homeland defense and civil support exercises, leveraging the Defense Department's experience in planning and training. The exercises will be conducted in near-real-world conditions, with civilian and military participation from national, state and local government agencies. These exercises should help to yield common understandings of assigned roles and responsibilities, and shared practice in complex planning and operations.

At the request of the Department of Homeland Security, organize and sponsor homeland defense tabletop exercises, in which senior leaders from civilian and military agencies practice responses to disaster scenarios.

Continue consultations with our neighbors to address security and defense issues of common concern, while ensuring coordination with the Department of Homeland Security.

### *Working with International Allies and Partners*

Long-standing alliance relationships will continue to underpin unified efforts to address twenty-first century security challenges. These established relationships continue to evolve, ensuring their relevance even as new challenges emerge. The ability of the United States and its allies to work together to influence the global environment is fundamental to defeating terrorist networks. Wherever possible, the United States works with or through others: enabling allied and partner capabilities, building their capacity and developing mechanisms to share the risks and responsibilities of today's complex challenges.

The nation's alliances provide a foundation for working to address common security challenges. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) remains the cornerstone of transatlantic security and makes manifest the strategic solidarity of democratic states in Europe and North America. NATO is evolving through the

addition of seven new allies, the Partnership for Peace Program, the creation of the NATO Response Force, the establishment of the new Allied Command Transformation, the Alliance's leadership of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and the NATO Training Mission in Iraq. In many European allied states, however, aging and shrinking populations are curbing defense spending on capabilities they need for conducting operations effectively alongside U.S. forces. In the Pacific, alliances with Japan, Australia, Korea and others promote bilateral and multilateral engagement in the region and cooperative actions to address common security threats. India is also merging as a great power and a key strategic partner. Close cooperation with these partners in the long war on terrorism, as well as in efforts to counter WMD proliferation and other nontraditional threats, ensures the continuing need for these alliances and for improving their capabilities.

The DoD will continue to strengthen traditional allied operations, with increased emphasis on collective capabilities to plan and conduct stabilization, security, transition and reconstruction operations. In particular, the DoD supports efforts to create a NATO stabilization and reconstruction capability and a European constabulary force. The United States will work to strengthen allied capabilities for the long war and countering WMD. The United States, in concert with allies, will promote the aim of tailoring national military contributions to best employ the unique capabilities and characteristics of each ally, achieving a unified effort greater than the sum of its parts.

Consistent with the president's emphasis on the need to prevent, rather than be forced to respond to, attacks, the DoD recommends that the United States continue to work with its allies to develop approaches, consistent with their domestic laws and applicable international law, to disrupt and defeat transnational threats before they mature. Concepts and constructs enabling unity of effort with more than seventy supporting nations under the Proliferation Security Initiative should be extended to domains other than WMD proliferation, including cyberspace, as a priority.

To prevent terrorist attacks or disrupt their networks, to deny them sanctuary anywhere in the world, to separate terrorists from host populations and ultimately to defeat them, the United States must also work with new international partners in less familiar areas of the world. This means the DoD must be prepared to develop a new team of leaders and operators who are comfortable working in remote regions of the world, dealing with local and tribal communities, adapting to foreign languages and cultures and working with local networks to further U.S. and partner interests through personal engagement, persuasion and quiet influence—rather than through military force alone. To support this effort, new authorities are needed. During the Cold War the legal authorities for military action, intelligence, foreign military assistance and cooperation with foreign police and security services were separately defined and segregated from each other. Today, there is a need for U.S. forces to transition rapidly between these types of authorities in an agile and flexible manner, to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century.



Based on operational experiences of the last four years, the QDR recommends that Congress provide considerably greater flexibility in the U.S. government's ability to partner directly with nations in fighting terrorists. For some nations, this begins with training, equipping and advising their security forces to generate stability and security within their own borders. For others, it may entail providing some assistance with logistics support, equipment, training and transport to allow them to participate as members of coalitions with the United States or its allies in stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations around the globe.

Recent legislative changes remove some of the impediments to helping partners engaged in their own defense, but greater flexibility is urgently needed. The DoD will seek to:

- Establish a Defense Coalition Support Account to fund and, as appropriate, stockpile routine defense articles such as helmets, body armor and night vision devices for use by coalition partners.
- Expand department authority to provide logistics support, supplies and services to allies and coalition partners, without reimbursement as necessary, to enable coalition operations with U.S. forces.
- Expand department authority to lease or lend equipment to allies and coalition partners for use in military operations in which they are participating with U.S. forces.
- Expand the authorities of the Departments of State and Defense to train and equip foreign security forces best suited to internal counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. These may be nonmilitary law enforcement or other security forces of the government in some nations.

The DoD will continue to support initiatives, such as the Global Peace Operations Initiative, to increase the capacity of international organizations so that they can contribute more effectively to the improvement of governance and the expansion of civil society in the world. In this regard, the DoD supports the African Union's development of a humanitarian crisis intervention capability, which is a good example of an international organization stepping up to the challenge of regional stabilization missions. The DoD stands ready to increase its assistance to the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations in areas of the department's expertise, such as doctrine, training, strategic planning and management.

### *Transforming Foreign Assistance*

Foreign military assistance missions during the Cold War were largely designed to shore up friendly regimes against external threats. Today, the aim is for partners to govern and police themselves effectively. Assistance in today's environment relies on the ability to improve states' governance, administration, internal security and

the rule of law in order to build partner governments' legitimacy in the eyes of their own people and thereby inoculate societies against terrorism, insurgency and nonstate threats. In partnership with the State Department and others, the DoD must become as adept at working with foreign constabularies as it is with externally focused armed forces, and as adept at working with interior ministries as it is with defense ministries—a substantial shift of emphasis that demands broader and more flexible legal authorities and cooperative mechanisms.

Bringing all the elements of U.S. power to bear to win the long war requires overhauling traditional foreign assistance and export control activities and laws. These include foreign aid, humanitarian assistance, post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, foreign police training, international military education and training (IMET) and, where necessary, providing advanced military technologies to foreign allies and partners. In particular, winning the long war requires strengthening the ability of the DoD to train and educate current and future foreign military leaders at institutions in the United States. Doing so is critical to strengthening partnerships and building personal relationships. In all cases, they are integral to successful irregular warfare operations.

For example, quick action to relieve civilian suffering, train security forces to maintain civil order and restore critical civilian infrastructure denies the enemy opportunities to capitalize on the disorder immediately following military operations and sets more favorable conditions for longer-term stabilization, transition and reconstruction. Full integration of allied and coalition capabilities ensures unity of effort for rapidly evolving counterinsurgency operations. Similarly, foreign leaders who receive U.S. education and training help their governments understand U.S. values and interests, fostering willingness to unite in a common cause.

The QDR found that, with the exception of legislation applicable only to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, existing authorities governing planning, financing and use of these instruments for shaping international partnerships do not accommodate the dynamic foreign policy demands of the twenty-first century. Based on recent operational experience, the DoD seeks a continuum of authorities from Congress balancing the need to act quickly in the war on terrorism with the need to integrate military power to meet long-term, enduring foreign policy objectives.

The DoD recommends a number of important legislative changes in the near term, while also working in close partnership with the Department of State and the Congress to enable better alignment of the *Foreign Assistance Act* and the *Arms Export Control Act* with today's security challenges. In addition to expanding coalition management authorities, the DoD seeks to:

- Institutionalize OIF/OEF authorities to conduct humanitarian assistance and stability operations.
- Significantly improve and increase IMET-like opportunities targeted at shaping relationships and developing future foreign leaders.

Consider whether the restrictions on the *American Service Members Protection Act* (ASPA) on IMET and other foreign assistance programs pertaining to security and the war on terror necessitate adjustment as we continue to advance the aims of the ASPA.

Expand the Counter Terrorism Fellowship Program beyond its current focus on senior-level government officials and national strategic issues. Combatant commanders and U.S. chiefs of mission, in consultation with regional partners, will develop education programs to improve regional counterterrorism campaigns and crisis response planning at the operational level.

### *Strategic Communication*

Victory in the long war ultimately depends on strategic communication by the United States and its international partners. Effective communication must build and maintain credibility and trust with friends and foes alike, through an emphasis on consistency, veracity and transparency both in words and deeds. Such credibility is essential to building trusted networks that counter ideological support for terrorism.

Responsibility for strategic communication must be government-wide and the QDR supports efforts led by the Department of State to improve integration of this vital element of national power into strategies across the federal government. The DoD must instill communication assessments and processes into its culture, developing programs, plans, policy, information and themes to support combatant commanders that reflect the U.S. government's overall strategic objectives. To this end, the DoD will work to integrate communications efforts horizontally across the enterprise to link information and communication issues with broader policies, plans and actions.

The QDR identified capability gaps in each of the primary supporting capabilities of Public Affairs, Defense Support to Public Diplomacy, Military Diplomacy and Information Operations, including Psychological Operations. To close those gaps, the DoD will focus on properly organizing, training, equipping and resourcing the key communication capabilities. This effort will include developing new tools and processes for assessing, analyzing and delivering information to key audiences as well as improving linguistic skills and cultural competence. These primary supporting communication capabilities will be developed with the goal of achieving a seamless communication across the U.S. government.

### **Summary**

The United States will not win the war on terrorism or achieve other crucial national security objectives discussed in this chapter by military means alone. Instead, the

application of unified statecraft, at the federal level and in concert with allies and international partners, is critical. In addition to coalition- and partner-supported combat and preventive operations, simultaneous effective interaction with civilian populations will be essential to achieve success. Authorities that permit nimble and adaptive policies, processes and institutions—domestic and international—are essential adjuncts to the military capability needed to address the rapidly evolving security challenges around the globe.



## *Chapter 5*

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# Strategic Planning by the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1990 to 2005\*

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Richard Meinhart

### **Introduction**

Military leaders at many levels have used strategic planning in various ways to position their organizations to respond to the demands of the current situation, while simultaneously focusing on future challenges. This chapter examines how four Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff—Generals Colin L. Powell (1989–1993), John M. Shalikashvili (1993–1997), Henry Hugh Shelton (1997–2001) and Richard B. Myers (2001–2005)—used a strategic planning system to enable them to meet their statutory responsibilities specified in Title 10 *U.S. Code* and respond to the strategic environment. As the 1990s progressed, the first three chairmen were faced with responding to a strategic environment that started with the Gulf War and was followed by an increasing number of regional military operations across the spectrum of conflict, while accommodating slowly declining financial resources and a one-third decline in force structure. Since 2000, and particularly after September 11, 2001, the last two chairmen were faced with entirely different strategic challenges

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\* This chapter does not reflect the views of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense or the United States Army War College.

dominated by the focus on terrorism and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, while needing to transform by developing future capabilities to achieve full spectrum dominance.

In focusing on how these four leaders used a strategic planning system, this chapter briefly describes the chairman's responsibilities, as well as the Joint Staff's key organizational characteristics. Both the leader's focus and the organization's characteristics will influence how a strategic planning system is used. The author then examines how the strategic planning system evolved to better meet each chairman's needs. This planning system produced many products related to assessment, vision, strategy, resources and plans. These products will be described for their broad impact and influence. Because many of these products are classified, the assessments will have to be brief. The author then summarizes the more significant ways each chairman used this strategic planning system, which is part of his leadership legacy. Although this comprehensive assessment of each chairman's use of strategic planning has historical relevance, its main value is that today's leaders can learn from these four leaders how they used systems and processes differently to respond to their complex global environment and varied strategic challenges. During this assessment, specific leadership concepts are illustrated throughout, including how leaders use vision, how leaders balance flexibility and structure in strategic planning processes and products, how leaders use strategic planning to respond to different types of global environment challenges, and how leaders use systems to influence an organization's climate and culture. Hence, this chapter concludes by identifying five key leadership concepts that future leaders can employ when using strategic planning.

## Chairman's Responsibilities

Congress specified the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff's formal leadership responsibilities in *U.S. Code*, Title 10, Section 153, under the following descriptive sub-headings:<sup>1</sup> (1) strategic direction; (2) strategic planning; (3) contingency planning and preparedness; (4) advice on requirements, programs, and budget; (5) doctrine, training, and education; and (6) Other matters. These increased responsibilities were a result of the *Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986* (GNA), which is considered the most significant piece of defense legislation since the *National Security Defense Act of 1947* established the Defense Department.<sup>2</sup> The GNA was the result of almost four years of contentious dialogue and debate among Congress, military leaders, the defense intellectual community, and the Reagan administration on how best to organize the Defense Department fundamentally to strengthen civilian authority, improve military advice to civilian leaders, provide for more efficient use of resources, and better execute in the field to respond to the nation's security challenges.<sup>3</sup> Since the *U.S. Code* was changed to incorporate the GNA's provisions, the major functions and broad wording describing the

chairman's key responsibilities fundamentally have remained the same, but there have been a few additions. These additions are associated with reports required by Congress, which were not envisioned in 1986, to assist members with their oversight and resource responsibilities. For example, the chairman must now produce an annual report on combatant command requirements about the time when the budget is submitted to Congress. Most significantly, the *National Defense Authorization Act of 2004* (NDAA) required that the chairman produce, by February 15 of every even-numbered year, a detailed report that is a biennial review of the National Military Strategy to include the strategic and military risks to execute that strategy.<sup>4</sup> This 2004 Act cleared up ambiguity that existed as to whether the chairman actually needed to produce a National Military Strategy and what it should encompass. This change to existing *U.S. Code* is an example where the chairman's responsibilities initially were broad and identified "what" he had to do versus "how" to do it. But if Congress is not satisfied with execution or information, then the subsequent *Code* becomes more specific.

To help with executing his responsibilities, the Joint Staff now directly supports the chairman, an important distinction emphasized in the GNA. The Joint Staff has a budget of under \$700 million and consists of approximately 700 military officers, 210 enlisted members and 195 civilians, which is about a 15 percent military reduction from 2000.<sup>5</sup> Further, there are others, such as those in the Defense Intelligence Agency or contractors, who work alongside this staff to support their focused work directly. The chairmen used a well-documented strategic planning system, which formally changed four different times (1990, 1993, 1997 and 1999), to help them execute the first four formal responsibilities identified earlier.<sup>6</sup> The importance of this planning system is reflected by the words "primary" and "formal," which appeared in the beginning of all Joint Staff guidance that described the desired impact of its products and processes.

The chairman's strategic planning system creates products to integrate defense processes and influence others related to assessment, vision, strategy, resources and plans.<sup>7</sup> This planning system integrates the processes and documents of the people and organizations above the chairman (president and secretary of defense) and the people and organizations with whom he directly coordinates (services and combatant commanders). The chairman has no control over any significant defense resources (secretary of defense and services control resources) or direct control of operational military forces (combatant commanders control operational forces); however, orders to those forces flow through him. The chairman formally influences his civilian leaders and those with whom he coordinates through this strategic planning system. In addition to influencing leaders, this system provides specific direction for many staffs that support these leaders. As such, this planning system is a key function that integrates the nation's military strategy, plans and resources consisting of approximately 2.24 million active, guard, and reserve forces and total defense outlays of \$290 billion in 2000 that increased to \$465 billion by 2005.<sup>8</sup>



## Strategic Challenges, Culture and Structure

Strategic challenges can affect both a leader's and staff's use of a strategic planning system. The major challenges the chairmen faced in the 1990s were characterized by the following: global competition and regional instability, increased military operations across the spectrum of conflict, slowly declining financial and personnel resources, rising maintenance and infrastructure costs, Cold War-focused equipment, and a need to infuse new technology. Since 2000, with the secretary of defense's initial focus on transformation, followed shortly by the global war on terror and then the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, these challenges significantly changed in scope and character. To meet these new challenges, there was an increase of financial resources and better integrated technology, but there was no military manpower growth.<sup>9</sup>

Each chairman generally used a consensus and collaborative leadership style when dealing with civilian and military leaders, but there were differences in their style and focus.<sup>10</sup> This style and focus can have important influences on their organization's climate and culture. What they pay attention to, what they say and what organizational systems they use can embed and reinforce a certain culture within their organization.<sup>11</sup> The chairman establishes his unique "joint" climate that has been shaped by years of service culture and experiences. The other joint chiefs, who serve dually as their separate military service chiefs, may embrace that joint climate. But they are also steeped in their service culture and have specific service interests and Title 10 responsibilities they must articulate and sometimes defend. For example, each service chief routinely identified unfunded needs to improve effectiveness. The officers on the Joint Staff, who have specific joint responsibilities among the eight staff directorates, only serve in this joint climate between two and three years before most return to their respective services. Although developing a joint culture was difficult, a strategic planning system can be an important reinforcing mechanism leaders can use to change existing culture.

In addition to these culture issues, there are multiple structural layers between the highest and the lowest levels of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A strategic planning system must integrate the focused interests within these levels. For example, to process a typical Joint Staff action, there are between four and six layers where an issue will be scrutinized and revised to respond to these focused interests. This occurs typically as the staff action flows from action officer to division chief to the first general officer to Joint Staff director to director Joint Staff and, finally, to vice chairman or chairman. Within these structural layers are the historic cultural influences officers bring with them when working on or with this staff for a short time. Hence, a strategic planning system must be both inclusive and flexible enough to accommodate these staff structural realities, while being responsive to the leader's needs. Table 5.1 summarizes these strategic planning challenges and decision-making influences.

<b>Table 5.1 Key Challenges and Decision-Making Influences</b>			
<i>Joint Chiefs of Staff 1990-2005</i>			
<i>1990s Challenges</i>		<i>2000s Challenges</i>	
A.	Regional competition and threats	A.	Global War on Terror
B.	Gulf War	B.	Iraq and Afghanistan
C.	Greater number of military operations	C.	Continued global engagements
D.	Declining financial and personnel resources	D.	Increasing financial resources
E.	Need to integrate technology	E.	Need to transform capabilities
F.	Well maintained Cold War equipment	F.	Updated but worn equipment
<b>Decision-Making Influences</b>			
A.	Chairman uses consensus and collaborative leadership style with little direct control		
B.	Joint climate versus service's unique culture		
C.	Financial focus on effectiveness		
D.	Four to six structural layers to process actions		

## Strategic Planning System Changes

Having identified the leader's challenge, culture and structure as they influence strategic planning, this chapter now focuses on the changes to the planning system itself to give one insight into its use. There were four formal changes to the strategic planning system in 1990, 1993, 1997 and 1999. Although the 1999 version is the current chairman's operation instruction in 2005, it has not been completely followed and is currently being revised. These formal changes, along with the current system in use, will be examined.

### **1989 Status**

Prior to 1990 there was a realization that the strategic planning system, as specified in the January 24, 1989, *Memorandum of Policy No. 84*, was not accomplishing its purpose to enable the chairman to execute fully his increased 1986 GNA responsibilities. This memorandum, the seventeenth revision since 1952, was described as "unwieldy, complex, and bureaucratic, and produced no less than ten major documents every two-year planning cycle."<sup>12</sup> Congress criticized the strategic planning process itself during hearings that led to passing the GNA. Hence, the Joint Staff's director of Strategy and Planning was tasked to "... undertake an end-to-end

evaluation of the products which are created by the Joint Strategic Planning System to seek further opportunities in the cogency and timeliness of the process and products.”<sup>13</sup> Such a comprehensive evaluation was the exception and not the norm.

### **1990 Change**

The outcome of this complete system overhaul culminated with *Memorandum of Policy No. 7*, dated January 30, 1990.<sup>14</sup> This change streamlined the system by adding front-end leader’s guidance and eliminating or combining many other documents into more concise products, as ten products were reduced to four. The front-end guidance was provided through a formal joint strategy review for “... gathering information, raising issues, and facilitating the integration of strategy, operational planning, and program assessments,”<sup>15</sup> that culminated in publishing its first product— *Chairman’s Guidance*. This concise document (six to ten pages) was structured to provide the principal, initial guidance in support of developing the planning system’s next three documents: the *National Military Strategy Document*, *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*, and the *Chairman’s Program Assessment*. This system, although streamlined, still required that a classified *National Military Strategy Document* (NMSD) be produced under a rigid two-year cycle with several parts, one of which was called *National Military Strategy*. In addition, there were several separate functional annexes added to this document, such as intelligence and research and development that totaled hundreds of pages. One annex alone had eleven chapters, thirteen tables, and fifteen tabs. The part of the NMSD called the *National Military Strategy* (also classified) was sent to the secretary of defense for review, forwarded to the president for approval, and then returned to influence defense resource guidance. As will be later described, only the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* was produced as specified in the memorandum; the other three documents were changed significantly during execution. These changes enabled the chairman to respond more nimbly to the strategic environment, then dominated by the Soviet Union’s demise and the Gulf War’s quick completion.

### **1993 Change**

The next revision to the organization’s planning system culminated with publication of a change to *Memorandum of Policy No. 7* in 1993.<sup>16</sup> This change essentially codified what had been executed in previous years rather than designing a new system. Major revisions, which built on these practices, included placing more focus on long-range planning overall by requiring formal environmental scanning, issuing the *National Military Strategy* as an unclassified document designed to communicate with the American people rather than providing internal military direction, and establishing a *Joint Planning Document* to sharpen the chairman’s advice to the secretary of defense on budget issues. The process and product, called the *Joint*

*Strategic Capabilities Plan*, which provided guidance to combatant commanders to develop plans to execute the strategy in the field, remained fairly constant.

### **1997 Change**


The next major revision to the strategic planning system occurred in 1997 and again reflected execution changes the chairman instituted in prior years.<sup>17</sup> The chairman needed to provide better resource advice and long-range direction to enable defense leaders to make needed mission or weapon system trade-offs required by fiscally constrained defense budgets. His planning system did not provide him this ability. To correct this problem, in 1994 General Shalikashvili expanded the charter of the existing Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).<sup>18</sup> This council, chaired by his vice chairman and including the services' vice chairmen, was empowered to assess specific war-fighting areas. This expanded charter created analytical rigor in an inclusive review process to shape mission or weapon system decisions among the services. It provided recommendations that later appeared in a new leader-focused resource document called the *Chairman's Program Recommendation*. The older chairman's assessment was retained. In 1996, General Shalikashvili published the first chairman's vision, *Joint Vision 2010*, a thirty-four-page document designed to provide the conceptual template to channel the vitality of people and leverage technology to achieve more effective joint war fighting.<sup>19</sup> These two new planning products were added formally to the planning system's guidance published in 1997 as a Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction. Memoranda of Policies were phased out.

### **1999 Change**

The last formal change to the strategic planning system in 1999 did not change any major processes or products.<sup>20</sup> Instead, it focused on Theater Engagement Plans to integrate the strategy's "shape" component and to implement the 1996 Joint Vision, which was a priority General Shelton identified when he became chairman.<sup>21</sup> This decade's evolution is illustrated graphically in Figure 5.1.<sup>22</sup> These changes incrementally evolved the strategic planning system from a rigid, Cold War focus at the start of the decade to a more flexible, vision-oriented and resource-focused system at the decade's end.

### **The 2005 System**

Although there have been no official changes to the 1999 chairman's operating instruction that describes the strategic planning system as of November 2005, it has not been completely followed during General Myers' tenure. Three strategic




**Figure 5.1 Evolution of strategic planning system.**

planning documents have been added, two were deleted, and four retained. The three new products added from the 1999 revision were: *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*, *Chairman's Risk Assessment* and the *Joint Operations Concepts* (changed to *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* in August 2005). The two strategic planning products deleted were the joint vision (vision is now embedded in the strategy) and the *Joint Planning Document* (staff resource advice). The unclassified strategy, two leader-focused resource documents, and the war planning guidance remained the same. As the 1999 operating instruction is currently under revision, the next one will be influenced by these practical changes and a recent study on strategic planning by the Institute for Defense Analysis. These strategic planning system changes as of June 2005 and integrating relationships are depicted in Figure 5.2.<sup>23</sup>

## Strategic Planning Products

The chairman's strategic planning process described above created many products to provide formal direction to manage existing demands and respond to future challenges during this sixteen-year period. As mentioned, there were products related to assessment, vision, strategy, resources and plans; all subjects identified in the academic literature as areas that a strategic planning system should address. The key planning products in each of these major subjects are now discussed for their broad direction.

*Strategy: Foundation for All Major Processes*



**Figure 5.2 Strategy: Foundation for all major processes.**

**Assessment**

The chairmen’s assessment of the strategic environment, called the *Joint Strategy Review*, became a constant strategic planning product beginning in 1993; however, it was completed in different ways and with different focuses.<sup>24</sup> A separate classified report was issued frequently, but at other times the intellectual output from the review process was used to update this system’s strategy or vision documents or prepare the Joint Staff to support the *Quadrennial Defense Review*. When a separate report was produced, it often would identify issues that needed more intense study or areas where existing strategic planning products needed updating. The chairman directed what the strategy review would entail prior to its start, hence, this review responded to strategic issues he needed examined. The strategy review process was not conducted within the Joint Staff alone, but included representatives from the services, combatant commands, and appropriate defense organizations.

The process was inclusive in design, allowing ideas to be initially introduced from an organization’s lower levels, which helped ensure this strategy review had a broad perspective that resonated with those the chairman influenced. Another type of assessment, now called the Chairman’s Risk Assessment, has been part of the strategic planning system since 2000. Earlier, the chairman assessed strategic issues under the overarching construct of a net assessment, which was loosely defined in his planning instructions and did not always result in a formal product. In addition, Congress required the chairman to write an assessment of the secretary of

defense's *Quadrennial Defense Review*, which appeared at this document's end. The Chairman's Risk Assessment started as an annual assessment with the *National Defense Authorization Act of 2000* (NDAA)<sup>25</sup> and was modified to require greater specificity by the 2004 NDAA.<sup>26</sup> The chairman is required to conduct a comprehensive examination of the strategic and military risk to execute the *National Military Strategy*.<sup>27</sup> There are defined areas this report must address, along with a caveat that it must be routed through the secretary of defense if risk is determined to be significant.

## **Vision**

The strategic planning system's first two vision documents, *Joint Vision 2010* in 1996 and *Joint Vision 2020* in 2000, each consisted of about thirty-five pages.<sup>28</sup> They were used to identify joint war-fighting requirements ten to fifteen years out and directly influence service programs to meet those requirements. In organizational terms, this was a way the chairman was trying to embed a joint climate within the services' cultures through resource direction. The first vision was centered on four operational concepts of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics and full-dimensional protection. It served to focus attention and leverage technology to achieve better joint interoperability and war fighting. The second vision directly built upon the first, as it kept the same four operational concepts. But it placed more emphasis on innovation, information, and interagency coordination to transform the force to be fully joint; now defined as "intellectually, operationally, organizationally, doctrinally, and technically."<sup>29</sup> Both visions had broad acceptance as service leaders spoke positively about each vision's influence in shaping their decisions or their service visions. These two visions were the most mentioned strategic planning products in the chairman's annual posture statements to Congress during this time frame, which is an indicator of their importance.<sup>30</sup>

The current joint vision is now embedded in three pages of the 2004 *National Military Strategy*. This vision built upon the previous joint vision, as it is focused on the goal of full spectrum dominance, which is defined as "the ability to control any situation or defeat any adversary across the range of military operations."<sup>31</sup> Although the chairman's vision is still specified, its purpose to influence service resource decisions was replaced by the secretary of defense's transformation guidance documents in the 2000s, with the services developing transformation plans to execute this guidance. However, the vision of full spectrum dominance is in conceptual agreement with the more detailed transformation guidance.

Vision can be focused operationally in addition to being strategic. The chairman's *Joint Operations Concepts* in 2003 and now the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* in 2005 provided an operational war-fighting focus to develop a capabilities-based joint force.<sup>32</sup> This capabilities focus was described in the 2001 *Quadrennial Defense Review* and later in other defense guidance. The focus of the twenty-eight-page

*Joint Operations Concepts* was to articulate the overarching concept for future joint military operations. It broadly defined the construct for robust subordinate operating, functional, and enabling concepts to create joint capabilities. The 2005 *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* incorporated lessons learned from operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, while looking to the future to develop capabilities to fight tomorrow's wars. These operationally focused vision documents, and the substantive complex processes and products developed to implement these concepts, are encouraging military personnel to think and act jointly. The earlier joint visions, along with these operationally focused concepts, will complete the joint journey that began with service deconfliction in the early 1990s, to interoperability in the mid-1990s, to now emerging interdependence. This is a journey to create a joint military culture.

## Strategy

The chairman's unclassified *National Military Strategy*, the key strategic planning system product, was produced in 1992, 1995, 1997 and 2004.<sup>33</sup> These four strategies broadly outlined the military's global challenges, identified the objectives to be achieved, specified the foundations and principles of military power, and described the force structure or capabilities to achieve those objectives. This was essentially an *ends, ways, and means* paradigm to respond to the ever-changing strategic environment. In the first three strategies, the service's force structure was defined broadly (carrier battle groups, divisions and wings), but with greater specificity as the decade continued. For example, the 1997 strategy identified the numbers of army regiments and brigades, navy attack submarines, coast guard cutters, and special operations people. In the 2004 strategy, there was no reference to specific force structure. Instead, joint force attributes and capabilities were broadly identified, along with a need to size the force in a 1-4-2-1 construct to accomplish the following: defend the homeland (1), deter forward in and from four geographic regions (4); conduct two overlapping swiftly defeat campaigns (2); and win decisively in one campaign (1).<sup>34</sup> This latest approach was designed to provide flexibility for force structure changes in concert with a capability-based versus a threat-based military focus.

When the 1990s began, the strategy was focused on global war, and the enemy was the Soviet Union. The 1992 strategy changed the focus to the core mission of fighting regional wars. The 1995 strategy more broadly encompassed global engagement across the spectrum of conflict from peacekeeping, to peacemaking, to war. In 1997, the strategy provided a balance between shaping the environment, responding to the multiple missions and preparing now for the uncertain future. The words *shape, respond* and *prepare* and their concepts appeared in many other strategic documents, such as the 1997 *National Security Strategy* and 1997 *Quadrennial Defense Review*. As these strategies changed in the 1990s, the force structure to accomplish these strategies was reduced by about one-third. In 2004, the



strategy was simply articulated along three “p” words—“*protect* the United States against external attacks and aggression, *prevent* conflict and surprise attack, and *prevail* against adversaries.”<sup>35</sup> Its success rested on the three priorities of winning the war on terror, enhancing the ability to fight jointly, and transforming the armed forces through a combination of technology, intellect and cultural adjustments.

In addition to the unclassified national military strategies, there were two classified strategies produced that were focused on the war on terrorism. In October 2002, Chairman Myers and the secretary of defense issued a *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism* to provide guidance to the military services and regional commanders to focus their efforts.<sup>36</sup> Later, in March 2005, they issued an update to that plan. This update, which went through many revisions, was described in a news article as “. . . a multipronged strategy that targets eight pressure points and outlines six methods for attacking terrorist networks.”<sup>37</sup>

## **Resources**

The chairman’s three resource documents (*Joint Planning Document*, *Chairman’s Program Recommendation* and *Chairman’s Program Assessment*) expanded in the mid-1990s as strategic planning processes were developed to influence resource decisions.<sup>38</sup> These resource documents, along with the Defense documents they were intended to influence, were classified. As the decade progressed, these documents were focused to enable the chairman to provide more resource influence and specificity, a requirement emphasized by the GNA. The staff-focused resource document, *Joint Planning Document*, was produced biennially starting in 1993. It went from separate chapters developed by Joint Staff directorates or separate agencies to a fully integrated resource document in 1997 that used the chairman’s vision and war-fighting assessments to produce integrated resource advice. However, by decade’s end, this document was no longer published, which perhaps was an indicator of its declining influence.

The planning system’s two leader-focused annual resource documents, *Chairman’s Program Recommendation* and *Chairman’s Program Assessment*, increased in influence and specificity starting in the middle 1990s. For example, the *Chairman’s Program Assessment* went from a few pages in 1992 to an expanded assessment in 1995 that argued for shifting significant funds and pursuing different approaches for recapitalization that would readjust up to 12 percent of the defense budget.<sup>39</sup> These two leader-focused documents, which reflected the chairman’s style and priorities, were considered personal correspondence between the chairman and the secretary of defense. Hence, they had limited external review and were classified. The program recommendation was designed to influence the secretary’s initial resource guidance to the services. The program assessment was designed to enable the chairman to assess the services’ Program Objective Memorandums (POMs) and influence budget deliberations that converted the services’ POMs to the defense budget

submitted to Congress. These two documents, which were shaped by the JROC's meetings, were vetted with the service chiefs and combatant commanders instead of being merely coordinated. They were a formal way the chairman, in addition to other resource advice, directly advocated the combatant commanders' requirements within the defense processes.

## **Plans**

The *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* was the one constant among all the strategic planning changes during this sixteen-year period. It continued to have the same purpose, which was to provide strategic guidance to the combatant commanders and service chiefs to develop executable plans based on resourced military capabilities to execute the military strategy.<sup>40</sup> More specifically, it identified the various types of plans that combatant commanders must develop, as this document integrated higher-level guidance from the president and secretary of defense into a family of executable plans and apportioned forces based on completed budgets. It identified the agreed assumptions upon which these plans were based and specified the numerous functional annexes required by specific plans, such as intelligence, logistics and mobility. The actual contents of the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* were classified, but it evolved during this sixteen-year period as the types of plans it tasked changed in response to the changing threats and the different military strategies. For example, in 1990 it specified global (Cold War focused) and regional plans. They were replaced in 1993 with operational plans (OPLANS), concept plans (CONPLANS) and concept summaries for global and regional contingencies. Later there was guidance to develop theater engagement plans, which are now called security cooperation plans. In the 1990s, these products continued to be reviewed formally for currency within an overall two-year planning cycle, and they were republished or amended during this cycle. In the 2000s, the intent was to shorten this planning cycle to one year, and the process by which combatant commanders develop plans also received additional secretary of defense involvement.

## **Chairman's Legacy**

### ***General Colin L. Powell (1989–1993)***

General Powell greatly simplified strategic planning by reducing the number of formal planning products from ten to four and increasing the system's flexibility to respond to his direction by a concise leader-focused document called *Chairman's Guidance*. He short-circuited the system's processes, as he did not wait for a completed environmental assessment specified by his planning system, but issued this guidance based on a senior commander's meeting.<sup>41</sup> He did not wait for his planning

system's structured processes and coordination cycles to produce another classified, voluminous military strategy document with hundreds of pages of annexes, but published an unclassified twenty-seven-page *National Military Strategy* in 1992 under his signature. Considered the most significant strategy change since the 1950s, this strategy's content, overall coordination and the force structure incorporated within it were more a result of his interpersonal skills than of a formal strategic planning process.<sup>42</sup> This strategy's focus on communicating with the American people and Congress, versus the internal staff advice it provided before, was an important legacy that remains today. In the resource area, whereas his planning system specified a detailed assessment of service programs not to exceed one hundred seventy-five pages, his assessment was a very short memorandum.<sup>43</sup> Although General Powell did not use many formal planning processes, he kept some structure. For example, he used the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* and structured processes to keep the military in the field focused operationally.

Although his strategic planning products clearly addressed the military's challenges as identified in the chairman's annual Posture Statements to Congress, very few strategic planning products or processes (average five) were mentioned in his statements. In addition, the word "joint" also was not emphasized in his lexicon, as this word barely appeared in these same statements.<sup>44</sup> As the first chairman fully under the GNA's direction, a joint climate had not yet evolved. As he did not follow his planning system in producing three of its four products, either the system was not nimble enough to respond to fast-moving challenges, or he preferred a leadership style in which personal relationships dominated when providing formal advice.

### ***General John M. Shalikashvili (1993–1997)***

General Shalikashvili used the strategic planning system markedly differently than his predecessor. He kept the flexibility and simplicity his predecessor established by limiting the strategy's complexity, but he emphasized using the planning processes to develop it. For example, his two national military strategies in 1995 and 1997 were coordinated fully within the planning system's processes, and other strategic planning products were used in their development. He kept the same structure in war planning as his predecessor, but he expanded its focus by requiring new theater engagement plans to more fully implement his 1997 strategy's "shape" component. General Shalikashvili went farther in providing long-term strategic direction, when he published the chairman's first vision in 1996, and later included it in the planning system. He used considerable interpersonal skills, which included sending personal notes to his colleagues and personally reviewing every recommended change to develop this vision.<sup>45</sup> He used this same strategic planning system to start an implementing process for the vision. He also fostered a close relationship with defense officials using the strategic planning system through his consensus and process-focused decision style. For example, his vision gained wide acceptance with

civilian and military leaders, aspects of it appeared in Defense resource documents, and his environment assessment helped focus the initial work of the Department of Defense's first *Quadrennial Defense Review*.<sup>46</sup>

General Shalikashvili expanded strategic planning in the resource areas, as he added a short leader-focused document called the *Chairman's Program Recommendation* that continues today. He used his vice chairman to expand by roughly a factor of ten the amount of time spent by the JROC to access programs analytically and provide resource recommendations that appeared in his two leader-focused resource documents.<sup>47</sup> Using outputs from this council, his resource advice to the secretary of defense grew in content and influence. He mentioned strategic planning products and processes in his annual Posture Statements to Congress an average of fifteen times versus his predecessor's average of five. He also mentioned the word joint or derivatives of that word about twenty-five times during these posture statements, which is an indicator of his focus.<sup>48</sup> Perhaps his most important legacy was that his vision, process-focused strategic planning system and joint emphasis embedded a joint climate within his staff and those he influenced. This established the foundation for today's joint thinking.

### ***General Henry Hugh Shelton (1997–2001)***

General Shelton used the strategic planning system in a very process-oriented manner. No substantive changes were made to this system overall, but he focused on using it to promote evolutionary changes to the military and provide difficult resource recommendations. Similar to his predecessors, he kept the heavily structured war planning document and processes relatively untouched, but he more fully integrated theater engagement plans within the planning processes. He defined a process to implement his predecessor's joint vision by identifying twenty-first century challenges and the desired operating capabilities to meet them, while providing direction to conduct vision-related experiments.<sup>49</sup> In 2000, during the later part of his tenure, he fully used the strategic planning processes to update formally the joint vision to better incorporate concepts associated with leveraging the information component, encouraging more innovation, and using the interagency to help resolve strategic issues.<sup>50</sup> He also improved the process and timeliness of the leader-focused strategic planning resource recommendations to defense leaders. He elevated the work of the JROC and the associated processes to be more strategic in nature.<sup>51</sup> He used his resources and leadership influence to more directly support quality of life programs for military people and their families, the importance of which was specifically covered in his Congressional Posture Statements.<sup>52</sup> For example, he mentioned strategic planning products and processes an average of twenty-two times and the word "joint" forty-four times in these posture statements, which were indicators of his process and joint leadership focus.<sup>53</sup> Most importantly, he clearly continued the joint focus. He built on General Shalikashvili's work to

embed that joint climate more strongly and perhaps establish the beginning of a joint culture within his staff and the services.

### **General Richard B. Myers (2001–2005)**

General Myers faced a more challenging strategic environment caused by the September 11, 2001 attack. His environment was dominated by the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, along with the global war on terror that continues today. If this was not enough, the need to transform in stride also occupied his and his staff's energy. These challenges caused him to modify significantly the strategic planning system he inherited. He referenced strategic planning processes and products more than any other chairman, illustrating the importance he placed on this system.<sup>54</sup> These modifications, which involved three new strategy-related products, have not yet been codified in a chairman's strategic planning instruction. However, instructions have been published that specify the processes used by the JROC and establish new Functional Capability Boards that shape issues before the JROC. The programs this council reviewed also greatly expanded, which provided greater joint inclusiveness in his resource advice.<sup>55</sup> To illustrate this greater inclusiveness, the Functional Capability Boards review all programs with a joint impact, instead of those with large dollar criteria only, and members of defense agencies or even other government agencies, such as Homeland Security, can attend meetings associated with these programs.

The strategy parts of his strategic planning system differed most from those of his predecessors. He and the secretary of defense produced a separate classified strategy focused on the war on terrorism in 2002 and updated it in 2005 to better link the military element to the many other national strategies associated with combating terrorism. The chairman's 2004 *National Military Strategy*, redrafted numerous times, was completed in May 2004 as the need for a chairman's military strategy, along with the need to assess the strategic and military risk to execute that strategy, was clarified by Congress in the 2004 NDAA. He also succinctly identified the overall joint vision in this strategy. Chairman Myers identified the importance of a joint culture or being "born joint" in several of his Posture Statements.<sup>56</sup> His focus on operationalizing a vision with the additional joint concepts and inclusive processes resulting from the 2003 *Joint Operations Concepts* and 2005 *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* have the potential to create a remarkable legacy for transforming to a true joint force. He instituted a greater top-down and combatant commander input on jointness to develop capabilities to create a synergistic joint end-state now called interdependency. It is too early to determine the result of his efforts, as developing capabilities to achieve joint interdependency takes years; however, he not only enhanced the joint climate, but perhaps established a culture of real jointness among all the military services. Creating a culture is much more difficult than creating a climate, but it is more powerful once established.

## Conclusion

Today's senior leaders can learn from examining how others used systems or processes to better enable their organizations to respond to complex and ambiguous strategic challenges. Examining how four chairmen of different leadership styles used an evolving strategic planning system to respond to the complex and ever changing strategic environment reveals five key leadership concepts today's leaders should employ. These leadership concepts are organized along the following five areas: importance of a vision, key characteristics of an effective strategic planning process, the need to strike a balance between flexibility and structure within the strategic planning system's products, understanding the magnitude of change needed and using systems and processes to create a culture.

The first leadership concept is that leaders need to clearly articulate a vision, owned by the organization, as part of the strategic planning system to influence long-term change effectively. Chairman Shalikashvili clearly identified a need for a joint vision in 1996 and employed an inclusive leader-involved process to create that vision, which had wide acceptance among those he coordinated with and those above him. Chairman Shelton followed this and developed comprehensive processes to implement that vision before he formally updated the joint vision in 2000 to place more emphasis on innovation, information and interagency. Chairman Myers continued with a vision focus through his two concept guidance documents to transform the military operationally to a higher level of jointness. Much of the joint war-fighting progress to date can be traced back to the first two visions, and the current vision to achieve full spectrum dominance is being directed by the 2005 *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*.

The second leadership concept is that leaders need to ensure their strategic planning processes are flexible, inclusive and integrated to improve effectiveness. The flexible aspect rests with the fact that, in execution, each chairman modified to different degrees the strategic planning system he inherited. This was caused by the leader's style and the strategic environment. For example, Chairman Powell's modification of the planning system from ten classified, voluminous products into four products of greater clarity and simplicity that were developed more nimbly was influenced by the Cold War's unexpected demise and his personal leadership style. Chairman Shalikashvili's addition of leader-focused resource advice and joint vision was influenced by the tight fiscal environment and his process-oriented style. The inclusive aspect is supported by the diverse composition of the joint boards and councils that developed strategic planning products, which allowed divergent views to be heard, understood and incorporated. Interviews with strategic planners revealed that these inclusive processes educated and created important relationships, and many planners even considered planning processes more important than products.<sup>57</sup> The integrated nature aspect goes one step farther than inclusiveness in that this system's planning processes directly influenced other defense, service and combatant command leaders and their processes to ensure the end result was integrated.

The third leadership concept centers on the need for leaders to ensure their strategic planning products have the proper balance between flexibility and structure. The chairman's strategic planning products related to strategy and vision had great flexibility in providing broad direction, which enabled staffs to use their intellectual capacities to develop a wide range of successful responses to complex issues. The chairman's strategic planning products related to plans had a much greater degree of structure to provide the needed disciplined direction to execute those strategies. This disciplined direction in developing war plans is driven by the systems integration and overall synchronization that is associated with joint interdependence needed by the supportive and supporting combatant commanders. Disciplined direction in developing war plans, then, allows the creativity needed in execution, as disciplined planning considers various options that are vetted prior to execution.

The fourth leadership concept is that leaders need to understand the relationship between the magnitude and speed of change needed and how a strategic planning system can be used to influence that change. If change is needed quickly and is revolutionary in scope, then leaders should not use a strategic planning system but work outside that formal system. For example, when Chairman Powell created the 1992 *National Military Strategy*, a strategy revolutionary in substance when compared to its predecessors, he did not follow the processes or product characteristics described in his strategic planning system. Similarly, Chairman Shalikashvili did not follow directions in his strategic planning system, but used extraordinary personnel interaction when creating the chairman's first joint vision, a direction thought outside the chairman's domain. However, in implementing both this strategy and vision, which would take a decade or more, the strategic planning system was used heavily. Hence, a strategic planning system is more valued to make the needed evolutionary changes over time that can ultimately lead to revolutionary results.

The last leadership concept is that leaders can use a strategic planning system to help them create a climate and embed a culture within complex organizations. Although there have been many other mechanisms that influenced a joint culture, such as congressional-required joint promotion, assignment and educational criteria, the strategic planning system reinforced these mechanisms. Whereas Chairman Powell was just starting to create a joint climate, Chairman Shalikashvili greatly reinforced that climate with his strategic planning joint vision and inclusive planning bodies that developed the system's resource products. Chairman Shelton reinforced that joint climate and started the beginning of a joint culture through implementing the joint vision and more inclusive planning bodies. Chairman Myers focused on embedding a joint culture through his expansive joint operating concepts and more inclusive functional capabilities boards. It is this author's belief, based on working within and studying the effects of strategic planning during this period, that a culture of jointness, envisioned in the heart and spirit of many of our nation's civilian and military leaders, has taken hold within the higher levels of the

Joint Staff and the services. The strategic planning system clearly assisted this joint cultural evolution.

Leaders of complex organizations who embrace these five concepts just mentioned will be able to better use a strategic planning system to respond to their strategic challenges and provide direction to their organizations to meet the current demands while positioning for the future. An examination of history has shown that each chairman's ever-evolving strategic planning system comprised of inclusive and flexible processes, along with the right combination of flexibility and structure in products, was important in enabling him to provide strategic advice and direction to our nation's civilian and military leaders during volatile and uncertain times.

## Notes

1. Robert H. Cole et al., *The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff* (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, 1995), 207–209.
2. *Ibid.*, 30.
3. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, *Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Conference Report*, 99th Congress, 2nd session, September 12, 1986 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Section 3, 99–824); Richard Meinhart, *Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff's Leadership Using the Joint Strategic Planning System in the 1990s: Recommendations for Strategic Leaders* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 2–7.
4. House Report 108–354, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004,” Section 903; “Biennial Review of the National Military Strategy by Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff,” available from <http://thomas.loc.gov/> (accessed November 11, 2005).
5. The Joint Staff, “Fiscal Year (FY) 2004/FY 2005 Biennial Budget Estimates,” February 2003, available from [http://www.dod.gov/comptroller/defbudget/fy2004/budget\\_justification/pdfs/operation/Volume\\_1\\_-\\_DW\\_Justification/TJS\\_FY04-05\\_PB.pdf](http://www.dod.gov/comptroller/defbudget/fy2004/budget_justification/pdfs/operation/Volume_1_-_DW_Justification/TJS_FY04-05_PB.pdf) (accessed November 30, 2005). Personnel reductions reflect 1999 defense reform initiatives and 2002 Nation Defense Authorization Act guidance.
6. Detailed strategic planning guidance was reflected in Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 7, 1990; MOP 7, 1993; Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3100.01, 1997; and CJCSI 3100.01A, 1999.
7. Discussion that follows on relationships and integration of the leader with organizations above the chairman and those with whom he coordinates is covered in the 2000 edition of *The Joint Staff Officers Guide* and in the memorandum and instructions that define the organization's strategic planning system.
8. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, “National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2006,” April 2005; and “National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2001,” March 2000, 4, 33, both sources.
9. This discussion of challenges is the author's assessment from reading the four national military strategies and attending service chiefs' lectures while teaching at the Army War College.



10. Davis, 160; Meinhart, *Chairman Joint Chiefs*, 11–12. Some chairmen, such as Powell, had a more developed personal relationship with many leaders in Washington, D.C., based on past experiences than General Shelton, who was relatively new to this strategic arena. In addition, each succeeding chairman used “joint” words with varying frequency in his annual Congressional Posture statement.
11. Edgar H Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership* (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1993), 231.
12. Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., and Thomas-Durell Young, *U.S. Department of Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003) 10, 35–36.
13. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Memorandum of Policy* (hereafter *CJCS MOP*) No. 84 (*CJCS MOP 84*), *Joint Strategic Planning System* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 30, 1989), 3.
14. *CJCS MOP 7, Joint Strategic Planning System* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 30, 1990). Discussion reflects materiel in this document.
15. *Ibid.*, 20.
16. *CJCS MOP 7*, 1st Revision, March 17, 1993. Discussion reflects material in this document.
17. Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3100.01 (hereafter *CJCSI 3100.01*), *Joint Strategic Planning System* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 1, 1997). Note: Chairman’s instructions replaced memoranda of policies during this period.
18. Office of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *JROC Planning in a Revolutionary Era* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1996), 4–5.
19. John M. Shalikashvili, *Joint Vision 2010* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 1.
20. *CJCSI 3100.01A* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 1, 1999). Discussion reflects material in this document.
21. The “shape” component was one of the three components of the 1997 *National Military Strategy*. The other two components were titled “respond” and “prepare.” These components are discussed later in the chapter, in the section on “Strategy.”
22. “Joint Strategic Planning System” briefing slides for Joint Processes and Landpower Course 3, Lesson AY 05 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, October 28, 2004), slide 5.
23. “National Military Strategy Linkages and the Joint Strategic Planning System,” briefing to Joint Faculty Education Conference (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, June 22, 2005), slide 12. In Figure 5.2, IPL stands for Combatant Commanders Integrated Priority List, which identifies what combatant commanders desire that is not funded in service programs. POMs are Program Objective Memorandums, the programs the services desire to place in the upcoming budget submitted to Congress. JOC stands for *Joint Operating Concepts* described later in the chapter, in the discussion of vision. CPR is the *Chairman’s Program Recommendation*, and CPA is the *Chairman’s Program Assessment*, explained later in the discussion of resources.
24. The author read many classified strategy reviews and correspondence documenting the process and, in May 2002, interviewed military planners who worked on the vision and military strategies during the 1990s.

25. House Report 106-162, "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000," Section 1034, available from <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/uscode/index.html> (accessed December 4, 2005).
26. House Report 108-354, "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004," Section 903, "Biennial Review of the National Military Strategy by Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff," available from <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin> (accessed November 11, 2005).
27. There is a congressional requirement under *U.S. Code*, Title 10, Section 153 (b) for the chairman to assess the strategic and military risks associated with executing the missions called for under the current *National Military Strategy*. This task is due no later than January 1 of every odd-numbered year. There is also a congressional requirement under Section 153 (d) to do a detailed biennial review of the *National Military Strategy*, which includes as part of this review an assessment of the military and strategic risks in executing the missions of the current strategy. This much more detailed review is due no later than February 15th of every even-numbered year.
28. John M. Shalikashvili, *Joint Vision 2010*; Henry H. Shelton, *Joint Vision 2020* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2000). Discussion reflects material from these documents.
29. Shelton, *Joint Vision*, 2.
30. Richard M. Meinhart, *Strategic Planning Through an Organizational Lens* (ProQuest UMI Dissertation Services, 2004), 104–107. An analysis was performed on key words in the chairman's annual Congressional Posture Statements to identify what was emphasized.
31. Richard B. Myers, *National Military Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004), 20.
32. Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Joint Operations Concepts* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 2003, available from [www.dtic.mil/jointvision/secdef\\_approved\\_jopsc.doc](http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/secdef_approved_jopsc.doc); accessed December 1, 2005); Richard B. Myers, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff August 2005, available from [http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/approved\\_ccjov2.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/approved_ccjov2.pdf); accessed December 1, 2005).
33. Discussions that follow reflect material in the following strategies: Colin L. Powell, *National Military Strategy of the United States*, January 1992; John M. Shalikashvili, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, 1995; John M. Shalikashvili, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, 1997; and Richard B. Myers, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, 2004 (all, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff).
34. The overlapping "swiftly defeat" campaigns were described as quickly denying an adversary's operational or strategic objective in both locations and rapidly reestablishing security conditions favorable to the United States and its partners. A "win decisively" campaign is much broader in scope than a swiftly defeat campaign. It is designed to bring about fundamentally favorable and enduring results that may entail lengthy periods of combat and stability operations, along with significant investments of the nation's resources and time.
35. Myers, *National Military Strategy*, 8.

36. U.S. General Accounting Office, *Combating Terrorism: Observations on National Strategies Related to Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, March 3, 2003), 5.
37. Linda Robinson, "Plan of Attack," *USNews.com*, August 1, 2005, <http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/050801/1terror.htm> (accessed November 11, 2005).
38. Author's assessment from listening to many lectures from speakers at the U.S. Army War College from 1997 to 2005, who described these documents, and from reading some of the 1990 documents.
39. Office of the Vice Chairman, *JROC Planning*, 23.
40. These words describing the JSCP's purpose remained fundamentally the same from the *MOP 7* through *CJCSI 3100.01A*. The descriptions of the types of plans came from the strategic planning instructions and discussions with individuals who worked directly with the plans or taught this subject.
41. Douglas Lovelace and Thomas-Durnell Young, *U.S. Department of Defense*, 37–45.
42. Harry E. Rothman, *Forging a New National Military Strategy in a Post Cold War World: A Perspective from the Joint Staff* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 16; Lorna S. Jaffe, *The Development of the Base Force 1989–1992* (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, 1993), 48–50.
43. Meinhart, *Strategic Planning*, 132.
44. *Ibid.*, 104.
45. Interview with Joint Staff planner on May 9, 2000; Industrial College of the Armed Forces, *JV 2010 Case Analysis* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 2002), 6.
46. *Joint Vision 2010* was referenced in *Defense Planning Guidance* and the Defense Department's logistics strategic plan. Many service leaders spoke positively on this vision's influence. For the QDR influence linkage, see John Y. Schrader, Leslie Lewis, and Roger A. Brown, *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Analysis* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 19.
47. Office of the Vice Chairman, *JROC Planning*, 10–12.
48. Meinhart, *Strategic Planning*, 104.
49. Processes described in *CJCSI 3010.02, Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 9, 1998); *CJCSI 3010.02A, Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 29, 2000).
50. Interagency is a term used to identify when other government agencies under the president collectively work together to respond to our nation's challenges.
51. "Statement of General Richard B. Myers, Vice Chairman of The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee," April 4, 2000, <http://armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/2000/e000404.htm> (accessed November 20, 2005).
52. Meinhart, *Chairman Joint Chiefs*.
53. Meinhart, *Strategic Planning*, 104.
54. The author analyzed Chairman Myers' posture statements in the same way as was done for the other chairmen and he averaged the highest.

55. Author's assessment from reading the many *CJCSIs* that covered the Joint Requirements Oversight, Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments, and Functional Capability Boards since the middle 1990s.
56. Chairman Myers referenced "born joint" in his 2004 and 2004 Posture Statements to Congress. In addition, he talked about the importance of a cultural change in his 2002 and 2003 Posture Statements to change mindsets. He was the first chairman to do so.
57. Meinhart, *Strategic Planning*, 187–188.



## *Chapter 6*

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# The Leviathan's Bit: The U.S. Defense Budget

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Jeffrey A. Weber

The way the Department of Defense runs the budgeting system, the planning system is broken. It is not serving the department or the country well. And yet it is inexorable. It just rolls along, like a freight train coming from San Francisco with the wrong things for New York. There are plenty of people who look at it and don't know it's wrong ... and people say, "Well, that's the way we do it. This is how it works, and don't you understand that the only way to affect that (the freight train) is to reach back 2½ years and load it properly." Of course, my answer is, "Don't you understand, we don't have 2½ years to wait to change."

**Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in answer to a question asked after a speech unveiling DoD transformation plans, National War College, January 31, 2002.**

## **Introduction**

Budgeting is recognized as the primary administrative tool for controlling an organization. Financial resources are the life blood of any policy or program. In order

for any program to begin or continue, it requires funding. The priorities of an organization are found in what it chooses to fund and what it chooses not to fund. Shift an organization's funding from one program to a different program and you change that organization's direction.

Budgeting for defense is a complex, networked structured, multifaceted, time-consuming process, fraught with uncertainty, especially for the long-term implications. The decision makers involved are not only considering the current operating costs, but force structures, weapon systems, bases, training and maintenance requirements for defense needs ten to fifteen years from now.

Control and direction of the Department of Defense (DoD) is determined through the budgetary process. With over \$500 billion in expenditures and operations in every state and around the globe, there is no single point of control over the DoD's budget process. The vast and complex network that the DoD's Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) encompasses makes singular control of the DoD an impossibility. The inherent complexity in PPBES, in both its process and the number of stakeholders involved, has produced an asymmetric results state, combined with a paradoxical state of organizational inertia.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the DoD's budget process and its interconnection with defense policy. This chapter begins with an overview of the influence of the U.S. Constitution on defense budgeting. The first section clarifies what is meant by the defense budget. Misunderstandings can occur from failing to understand the scope of what the defense budget entails. The second section focuses on explaining who the key decision makers are in terms of the DoD, the president, and Congress. The focus of this section is to identify the key agencies, committees and positions involved in the budgetary process. The defense budgeting process occurs in a network structure with no central locus of power, thereby requiring a collaborative process. The third section examines the specific defense budgeting process as it occurs through the entire defense budget network. Consequently, the DoD's specific budget process, PPBES are explained, as well as the process of the Office of Management and Budget and other offices of the president, and the congressional appropriation process. The intent in the second section is to show the interconnection of multiple processes and how each is used as a way of controlling the direction of defense policy and the U.S. military. The final section explains the trends in the actual defense budget numbers and the possible long-term implications.

## **Overview of a Public Budget**

A budget is a fiscal plan for a defined time period, which describes and explains fiscal resources available and their allocation for the accomplishment of policy objectives compared over one or more past and future time periods. Basically, a budget illustrates, across multiple time periods, past, present and future, the allocation of

anticipated financial resources to established or desired policy objectives and programs. One can conceive of a budget as the actual budget document, which shows the revenues and expenditures in different categories over three or more time periods, or as a process for allocating fiscal resources for the purpose of accomplishing policy objectives.

A budget document typically consists of an explanation of what the budget is meant to achieve. This is followed by a presentation of expected revenues, which are shown based on the sources for those revenues. Generally, revenues are depicted either by their sources or by source and program area. Next, the expenditures are shown for the past year, current year and for the next year.

Generically, a budgeting process consists of four phases: (1) planning and analysis, (2) formulation and allocation, (3) execution and (4) audit and evaluation. The planning and analysis phase involves determining the policy goals and objectives to be achieved and their priority. Next, is an analysis of revenue sources and the amounts of revenue that can be expected, matched to the estimated costs of the approved policy goals and objectives. The second phase, formulation and allocation, concerns the drafting, presenting and approving of a budget. Once the budget is approved, the funds are allocated to the policy goals and objectives as directed in the approved budget. The third phase of the budget process, execution, is the actual expenditure of the funds and the tracking of those expenditures and the determination of policy accomplishment. The fourth and final phase, evaluation and audit, examines the revenue and expenditure data, in connection with the policy accomplishment data, to determine the efficiency and effectiveness of the current budget and provide direction for future budgets. Using information derived from the audit and evaluation phase, the process begins again with the next budget.

The defense budgeting process occurs within the context of the federal government budgeting process, which also occurs within the Constitutional framework. An understanding of the defense budget requires one to understand how the Constitution frames the federal budgeting process and the overall federal budget process. Once this context is established, it helps to make sense of the defense budgeting process.

## **The U.S. Constitution and the Defense Budget**

Whoever controls funding, controls policy. Consequently, recognizing the power that is inherent in the budget process, the United States' founders ensured that the use of money was divided between the Congress and the president. The Constitution does not explicitly address the formulation and approval of a budget. It does vest the power of the chief executive with the president, thereby implying the power of managing a budget. The Constitution also provides sole authority for the levying of taxes (raising of revenue) and the appropriation of funds (spending of money) to Congress.<sup>1</sup>



Control over defense budgeting is further divided by the U.S. Constitution, which explicitly divides control over the military between the president and Congress. Whereas Article II, section 1 of the Constitution vests all executive power in the president, and section 2, clause 1 makes the president the commander in chief of the military, article I, section 8, clause 1 provides Congress with the authority to “make rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces.” Furthermore, as in all areas of the budget, as “chief executive,” the president compiles a budget and presents it to Congress, but only funds that have been authorized and appropriated by Congress can actually be spent. The president is also bound to spend the appropriated funds in the manner proscribed by Congress, thereby giving Congress additional authority in the administration of the military.

Additionally, the Constitution explicitly places defense funding in a unique category, in that article 1, section 8, clause 12 forbids any appropriation for the military to be for a two-year term. This provision makes defense funding separate and distinct from all other appropriations because there are no long-term funding obligations. However, defense funding does entail long-term funding for the development and procurement of weapon systems and capital projects. Consequently, there is an inherent conflict between the type of funding and budgeting that is necessary for a portion of the defense budget, and the type of funding and budgeting that actually occurs.

The constitutionally proscribed friction has produced an historical, administrative power struggle between the president, Congress and the military leadership over control of the U.S. military organization and operations. The power struggle has produced a budgetary process for defense that is distinctive from the rest of the federal government’s budgetary process, but at the same time is fully a part of the process.

## **The Federal Budget**

From the founding of the United States (in 1789) to 1921, there was no explicitly defined federal budget process. Generally, each executive branch department or agency would go to Congress when it required funding and Congress would appropriate funds. Additionally, Congress would demand an accounting of expenditures by the different departments and agencies. The *Budget and Accounting Act of 1921* (P.L. 67-13;42 Stat. 20-27) as amended, changed all of that and established the current federal budget process.

### ***The Federal Government Budget Documents***

There are multiple budget documents for the U.S. government. The first document is the president’s multivolume annual budget request, which the president presents

to Congress by the first Monday in February.<sup>2</sup> Basically, the budget contains the overall budget message of the president, what he hopes to achieve in the coming fiscal year and this is followed by a section for each of the fifteen executive branch departments, the Corps of Engineers, Environmental Protection Agency, NASA, the National Science Foundation, Small Business Administration, and the Social Security Administration.

The second budget document is the congressional budget resolution, which provides the revenue and expenditure limits by major areas. This document is not law and, therefore, does not authorize any expenditures of funds by the executive branch. The budget resolution establishes the boundaries for the formulation of the actual allocation of funds to specific programs within each of the areas.

The third budget document is the set of appropriation bills, which are the statutory authority for executive branch agencies to spend. Each fiscal year, the number of appropriation bills can vary. Generally, there are thirteen appropriation bills, one for each major area of expenditures.

Each of the three budget documents occurs at a different point in the federal budget process during the fiscal year. The president's budget request is released by the first Monday in February. The Congressional Resolution is required to be passed by April 15. Finally, all thirteen appropriation bills are to be passed prior to the end of the fiscal year, by September 30.


### ***The Federal Government Budget Process***

Overall, the federal budget process consists of: the president's budget request, congressional budget action, implementation of appropriations and a period audit and review (Figure 6.1).


The entire federal government budget process for a single fiscal year budget takes 2.5 years. Consequently, federal agencies will be working on three fiscal years, each at different stages in the process, simultaneously in any given year. For example, when department X is working on generating its budget request for the next fiscal year 2009, it is executing fiscal year 2007 budget, and it is in the allocation phase for fiscal year 2008 (Figure 6.2).

The federal budget process begins with the president establishing policy objectives and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)<sup>3</sup> drafting and issuing budget guidance to the departments and agencies. The secretary of the department or the director of the agency will add to the guidance. In addition to establishing policy objectives to be achieved, the guidance will also include planning assumptions, which are critical to developing cost estimates. Examples of planning assumptions would include anticipated salary increases or increases in the cost of benefits.

The middle and lower management in each department and agency goes through a process of assessing the budgetary impact of changes in existing policy objectives and the establishment of new ones. The specific process varies with each



**Figure 6.1 Overview of the federal budget process.**



**Figure 6.2 Timing of the federal budget process.**

department and agency. Once estimated budget requirements are determined they are passed in the proper format to the senior management of the department or agency.

The senior management of the agency works with the OMB to draft the agency’s request. The request is submitted to the OMB’s examiners, who review it and finalize the budget request. The department or agency is notified of the OMB’s decision.

Next, the OMB assembles all the budget requests into one single document, which will become the president's budget request to Congress. The president's budget is only a request for spending levels in the form of budget authority (BA), which is the legal authority provided by Congress for the departments and agencies to obligate funds. The obligation of funds can be in the near to far term. Once funds are obligated, the Treasury issues payment in the form of a check or electronic transfer, which then becomes an outlay.

Once Congress receives the president's budget request, it begins the process of adopting a budget resolution.<sup>4</sup> By February 15, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) provides the members of Congress with a report on the economic and budgetary outlook. Simultaneously, budget hearings are held concerning different parts of the proposed budget and the various committees submit their reports on their views and estimates to respective budget committees not later than six weeks after the president's budget is presented. By April 1, the Senate Budget Committee reports a budget resolution, and by April 15 Congress completes action on the budget resolution.

The budget resolution consists of the following: (1) total expected revenues and the amount revenues will change due to expected legislative action, (2) total new budget authority and outlays in each departmental and agency area (functional category), (3) the expected deficit or surplus, and (4) the expected debt limit.<sup>5</sup> The budget resolution is not the legal authority to spend money; consequently, it is not signed by the president, but is simply passed by both the House and the Senate. The budget resolution provides the framework for the development of the appropriation bills by the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. The revenue and spending levels in the budget resolution may be adjusted during the appropriations process for the following five reasons: emergency spending, continuing disability reviews, providing for the International Monetary Fund, providing for International Peacekeepers or multilateral banks, and maintaining the Earned Income Tax Credit program.<sup>6</sup>

The House and Senate Appropriations Committees each consist of several subcommittees, which put together appropriation bills within their areas of jurisdiction. Altogether, there are, since 1997, thirteen appropriation bills. Typically, appropriation bills originate in the House and then are considered by the Senate. More recently, there have been several incidences where the rules of House and Senate have been modified so as to permit simultaneous consideration of appropriation bills in the House and Senate.

The subcommittees of the Appropriations Committee consider the specific legislative language for their respective appropriation bill. The chair of the subcommittee proposes a bill and the members of the subcommittee discuss changes (amendments) to the bill. This process is known as "marking up" the bill. The marked-up bill is voted on and sent to the entire Appropriations Committee, which considers each of the subcommittee's marked-up bills separately.<sup>7</sup> Once the entire Appropriations Committee has approved the bill, it is sent to the floor.

The House has special rules that govern the consideration of regular appropriations bills, which typically provide for a Committee of the Whole, where all the representatives are considered members. The bill is debated and amendments are considered by predetermined rules guiding the length of debate and requirements for amendments. Once the Committee of the Whole completes debate on the bill, it reports the bill, with amendments, to the full House for a vote on passage. If the bill passes the House, it is sent over to the Senate for consideration.

In the Senate, the bill is sent to the Appropriations Committee, which considers the bill, makes amendments and votes to move the bill out of committee. The bill is reported out of committee for consideration by the full Senate. Similar to the House, the Senate has predetermined rules governing the debate and amendment of appropriation bills. Typically, after the opening statements on the bill, Senators are allowed to discuss or debate any portion of the bill and offer amendments. Once the debate is closed, the bill is brought for a vote, typically by unanimous consent, but on occasion by a motion.

The differences between the House and Senate version of a bill are worked out in a Conference Committee. The members of Conference Committees are appointed by the leadership of majority and minority parties in the House and the Senate. Generally, the members are from the Appropriations Committees, subcommittees relevant to the bill being considered.<sup>8</sup> The members of the Conference Committee focus on reaching an agreement between the two versions of the bill. Once the Conference Committee reaches an agreement and passes a conference report, it is considered by both the House and the Senate. When a Conference report goes to the House and the Senate, it cannot be amended by either chamber.

All appropriation bills are suppose to be passed by September 30. When Congress does not pass all appropriation bills by September 30 it passes a continuing resolution to continue funding the areas without enacted appropriation bills, funded at the current level. Once an appropriations bill is passed by Congress it is sent to the president. The bill must be signed or vetoed in ten days; if no action is taken, the bill automatically becomes law.

## **The Defense Budget**

Any understanding of the defense budget and the process that produces it needs to have an appreciation for the complexity of the deadline-driven process, combined with the uncertainty of the impact of some of the decisions. The overall complexity is generated by the number of individuals and organizations involved at various stages in the planning, formulation, execution and evaluation of the budget. The process is made even more complex by the enormous uncertainty involved in developing a budget eighteen months from when it will actually be executed, and the budget contains a fifteen year plan within a six year defense program, which

only funds personnel for three years, but with one year appropriations, which are normally passed by Congress six months or more later.<sup>9</sup>

Consequently, there is no single individual who fully comprehends all the complexities of the defense budget. Deceptively the process appears to be straightforward when laid out in diagrams and on paper. The process has varied from administration to administration, as political and military leaders have attempted to control DoD. Consequently, one can find differing explanations of the defense budget process depending on the source. The frustrating thing is that all the sources can be correct because each source has approached the process from a different perspective. The following is an attempt at capturing the current process from multiple sources.

### ***The Defense Budget Process***

The defense budget process primarily consists of the DoD's PPBES. Ninety-five percent of the funds, which fall under the defense function in the budget, are controlled by PPBES. The other five percent are controlled by the Departments of Energy, Health and Human Services, Transportation, State, and NASA in areas that are directly related to defense. For the purpose of this chapter, the focus is on PPBES.

### ***Historical Overview of PPBES***

The Department of Defense was created in 1947 as a way of coordinating all aspects of defense instead of each service operating independently. From the start, the budget process was seen as one of the primary tools for helping to force the services to operate in a joint manner.<sup>10</sup> The Department of Defense began as the National Military Establishment (NME). By the time the first secretary of defense, James Forrestal, took office, President Truman, independent of the service chiefs and Forrestal, had submitted the NME budget for FY 1949.<sup>11</sup> The initial appropriation, \$10 billion, was insufficient to meet expenditures the military was encountering in operations in Germany, Greece, Turkey and Korea. The president wanted to limit a supplemental appropriation to \$3 billion, and the service chiefs were arguing for \$9 billion. Forrestal held a joint meeting of the service chiefs to work out an agreement among the services for the supplemental budget request. The fledgling Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), with General Eisenhower acting as temporary chair, meet with Secretary of Defense Forrestal, and they focused on developing the strategic goals of the NME, which became three: protecting the United Kingdom, controlling the Western Mediterranean and retaining a position in the Middle East.<sup>12</sup> This led the JCS to develop the composition of forces necessary to carry out the strategy. Working independently, each service focused on its component and what

it believed the other services required. Eisenhower took the lowest estimate offered and was able to come within an additional \$5 billion.<sup>13</sup>

Under Truman, the budget ceiling would steadily decrease even in the midst of fighting the Korean War. Fiscal Year 1950 DoD budget request and appropriation was \$13.3 billion. After the war started, the FY 1951 budget request and appropriation was \$12.2 billion. In the midst of the Korean War, the focus of the Truman administration was to fight while keeping the budget balanced.<sup>14</sup> The remaining years of the Truman administration focused on Frank Pace, the budget director for the president, establishing a budget ceiling for defense, and the joint chiefs working on having a force structure that fit the budget. Little to no consideration was given to how the joint chiefs believed U.S. military capabilities matched U.S. diplomatic goals.<sup>15</sup>

During the Eisenhower administration, budget ceilings were maintained, but instead of an amount based on projected revenues, the ceilings were a percentage of the gross national product (GNP). DoD's budget ceiling was no more than ten percent of the GNP.<sup>16</sup> Similar to the percentage-driven ceiling on DoD as a whole, the amount divided out to the services also fell into rigid percentages: Army, 24 percent; Navy (which included the Marines), 29 percent; and the Air Force, 47 percent.<sup>17</sup> A budget request process was developed by the JCS, which consisted of using the National Security Council's Basic National Security Policy as guidance. This document was translated into the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan and costs from each of the services were developed to meet those objectives. These requests were fielded by the secretary of defense who would ensure the budget ceilings were enforced and settle disputes among the services. Overall though, this process occurred separate and distinct from the actual budget process, which was top-driven from the president's Bureau of the Budget office.<sup>18</sup>

General Maxwell Taylor would later remark about defense budgeting during this time as being unrealistic and creating a mismatch between the emerging threats in the world and the U.S. military capabilities.

The maintenance of the rigid percentage distribution by service of the budgets since 1953 is clear proof of the absence of flexibility in our military preparations. The frozen pattern could only be justified if the world had stood still since 1953 and I doubt that anyone would say that it has.<sup>19</sup>

The disconnect between the ever-changing world situation and actual military capabilities became evident to the new Kennedy administration. While the services were planning to defend against an attack by the Warsaw Pact along the Rhine River, the budgetary reality constraints "did not even allow them to maintain a line of communication in the Mediterranean."<sup>20</sup> Even though President Eisenhower moved the review of the defense budget from the Bureau of the Budget to the National Security Council, there was no real integration of foreign policy, defense strategy and the defense budget.<sup>21</sup>

After winning the presidency in 1960, president-elect John F. Kennedy sought to appoint a fresh face to the DoD, specifically looking for a person who could

get the military establishment to function as a unified whole, instead of disparate services.<sup>22</sup> Kennedy appointed Robert S. McNamara, who was then serving as president of Ford Motor Company. McNamara came into the position feeling himself not qualified.<sup>23</sup> He had made a study of the administration of large organizations as an assistant professor of business administration. Additionally, a field of interest and research for him was statistical analysis. These attributes, combined with his limited military experience as an officer in the Pentagon during World War II, served as the foundation he was to bring to the DoD.<sup>24</sup>

McNamara believed that business and government could be run in a similar fashion. He quickly discovered that all defense strategy planning was constructed on the assumption of total nuclear war and that the goal of the services were to attempt to maintain a “viable society.”<sup>25</sup> The focus had been so driven to stay within the ceiling that most of the funding was devoted to maintaining a strategic air and missile retaliation system. All other areas of the military had been lacking funding for so long, they were barely functioning. Kennedy was surprised to find out that when he alerted the 82nd Airborne Division during the Bay of Pigs, they had to borrow men and equipment to bring themselves up to full complement.<sup>26</sup> Most of the equipment throughout all services dated from World War II. In short, McNamara found that the United States did not possess a useable military. Additionally, he found that there was no unifying procurement or accounting process.

In March 1961, Secretary McNamara disbursed among the services ninety-six questions concerning the state of affairs and how planning and budgeting was currently done. These questions served as a basis for a review of the DoD. This review resulted in a change of strategy, which was the first time it came out the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Instead of focusing on maintaining a viable society, McNamara made the strategic focus of all forces to be able to respond in a non-nuclear fashion to any potential aggressor, worldwide, in a “suitable, selective, swift, and effective, method.”<sup>27</sup>

The DoD had already turned into the largest and most expensive federal government department. A system of accounting needed to be introduced as well as some method of controlling it. In 1962, Defense Secretary McNamara introduced to the DoD a budgeting process known as the planning, programming and budgeting system (PPBS). PPBS was introduced as a means of maintaining control over the military departments. President Kennedy, as a former senator on the Armed Services Committee, was distrustful of how the military departments were doing their own budgeting. Consequently, he directed Secretary McNamara to establish a centralized budgeting system which would ensure civilian control over the process (McCaffery and Jones, 2005).

The intent of PPBS was to integrate a coordinated, unified, long-range resource planning and allocation into the budgeting process. The primary way that PPBS accomplished this was by passing budgeting each fiscal year on the Planning Guidance developed by the National Security Council, and the Defense Guidance developed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), which the JCS converted



into the Joint Strategic Planning Document. This in turn was divided into ten inter-related programs across the services and agencies. Weapons systems, force and cost projections were compiled for each program into the Five Year Defense Program (FYDP), which also contained an eight-year force structure projection compiled by the JCS. The FYDP became the basis for the single defense budget request, which was worked out between OSD and OMB. Previously, each of the services would present a budget request to Congress; under PPBS it became a single budget request presented by the secretary.<sup>28</sup>

To implement PPBS, McNamara appointed as comptroller of DoD one of the originators of the process, Charles J. Hitch. In addition to Hitch, he also brought in a large systems analysis staff, all young Ph.D. civilian analysts with no military experience. This group, within the OSD, became the focal point for the new PPBS. Weapons systems were chosen based on systems analysis being conducted from the OSD, which became one of the more controversial elements of PPBS.

Despite the opposition of service chiefs and some members of Congress to PPBS, the “McNamara revolution” is still the framework for defense budgeting. After McNamara left the OSD, the process became increasingly decentralized. The services adapted to the process and a corresponding increase in the staff of the JCS occurred, thereby increasing their ability to counter arguments by the system analysts in the OSD. Each of the combatant commanders’ input became more formalized.

Consequently, depending on the secretary of defense, the locus of control of the process would shift between the OSD and the JCS. The Nixon–Ford administration saw a resurgence of the JCS as the primary controller of PPBS, while during the Carter administration, Secretary Harold Brown exercised a larger degree of control. There was a return of decentralization under Casper Weinberger, followed by a tightening of control during Dick Cheney’s tenure as he sought to cut defense spending. Les Aspin sought to increase centralization, while at the same time arguing for more input below the combatant commander level, as the cuts in defense spending were increased. This was followed by a more balanced approach under William Perry. The Clinton administration ended with William Cohen, who decentralized the process almost completely to the JCS and the combatant commanders. Overall, during the Clinton administration, due to the succession of three secretaries of defense, and the increase in the number of operations, the JCS and the combatant commanders tended to dominate the process.

Calls for reform of the PPBS began almost as soon as it was developed. Aaron Wildavsky (political scientist/University of California-Berkeley) argued that PPBS was a rational process overlaid on a political decision-making process. He contended that the political costs were omitted and that it was not possible to quantify all the political values (national and international) involved in defense. Additionally, he saw the volume of detail as unmanageable; consequently, it was a system that gave only the illusions of control because in actuality it typically fell into an incremental adjustment.<sup>29</sup> Later, Wildavsky would argue the system unrealistically

would lock the president into major weapons systems expenditures, which would remain unchanged despite changes in the world situation.<sup>30</sup>

Similarly, Jacques Gansler (former Under Secretary of Defense—1997 to 2001) would argue that despite allegations of cost overruns, PPBS did provide an efficient way of purchasing weapons systems and that weapons systems cost overruns were some of the smallest in federal government and in major corporations.<sup>31</sup> The difficulty was that the system was not responsive to the changing circumstances of the world. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, DoD remained locked into weapon systems developed for defeating a threat that no longer existed. The ability to cancel those weapons systems was limited due to the services vested interest and the political maneuver by defense industries of spreading the development and manufacturing of the weapons system over multiple congressional districts to help ensure its political survival.

In 2000, the Business Executives for National Security (BENS) conducted a study of PPBS to determine “what the process is intended to do, what it actually does, and if it should be retained, modified, or replaced.”<sup>32</sup> Overall, the BENS study found that PPBS is more reflective of what had occurred than of what will occur in the future. They called for turning PPBS into a two-year cycle, with a consolidation of some of the steps in the process, thereby shortening the process, so that the Office of the Secretary of Defense and JCS were not constantly involved in drafting a budget. The process should focus more on objectives, by specifically tying each of the programs to strategic objectives. Additionally, it called for increasing the focus on objectives and performance of achieving those objective. Each program should be linked to the accomplishment of an objective. The PPBS system was more focused on the planning than on the execution; by looking more at the performance it would bring about an emphasis on the execution. Finally, the report called for the trimming of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and JCS staff, arguing that PPBS had created a vast planning bureaucracy. Instead of producing a useful document, the focus was in the process itself.

On September 23, 1999, then presidential candidate George W. Bush had argued, in a speech at The Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina, that the DoD, its organization and processes needed to be restructured to match the new and emerging threats, and that this may require skipping a whole generation of weapons systems.

Yet today our military is still organized more for Cold War threats than for the challenges of a new century—for industrial age operations, rather than for information age battles. There is almost no relationship between our budget priorities and a strategic vision. The last seven years have been wasted in inertia and idle talk. Now we must shape the future with new concepts, new strategies, new resolve. . . . As president, I will begin an immediate, comprehensive review of our military—

the structure of its forces, the state of its strategy, the priorities of its procurement—conducted by a leadership team under the secretary of defense. I will give the secretary a broad mandate—to challenge the status quo and envision a new architecture of American defense for decades to come.<sup>33</sup>


Six days after Bush was sworn in as president, Donald Rumsfeld, for the second time in his life, became the secretary of defense. From the start of his tenure, his focus was going to be on defense transformation. On August 2, 2001, the change in PPBS began when Secretary Rumsfeld announced a concurrent review process as a way of simplifying the process. In essence, it started the move to a two-year budget cycle. In April 2003, the changes were formalized with the passage of the *Defense Transformation Act for the 21st Century*. This act authorized the secretary to establish more flexible rules for the management of funds, and gave the secretary the authority to shift funds between programs and departments depending on changes in the security situation. Additionally, it authorized the elimination of regulations to make it easier to competitively outsource nonmilitary functions that were being performed by the military. Secretary Rumsfeld was quick to task the Senior Executive Council in the Department of Defense with studying the decision-making processes of DoD and recommend improvements. The Executive Council's study recommended the process, which was adopted without change, known as Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES).

### ***The PPBES Process***

PPBES is a strategic process designed to serve as a “bridge between military planning and budgeting.”<sup>34</sup> Strategic defense plans are developed and current and future needs are assessed, then fiscal resources are matched to accomplish these needs. The overall goal of the process is to produce a budget that provides the financial resources to accomplish established strategic objectives within the fiscal restraints and political priorities.

One of the major changes to the PPBES was to turn it into a biennial process, that varies odd- and even-numbered years. This change makes the PPBES coincide with the four-year term of the president (Figure 6.3). A presidential term begins on an odd-numbered year (off-budget), which is year one and three in the process, whereas even-numbered (on-budget) are years two and four. During even-numbered years, it is a full PPBES process, while during odd-numbered years the process is shortened to an assessment on the progress made in achieving objectives laid out the previous year, and to make any necessary adjustments.<sup>35</sup>

PPBES occurs in four sequential, but overlapping phases: planning, programming, budgeting and execution.



**Figure 6.3** PPBES: planning phase.

*Planning*

The planning phase on odd-numbered years begins with the Office of the President, sixteen months prior to the start of the fiscal year under consideration.<sup>36</sup> The National Security Council is responsible for developing the National Security Strategy (NSS), which outlines the strategic goals of the United States, the threats to those goals and the overall defense strategy to counter those threats. Based on the NSS, the JCS develops and prepares the National Military Strategy (NMS). The NMS provides the primary military strategic objectives that correspond to the NSS, and the force levels and options that are necessary based on fiscal and political constraints. Based on the NMS, the JCS produces the Joint Planning Document (JPD), which provides the JCS guidance on the implementation of the NMS.

Using the NMS and the JPD, the unified commanders conduct a review of their areas to determine the major issues and problems associated with executing it. The analysis is provided to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Next, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the JCS go through the Joint Capabilities Development process, which consists of three parts: (1) the Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG), (2) the Major Issue Analysis and (3) the Joint Programming Guidance (JPG).<sup>37</sup> The SPG provides overall policy and strategy guidance and direction for force and resource planning to the unified commanders, and all the major program areas in DoD. The commanders in each of these areas provide feedback to the JCS on the implications of the SPG.

The second part, the Major Issue Analysis is a combined effort of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the JCS to develop measures for monitoring program success. The final component, JPG is issued by the Office of the Secretary of Defense on even-numbered years and represents the combined results of the SPG and the Major Issue Analysis. Simultaneously, with the execution of the Joint Capabilities Development process, the CJCS develops the Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR), which is the CJCS personal recommendation and advice given to the secretary of defense. The CPR also contributes to the JPG. The JPG is the final document of the planning phase.

### *Programming*

The programming phase is focused on the components of the DoD using the JPG to develop a Program Objectives Memorandum (POM). The POM is a seven-year plan that provides analysis of missions, objectives, alternative methods to accomplish objectives and the allocation of resources, and categorizes each of these by one or more of the DoD programs.<sup>38</sup> DoD has eleven programs:

1. Strategic Forces
2. General Purpose Forces
3. Intelligence and Communications
4. Airlift and Sealift
5. Guard and Reserve Forces
6. Research and Development
7. Central Supply and Maintenance
8. Training, Medical and General Personnel Activities
9. Administrative and Associated Activities
10. Support of Other Nations
11. Special Operations Forces

The development of the POM takes into consideration the combatant commander's Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs), which is a fiscally unconstrained list of the "highest priority requirements, prioritized across service and functional lines, defining shortfalls in key programs that, in the judgment of the combatant commander, adversely affect the capability of the combatant commander's forces to accomplish their assigned mission."<sup>39</sup>

POMs are seven-year plans that include the previous fiscal year, the current fiscal year, the budget year and the next four fiscal years. Fiscal and human resources and force structure are considered for the budget year plus the next four fiscal years. Another part of the POM considers force structure for eleven fiscal years, the previous fiscal year, the current fiscal year, the budget year and the next seven fiscal years. This portion of the POM is known as the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).

The FYDP is actually a database that catalogs the anticipated force structure seven years into the future. Also entered in the database are all the decisions made during programming and budgeting phases.<sup>40</sup> This data is essential for establishing production of repair or replacement parts for equipment and facilities. It is updated after every major process action during PPBES and the congressional budget process.

POMs are developed during even-numbered years. During odd-numbered years, they are reviewed by the combatant commanders and Program Change Proposals are submitted. The review of POMs is based on the performance measures or metrics developed during the even-numbered years as a way of measuring success in accomplishing the program. The focus is on outputs, what is being accomplished for the money and how cost effective is the program.

Because they are only reviewed during the odd-numbered years, an additional change made by Secretary Rumsfeld in 2001 was to speed up the process by running the POM review at the same time as the budgeting phase. Consequently, POMs have to be assessed in an on-going fashion, and change proposals drafted beforehand and submitted immediately at the start of the phase if they are going to impact the budgeting phase.

The combatant commanders submit the POMs or Program Change Proposals to review teams comprised of personnel from other defense agencies, the JCS, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The result of the review is provided to a Senior Level Review Group (SLRG), who, based on the review, may propose changes to the POM. The JCS conducts a concurrent check on all POMs, "focusing on the balance and capabilities of the proposed force levels."<sup>41</sup>

All of the reviews of the POMs are given to the secretary of defense who will use this input to draft the Program Decision Memorandum (PDM). The PDM is a set of directives from the secretary and the deputy secretary of defense, based on the POM review, to each of the DoD components, the CJCS, the JCS, and the OMB. The PDM provides the approval or adjusts each POM. Based on the approved/adjusted POMs, each service is now prepared to submit its budget estimations.<sup>42</sup>

## *Budgeting*

Prior to 2001, the budgeting phase was a separate and distinct phase. In August 2001, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld merged the programming and budgeting phases so as to streamline the process and to bring about a better sense of cooperation/collaboration among the programming and budgeting staff. The overlapping of the POM and the budget estimate submissions process enables the budget staff within the services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and OMB to further adjust the POMs based on budgetary reality.<sup>43</sup>

Utilizing the approved and adjusted POMs, the services (army, air force, navy, and marines) develop their budget estimate submissions. Prior to the changes in

PPBES, the budget estimate submissions were frequently characterized as reflecting previous estimation with upward adjustments and ensuring that everyone “got their fair share.”<sup>44</sup> The services’ budget staff use performance measures (metrics) to assess the cost efficiency/effectiveness of programs, the idea being to help ensure the proper allocation of resources. This has raised the level of scrutiny that the budget estimate submissions go through and has resulted in an increase in realignment of resources.

Each budget estimate submission includes the prior fiscal year, the current fiscal year, the budget year and the next fiscal year. During even-numbered years, a detailed budget estimation process is conducted. Once the services have developed the budget estimate submissions and adjustments are made to the POMs, they are submitted to the under secretary for defense (comptroller) for review.

During odd-numbered years, the services prepare and submit Budget Change Proposals (BCP). The FYDP serves as the budgetary baseline, and BCPs are submitted only on changes from that baseline. Changes can result from: “costs increases,” beyond what had been worked into the FYDP; “schedule delays, workload changes, and changes resulting from congressional action.”<sup>45</sup>

During even-numbered years, the comptroller and staff from the OMB conduct a detailed and exacting review and analysis of the budget estimate submissions. According to the DoD’s comptroller, the review process focuses on answering the following questions:<sup>46</sup>

1. Does the budget estimate reflect the priorities of the secretary of defense and the president?
2. Does it support the administration’s policies and initiatives?
3. Does it appropriately reflect legislative direction that may have been included in DoD and *Military Construction Appropriation Acts*, the *Defense Authorization Act* and the *Intelligence Authorization Act* for the current fiscal year?
4. Does it reflect earlier guidance?
5. Are the programs funded in a manner that is consistent with the legal limitations and financial policy guidance?
6. Are the programs appropriately priced, based on sound estimating and cost principles, and executable as proposed?
7. Can the programs and the budget estimates be justified to the Congress?

During odd-numbered years, the focus of the comptroller and OMB joint review is to assess the extent to which current programs are meeting their goals. The performance measures (metrics) that were developed originally by the combatant commanders and other DoD components are used as a basis for the assessment. Based on the assessment, decisions will be made to stop a program and replace it with an alternative, or reallocate resources to the program area.

A result of the review process (even- or odd-numbered years) is a set of issues concerning adjustments or reallocation of resources. The process authorizes the deputy

secretary of defense to make realignment decisions on the issues regarding “marginal or overpriced programs to cover shortfalls in higher priority programs.”<sup>47</sup>

The services and other DoD components are given an opportunity to appeal decisions that are made on issues identified in the review process. Solutions generally are worked out between the comptroller and the component, but the components do have the option of appealing directly to the secretary of defense. These appeals are typically handled in mid-December in Major Budget Issues (MBI) sessions.

Once all the decisions have been finalized, the comptroller pulls all the budget data together into the approved OMB format, and electronically transmits it to the OMB in early January. Additionally, standing agreements with congressional committees and statutes require the submission of supporting documentation. In 2003, this documentation amounted to 26,000 pages contained in 800 different required reports.<sup>48</sup> At this point, the DoD budget is integrated into the president's budget request.

## Execution


The addition of and emphasis on the execution phase is a significant change introduced by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. This phase begins after congressional approval and the president signs the appropriation bill(s). One should note that there is a gap in the process between the budget phase and the execution phase, which covers the entire congressional appropriations process (see the section on Federal Government Budget Process).

During the congressional appropriations process, hearings are held with officials from DoD to discuss various aspects of the budget request. These hearings typically require significant preparation time and, therefore, consume a large amount of time of the leaders of the DoD components. Additionally, it should be noted that the appropriation process is lengthy and that the defense appropriation bills are rarely passed on time. Consequently, Congress often passes supplemental appropriations or continuing resolutions.

Congressional appropriations are broken down by service across five categories:

1. *Military personnel*—Provides for pay, allowances, clothing, subsistence and official travel or permanent change of station, for one year.
2. *Operation and maintenance*—Provides operation and maintenance for installations and units, for equipment, facilities, supplies and civilian pay.
3. *Procurement*—Provides for the manufacture and reconfiguration of aircraft, missile, weapons and tracked combat vehicles, ammunition and other items to include spare and repair parts.





**Figure 6.4 DoD programs versus appropriations. (Data from the Financial Management Department, U.S. Army Finance School.)**

4. *Research and development, test and evaluation*—Provides for the development, engineering, design, purchase, fabrication or modification of end items, weapons, equipment or materials.
5. *Military construction*—Provides for the acquisition of land and the construction of buildings, roadways and facilities that have been authorized by statute.

After an appropriation bill has been signed by the president, the Treasury Department issues a Treasury Warrant, which permits the OMB to transfer the appropriations to DoD. The funds are allocated to DoD’s components by the DoD comptroller. Once DoD components receive the funds, they are provided budget authority, which permits them to obligate the government to pay for goods and services.<sup>49</sup> It is important to note that congressional appropriations are made in different categories than the DoD components use them. A comparison of the two categories is provided in Figure 6.4.

The allocation of appropriated funds by the DoD comptroller to the DoD components involves a period of rebudgeting because appropriated funds do not always correspond to the budget request. During this period, an allotment review is conducted to decide the division of actual appropriated funds and how the funds will be spent, by month, quarter or fiscal year. The allotment review is approved by OMB and Treasury when the actual distribution of funds to DoD components occurs.

As the DoD components obligate funds, auditors and comptrollers at all levels of the DoD monitor and control the expenditure to ensure it complies with statutory and regulatory requirements. At the mid-point in the fiscal year, a review is conducted of all performance measures and funds may be shifted due to changing priorities. At the end of the fiscal year all obligations and spending are documented and all accounts are reconciled. Internal and external, fiscal and performance audits are conducted by the DoD components, DoD inspector general, the OMB, the General Accounting Office, and independent outside auditors.

### ***The Defense Budget Network***

Although understanding the process is important, it is essential to realize that the final result of the defense budgeting process is influenced by the interactions of all the components of the network of individuals and organizations that are stakeholders within the defense policy area. One can easily understand the key organizations in the network: DoD components, the OMB, the leadership of the House and Senate, and the House and Senate Budget and Appropriations subcommittees for armed services, and some of the major industries concerned with the manufacture of weapons systems.

Due to the proliferation of weapon systems development, and the increased use of National Guard and Reserve forces, the number of congressional districts impacted by Defense activities has greatly increased; consequently, the number of congressional stakeholders involved in the process has increased. Simultaneously, the growth of congressional staff has enabled an increasing number of members of Congress to research and study and perform their own competing analyses of expenditures. Adding to that was the market for private and nonprofit think tanks, which saw a rich and diverse market for selling their ideas, often able to increase the value of their product by having it produced by a former DoD official.

Stakeholders attempt to influence the organizational direction of the DoD sometimes on a macro level and sometimes on a narrow micro level. This can result in DoD being pushed and pulled in numerous directions simultaneously. Increases in DoD's budget do not necessarily translate into greater flexibility because of more resources. The growth of congressional earmarks, a direct result of attempting to satisfying an increasing number of stakeholders, has had the effect of preventing DoD from spending its resources where they need to be spent. A recent supplemental defense appropriation bill started out as a request for \$90 billion, but by the time it had gotten through the House, it had grown to \$124 billion, with the addition of \$34 billion of unrelated earmarks attached and of the \$90 billion, approximately \$35 billion were earmarked for specific use. Additionally, the House placed a timetable for Defense operations in Iraq, and restrictions on DoD's ability to deploy forces.<sup>50</sup>

Additionally, the defense policy network is operating in an intense political environment, which currently is resulting in a historic power struggle between the presidency and Congress over the direction and use of the military. This has the result of increasing congressional micromanagement of the defense budget. In the FY 2005 defense appropriation bill there were 3,200 earmarks that directed the expenditure of funds in a specific manner.<sup>51</sup>

## Conclusion

The full result of the reforms instituted by Secretary Rumsfeld is unknown. The early assessment varies depending on the source. Some see this as a major positive reform that has led to “increased cooperation between programmers and budgeters” and “gives services longer to finish the POM while incorporating emergent budget issues.”<sup>52</sup> Others have assessed the change as producing “chaos” and leading to a “complete breakdown” of the budgeting system.<sup>53</sup>

Overall, the changes get the secretary of defense involved in the process earlier than before. This has increased the power of the Office of the Secretary of Defense to influence the DoD and effect change. Although this makes the military bureaucracy more responsive to civilian leadership, it also can increase the politicization of the DoD process, by decreasing the authority of the military leadership.

The changes that have been made to the DoD budgeting process had been argued for over ten years. The most significant change was the shifting from a theater-based approach to a capabilities-based planning process. This helped to focus the capabilities to counter current and emerging threats. The biannual budget process enables DoD to spend more time on actual execution, instead of being locked into a perpetual planning/analysis stage.

The focus on outcomes of the programs is an important change that helps to ensure an evaluation of the program in light of changing world situations. This should enable DoD to become more flexible in facing threats. Also, it enables the services to alter or change programs faster.

The ability of the secretary to shift funds increases the flexibility of the DoD to react to unexpected situations that may arise. This authority, though, is being used for the frequent shifting of funds based on performance measures as indicators of the success or failure of a program and its established priorities. This frequent use of the shifting of funds combined with congressional earmarking has increased the uncertainty of funding on different installations and in different programs. Consequently, the military is experiencing military installations that are unable to perform basic, routine maintenance because of a lack of funds. Also, units are resorting to cannibalizing parts from one piece of equipment to get several other pieces of equipment operational, due to a lack of funds to purchase repair parts.<sup>54</sup>

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## Chapter 7

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# Human Capital: DoD's National Security Personnel System Faces Implementation Challenges\*

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Government Accountability Office

### Background

The *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004*<sup>1</sup> provided the Department of Defense (DoD) with authority to establish (1) a pay and performance management system, (2) an appeals process and (3) a labor relations system—which together comprise the National Security Personnel System (NSPS). The legislation permits significant flexibility for designing NSPS, allowing for a new framework of rules, regulations and processes to govern how defense civilian employees are hired, compensated, promoted and disciplined. The law granted DoD certain exemptions from laws governing federal civilian personnel management found in Title 5 of the *U.S. Code*.<sup>2</sup> The Congress provided these flexibilities in response to DoD's position

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\* Reprinted from Government Accountability Office Report, GAO-05-730, July 2005, pp. 9–32.



that the inflexibility of federal personnel systems was one of the most important constraints to the department's ability to attract, retain, reward and develop a civilian workforce to meet the national security mission of the twenty-first century.

## The Initial NSPS Design Process

The initial proposals for NSPS were developed by DOD and were based on a 2002 compilation of best practices generated by demonstration projects that experimented with different personnel management concepts. After these proposals were sent to the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) for review, OPM identified a broad range of legal, policy and technical concerns, and also noted that the labor-management relations proposal was developed without any prior OPM involvement or union input. OPM also indicated that the initial proposals had been crafted with only token employee involvement, and it noted a high level of concern expressed by congressional oversight committees, stakeholders and constituent groups. In addition to OPM, assistant secretaries for the military services' manpower organizations also expressed concerns that NSPS as designed would not work.

Subsequently, the secretary of defense established a three-week reassessment of system requirements, process issues, personnel and communication strategies, and program schedules and milestones. The Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT), an advisory group co-chaired by the principal deputy under secretary of defense for personnel and readiness and OPM, and including the military services' assistant secretaries for manpower and reserve affairs, oversaw this reassessment.

## Employees Covered by NSPS

NSPS labor relations provisions will be implemented across the entire department once final NSPS regulations are issued and effective, and they will apply to all DoD employees currently covered by the labor relations provisions of *U.S. Code*, Title 5, Chapter 71. In contrast, NSPS regulations governing the new pay and performance management system and appeals process will be phased in and will not apply to some employees, as stipulated by law (e.g., intelligence personnel and employees in DoD's laboratory demonstration organizations). The authorizing legislation stipulates that these latter regulations may not apply to organizations with more than 300,000 employees until the secretary of defense determines and certifies that the department has a performance management system in place that meets the statutory criteria established for NSPS.

The first phase of implementation—Spiral One—will provide the basis for this certification prior to the deployment of Spiral Two. Spiral One includes approximately 300,000 general schedule defense civilian employees, who will be converted

to the new system over a period of eighteen months. DoD initiated Spiral One in early fiscal year 2006. Spiral Two will include the remainder of DoD's eligible workforce, including wage-grade employees. Spiral Three will apply to demonstration laboratory employees no earlier than October 1, 2008, and then only to the extent the secretary of defense determines that NSPS provides greater personnel management flexibilities to the laboratories than those currently implemented.

## DoD's Employee Unions

According to DoD, almost two-thirds of its more than 700,000 civilian employees are represented by forty-three labor unions, including over 1,500 separate bargaining units.<sup>3</sup> According to a DoD official, since 2000, defense civilian employee membership in DoD's labor unions has remained about the same; however, the number of unions has dropped from about sixty unions to the current forty-three unions, primarily the result of mergers and consolidation among the unions.

## Practices and Implementation Steps for Mergers and Transformations

In our prior work, we identified key practices and lessons learned from major public and private sector organizational mergers, acquisitions and transformations.<sup>4</sup> This work was undertaken to help federal agencies implement successful cultural transformations in response to governance challenges. Although no two mergers or transformation efforts are exactly alike and the "best" approach depends on a variety of factors specific to each context, there was general agreement on a number of key practices, which are as follows:


1. *Ensure top leadership drives the transformation.* Leadership must set the direction, pace, and tone and provide a clear, consistent rationale that brings everyone together behind a single mission.
2. Focus on a key set of principles and priorities at the outset of the transformation. A clear set of principles and priorities serves as a framework to help the organization create a new culture and drive employee behaviors.
3. Set implementation goals and a timeline to build momentum and show progress from day one. Goals and a timeline are essential because the transformation could take years to complete.
4. Dedicate an implementation team to manage the transformation process. A strong and stable team is important to ensure that the transformation receives the needed attention to be sustained and successful.

5. Establish a communication strategy to create shared expectations and report related progress. The strategy must reach out to employees, customers and stakeholders and engage them in a two-way exchange.
6. Involve employees to obtain their ideas and gain their ownership for the transformation. Employee involvement strengthens the process and allows them to share their experiences and shape policies.

## **NSPS Design Process Evolved into a Phased Approach**

DoD's current process to design NSPS is divided into four stages: (1) development of options for the personnel system, (2) assessment of the options and translation into recommended proposals, (3) issuance of proposed regulations and (4) a statutory public comment period, a meet and confer period with employee representatives and a congressional notification period. As discussed earlier, DoD's initial process to design NSPS was unrealistic and inappropriate. However, after a three-week reassessment, DoD adjusted its approach and attempted to create a more cautious and deliberate process that would involve all of the key stakeholders, including OPM. At this time, DoD adopted a management framework to guide the design of NSPS based on DoD's acquisition management model and adopted an analytical framework to identify system requirements as well as a phased approach to implementing the new system, also based on the acquisition management model.<sup>5</sup> Figure 7.1 presents the four stages in DoD's current process in terms of the key organizational elements, inputs and outputs.

In the first stage, the NSPS PEO<sup>6</sup> convened six multidisciplinary design teams—called working groups—that were functionally aligned to cover the following personnel program areas: (1) compensation (classification and pay banding); (2) performance management; (3) hiring, assignment, pay setting and workforce shaping; (4) employee engagement; (5) adverse action and appeals; and (6) labor relations. The working groups were co-chaired by DoD and OPM, and they were largely staffed from the defense components. The working groups reviewed and analyzed data from alternative federal personnel systems and laboratory and acquisition demonstration projects, research materials from the Department of Homeland Security's personnel system design process and private industry practices. According to DoD, the working groups also received input and participation from DoD human resources practitioners, attorneys, financial management experts and equal employment opportunity specialists. The working groups also reviewed input gathered from DoD employee and employee representatives. The PEO was responsible for conducting outreach to employees and employee representatives, in conjunction with NSPS program managers in the DoD components;<sup>7</sup> their efforts included 106 focus groups, more than 50 town hall meetings worldwide and 10 meetings with DoD employee representatives. The working groups provided a broad range



Source: GAO Analysis Based on DOD Information.

**Figure 7.1 Key elements of the NSPS design process.**

of options for the OIPT in September and October 2004; they did not prioritize the design options.

In the second stage of the design process, OIPT assessed the design options and then submitted them to the NSPS senior executive in November 2004. The senior executive—appointed by the secretary of defense to design and implement NSPS on his behalf—reviewed and approved the design options and presented them as proposed enabling regulations to submit to the secretary of defense and the director of OPM for a decision. Throughout this period, the OIPT, PEO, and working group members continued to participate, in both drafting and reviewing the proposed regulations.

In the third stage, the secretary of defense and director of OPM reviewed the proposals submitted by the NSPS senior executive. After finalizing the proposed regulations, the secretary and director jointly released them for public comment in the *Federal Register* on February 14, 2005.

In the fourth stage, the NSPS proposed regulations were subjected to a statutory thirty-day public comment period, after which DoD held a thirty-day meet and confer period (which began on April 18, 2005) with employee representatives

to discuss their views; the meetings were facilitated by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. As allowed by statute, DoD extended the meet and confer process. Lastly, DoD is to engage in a thirty-day congressional notification period. As called for in the authorizing legislation, the proposed regulations are subject to change based on consideration of formal comments received during the thirty-day public comment period and the results of a thirty-day meet and confer process with employee representatives. As provided for in the authorizing legislation, DoD can immediately implement those parts of the regulations upon which they have reached agreement with employee representatives. DoD can implement those parts of the proposed regulations not agreed to only after another thirty calendar days have elapsed after (1) notifying the Congress of the decision to proceed with implementation and (2) explaining why implementation is appropriate.

DoD's NSPS design process generally reflects practices of successful transformations, but some key practices are lacking. The design process reflects four of six key practices we identified that have consistently been found at the center of successful transformations. First, DoD and OPM have developed a process to design the new personnel system that is supported by top leadership in both organizations. Second, from the outset, a set of guiding principles has guided the NSPS design process. Third, DoD has a dedicated team in place to design and implement NSPS and manage the transformation process, to include program managers from DoD components. Fourth, DoD has established a timeline, albeit ambitious, and implementation goals for implementing its new personnel system. The design process, however, does not fully reflect two other key practices. First, DoD developed and implemented a written communication strategy document, but it is not comprehensive. Second, although the NSPS design has involved employees through town hall meetings and other mechanisms, it has not included employee representatives on the working groups that drafted the design options for the new system.

## **Top DoD and OPM Leadership Drives Human Capital Transformation**

DoD and OPM have developed a process to design DoD's new human capital resources management system that is supported by top leadership in both organizations. As previously discussed, DoD's initial process to design NSPS was unrealistic and inappropriate; however, after a strategic reassessment, DoD adjusted its approach to reflect a more cautious, deliberative process that involved top DoD and OPM leadership. In our report on key practices for successful transformations, we noted that top leadership that is clearly and personally involved in transformations

provides stability and an identifiable source for employees to rally around during tumultuous times.<sup>8</sup> In addition, we noted that leadership should set the direction, pace and tone for the transformation. In our prior reports and testimonies, we observed that top leadership must play a critical role in creating and sustaining high-performing organizations.<sup>9</sup>

Senior leaders from DoD and OPM are directly involved in the NSPS design process. For example, the secretary of defense tasked the secretary of the Navy to be the NSPS senior executive overseeing the implementation of NSPS. Also, the under secretary of defense for personnel and readiness and the NSPS senior executive provided an open letter to all DoD civilian employees stating that DoD is tasked to design a transformation system for the department's civilian employees that supports its national security mission while treating workers fairly and protecting their rights. In addition, the principal deputy under secretary of defense for personnel and readiness, the assistant secretaries for Manpower and Reserve Affairs from each military service and the OPM senior advisor to the director for the Department of Defense are members of an integrated executive management team—the OIPT—that, among other things, provides overall policy and strategic advice on the implementation of NSPS. Similarly, senior-level executives from DoD and OPM are members of a group, known as the Senior Advisory Group, that provides advice on general NSPS conceptual, strategic and implementation issues. Finally, senior leaders from DoD and the military components participated in town hall meetings at DoD installations worldwide to discuss the concept and design elements of NSPS.

Experience shows that successful major change management initiatives in large private and public sector organizations can often take at least five to seven years. This length of time and the frequent turnover of political leadership in the federal government have often made it difficult to obtain the sustained and inspired attention to make needed changes. The development of the position of deputy secretary of defense for management, who would act as DoD's chief management officer, is essential to elevate, integrate and institutionalize responsibility for the success of DoD's overall business transformation efforts, including its new personnel management system.

As DoD embarks on a large-scale change initiative, such as its new personnel management system, ensuring sustained and committed leadership is crucial in developing a vision, initiating organizational change, maintaining open communications and creating an environment that is receptive to innovation. Without the clear and demonstrated commitment of agency top leadership, organizational cultures will not be transformed and new visions and ways of doing business will not take root.

## Guiding Principles and Key Performance Parameters Steer the Design Process

During the strategic reassessment of the NSPS design process, DoD and OPM senior leadership developed a set of guiding principles to direct efforts throughout all phases of NSPS development. We have reported that in bringing together the originating components, the new organization must have a clear set of principles and priorities that serve as a framework to help the organization create a new culture and drive employee behaviors.<sup>10</sup> Principles are the core values of the new organization and can serve as an anchor that remains valid and enduring while organizations, personnel, programs and processes may change. Focusing on these principles and priorities helps the organization maintain its drive towards achieving the goals of the new transformation.

According to DoD, its guiding principles translate and communicate the broad requirements and priorities outlined in the legislation into concise, understandable requirements that underscore the department's purpose and intent in creating NSPS. The NSPS guiding principles are

- Put mission first—support national security goals and strategic objectives
- Respect the individual—protect rights guaranteed by law
- Value talent, performance, leadership and commitment to public service
- Be flexible, understandable, credible, responsive and executable
- Ensure accountability at all levels
- Balance personnel interoperability with unique mission requirements
- Be competitive and cost effective

Senior DoD and OPM leadership also approved a set of key performance parameters, which define the minimum requirements or attributes of NSPS. The key performance parameters are

- High-performing workforce and management: employees and supervisors are compensated and retained based on performance and contribution to mission
- Agile and responsive workforce management: workforce can be easily sized, shaped and deployed to meet changing mission requirements
- Credible and trusted: system assures openness, clarity, accountability and merit principles
- Fiscally sound: aggregate increases in civilian payroll, at the appropriations level, will conform to Office of Management and Budget fiscal guidance, and managers will have flexibility to manage budget
- Supporting infrastructure: information technology support and training and change management plans are available and funded

- Schedule: NSPS will be operational and demonstrate success prior to November 2009


These principles and key performance parameters can serve as core values for human capital management at DoD—values that define the attributes that are intrinsically important to what the organization does and how it will do it. Furthermore, they represent the institutional beliefs and boundaries that are essential to building a new culture for the organization. Finally, they appropriately identify the need to support the mission and employees of the department, protect basic civil service principles, and hold employees accountable for performance.

## **Team Established to Manage the NSPS Design and Implementation Process**

As previously discussed, DOD established a team to design and implement NSPS and manage the transformation process. Dedicating a strong and stable design and implementation team that will be responsible for the day-to-day management of the transformation is important to ensuring that it receives the focused, full-time attention needed to be sustained and successful. Specifically, the design and implementation team is important to ensuring that various change initiatives are sequenced and implemented in a coherent and integrated way. Because a transformation process is a massive undertaking, the implementation team must have a “cadre of champions” to ensure that changes are thoroughly implemented and sustained over time. Establishing networks can help the design and implementation team conduct the day-to-day activities of the merger or transformation and help ensure that efforts are coordinated and integrated. To be most effective, establishing clearly defined roles and responsibilities within this network assigns accountability for parts of the implementation process, helps reach agreement on work priorities, and builds a code of conduct that will help all teams to work effectively.

The secretary of defense appointed a NSPS senior executive to, among other things, design, develop and establish NSPS. Under the senior executive’s authority, the PEO was established as the central policy and program office to conduct the design, planning and development, deployment, assessment and full implementation of NSPS. Specifically, its responsibilities include designing the labor relations, appeals, and human resource/pay for performance systems; developing a communication strategy and training strategy; modifying personnel information technology; and drafting joint enabling regulations and internal DoD implementing regulations. As the central DoD-wide program office, the PEO provides direction and oversight of the components’ NSPS program managers who wear dual hats under their parent component and the NSPS PEO. These program managers also serve as their components’ action officers and participate in the development of NSPS and





<sup>a</sup>Includes the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps.

<sup>b</sup>Represents defense agencies, DOD field activities, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Services, and Office of the Secretary of Defense.


**Figure 7.2 NSPS design and implementation team organization.**

plan and implement the deployment of NSPS. Figure 7.2 shows the organization of the NSPS design and implementation team.

## Ambitious Timeline and Implementation Goals Established

DoD established an ambitious eighteen-month timeline and implementation goals for completing the design process and beginning the phased implementation of NSPS. We have reported that successful practices of mergers and transformations include the establishment of a timeline with specific milestones that allow stakeholders to track the organization’s progress towards its goals.<sup>11</sup> Figure 7.3 shows the current timeline and implementation goals for designing and implementing NSPS.

Although DoD established a clear timeline with specific implementation goals, they have allotted about six months for completing the design process and beginning



**Figure 7.3 NSPS timeline and implementation goals.**

implementation of NSPS (as shown in the shaded area of Figure 7.3). Specifically, the authorizing legislation provides for a meet and confer process for not less than thirty calendar days with the employee representatives in order to attempt to reach agreement. However, as allowed by statute, DoD extended the thirty-day meet and

confer period with employee representatives. After the meet and confer process is concluded, the secretary of defense must notify the Congress of DoD's intent to implement any portions of the proposal where agreement has not been reached, but only after thirty calendar days have elapsed after notifying the Congress of the decision to implement those provisions. In addition, DoD and OPM must jointly develop and issue the final NSPS regulations, which must go through an interagency coordination process before they are published in the *Federal Register*. Also, DoD must develop and conduct in-depth and varied training for its civilian employees, military and civilian supervisors, and managers. Moreover, DoD must modify its existing automated human resource information systems, including personnel and payroll transaction process systems department-wide, before NSPS can become operational. Finally, DoD plans to roll out the NSPS labor relations system and establish the National Security Labor Relations Board before the initial roll out of the NSPS performance management system in early fiscal year 2006. The board must be staffed with board members as well as about one hundred professional staff, which will support the board.

A large-scale organizational change initiative, such as DoD's new personnel management system, is a substantial commitment that will take years before it is completed, and therefore must be carefully and closely managed. As a result, it is essential to establish and track implementation goals and establish a timeline to pinpoint performance shortfalls and gaps and suggest midcourse corrections. Although it is appropriate to develop and integrate personnel management systems within the department in a quick and seamless manner, moving too quickly or prematurely can significantly raise the risk of doing it wrong. Having an ambitious timeline is reasonable only insofar as it does not impact the quality of the human capital management system that is created. In recent hearings on the NSPS proposed regulations, we testified that DoD's new personnel management system will have far-reaching implications for the management of the department and for civil service reform across the federal government.<sup>12</sup> We further testified that NSPS could, if designed and implemented properly, serve as a model for government-wide transformation. However, if not properly designed and implemented, NSPS could impede progress toward a more performance- and results-based system for the federal government as a whole.

## **Communication Strategy Not Comprehensive**

DoD developed and implemented a written communication strategy document that provides a structured and planned approach to communicate timely and consistent information about NSPS, but this strategy is not comprehensive. It does not contain some elements that we have identified as important to successful communication during transformations. As a result, the written communication strategy document may not facilitate two-way communication between employees, employee representatives

and management, which is central to forming effective partnerships that are vital to the success of any organization.

Specifically, the strategy does not identify all key internal stakeholders and their concerns. For example, the strategy acknowledges that employee representatives play an important role in the design and implementation of NSPS, but it does not identify them as a key stakeholder. Instead, DoD's written communication strategy document characterizes union leadership as a "detractor," in part due to their criticism of NSPS. Consequently, DoD identified the following four objectives as its most urgent communications priorities, which are to (1) demonstrate the rationale for and the benefits of NSPS, (2) express DoD's commitment to ensuring that NSPS is applied fairly and equitably throughout the organization, (3) demonstrate openness and transparency in the design and process of converting to NSPS, and (4) mitigate and counter any potential criticism of NSPS from such detractors as unions and their support groups. Experience shows that failure to adequately consider a wide variety of people and cultural issues can lead to unsuccessful transformations.

Furthermore, although the written communication strategy document identified key messages for those internal and external stakeholders that are identified, it does not tailor these messages to specific stakeholder groups. For example, the strategy does not tailor key messages to such groups of employees as human resource personnel, DoD executives and flag officers, supervisors and managers, even though these employees may have divergent interests and information needs. Tailoring information helps employees to feel that their concerns are specifically addressed. We have reported that organizations undergoing a transformation should develop a comprehensive communications strategy that reaches out to employees, customers and stakeholders and seeks to genuinely engage them in the transformation process and facilitate a two-way, honest exchange with and allow for feedback from employees, customers and stakeholders.<sup>13</sup>

## **NSPS Design Process Has Involved Employees**

Although the design process has involved employees through many mechanisms, including focus groups, town hall meetings, a NSPS Web site for employee comments and meetings with employee representatives, it has not included employee representatives on the working groups that drafted the design options.<sup>14</sup> The composition of the team is important because it helps employees see that they are being represented and that their views are being considered in the decision-making process. A successful transformation must provide for meaningful involvement by employees and their representatives to, among other things, gain their input into and understanding of the changes that are occurring in the organization. Employee involvement strengthens the transformation process by including frontline perspectives and experiences. Further, employee involvement helps increase employee's

understanding and acceptance of organizational goals and objectives, and gain ownership for new policies and procedures. Involving employees in planning helps to develop agency goals and objectives that incorporate insights about operations from a frontline perspective. It can also serve to increase employees' understanding and acceptance of organizational goals and improve motivation and morale.

The PEO sponsored a number of focus group sessions and town hall meetings at various sites across DoD and around the world to provide employees and managers an opportunity to participate in the development of NSPS. During a three-week period beginning in July 2004, over one hundred focus groups were held throughout DoD, including at overseas locations. The purpose of the focus groups was to elicit perceptions and concerns about current personnel policies and practices as well as new ideas from the DoD workforce to inform the NSPS design process. Separate focus groups were held for employees, civilian and military supervisors, and managers and practitioners from the personnel, legal and equal employment opportunity communities. According to DoD officials, bargaining unit employees and employee representatives were invited to participate. DoD officials stated that over 10,000 comments, ideas and suggestions were received during the focus group sessions and were summarized and provided to NSPS working groups for use in developing options for the labor relations, appeals, adverse actions and personnel design elements of NSPS.

In addition, town hall meetings were held and, according to DoD, are still being conducted at DoD facilities around the world. According to DoD officials, these town hall meetings have provided an opportunity to communicate with the workforce, provide the status of the design and development of NSPS, and solicit thoughts and ideas. The format for town hall meetings included an introductory presentation by a senior leader followed by a question and answer session where any employee in the audience was free to ask a question or make a comment. To facilitate the widest possible dissemination, some of the town hall meetings were broadcast live, as well as videotaped and rebroadcast on military television channels and Web sites.

DoD's NSPS Web site was available for DoD employees and interested parties to view and comment on the proposed regulations, as well as for the most recent information and announcements regarding NSPS. After the proposed NSPS regulations were published in the *Federal Register*, there was a thirty-day public comment period, providing all interested parties the opportunity to submit comments and recommendations on the content of the proposal. The proposed regulations were published on February 14, 2005, and the thirty-day comment period ended on March 16, 2005. During this time, according to DoD, it received more than 58,000 comments.

Prior to the publication of the proposed NSPS regulations, DoD and OPM conducted ten joint meetings with officials of DoD's forty-three labor unions to discuss NSPS design elements. According to DoD officials, these meetings involved as many as eighty union leaders at any one time, addressed a variety of topics, including (1) the

reasons change is needed and the department's interests; (2) the results of department-wide focus group sessions held with a broad cross-section of DoD employees; (3) the proposed NSPS implementation schedule; (4) employee communications; and (5) proposed design options in the areas of labor relations and collective bargaining, adverse actions and appeals, and pay and performance management. According to DoD officials, these meetings provided the opportunity to discuss the design elements and proposals under consideration for NSPS, and solicit employee representative feedback.

According to DoD, the focus group sessions and town hall meetings, as well as the working groups and union meetings, assured that DoD employees, managers, supervisors, employee representatives and other stakeholders were involved in and given ample opportunity to provide input into the design and implementation of NSPS.

Opportunities for employee involvement were limited between the conclusion of the town hall meetings and focus groups in July 2004 and the publishing of the proposed NSPS regulations in February 2005; the primary means for employees to provide feedback during this time was through the NSPS Web site.

## **DoD Faces Multiple Challenges in Implementing NSPS**

As DoD implements its new personnel management system, it will face multiple implementation challenges in both the early and later stages of implementation. At recent hearings on the proposed NSPS regulations, we highlighted multiple challenges: (1) establishing an overall communications strategy, (2) providing adequate resources for the new system, (3) involving employees and other stakeholders in implementing the system, (4) ensuring sustained and committed leadership, and (5) evaluating the new personnel management system after it has been implemented.<sup>15</sup>

### ***Early Implementation Challenges***

- Establishing an overall communications strategy. A significant challenge for DoD is to ensure an effective and ongoing two-way communications strategy, given its size, geographically and culturally diverse audiences, and different command structures across DoD organizations. We have reported that a communications strategy that creates shared expectations about, and reports related progress on, the implementation of the new system is a key practice of a change management initiative. The communications strategy must include the active and visible involvement of a number of key players, including the secretary of defense, and a variety of communication means and mediums for successful implementation of the system. DoD acknowledges

that a comprehensive outreach and communications strategy is essential for designing and implementing its new personnel management system, but the proposed regulations do not identify a process for continuing involvement of employees in the planning, development and implementation of NSPS.

- Providing adequate resources for implementing the new system. Experience has shown that additional resources are necessary to ensure sufficient planning, implementation, training and evaluation for human capital reform. According to DoD, the implementation of NSPS will result in costs for, among other things, developing and delivering training, modifying automated personnel information systems, and starting up and sustaining the National Security Labor Relations Board. Major cost drivers in implementing pay-for-performance systems are the direct costs associated with salaries and training. DoD estimates that the overall cost associated with implementing NSPS will be approximately \$158 million through fiscal year 2008. However, it has not completed an implementation plan for NSPS, including an information technology plan and a training plan; thus, the full extent of the resources needed to implement NSPS may not be well understood at this time.
- Involving employees and other stakeholders in implementing the system. DoD faces a significant challenge in involving—and continuing to involve—its employees, employee representatives and other stakeholders in implementing NSPS. DoD's proposed NSPS regulations, while providing for continuing collaboration with employee representatives, do not identify a process for the continuing involvement of employees and other stakeholders in the planning, development and implementation of NSPS. The active involvement of all stakeholders will be critical to the success of NSPS. The involvement of employees and their representatives both directly and indirectly is crucial to the success of new initiatives, including implementing a pay-for-performance system. High-performing organizations have found that actively involving employees and stakeholders, such as unions or other employee associations, when developing results-oriented performance management systems helps improve employees' confidence and belief in the fairness of the system and increases their understanding and ownership of organizational goals and objectives. This involvement must be early, active and continuing if employees are to gain a sense of understanding and ownership of the changes that are being made.

### ***Later Implementation Challenges***

- Ensuring sustained and committed leadership. As DoD implements this massive human capital reform, its challenge will be to elevate, integrate and institutionalize leadership responsibility for NSPS to ensure its success. DoD may face a future leadership challenge when the NSPS senior executive and

the PEO transition out of existence once NSPS is fully implemented. According to a PEO official, at that time, ongoing implementation responsibility for NSPS would come under the Civilian Personnel Management Service, which is part of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. In recent testimony on the transformation of DoD business operations, we stated that as DoD embarks on large-scale business transformation efforts, such as NSPS, the complexity and long-term nature of these efforts requires the development of an executive position capable of providing strong and sustained change management leadership across the department—and over a number of years and various administrations.<sup>16</sup> One way to ensure such leadership would be to create by legislation a full-time executive-level II position for a chief management official, who would serve as the deputy secretary of Defense for Management. This position would elevate, integrate and institutionalize the high-level attention essential for ensuring that a strategic business transformation plan—as well as the business policies, procedures, systems and processes that are necessary for successfully implementing and sustaining overall business transformation efforts, like NSPS, within DoD—are implemented and sustained. In previous testimony on DoD's business transformation efforts, we identified the lack of clear and sustained leadership for overall business transformations as one of the underlying causes that has impeded prior DoD reform efforts.<sup>17</sup>

- Evaluating the new personnel management system. Evaluating the impact of NSPS will be an ongoing challenge for DoD. This is especially important because NSPS would give managers more authority and responsibility for managing the new personnel system. High-performing organizations continually review and revise their human capital management systems based on data-driven lessons learned and changing needs in the work environment. Collecting and analyzing data will be the fundamental building block for measuring the effectiveness of these approaches in support of the mission and goals of the department.

According to DoD, the department is planning to establish procedures to evaluate the implementation of its new personnel management system. During testimony on the proposed NSPS regulations, we stated that DoD should consider conducting evaluations that are broadly modeled on demonstration projects. Under the demonstration project authority, agencies must evaluate and periodically report on results, implementation of the demonstration project, costs and benefits, impacts on veterans and other equal employment opportunity groups, adherence to merit system principles, and the extent to which the lessons learned from the project can be applied government-wide. We further testified that a set of balanced measures addressing a range of results, and customer, employee, and external partner issues may also prove beneficial. An evaluation such as this would facilitate congressional oversight; allow for any midcourse corrections; assist DoD in benchmarking its



progress with other efforts; and provide for documenting best practices and lessons learned with employees, stakeholders, other federal agencies and the public.

## Conclusions

DoD's efforts to design and implement a new personnel management system represent a huge undertaking. However, if not properly designed and implemented, the new system could severely impede DoD's progress toward a more performance- and results-based system that it is striving to achieve. Although DoD's process to design its new personnel management system represents a phased, deliberative process, it does not fully reflect some key practices of successful transformations. Because DoD has not fully addressed all of these practices, it does not have a comprehensive written communication strategy document that effectively addresses employee concerns and their information needs, and facilitates two-way communication between employees, employee representatives and management. Without a comprehensive written communication strategy document, DoD may be hampered in achieving employee buy-in, which could lead to an unsuccessful implementation of the system.

In addition, evaluating the impact of NSPS will be an ongoing challenge for DoD. Although DoD has plans to establish procedures to evaluate NSPS, it is critical that these procedures be adequate to fully measure the effectiveness of the program. Specifically, adequately designed evaluation procedures include results-oriented performance measures and reporting requirements that facilitate DoD's ability to effectively evaluate and report on NSPS's results. Without procedures that include outcome measures and reporting requirements, DoD will lack the visibility and oversight needed to benchmark progress, make system improvements and provide the Congress with the assessments needed to determine whether NSPS is truly the model for government-wide transformation in human capital management.

## Notes

1. Public Law No. 108-136, § 1101 (Nov. 24, 2003).
2. The Congress did not exempt DoD from provisions of Title 5, *U.S. Code*, pertaining to veterans' preference, merit systems principles, prohibited personnel practices and equal employment opportunity.
3. The United Defense Workers Coalition currently represents thirty-six of the forty-three DoD labor unions. The coalition was formed in February 2004 to more effectively represent the interests of its members during NSPS design meetings with DoD officials. The remaining unions, for various reasons, decided to remain independent of the coalition.

4. U.S. GAO, *Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformation—Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal Agencies*. GAO-03-293SP (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GAO, 2002); and *Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and Organizational Transformations*. GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GAO, 2003).
5. The acquisition management model is contained in DoD Directive 5000.1 and DoD Instruction 5000.2, *Operation of the Defense Acquisition System* (May 12, 2003).
6. The PEO is the policy and program management office responsible for conducting the design, planning development, implementation and assessment of NSPS.
7. Component program managers wear dual hats under their parent components and the NSPS PEO.
8. GAO-03-669.
9. See U.S. GAO. *Managing for Results: Federal Managers' Views Show Need for Ensuring Top Leadership Skills*. GAO-01-127 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 20, 2000); *Management Reform: Using the Results Act and Quality Management to Improve Federal Performance*. GAO/T-GGD-99-151 (Washington, D.C.: July 29, 1999); and *Management Reform: Elements of Successful Improvement Initiatives*. GAO/T-GGD-00-26 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 1999).
10. GAO-03-669.
11. Ibid.
12. U.S. GAO. *Human Capital: Preliminary Observations on Proposed Regulations for DoD's National Security Personnel System*. GAO-05-559T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 14, 2005); *Human Capital: Preliminary Observations on Proposed Department of Defense National Security Personnel System Regulations*. GAO-05-517T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 12, 2005); and *Human Capital: Preliminary Observations on Proposed DoD National Security Personnel System Regulations*. GAO-05-432T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2005).
13. GAO-03-669.
14. It should be noted that ten federal labor unions have filed suit alleging that DoD failed to abide by the statutory requirements to include employee representatives in the development of DoD's new labor relations system authorized as part of NSPS. See *American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO et al. v. Rumsfeld et al.*, No. 1:05cv00367 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 23, 2005).
15. GAO-05-432T, GAO-05-517T and GAO-05-559T.
16. U.S. GAO. *Defense Management: Key Elements Needed to Successfully Transform DoD Business Operations*, GAO-05-629T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 28, 2005).
17. U.S. GAO. *Department of Defense: Further Actions Are Needed to Effectively Address Business Management Problems and Overcome Key Business Transformation Challenges*. GAO-05-140T (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GAO, 2004).



## *Chapter 8*

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# **The History and Role of TRADOC System Manager (TSM) Abrams\***

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John M. Shay, Seth T. Blakeman and Hank Hughes

### **Setting the Stage for TSM: Formation of TRADOC and M1 Abrams Tank**

In the early 1970s, the U.S. Army initiated the 1973 STEADFAST Reorganization plan and began modernizing the force, focusing on readiness and overall combat effectiveness. The Vietnam and 1973 Arab–Israeli wars illustrated the need for an overhaul, forcing a reassessment on combat effectiveness against our heavier armed and numerically superior Soviet counterparts. Although the Arab–Israeli conflict proved a smaller force, applying sound doctrine could repel and destroy a larger, Soviet-equipped army; the U.S. military community recognized the emergence of a technological threshold and more importantly that we were not at the forefront of this combat revolution. Due to the growing sophistication of Soviet weapons and the increased lethality of modern combat, combat development rose as the natural conduit for reorganization, mirroring the induction of other innovative weapons systems like the armored horse, the longbow or artillery. The creation of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in 1973 proved one of the most

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\* This chapter does not reflect the views of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense or the United States Army War College.

important actions taken to ensure the continued ability of U.S. soldiers to secure battlefield dominance (Swain, 1985, 69). Under the command of General William E. DePuy, TRADOC assumed the training functions of the Continental Army Command (CONARC) and merged them with the combat development mission of the Combat Developments Command (CDC) (Cameron, 1999, 1).

The 1973 Arab–Israeli conflict emphasized the need for continuous evolution of weapon systems and matériel to ensure superior combat effectiveness on an adapting battlefield. With a clear task and purpose, the military made determinations on what systems to develop based on criteria to meet the Soviet threat. In contrast to the cumbersome CONARC, TRADOC’s operative design of combining doctrine and development streamlined the modernization process (Romjue et al., 1998, 42). Now a key player in the requirements and characteristics determination of new matériel, TRADOC relied upon input compiled by combat developers working within their respective branches. Even after a system entered the acquisition process, TRADOC continued to monitor its progress and provided a check on the actions of the Army Materiel Command (AMC). Through control of the operational testing process, TRADOC measured the effectiveness of a given system against its initial performance requirements. These tests and TRADOC’s evaluation directly affected a system’s continued development. In determining the parameters for the operational tests and in assessing a system’s performance, TRADOC relied upon the views of the combat developer (Romjue et al., 1998, 42).

Spearheading the military’s transformation was the “big five” concept. To solve the dilemma of how to fight a numerically superior enemy, the United States relied, in part, on technologically superior hardware that could defeat an enemy at ratios higher than one to three (Kelly, 1989, 81). To achieve that end, the army in the early 1970s began work on the “big five” equipment systems: a new tank, a new infantry combat vehicle, a new attack helicopter, a new transport helicopter and a new anti-aircraft missile (Swain, 1985, viii).

The Fulda Gap (situated between East and West Germany, near Frankfurt), the most likely penetration point for Warsaw Pact countries to invade the NATO alliance, determined the most critical improvement—a competitive Main Battle Tank (MBT). The M1 Abrams tank, the first of the “big five” systems, rose from the failure of a preceding tank program and benefited from this trial. Prior to the Abrams, the standard tanks in the army inventory had been various models of the M48 and M60, both surpassed in some respects by new Soviet equipment. The M60 was intended as an interim vehicle pending the development and fielding of the MBT 70 (joint U.S. and Federal Republic of Germany program). The Germans backed out of the program due to immature technology and cost overruns. The XM803 was the successor to the abortive joint American–German Main Battle Tank-70 project carried on solely by the Americans, which Congress later cancelled due to cost. The Army started work on a new MBT in 1973, fielding the first M1s in February 1980. The M1 was the first U.S. tank since World War II that was qualitatively superior

to Soviet models (Kelly, 1989, 270). American success in Desert Storm (1991) provided conclusive evidence to justify armored dominance.


## **The System Needs a Parent: Formation of TSM**

General Donn A. Starry assumed command of TRADOC from General DePuy on July 1, 1977. Creator of the AirLand doctrine, Starry's reform on internal affairs proved to be a beneficial act of his tenure, leaving an imprint on the organization of the modern army (Kelly, 1989, 135). Accordingly, he enacted a pronounced decentralization of major projects to the integrating centers and schools. Decentralization of power and proximity of partners, he hoped, would expedite results. The concerns about the U.S. army's readiness and ability to win on the battlefield delineated the emphasis of planning combat development to current needs over long-term needs. Learning their lesson from the failed MBT-70 and XM803, tank designers shied away from unproven technologies and toward the innovative use of proven components and technology (Romjue et al., 1998, 43). However, the tank required proper oversight in order to make a successful transition into combat units. Training, organizational, personnel and fielding issues had still to be resolved. Therefore, in 1977 TRADOC introduced the system manager to perform this role. This new position helped to ensure that preparations for a weapon's combat usage began before production and fielding. The TRADOC system manager (TSM) represented a quality control measure whose roots stemmed from a series of failed programs in the 1960s and 1970s. The TSM also assumed responsibility for improving a system after fielding began (Romjue et al., 1998, 43).

## **Army Transformation: Evolution of TRADOC and TSM CBRS and DOTLMS**

Introduced in the 1980s, the Concept Based Requirements System (CBRS) emerged as the answer to TRADOC's determination to successfully manage combat development and requirements determination. CBRS tied doctrine, organization, training, leadership, matériel and soldiers (DOTLMS) requirements to specific army needs and provided a structured process to coordinate modernization efforts, using Soviet military capability as the standard of comparison for all systems (Kornacki, 1993, 28) (Figure 8.1).

CBRS began with TRADOC's evolving vision of the future battlefield. Operational concepts derived from this vision identified desired capabilities. The Mission Area Assessment followed in which each branch compared its current capabilities to those deemed necessary for the future battlefield. The Battlefield Development Plan prioritized and integrated these assessments, suggesting actions to ensure



**Figure 8.1** Concept Based Requirement System.

effective operation on the future battlefield. It directly fed budget and program planning, and it guided AMC efforts to provide technical support. Mission Area Development plans recommended a course of action to address each deficiency identified. From these plans were derived the input for specific matériel requirements that would guide development and acquisition. Supporting studies reviewed logistical, personnel and cost issues. Subject to TRADOC and Department of Army approval, the outcome of these studies then fed the Life Cycle System Management model. Program initiation and related budgeting authority from the secretary of defense followed. Once a new design entered the acquisition cycle, AMC bore primary responsibility for research, matériel development, engineering tests and product validation (TRADOC pamphlet 71-9, 1998).

Although success in the Gulf War illustrated the “big five’s” achievement, the 1990s saw a downturn in military spending. The 1991 Gulf War also highlighted the innovative use of evolving information technology, triggering a revolution in military affairs. Digitization, symbolized by the activities of the Experimental Force (EXFOR) and the Force XXI process, began to transform the army as far out as 2010 to 2020. The emphasis of combat development therefore shifted back to meeting future battlefield needs because the modern military’s effectiveness hinged on meeting the next threshold. A growing concern arose over the length of time to develop matériel from concept to fielding. The 1980s witnessed major efforts to streamline the development and acquisition process, but too often these highly visible and politically charged efforts resulted in more steps to the process, thus lengthening it. Consequently, in the 1990s, several rapid acquisition initiatives were started to speed up delivery of new matériel to the field. These efforts proved only partially successful and acquisition reform remains a focus at the Pentagon today (Cameron, 1999).

Mirroring the digitization revolution, the CBRS adapted from a Soviet-based threat requirements determination, refocusing for use against a multitude of

potential regional threats in an array of environments. The shift in the army's stance from forward deployment to power projection necessitated all planned combat vehicles being easily transportable via air or sea transport. Moreover, army downsizing ensured that the number of such systems would be limited, increasing the importance of effective doctrine and training (TRADOC pamphlet 71-9, 1998). This CBRS process was a lock-step process well suited to matching or surpassing the capabilities of a known threat. It did not work as well in a rapidly changing environment marked by uncertainty as to threat, location of conflict and timing of a national crisis (Cameron, 1999).

## **Battle Labs**


In 1992, TRADOC created the Battle Lab Program to explore new concepts and technology and determine their applicability across the doctrine, training, leadership, organization, material, personnel, and force (DTLOMPF). Their principal analytical tools included modeling, simulation, field trials, and the horizontal integration of technology. The strong science and technology orientation of the Battle Labs made them a useful link between the research and development (R&D) efforts of the military and private industry. TRADOC also relied upon the Battle Labs to test new approaches to requirements determination, saving time and money by utilizing technology and bypassing the more costly resources of previous experimentation (Romjue et al., 1998, 48).

The principal role of the Battle Labs became one of testing and experimentation. Through these activities, the Battle Labs identified promising technology for accelerated development and acquisition, worked with industry to evaluate ideas or matériel for potential military applications, tested new concepts and helped define the need for new systems and their characteristics. Their testing of concepts across the DTLOMPF suited the holistic approach to requirements determination that TRADOC sought. The combat developer and the appropriate Battle Lab determined possible solutions through experimentation. They also determined whether these solutions should be pursued through DOTLMPF channels. As the most expensive, time-consuming and complex, matériel solutions were considered the last option (Cameron, 1996, 4).

## **New Requirements System**

The 1996 *TRADOC Black Book No. 3: Requirements Determination* and 1998 TRADOC Pamphlet 71-9, *Force Development Requirements Determination* formalized a new requirements policy (Figure 8.2). TRADOC assumed control over all war-fighting requirements. The TRADOC commander bore sole responsibility for approving such requirements, eliminating the need to seek approval from multiple





**Figure 8.2 Force Development Requirements.**

commands within the Department of the Army (DA). This authority enabled TRADOC to standardize the requirements process by providing a single system applicable to all weapons, equipment, clothing and information technology (Cameron, 1999, 4). TRADOC Pamphlet 525-66: *Future Operational Capabilities* further refined these ideas into specific capabilities to guide research and development efforts. This document indicated the desired end state of the army in twenty to thirty years, serving as a focal point for the separate development paths of each branch. It also helped to guide the independent R&D efforts of the national laboratories and industry. Through experimentation and operational experience, a means of realizing each desired capability was sought. The combat developer and the appropriate Battle Lab determined possible solutions through experimentation. They also determined whether these solutions should be pursued through DOTLMPF. As the most expensive, time-consuming and complex, matériel solutions were considered the last option (TRADOC pamphlet, 71-9, 1998).

### Integrated Concept Teams


The Armor Center became one of the first branches to make wide use of integrated concept teams (ICTs) in 1995. The army developed a new requirements determination process aimed at providing decision makers with better cost and technological

feasibility information with goals to cut the acquisition cycle time and costs. The user, requirements and acquisition communities will have representatives on newly created integrated concept teams. ICTs will guide the requirements development process and complement the integrated product team (IPT) methodology already used by material developers. Establishing ICTs early in concept development enables the teams to transition to IPTs when a material requirement is approved at a Milestone I decision. One of the key components of the ICT process is considering cost as an independent variable (CAIV) to weight capabilities versus cost tradeoffs. Under Major General Lon E. Maggart, the Armor Center played a central role in developing the ICT notion. Once accepted and incorporated into the requirements determination process, the Armor Center established separate ICTs to analyze key armor issues: tank fleet modernization, ammunition and guns, development of a replacement for the current tanks' Future Combat System (FCS), and development of a dedicated scout vehicle Future Scout Combat System (FSCS) (ACH, 1996, 112).

The integrated approach to requirements determination and combat development suited the "system of systems" nature of major end items. Each comprised a collection of subsystems that possessed their own development tracks and fielding schedules (see Figure 8.3/M1A2SEP). In addition, some subsystems also required doctrinal changes, training plans, and organizational modifications. All of these separate schedules and actions had to be coordinated and balanced. Moreover, subsystems often were incorporated into several parent systems with different proponents, whose development and fielding schedules also had to be considered. Such an intricate web of linked activity, spanning branch and service lines, forced the complete abandonment of the stovepipe development patterns of the Cold War and the CBRS (ACH, 1996, 128).

## **Army Transformation Initiative**

In mid-October 1999, Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki and Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera outlined their initiative for the army of the future. Including rapidly deployable forces and equipment capable of responding to the full spectrum of operations, they termed this initiative "Transformation." The initiative looked to the weapons, force structure, training and doctrine of the army well into the twenty-first century. TRADOC was the forerunner of that effort. The advances in technology indicated an evolution to a battlefield on which time, distance, movement and firepower existed in new relationships emerging from the evidence of the extended reach and pinpoint accuracy of weapons brought to effect by deployability, responsiveness, near-real-time intelligence, target acquisition and communications technology. This advent of a new strategic world and the emergence of a new higher level of technological warfare took place in the context of a



**Figure 8.3 M1A2 SEP.**

U.S. military establishment sharply drawing down in the wake of the retrenchment of Soviet power (Chapman, 1998, 25).

The Abrams Tank Modernization Strategy (ATMS) supported the Army’s transformation vision. The 2000 Mechanized Force Modernization Plan critically acclaimed the Abrams as a decisive factor in the U.S.’s war-fighting requirements. The ATMS took a balanced approach that allowed the army to sustain combat overmatch while improving reliability and reducing operations and support (O&S) cost on an aging tank fleet. To operate effectively within a “system of systems” environment and provide improved force effectiveness to the organization, action must be taken to improve the Abrams platform (Chapman, 1998, 43).

## The Joint Capabilities Integration Development System

In 2002, in order to augment future battlefield capability and combat development, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld initiated the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) program, which defined acquisition requirements and evaluation criteria for future defense programs. Created to fix the problems of redundancies and unilateral development of the previous service-specific requirements generation system, JCIDS guided the development of requirements for future acquisition systems to reflect the needs of all four services. JCIDS now focuses the requirements generation process on needed *capabilities* as requested or defined by one of the five U.S. combatant commanders. In the JCIDS process, regional and functional combatant commanders give feedback early in the development process to ensure that their requirements are met.

## **TSM Function and Method**

Today, TSMs bear the responsibility to serve as the TRADOC user representative and single POC for systems assigned in accordance with the TSM charter and provide intensive, centralized, total system management and integration of all DTLOMPFS considerations. The TSM also monitors and synchronizes all aspects of total system development, testing and evaluation, corrective actions, acquisition, matériel release, and fielding, to include direct interaction with the program/project/product managers and matériel developers of the primary and ancillary system(s), test community, and the fielding/gaining commands (Skaff, 2002, 1).

Using an ICT with empowered membership from schools and matériel developers, coordinate the development and documentation of all related materials, as needed:

- Operational and Organizational Plan (O&O)
- Operational and System Architecture
- Operational Requirements Document (ORD)
- Operational Mode Summary/Mission Profile (OMS/MP)
- System Threat Assessment Report (STAR)
- Manpower and Personnel Integration (MANPRINT)
- Supportability Strategy
- System Training Plans (STRAP)
- Software Development Plans
- Doctrinal publications
- System Evaluation Plans (SEPs)
- Critical Operational Issues and Criteria (COIC)
- Simulation Support Plan (SSP)
- User input to Qualitative and Quantitative Personnel Requirements Information (QQPRI) and Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP) Feeder Data
- Integrated Logistics Support Plan
- Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE)

In coordination with the proponent Directorate of Combat Developments (DCD), the TSM proposes refinement of system requirements in the Operational Requirements Document/Capabilities Development Document (ORD/CDD); justified or validated system requirements at all levels of the army, DoD, and Congress, as directed. The TSM participates in system concept analyses by matériel developers, as well as cost performance trade-off and cost as an independent variable analyses by providing detailed war-fighting capability impact of specific system characteristics. Additionally, the TSM provides TRADOC senior leadership recommendation for all design reviews (Skaff, 2002, 2).

The TSM prepares the TRADOC position on, receives TRADOC leadership approval for and participates in decision reviews (In Progress Review (IPR)/Army

Systems Acquisition Review Council/Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC)/Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)/Defense Acquisition Board) for assigned systems. He or she provides user input for documentation of these reviews, such as Acquisition Program Baseline and acts as a user representative on any other acquisition review boards for assigned systems (Skaff, 2002, 2).

As part of unit set fielding, the TSM manages a coordinated schedule of work for TRADOC schools and activities in support of system development and initial fielding. The TSM identifies and prioritizes system hardware and software deficiencies to the matériel developers for corrective action. The TSM reviews and evaluates proposed actions and engineering change proposals of the project or program manager to ensure that user requirements are adequately addressed (Skaff, 2002, 2).

The TSM provides for system improvements (Preplanned Product Improvements, System Enhancement Program, Service Life Extension Program, recapitalization efforts, etc.) in coordination with the proponent. This is accomplished through the identification of Science and Technology, Science and Technology Objectives, Advanced Technology Demonstrations, Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations, and Concept Experimentation Programs for systems assigned to the TSM. The TSM ensures that test units are trained and prepared for testing; coordinates all user involvement in system testing (for example, scenario development, test support, unit training and user subject matter expertise); and monitors technical and user test activities for assigned systems to keep TRADOC leadership informed of system progress and to initiate corrective action for user unit or test personnel activities as needed (Skaff, 2002, 2).

Lastly, the TSM cross-walks and reconciles O&O concept to ORD characteristics to the request for proposal (RFP) matériel specifications, to ensure the acquisition strategy meets user needs; articulates system operational and organizational concepts associated with the system as a member of combined arms system of systems and joint environments; provides user coordination to manpower estimates; user representation in analysis of alternatives (AoAs), and other studies, evaluations and efforts that support the development programs. The TSM provides TRADOC representation to allied/prospective users of the assigned systems and develops and implements office closure and responsibility transfer plan (Skaff, 2002, 3).

## **TSM Abrams Day-to-Day Activities**

The mission statement of TSM Abrams is to conduct total capabilities management for the Abrams tank program across DOTLMPF and ensure all current and future user requirements are developed, fully integrated early and continuously throughout the development, production and deployment of assigned systems.

From this mission statement, the TSM Abrams office performs many functions on a daily basis. The TSM, a colonel, and his deputy, a GS-14, get guidance from the TRADOC CG and Fort Knox CG (Chief of Armor). They coordinate with

many outside agencies, such as the Abrams project manager, division and brigade commanders (user), other TSMs and disseminate their guidance to the other members of the TSM Abrams office and manage their progress. The activities of the twelve-member staff are many and include the following:

#### Project Management

- Provide oversight on Abrams training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations (TADSS), ensuring they are up to date and reflect the current capabilities of the systems in the field.
- Coordinate with Training and Doctrine and Combat Development (TDCD) who write the doctrine and develop new systems for the armor community and ensure new systems and technology are reflected in doctrine.
- Monitor new capabilities being developed for the Abrams tank and assist with the integration of these new technologies/capabilities.
- Write documents in the form of requirements documents, information papers, DA form 2028 change documents, and memoranda updating the Abrams tank with current and future technology.
- Review other system's requirements documents for commonality opportunities and ensure they are able to integrate and are in sync with the Abrams tank.
- Interact with the user, ensuring his needs are met with DOTLMPF analysis.
- Coordinate for soldier testing and evaluation on new systems and equipment.
- Coordinate with program manager (PM) for new equipment plans, fielding, budget.
- Coordinate with National Guard Bureau for fielding, budget and fleet issues.
- Track the number and type of tanks in the fleet and at each installation to include Fort Knox.
- Track the modifications that are being applied to the Abrams fleet.
- IAW DA and PM offices address modernization needs in relation to threat, budget projections and Army Campaign Plan.

#### Ammunition

- On-site monitoring and evaluation of currently fielded tank ammunition.
- Monitor, evaluate, coordinate and participate in testing of developmental tank ammunition.
- Develop, coordinate and participate in capability requirements of future ammunition.
- Provide ammunition information to soldiers and marines through on-site briefings, written responses, as well as through technical, tactical and professional publications.

- Serve as a liaison for TCM/ammunition community with soldiers and marines on all areas of tank ammunition to include lessons learned during training and combat.

#### Safety

- Track and analyze the trends on the number and type of armor crewmen deaths in Iraq.
- Analyze all Abrams tank fires and accidents for trends and possible risk mitigation.
- Research and submit findings and recommendations to the Combat Readiness Center concerning fatal accidents.
- Address Congressional Requests for Information (RFI) on various accidents, incidents and occasional “good ideas.”

## **Termination of TSM Abrams and Formation of TCM Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT)**

Many officials within the Army felt the Abrams could not fight and succeed in an urban fight. They felt it could be replaced with emerging technology as it was obsolete, too heavy to deploy rapidly and too expensive to own and maintain. In May 2002, the deputy chief of staff of the army called for the termination of the TSM Abrams office and the establishment of the TSM Future Combat System (FCS) office (Jordan, 2002). TSM Abrams was able to prolong the termination for two more years and eventually avoid it altogether, but lost its charter in August 2004 (Harris, 2004). The TSM Abrams office remained opened, but with minimal staffing, no budget and without a charter (Harris, 2004).

It wasn't until the Abrams and Bradley demonstrated overwhelming success in spearheading the assault on Baghdad in March 2003 and again in counterinsurgency operations shortly after the fall of Baghdad that the army realized they needed heavy, mobile protected firepower to win its ground battles in all environments, including urban. In 2005, TRADOC and the Futures Center (FC) reemphasized their support for the Army strategy to improve and maintain the Abrams and Bradley as key elements of the combat capability through the next two decades and beyond. They also added, “Abrams and Bradley were needed in the Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (HBCTs) to continue to provide the necessary combat overmatch to modular forces for the foreseeable future ... This will drive the requirement for these systems to remain compatible with the future force network as a viable combat element” (Curran, 2005). With this the TSM Abrams office had their Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) reinstated and planned for the reinstatement of their charter and Research, Development, Training, and Evaluation (RDT&E) money.

By 2003 and 2004 the Army reorganized its combat formations into modular HBCTs, combining two tank battalions and two mechanized infantry battalions forming a HBCT. This was done in an effort to move away from a divisional structure into a more lethal, flexible brigade structure. The Product Manager Combat Systems followed suit and adopted the name PM HBCT soon after. For consolidation purposes and economy of effort, in 2006 the decision was made for TSM Abrams to assume management of the M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the M104 Wolverine Heavy Assault Bridge and the M88 HERCULES recovery vehicle in forming the TCM HBCT office. TCM HBCT officially became an organization with an effective date of January 1, 2007. The former TSM Abrams office has grown to the largest size and encompasses more heavy combat vehicles than ever before. The TSM offices managed the systems, whereas the new TCM office now manages the capability driven by the army requirements.

## Summary

Since the 1970s there have been numerous attempts at acquisition reform, most of which are still applicable today in one form or another. The acquisition process was a fixed, regimented inflexible path that focused on threat requirements. The new system today is better in that it represents a major change to how weapon and support systems are started in the Defense Acquisition System and the detailed processes and documents required in the different phases of acquisition. The summation of changes is as follows:

The 1970s were characterized by an effort to decentralize major projects and assign them to newly formed TRADOC. To assist in managing those programs, the TSMs were created in 1977. Requirements are threat-based.

The 1980s brought the concept-based requirements system (CBRS) in an attempt to successfully manage combat development and requirements determination. CBRS tied doctrine, organization, training, leadership, matériel and soldiers (DOTLMS) requirements to specific army needs and provided a structured process to coordinate modernization efforts.

The 1990s saw the most acquisition reform in several initiatives starting with the creation of Battle Labs in 1992. The battle labs explored new concepts and technology and determined their applicability across the DOTLMPF. In 1995 the Armor Center became one of the first branches to make wide use of integrated concept teams (ICTs). One of the key components of the ICT process is considering cost as an independent variable (CAIV) to weight capabilities versus cost trade-offs. The 1996 TRADOC *Black Book No. 3: Requirements Determination* and 1998 TRADOC Pamphlet 71-9: *Force Development Requirements Determination* formalized a new requirements policy by TRADOC assuming control over all war-fighting requirements.



This authority enabled TRADOC to standardize the requirements process by providing a single system applicable to all weapons, equipment, clothing and information technology.

In 1999 Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki and Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera outlined their initiative for the army of the future, calling it “Transformation.” It included rapidly deployable forces and equipment capable of responding to the full spectrum of operations. The initiative looked to the weapons, force structure, training and doctrine of the army well into the twenty-first century. The Abrams Tank Modernization Strategy supported the army’s transformation vision. The 2000 Mechanized Force Modernization Plan critically acclaimed the Abrams as a decisive factor in the U.S.’s war-fighting requirements. The strategy took a balanced approach that allowed the Abrams MBT to sustain combat overmatch while improving reliability and reducing O&S cost on an aging tank fleet.

In 2002, in order to augment future battlefield capability and combat development, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld initiated the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) program with the intent of fixing the problems of redundancies and unilateral development of the previous service-specific requirements generation system. This new system defined acquisition requirements and evaluation criteria for future defense programs. JCIDS was created to guide the development of requirements for future acquisition systems to reflect the needs of all four services. JCIDS now focuses the requirements generation process on needed *capabilities* (versus threat) as requested or defined by one of the five U.S. combatant commanders. In the JCIDS process, regional and functional combatant commanders give feedback early in the development process to ensure that their requirements are met.

Over three decades of reform has made the acquisition process easier and more user friendly; however, it still remains a complex and time-consuming venture.

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## Chapter 9

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# Private Military Companies

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Matthew Armstrong

### Introduction

All wars are fought for money.

— Socrates

Mercenaries solve the problem of limited political and economic resources to fight wars. The recorded history of mercenaries begins with the first recorded battle thousands of years ago. Today's mercenaries, in the form of contractors working for private military companies, provide ostensibly the same benefits as they did throughout history, but the rules of war have changed bringing into question the real value of those benefits today. Whether on the land or the sea, they are a source of temporary forces that providing new and additional capabilities, while supposedly extending diplomatic cover and providing deniable accountability at both home and abroad. The advantages and disadvantages were not foreign to Thucydides, Machiavelli, or the Founding Fathers of the United States, but the accountability, deniable or otherwise, is influenced and directed by news cycles that prioritize perceptions over fact. Today, the role and the impact of private military companies, specifically private security companies, have changed as the rules of war have changed. Understanding how they impact strategic, operational, and tactical operations is essential.

Military manpower has often been treated like a commodity, with providers bearing the cost of maintenance, technology adoption, and recruiting while the hiring party pays cash, including perhaps a booty sharing agreement, while

working within constraints imposed by domestic political and economic realities. Private arrangements, whether with nearby princes or hired armies of other lands, were often desired and even necessary because it limited the impact on sovereigns economy and permitted greater leeway by not directly engaging the population, if it did at all. Furthermore, most sovereigns could not afford to maintain a standing army. Not to be forgotten is much of the ancient armies of the Chinese, Greeks, Romans, and even half of William the Conqueror's army were mercenary (Shearer, 1998). Then, just as they are now, for-hire military service providers were attractive for their relatively quick availability, often in the form of turn-key solutions, absence of long-term costs, such as maintenance, training and research and development, deniable accountability, and the ability to conduct diplomacy through intermediaries.

From the first recorded use of mercenaries four thousand years ago, through the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, and until the nineteenth century, mercenaries were regular features of war. It was not Westphalia that disarmed mercenaries, but a confluence of nationalism, technology, and increasing interstate trade that marginalized them. It would be another two hundred years after the birth of the modern state before states would effectively hold each other accountable for the actions of their citizens, started linking the projection of force to a specific geographic territory, and consolidated the decision to personally volunteer and fight in wars away from the people and into the hands of the governments of states that private militaries were "de-legitimized, de-democratized, and territorialized" (Thomson, 1994, 4).

The purpose of war, and notably the manner in which a domestic audience is enlisted to support it, shows the importance of political capital. Clausewitz (1976, 87) wrote that war "is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument" and "the political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose."

This chapter looks at the impact of private military companies (PMCs) within the context of American military administration, with a primary focus on the private security companies (PSCs) as they have a greater influence on the outcome of conflicts. This chapter begins with a brief discussion on the taxonomy of the private military industry overall and the establishment of terms used here, this chapter begins with an historical foundation to contextualize the purpose and use of mercenaries through the ages and to properly frame why they were marginalized. Following this is a comparison of the past and the present, with a look at modern arguments behind using nonstate actors in the conduct of U.S. foreign and security policy. This chapter concludes with the important question of how private security companies integrate with and contribute to U.S. military objectives.

## Terms and Taxonomy

The difference between mercenary and contractor is more than semantics. The United Nations and international law define “mercenary” with such precision that the spokesman for a U.S. association of private military companies remarked that anyone convicted of being a mercenary by the UN should not only be shot, but so should his lawyer (Bicanic, 2006). Today, the preferred term is contractor, with “mercenary” largely transformed into a pejorative akin to Machiavelli’s *condottieri*, which ironically is Old Italian for contractor.

Despite the legal specificity, this chapter generally uses the term “mercenary” when referencing for-hire military forces on land and sea from the distant past up through the end of the Cold War. While many take umbrage with my choice to make as equals land and sea mercenaries, the fact is, privateers resembled modern corporate security firms with many of the privateers organized as shareholding members, accountable to a contract that provided for a cut beginning with the ship owner down through the captain to the lowest man on the vessel.

There are different ways to categorize PMCs. One is to place the function and purpose of a firm along a horizontal axis styled after an image of a spear. At the tip are “military provider firms” with implementation and command capabilities. PSCs fall into this category and are the primary focus of this chapter. In the middle are “military consultant firms,” which provide advisory and training services, such as training foreign militaries such as the Croatians and Nigerians. The third and last category is “military support firms,” which provide nonlethal aid and assistance like food services, transportation, and latrines (Singer, 2003, 93). Halliburton is probably the most famous provider in this category.

Another view looks at the location of a firm’s headquarters to suggest the intent and purpose of the firm. The judicial and administrative reach into the firm by the state may hint at the intended accountability and transparency of the firm. By locating the headquarters away from the reach of laws that might penetrate the veil of corporate privacy, the firm may consider its action more independently, and less in the context of its home, and more likely to provide services in the developing world with minimal (if indirect) government participation. Firms based in advanced legalist states like the United States and the United Kingdom would be expected to act in greater accordance with, or at least fear of, the wishes of the states.

States with lesser legal systems or states with different and less distinct civil-military relations, such as Belarus and Israel, are less likely to impose legal or bureaucratic restraints on private military firms. For example, the now-defunct Sandline International was shielded from legal remedies by the government of the United Kingdom. When the U.K. House of Commons investigated Sandline as a result of its violation of international arms embargoes in the Sri Leone affair, it found that even if it could pursue juridical action against Sandline, it would have limited recourse because of its being headquartered in the Isle of Man, beyond the legal reach of the United Kingdom (House of Commons, 2002).

Lastly, we may see firms based in rogue or failed states in the future. These should not be considered firms at all, but militia, insurgents, terrorists, pirates, or simply unofficial extensions of the government, if one exists. Rent-a-terrorist Carlos the Jackal may fit into this category.

This chapter will use “nonstate force” interchangeably with private forces. Similarly, “public military force” is synonymous with the military force of a state, such as the armed forces of the United States.

## History

Machiavelli’s oft-cited warning against the *condottieri* in fourteenth-century Italy stemmed from the failure to manage and oversee the *condottieri*. When both sides of a conflict were *condottieri*, it was not unheard of for a meeting to take place to extend the conflict at the expense of their clients but to the benefit of the mercenary. This collusion, however, was far from the norm. Then, as now, private military companies delivered trained professionals as fighters, sometimes as self-contained, without intrusive disruption of the economy or politics of the hiring party. By reducing the political capital necessary by distancing the people from military service, the ruler maintained autonomy in decision making (Zarate, 1998).

Before the rise of nationalism, foreign policy, state security, and even economic expansion depended on the services of mercenaries on land and sea. The value of the private firms to sovereigns and states was threefold: deniable accountability of independent actors; acquisition of resources; and refusing resources to the enemy of the moment. While similar, the course toward marginalization of sea and land mercenaries took different paths.

On the sea, legitimated privateering expanded as states authorized private men-of-war financed by growing private capital to operate on behalf of the state to attack enemy shipping and were motivated by the profit from the sale or ransom of the captured vessel and cargo under agreed upon terms with the authorizing government. In one example, King Louis XIV even encouraged the use of French warships by private investors for privateering to bolster the treasury (Little, 2005, 16).

Sea rovers, as Benerson Little describes them, were instrumental in both the acquisition and protection of resources and wealth of empires. A notable example of how inconsequential the Treaty of Westphalia was on mercenaries, English-hired *boucaniers* flushed out Spanish guerrillas on Jamaica and defended a Royal Navy base were the English launched attacks against the Spanish. The *boucaniers*, along with French-hired *filibustiers*, “were often very much a part of major government and business interests” in their use against the Spanish until rising legitimate trade, and the fall of Spain, made these raiders too troublesome and interfering (Little, 2005, 12–14). The development of “legitimate” trade and the fall of a central power would later conspire against sea rovers and landed mercenaries later.

Private mercantile companies, the first PMCs, were granted sovereign powers that in effect created mini-states. Granted the authority to raise troops, print money, and sign treaties on behalf of the state, companies functioned with license from a state and used violence to benefit the state while shielding the state from the dirty nature of empire building, resource extraction and the responsibility of diplomacy away.

Rising international trade also increased the cost of uncertainty. Merchants, back an increasingly wealthy that exerted greater influence on their governments, conspired to reduce the autonomy of states. A dichotomy began to develop with the increase in domestic pressure on foreign and commercial policy. On the one hand private military solutions became more appealing as a means to reduce the impact on and involvement of the domestic constituency, but growing international trade increased potential penalties as interconnectedness deepened it became “difficult to determine which acts of nonstate violence were state sanctioned and which were private, independent, or free-lance” (Thomson, 1994, 19). This was especially troublesome as private entrepreneurs turned against their masters or colluded with specific individuals while being paid from the state’s coffers, as Machiavelli had warned earlier. The benefit of this loose principal–agent relationship was not lost on the actors of the time. Simply put, plausible deniability was “not a trivial feature of global politics ... between 1600 and 1800” (Thomson, 1994, 21).

As the concept of neutrality took hold and laws of war were developed, proxy attacks on seaborne trade lost their distance. This and other factors led to the Declaration of Paris, signed in 1856, which made illegal any acts on the high seas against commercial trade not involved in a war and not accountable to a state (Stark, 1897, 153; Thomson, 1994, 144).

In time, the first PMCs were competing with the states that licensed them, becoming interfering and antagonistic. The United East India Company was authorized “to make war, conclude treaties, acquire territories and build fortresses” (Thomson, 1994, 11) and aggressively pursued its goal to satisfy shareholders regardless of the political costs to the home country, including seeking to sell territory to the enemies of the United Provinces. A governor general of the Company noted that “Trade must be driven and maintained under the protection and favour of your own weapon ... Trade can not be maintained without war, nor war without trade” (Singer, 2003, 19). In the case of the English, their British East India Company, while controlling military resources of the Crown, demanded land from the Royal Navy for its own use (Thomson, 1994, 67). With parallels to the eventual outlawing of privateers in 1856, states dismantled their private mercantile companies as they interfered more in the foreign policy of their home states.

In Canada and the East Indies, Britain closed down the Hudson’s Bay Company and the East India Company to assert its sovereignty in European and North American politics, respectively. The corsairs of North Africa were shut down through the establishment of French sovereignty, with the pirates of Tripoli and



Tunis deauthorizing nonstate operations from their ports as well (Thomson, 1994, 144).

As frustration with private forces increased and deniable accountability decreased, practical alternatives started to emerge. The United Provinces used their wealth from international trade to establish and train a standing professional army and eliminate their reliance on mercenaries drawn from the outside long before Napoleon was born (Howard, 2001, 37). Changes in military administration included conscription, an improved officer corps, and improved technology and logistics were impacted by societal and political pressures and demands. Globalization led to increasing wealth and interstate trade as successful states deepened their economic capacity through taxation and infrastructure development (Bob-bitt, 2002, 152–157; Paret, Craig, and Gilbert, 1986, 124–129).

Prior to Napoleon, the French marshaled the resources of the state to support and fight the war. States, in response, saw their borders ossify as they became more capable and desirous of extracting domestic resources, through such means as taxation. This increased capacity of the state, along with intensifying international trade and an increasing reliance on merchants who generated income for the state, ironically meant rulers were less autonomous internationally. According to Max Weber (1957), the authority of the state was coterminous with its territorial boundaries. As such, “states were held accountable for the trans-border coercive activities of individuals residing within their borders” (Thomson, 1994, 19). As power was consolidated inside borders and domestic resources were extracted with increasing efficiency, states sought to limit diplomatic liability and economic uncertainty as trade and conflicts over resources increased in a shrinking world.

Building on political and social changes wrought by the new Republic, and six years before Napoleon took control, France implemented universal conscription. This revolutionary source of manpower to fight wars relied on mobilizing the people through nationalism and patriotism on a massive scale.

It was not just the sheer size of national armies that shoved mercenaries to the margins, but also the amount of state control over these forces, which in turn was supported by professionalism of the officer corps, better fighting technology, as well as time for drill. Nationalism, new weapons technology, tactics, and strengthened command and control meant the common soldier could now be the citizen-soldier with little military experience. Universal conscription meant the bulk of the army was deprofessionalized in relation to the military cadres and mercenary bands that came before. Professionalization of the officer corps had other benefits besides increasing command and control of the military; it also promulgated the hierarchy of state authority over the military. Developing professionalism of the officer corps as servants of the state, with constant employment, also furthered the development of a distinct culture separating civilian from military (Howard, 2001, 54).

Technological advances, including more mobile and accurate artillery, accelerated changes on the battlefield. The advances of Gustavus Adolphus were improved upon by the Frenchman Jen-Baptiste de Gribeauval to create highly effective fire

near and in support of friendly troops whose ranks swelled under *levée en masse* (Howard, 2001, 61–63; Huntington, 1957, 32). Strategic and tactical changes by Napoleon are often noted as well. Napoleon disparaged fighting in “little packets”, or small unit warfare, which is generally all that mercenaries could do (Paret et al., 1986, footnote #127). Larger units of emotionally motivated soldiers were all rallied by nationalism (as was the supporting public back home), supported by mobile and powerful artillery, permitted and even required fighting in columns, or *l'ordre profond* instead of the traditional lines, or *l'ordre mince* (Bobbitt, 2002, 152; Howard, 2001, 79).

Through the nineteenth century, the international trend brought on by increasing interconnectedness held states accountable for the actions of their citizens. The growing international structure made it difficult for states to claim their citizens were independently accountable. States began enacting laws to prevent their citizens from entering conflicts against allies of the state, such as the *British Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819*, revised in 1870 when many of its citizens went to war on the side of the Prussians against the British ally, France.

Further, the maturation interstate politics and increasing state autonomy placed *raison d'état* over other considerations. Personal, or individual, enmity was replaced by the interests of the state and the state became a tool of the nation. Princes no longer went to war for sport at relatively low political and financial costs. Out of necessity in the changing nature of conflict, now the resources of the entire state were brought to bear, requiring greater mobilization. This change was reflected in international negotiations on trade that were increasingly codified. This created an ideal type of a soldier that laid down his arms being nearly equal to a person who never took up arms: both should be spared since neither was a combatant (Stark, 1897, 13–19). Accordingly, war was no longer “a ritual or instrument to redress petty grievances, but rather an activity to serve the interests of the state” (Handel, 2001, 66). Politics and trade between and within states increased the accountability of regimes to one another.

Different than earlier efforts to reduce or eliminate reliance on mercenaries, now there was a viable alternative that, in Europe for example, was required to match the threat of Napoleon. The result was the beginning of the end for mercenary armies as they were replaced with larger, cheaper, and better controlled armies of the state (Howard, 1976, 54; Huntington, 1957, 32–33).

By the time of the time of the Franco–Prussian War of 1870, it was a given that for a state to enter a large conflict, its people must be mobilized and armies of its own people put into action. Debating the use of mercenaries to fight for England in the Crimea in 1856, members of Parliament argued that if England could not mobilize its own people to fight, then it was should not consider itself a Great Power. By the end of the nineteenth century, no longer did “small armies of professional soldiers [go] to war to conquer a city ... Wars of the present day call whole nations to arms ... entire financial resources of the State are appropriated to the purpose” (Moltke, 1892, 1).

With regard to another oft-quoted and yet infrequently understood statement, Max Weber's declaration that a state must have a "monopoly" of force does not apply to expeditionary forces. Weber's "monopoly" described the internal capacity of a state and its ability to control its own territory. The nature or legitimacy of Max Weber's "administrative unit," or state, does not prohibit the use of, or suffer from the employment of, mercenaries. As Max Weber described it, a state was not a state without successfully upholding the "claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force" in its territory for the "enforcement of its order ... by the application and threat of physical force on the part of the administrative staff" of the political leadership (Weber, 1957, 154). The license of force, internally and externally, is permitted through implicit licensing.

## The U.S. Experience

The United States, like most states of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, embraced private forces to satisfy national security requirements. Beginning with the Revolution, the U.S. used private military forces to augment or fulfill the requirements of war and national security. Used by the American insurgency against the British as well against foreign pirates twenty-five years later, the Founding Fathers never felt mercenaries, or their sea-borne counterparts, privateers, to be inherently undemocratic. While concerns over maintaining a standing army were deep, Samuel Adams' warned that while an army was both necessary and dangerous to "Liberties of the People," he cautioned the military "should be watched with a jealous Eye" (Stevenson, 2006, 1).

Intimately aware of the potential that an army could be used to suppress its own citizenry, the Framers of the Constitution and found it prudent to firmly subjugate the military under civilian authority. As codified in the Constitution, the armed forces were given two masters: Congress and the President. Congress was empowered to "raise and support" the army as well as the power "To declare War" while the President was given the power to conduct the war (Stevenson, 2006).

Neither hiring nor hiring out as mercenaries was inimical to the Founding Fathers or to nascent American nationalism. As a contractor himself, America's own naval war hero, John Paul Jones, rented out his services after the Revolution to Catherine the Great of Russia.

Of course, the dollar cost of a standing military was expensive for the young U.S. More telling was that to defend the new nation's commerce, James Madison, before he was president, suggested hiring the Portuguese Navy to deal with the Barbary Pirates while campaigning against taxes for the national defense (Chernow, 2004, 460).

The truth be told, privateering was more a boon than a bane to the early United States. It was the backbone of some New England economies, even as it was a threat to international goodwill. Towns like Salem and Portsmouth relied on the income

generated from raiding English and other European commercial vessels during and after the American Revolution. The impact on English commerce was not only the quantity of lost goods, but shipping insurance rose significantly, and thus so did the cost of doing business, for English shipping going in and out of English ports (Stark, 1897, 123).

Despite their nominal independence, privateers still represented their principal, or the one who hired them. Then, as is the case now, a wrong move by a contractor could have severe repercussions and the veil of deniable accountability thinned or disappeared with increased trade and communications. A single American privateer, for example, created in Spain “considerable anti-American feeling” because of an expensive capture on the seas. Fortunately, American public and private diplomacy was such that this and similar incidents were not associated with the U.S. government and its policy goals (Stark, 1897, 125).

As in the millennia before, insufficient political and economic capital to maintain a military to satisfy the foreign policy and national security aspirations continued to make mercenaries attractive. This was certainly the case in 1812 when the United States and Britain went to war. With a navy outnumbered by almost ten to one, Congress gave the President the authority to “issue to private armed vessels of the United States commissions or letters of marquee and general reprisal, in such form as he shall think proper, and under the seal of the United States” (Stark, 1897, 127). Congress, in granting the president this authority, gave specific instructions on compensation and, more importantly, instructions on monitoring the privateers, as Congress was keenly aware of their impact on public diplomacy and foreign policy.

The rules of war and politics changed and leaders needed to mobilize the citizenry to go to war. Once the domestic campaign is in motion, however, democracies can be hard to stop. Using private forces means the level of domestic mobilization can be substantially lower. The people do not need to participate either directly or even viscerally in the conduct of war.

American wars through the end of World War II included various private and pseudo-public ventures. From Theodore Roosevelt’s Rough Riders that was in some respects a privately organized combat team to the mercenarial Flying Tigers, private military forces never completely left the American way of war.

From an economic capability to make war, liberal economic considerations pushed for greater integration with the private sector. One notable private–public partnership can be traced to the end of World War I when the government accepted that it did not and could not sufficient ability to manufacture all of the ammunition and other provisions required to fight future wars based on the troubles of World War I. This partnership expanded and deepened over the decades, rising to a level that was both helpful and troublesome, as President Eisenhower famously remarked in his farewell address to the nation.

Even as he warned of the military-industrial-Congressional complex, Eisenhower’s commitment to have the U.S. government increasingly “rely on commercial

sources” started the outsourcing ball rolling, possibly faster than he intended. It took a few years, but in 1966, with Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76, the ball President Eisenhower started rolling really took off and the private sector was preferred over the public sector if it could provide the service or product more economically (Congressional Research Service, 2005).

In the decades since A-76, outsourcing by the U.S. government increased. In the post-Cold War era, the pace quickened without a comparable growth in monitoring and oversight. In the 1980s, overpriced hammers and toilet seats created a public and Congressional furor. Just twenty years later, with more outsourcing and higher prices, barely an eyebrow was in Congress as questionable services and prices were bought with taxpayer money.

By the time of the Iraq War in 2003, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) was issuing frequent warnings on the failure to provide adequate oversight over contractor expenses and actions (Government Accountability Office, 2006). This lack of oversight in the unpredictable environment of a war zone has resulted in several high-profile problems in Iraq, ranging from use of force and rules of engagement to equipment and transport availability. From the private sector perspective, the uncertainty of war demands a cost-plus contract to cover unknown expenses. A cost-plus contract is when a vendor is able to bill the cost of a truck, for example, and mark it up with a previously agreed on percentage, for payment.

However, when contracting officers are unavailable, as is the case in Iraq, communication failures may occur and oversight disappears. There is little incentive for the contractor to pressure its supplier for better prices, but on the contracting state, it is useful because the contractor is not burdened with carrying and writing off inventory (Government Accountability Office, 2004).

An additional cost is lack of accountability through the military command structure, military legal system, or in-country legal system of the private military force. Hidden costs associated with the lack of accountability include the impact on morale of public troops, potential lack of steadfastness in time of need, and perhaps more importantly in the modern media environment and nonstate warfare, public diplomacy and image problems resulting from conduct (Kohn, 2002; Michaels, 2004).

## **Reasons for Use**

On the subject of private military companies, the most important but more infrequently asked question is “why” and “for what purpose.” Modern responses are similar to the historical reasons behind their use: surge capacity or availability, short-term cost, deniable accountability, and diplomacy by proxy. However, the rules of war have changed. Today, perceptions carry more weight than in the past and sometimes have a greater and longer lasting impact than bullets, and yet private forces are deployed with often little guidance and connection back to the core

mission resulting in a situation similar to the environment that marginalized them one hundred and fifty years ago.

Using slick marketing words and reacting to social constraints of military spending, mission selection, and accountability, PMCs promote themselves as a “low-risk, low-cost, low-visibility way to exert military influence in a time of diminished budgets and shrinking armed forces” (Adams, 1999) while providing flexible and professional solutions to clients with marketing language similar to information technology companies providing outsourcing.

The availability of additional guns that private security companies provide, or “surge” capacity, is one argument for going to the private sector. Based on the idea that it is politically or economically unfeasible to pay for increasing the size of the armed forces, its underlying assumption is the conflict will be short in duration. Some have argued the only way to upsize the military is through reinstating the draft and thus private security companies avoid conscription from returning to the U.S.

This argument has proven to be empty with the passage of time. After five years of the “Long War,” the White House finally changed its position on upsizing the military. Meanwhile, the Army and Marine Corps remain indirectly augmented (more on this below) in Iraq and Afghanistan by tens of thousands of security contractors. In response to attractive pay of the private sector in 2003-2005, the U.S. military, especially the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) vastly increased retention bonuses to prevent soldiers from leaving the service for the private sector. However, the services continue to supply the private sector with qualified personnel through inappropriate “Up or Out” personnel policies (Congressional Budget Office, 2006). Many recruiting cycles have passed since the war began and it is hard to argue that the ad hoc surge capability continues to provide a benefit to the strategic interests of the United States.

The downsizing of the post-Cold War period put a focus on “core competencies” and more “tooth” less “tail” in a variation of the Abrams Doctrine, except without the public support element. General Creighton Abrams sought to create a link between deploying the Army and public support for military operations. In practice, it was Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird who initiated Total Force to provide sufficient troops without the costly burden of maintaining a large standing army. Over time, instead of using Reserve and National Guard components to round out the force, the military was made more “lean” and the private sector was looked at to be the fat when necessary.

As this practice took hold, the government was slow to realize what the private sector had experienced in the 1990’s: overzealous outsourcing can result in a loss of control over critical functions and less favorable contract terms and higher per unit costs when factoring in all of the hidden costs. The government, not heeding the lessons of the private sector saw advantages in short-term access of expensive skill sets and a perceived lower unit cost.

These “private sector efficiencies” have actually increased costs in terms of hard dollars, institutional knowledge, and military-to-military connections and a failure to integrate private resources into missions increasingly focused on the struggle for minds and wills. The focus on the short-term ignores the real costs and real benefits associated with the outsourced services and skills.

Dollar-for-dollar comparisons, while frequently used, are misleading. At the macro level, there is the impact on the economy, including reduced investment in pensions and healthcare. At a lower level, These dollar-for-dollar comparisons oversimplify long-term costs of private markets that fail to be truly competitive while hiding substantial transaction costs that include higher finance costs of the private sector compared to the government’s ability to borrow money at lower rates, vendor incentives to skimp on quality or adhere to the letter of the contract not the spirit, future public costs to return outsourced skills in-house, and transactional costs of writing, enforcing, and monitoring contracts. In the aftermath of the expensive toilet seats and hammers in the Reagan Administration, the Federal Acquisitions Regulations (FAR) were strengthened in an effort to make sure the government received a fair product at a fair price. However, in the fast-paced post-9/11 environment FAR was frequently bypassed. The end result is questionable cost effectiveness of the practice of outsourcing security services (Fredland, 2004; Hartley, 2004).

Another feature of privatization found in historical use and assumed today is deniable accountability. Privatization allows for an upsizing of the force, or at least the project of the force if not well integrated into at the operational or strategic levels, without engaging popular support. Private military companies allow the government to ignore the Abrams Doctrine that led to the current force structure. As Thomas Friedman wrote, “You all just go about your business of being Americans, pursuing happiness, spending your tax cuts, enjoying the Super Bowl halftime show, buying a new Hummer, and leave this war to our volunteer Army” (Friedman, 2004).

This brings up the interesting evolution in the U.S. where the citizen-soldier is increasingly a myth as soldiers, and their families, turn inward and focus on their own support networks. Fewer Americans know somebody who is presently serving or even directly impacted by the post-9/11 wars. The modern all volunteer force (AVF) is far removed from the modern political and social spheres of power in the United States, leading to suggestions that nonveteran civilians may be more “interventionist” and simultaneously placing more constraints on the use of military force (Feaver and Gelpi, 2004; Stevenson, 2006). The result is the redevelopment of a professional warrior class in the United States proficient in the conduct of war, with a continuous and deep involvement in military affairs that harkens back to professional mercenary soldiers. In fact, because private military contractors are drawn from all walks of life, it might be that more Americans know a contractor than know a serviceman or servicewoman.

This disconnect as well as the marginal view of private military companies means outsourcing shortens the decision-making horizon into immediate “commercial

concerns and lobbying rather than real gains to the nation and citizens” that encourage the use of companies that “lack verification and mandatory evaluation safeguards to deliver promised results” (Markusen, 2003). But the potential problems of the decision of a private military force to withdraw from a combat zone because of rising interest rates, leverage for contract negotiations, including replacement time and costs, may seriously damage and reduce military capacity without much recourse. This is both a boon and a bane of the industry. Without effective oversight, problems will arise, yet this is part of their allure and a value to their clients.

As diplomatic proxies, private forces provide a questionable return on investment. In hindsight, net gains from their use may be less than if military exchanges were used instead of contracting for private services, such as in the Balkans in the 1990s and in Nigeria in 2006. The potential for differences between enterprises driven by professionalism and those by the market may limit the depth of institutional relations, cultural understanding, and even future intelligence operations.

The Balkans in the mid-1990s is one example of bypassing proven International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs in favor of private military training that, while expanding foreign policy options of the United States, prevented institutional connections that have proven invaluable in the past. This foreign policy by proxy in Croatia allowed intervention when political sensitivities prevented overt participation. Three factors contributed to the Clinton Administration intentionally avoiding congressional, and democratic, oversight and international law. First was the UN embargo in the region that prevented direct U.S. government assistance. Second and third was the need to respond to Russian assistance to the Serbs against the Croats and necessary support of Croatia as a moderating force. The United States also wanted Croatia in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program as a counterbalance to Russian-supported Serbia. U.S.-based military services firm MPRI, Inc., a firm that once bragged of having more generals per square meter in their office than could be found in the Pentagon, was positioned to help Croatia improve in required operational areas. After a few months of training from MPRI, the Croats were able to execute two sophisticated and successful military operations that brought the Serbs to the negotiating table. It is likely the engagement of MPRI, in addition to the training provided, was a clear signal to the Croats of American backing of the Croat government (Avant, 2005, 101–109; Singer, 2003, 124–127).

The choice between private forces, an international coalition, or American troops comes down to political capital and the ability or desire to use it. Private military forces afford a path of least, or less, resistance through bypassing Congress and the media.

Oversight and monitoring of contracting is negligible compared to deployed public military forces, and the deaths and injuries of contractors are not included in news tallies and are usually reported as lesser deaths than uniformed personnel. Using contractors decreases “casualty sensitivity” in the media, public debate, and



at senior levels in government. The “Dover Test,” the public response to Americans returning in flag-draped coffins (Lacquement, 2004), is arguably less relevant with today’s senior decision makers because of their lack of attachment (versus detachment) to the realities and consequences of military action (Feaver and Gelpi, 2004, 13).

Democratic control over the military in the U.S. is based on oversight by Congress as well as control by the President. The military knowingly operates within this political system and, at times, plays one master against the other. It may even interject a kind of “veto” into discussions on the use of military force in the interest of both itself and its oath to uphold the Constitution (Stevenson, 2006, 196–204).

How do these private forces fall under the combatant or noncombatant classification scheme of modern warfare, for which rules were drawn up as nonstate forces were delegitimized? This is more than an exercise in theory; these are questions that go to perception and control of America’s military.

The present arrangement ignores the balance of power in the U.S. system and assumes a system of hand-offs instead of the system of checks and balances the Founders created. First, the Senate gets to “advise and consent” to nominations of military (as well as civilian) officers of the government. Second, the House was given the power of the purse. Although the House has only once cut off funding, it has, to its right, managed to make changes over the years (Stevenson, 2006, 5–6).

The Founding Fathers, after fighting an irregular war against colonial masters and aware of history, were concerned about a military whose power was superior to the civilian authority. Military service and war was something most of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention knew well. Threats to the early United States were such that of congressional powers the U.S. Constitution enumerates, eleven of the eighteen pertain to security. Over half served in uniform during the Revolutionary War and at least half of those saw serious action. Concern was deep that an unchecked military would become an agent of one of the separate branches of government. The Congress, therefore, was empowered to “raise and support Armies,” to “provide and maintain a Navy,” and given the power “To declare War.” The executive branch was given the power to conduct the war (Stevenson, 2006). The potential for an unchecked military becoming an agent of one of the separate branches of government led to this deliberate separation of powers and the need for accountability and oversight.

PMCs allow control over armed force to be outside congressional oversight and in a way that “may increase functional control [of military force]” while changing “political control in ways that some view as distasteful” (Avant, 2005, 44). Examples include congressional authority to select and approve public military officers, a feature absent in the use of private military companies. As of this writing, Congress has yet to exercise its ability to hold hearings into the use and appropriations of financial resources to pay for private security companies and to look into the conduct of individuals employed by private military companies through its oversight committees. Congressional power over the military is more than holding the purse

strings, and with private military companies, their power is at best closing the purse strings but even paying for hired guns by the United States may be hidden, complex, or even disallowed by contracts, but without apparent recourse. This last point emphasizes the likelihood of a political aversion to do anything when considering the years of GAO warnings, media coverage, and even congressional testimony.

A major deviation of the normally discrete operation of contractors – at least from the perspective of the American public – was the famous slaughter of four security contractors in Fallujah in 2004. These contractors were employed by a large U.S. private security firm which was in turn contracted by a Kuwaiti-based company, which was subcontracted by a German food service company, which was subcontracted by a U.S. company that was providing logistical services under LOGCAP and paid by the U.S. army (Pelton, 2006, 119–120). However, an under-secretary of the army testified to Congress that the army never authorized “Hal-liburton or its subcontractors to carry weapons or guard convoys” (Neff and Price, 2006).

Missions performed in the name of the state may not be short-staffed because of field limitations, but because of contractual limits and profit motives. The four contractors, employed by Blackwater, killed in Fallujah in March 2004 allegedly died in part because their employer did not provide the armored vehicles and failed to properly fill the team with rear gunners (Bicanic, 2006; Pelton, 2006). Further, as a result of the contractors acting outside of military command authority, they were unaware of changing conditions in the city (Ricks, 2006, 331).

Private military companies redemocratize war. Soldiers and nonsoldiers now have the ability to participate in a conflict they otherwise could not, an opportunity made illegal in the nineteenth century. The British Foreign Enlistment Act, was just one of many laws enacted to limit state liability from the actions of its citizens (Thomson, 1994, 79–84). The capabilities of the Western contractors, typically older and more experienced to provide a better looking portfolio for the client, is conforming more to the citizen-soldier of nationalist armies than the AVF regular army. However, this is not the only profile of the contractor. Increasingly, as demand outstrips supply, third-country nationals are used.

The recruiting pool that is the U.S. armed forces can only feed the private industry for so long, which is one reason why private security companies are actively recruiting and acquiring facilities outside of the U.S. These facilities, along with their faculty, are increasingly providing training not only to the company’s own personnel, but to security personnel of other private companies, to government soldiers, and paramilitaries.

As the private security field expands and acquires new capabilities, including air power components, heavy equipment, and more, what will be the pressure to use these assets? Military equipment and training has little value and limited marketability outside conflict or recovery operations. Companies must seek revenue streams to make a profit. Ultimately the diplomatic costs of this new private ability could be unexpectedly high in the long run, especially if American military

firms begin providing assistance to unsavory foreign clients as Israeli PMCs do with Colombian and Mexican drug cartels.

To whom do the private companies grant their loyalty and how do they use that power is a question that can be answered indirectly through the guiding hand of clear monitoring and oversight.

It is noteworthy that some of the pressures that led to marginalizing mercenaries in the nineteenth century are eroding today. For example, the rise and increased manipulation of nationalism led to accountability crises, whereas twenty-first century “imagined communities” based on geography, heritage, ethnicity, religion, and even sport affinities creates new bonds and permits groups to draw on global audiences for financial, social, and physical support. This has altered the stigma and the ability to hold states accountable for the activities of its citizens. Globalization has largely, but not completely, especially in the case of South Africa discussed below, nullified laws banning citizens from participating in foreign conflicts, notably those against allies, such as the first *British Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819* mentioned earlier.

Increasingly heterogeneous, states must satisfy an increasingly diverse constituency while managing international media and markets. Citizens can now get information the state would prefer was unavailable. The state can do its best to co-opt the media and encourage certain views to percolate through the press to write its own version of history, but the rise of the blogosphere, camera phones, commercial pressures on the media, and a global news cycle complicates the efficacy of communication strategies. The need to effectively manage international communications and image is seen in the rising power of nonstate actors, from Hezbollah to the United Nations to the World Trade Organization at the expense of state autonomy.

Through public law and investigative powers, Congress could restrict the use of PMCs. This was done before in the interest of the neutrality of state and to protect the national execution of U.S. foreign policy. As war is a continuation of politics and military force is central to this, it is understandable that PMCs are an increasingly important solution tool in the toolbox of U.S. foreign policy in an era of accountability. However, unlike the past, oversight is absent and the agent may represent the principal in distasteful ways without repercussion.

## Legal Frameworks

The U.S. legal mechanisms to regulate trade in military skills and weapons are easily skirted by both contracting and contracted parties, if permitted as they often are. In 2002, the House of Commons’ Green Paper found the United States had the most substantial legal solutions for monitoring and regulating military industries (House of Commons, 2002). However, the two primary regulatory tools overseeing the export of security from the U.S., the *International Traffic in Arms Regulations*

(ITAR) of 1986 and the *Arms Export Control Act* (AECA) are both managed by the State Department and but lack any means to review contractual revisions.

In the case of ITAR, congressional review is not required unless the contract exceeds \$50 million and AECA may be avoided entirely if the contracting party is either the U.S. government or a contractor working directly for the United States. The threshold of additional scrutiny under ITAR is easily avoided by breaking up the contract into smaller segments, a frequently employed tactic. There are no review mechanisms once a contract is approved.

Bilateral agreements like Status of Forces agreements (SOFA) are, virtually by definition in the context of this discussion, meaningless since deployment is in failed states where the government has largely disappeared. In the case of Iraq with its nominal state governance, the *Coalition Provisional Authority's Memorandum 17* granted immunity from local regulation and prosecution to foreign military contractors operating in Iraq. The only law providing any real monitoring is the *Defense Base Act of 1941* that requires private U.S. insurance coverage for workers in combat zones hired under U.S. contracts.

Contractors in modern conflict raise questions about their identity and legal authority. Is the contractor a combatant or not? Frequently the discussion over their legal status holds them as noncombatants—but the inherent nature of the security contractor is at odds with this determination. The *Uniform Code of Military Justice* (UCMJ) provides a comprehensive scheme of “procedural rules and proscriptive laws to cover transgressions by members of the military,” but it does not cover the private military forces working for the government in the same theater of operations.

In early 2007, a subtle change was made to the section of the UCMJ defining personnel covered. The change, replaced “war” with “war or contingency operation,” and arguably means civilian contractors are now subject to UCMJ. Even if the UCMJ were to be found applicable to the civilian contractors, it is unclear how UCMJ proceedings and even punishments could be adapted to nonmilitary personnel.

The U.S. *Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) of 2000* extends the UCMJ to cover civilians employed by or accompanying the armed forces outside the United States or who are members of the armed forces. MEJA jurisdictional coverage is limited to civilian support personnel “hired to provide services that will free a ‘trigger-puller’ to fight, or ... provide technical expertise to the force, thereby assisting the force in waging war or enforcing peace” (Perlak, 2001).

The applicability of MEJA is questionable, when the U.S. armed forces do not directly hire the private security forces and they do not work alongside one another. Contractors not covered by MEJA include those under contract with the CIA, USAID, former CPA, for the Iraqi government, or being paid with “Iraqi funds” (Elsea and Serafino, 2004).

More important than the questionable applicability of MEJA to individuals outside of the service, and thus insensitive to reductions in rank or letters of

reprimand, is adherence to the mission. The noble but meaningless modification to the UCMJ was a step in the right direction but companies must be held accountable to the overall mission and not to their profit margin or beholden exclusively to their principal. By definition, PSCs are hired for two reasons: military or other security forces are unavailable or existing resources are not appropriate for the mission. Using the military for diplomatic protective services has proven unworkable for these reasons. One example was the use of Navy SEALs to provide personal security for a major principal in Afghanistan. Not trained in providing security for high-value targets in crowded civilian environments, their indiscriminate and yet perfectly reasonable response to an attack was inappropriate. They were replaced by a private security detail comprised of contractors knowledgeable with working and mingling in busy civilian environments. In another example, a major principal was protected by a military team but when they exited a building outside the Green Zone long ago, the detail was nowhere to be seen. The reason? The detail felt there was no risk at the moment and went to lunch.

The relationship between the state and nonstate force has more similarities than dissimilarities with the state and international peacekeeping operations. The accountability issue focuses on the relationship between the U.S. military unit and the private force, specifically in their role as proxies of the U.S. military, government, and public. The American perception of hiring somebody else to do the “dirty” work, or work that is too “expensive” for public soldiers brings with it an implied distance. This is a moral and legalistic distance that disconnects the United States from fallout of a contractor’s action. Similar distance is found between force and politics. Members of PKF who commit crimes generally tarnish the Blue Helmet and not their country of origin except to those paying close attention.

In today’s media environment, America’s response to the treatment of a contractor as a noncombatant by some current or future enemy is likely to create a delicate political situation. Examples of how the United States distances itself from associations with contractors include the contractors taken “hostage” in Colombia in 2004, the Aegis “Trophy Video,” and the Fallujah incident mentioned earlier, in which four contractors were killed. In Colombia, the United States has specifically declined to participate in calls to release three Americans who were working under contract for a U.S. private military company as part of “foreign policy by proxy.” The United States has stated these three individuals, held hostage for over a year as of this writing, are private citizens operating on their own. This language is similar to the distance the U.S. put between itself and Chennault’s Flying Tigers in 1940.

Outsourcing provides distance and deniable accountability. When a video surfaced of private security contractors firing indiscriminately at Iraqis while listening to Elvis, the subsequent investigation was kept secret. Aegis Defense Services Ltd. (Aegis), the security firm involved, compiled a two-hundred page investigation. The Defense Department reviewed the case and decided there was nothing improper. But independent review of the document, as would be possible by Congress or private citizens had it been a military unit, through simple request, subpoena or

*Freedom of Information Act* requests were denied because the Pentagon maintained the investigation was the property of Aegis, which in turn claimed the document to be proprietary corporate information and, thus, not to be made available to the public.

## International Accountability

At the core of the debate on how contractors conform to LOAC is whether they are considered a combatant or not. To say the contractor is a combatant under international law is, in part, to admit he is an agent of the state and that he operates in conjunction with the armed forces of a signer of the Geneva Conventions. Barred from wearing the uniform of the U.S. military, private security contractors in Iraq, for example, generally operate outside of the structure of the U.S. military and under informal and ad hoc relationships with military units and commanders. The doctrine, where it exists, assumes private military resources as working alongside public military units and quite often this is not the case. Recognizing the role of contractors in shaping public opinion and thus participating in the public diplomacy of the U.S. is essential to manage for successful and long-lasting counterinsurgency, and yet this awareness has been absent until the September 16, 2007, incident with Blackwater mentioned above. Instead, contractors are considered by U.S. political and military practice as independent agents with little reflection of the United States and are kept distanced from tactical, operational, and strategic planning. In writing the *Counterinsurgency Manual*, FM 3-24, the manual's authors felt the issue of contractors in the battlespace for the minds and will was a "too hard" of a problem to deal with (Nagl, 2006).

The implications for contractors of existing international legal precedence, such as the Geneva Conventions dealing with prisoners of war and civilians on the battlefield, are questionable. The Geneva Conventions are structured and designed to deal primarily with conflicts between states, a feature not lost on nonstate actors, as mentioned above in the case of the United Nations. But in the case of contractors who are employed by a state but intentionally kept at arms length through a lack of integration with command and control and by not wearing distinguishing insignia indicating membership in the armed forces, questions abound on where they fit in.

Noncombatants are protected under Common Article 3 of the Conventions. Persons protected by Article 3 are entitled, at a minimum, to humane treatment if they fall into enemy hands. However, noncombatants lose their status if they "take up arms" and must be properly identified. Contractors do carry an identity card in a format established by the convention that identifies them as a civilian authorized to accompany the force and confirms their noncombatant status. U.S. policy regarding these identity cards is found in Department of Defense Instruction 1000.1, "Issuance of Identity Cards Required by the Geneva Conventions." If captured, an authorized civilian accompanying an armed force is entitled to prisoner-of-war status.

But remember, this status applies only to contractors “accompanying the force.” The majority of deployed security contractors do not, as was the case in the three examples of Colombia, Aegis, and Blackwater cited above.

The reality is that under LOAC, the activities of private security contractors make them illegal combatants and, thus, subject to criminal prosecution. Taken to the extreme, the statement by the undersecretary of the army discussed above made the contractors in Iraq not working directly with the U.S. government illegal combatants. If captured, they are not entitled to prisoner-of-war status, an arguably moot point considering the enemy presently engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Failure to enforce appropriate conduct through existing available means is a failure of the client and not necessarily the company in a world of political accountability, strict licensing and purchasing business driven regulations, and the need to satisfy the client. The dilemma of accountability is not unique to government use of private military companies; it is also an issue for intergovernmental forces, such as those wearing the Blue Helmet for United Nations’ Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). By comparison, the independent nature of the contracting state, with liability and punishment resting solely within the state, is similar to the operation of a private military company in the employ of a state. Particularly in the United States, enough legal mechanisms exist for both, and simultaneous carrots and sticks to compel appropriate behavior. Looking at the United Nations’ peacekeeping operations, an area U.S. private military companies are eager to expand into, shows how accountability rests with the state and its delegated authority and not the agent.

Beyond legislative and legal arrangements, private security companies can be kept in line with two tools absent from the international peacekeeper toolbox. Private companies rely on governmental contracts and authorization and tend to shy away from negative publicity if incentivized properly. These levers are absent in the international peacekeeping arena with its dearth of contributing states.

The Security Council (SC) engages states to provide peacekeeping forces (PKF) in the stead of the SC members who collectively contribute less than 5 percent of forces themselves. The failure to create a permanent UN military force called for in Article 43 of the UN Charter results in ad hoc combinations of military and police resources almost exclusively drawn from outside of the permanent members of the UN Security Council. The SC makes a decision, often without direct input from the General Assembly, and then hires military manpower at a substantial mark-up over cost. There is a usual top five that contribute nearly fifty percent of all peacekeeping forces. The Security Council relies on these “subcontractor” states — Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Jordan, and Nepal — because of political constraints on the SC members that prohibit committing troops to regions when domestic interest is weak. In the post-Cold War environment, this pressure increased as Western military downsizing further eroded their ability to participate in peacemaking or peacekeeping operations, resulting in an increased reliance on forces for hire.

While PMCs are potentially held accountability by contract wording and options against the hiring principal, like the U.S. government, for its part, the UN does not

see itself as a member of the regimes of international humanitarian law (IHL) and Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), but does attempt to apply the “principles and spirit” of the law, primarily so the other actors it faces will operate at least at the same level (Bialke, 2001). In terms of legal liability, the actions of Blue Helmets are not the actions of a state, but of a collection of states, which removes them from constraints of signed international treaties. The international community in general, or the Security Council specifically, may be clear in the desire to intervene, granting authority from international law and collective will, but mission specifics are often murky and unclear and subject to further politicking and lobbying. This is compounded by indeterminate accountability of the PKF under international humanitarian law (Wills, 2004). The United Nations’ declared commitment to IHL and LOAC comes with the understanding that because a UN PKO is operating on behalf of the international community, they “cannot be considered a ‘party’ to the conflict, nor a ‘Power’ within the meaning of the Geneva Conventions” (Murphy, 2003). To accept this responsibility would imply they were no longer impartial (Murphy, 2003). To this, the U.N. secretary-general reaffirmed in 1999 that in cases “of violations of international humanitarian law, members of the military personnel of a United Nations force are subject to prosecution in their national courts” (United Nations, 1999). The UN reminded the world it is not a signatory to nor bound by the Geneva Conventions or the Additional Protocols, specifically stating the standards set forth in IHL are “observed at the national level,” obliging states and not nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to guarantee the principles and spirit of the laws of war while explicitly and implicitly excluding peacekeepers as not combatants. A subsequent bulletin by the UN in 1999 attempted to address this, but major gaps remain (Wills, 2004). As recently as early 2007, the UN is still attempting, without success, to grapple with peacekeepers that violate international laws.

## **Administration**

In 2002, the dean of the Army War College said, “the U.S. cannot go to war without contractors” (Avant, 2005, 115). In Iraq, at the time of maximum contribution of forces by the “Coalition of the Willing,” the force contribution by the United Kingdom was less than half the number of private security contractors, the armed subset of private military companies, in Iraq. This led some to suggest a more appropriate label: the “Coalition of the Billing.”

Although this book is on military administration, it is admittedly odd that this chapter is anemic on the topic. The fact is, there is little evidence of integrated operations between the private and public sectors and the history of hired force indicates this is intentional. Reconstruction efforts, largely reliant on private enterprise, are critical to defeating insurgencies, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan. The role of the military is limited by its political masters through both action and inaction. In the laissez faire environment of privatization and outsourcing, it is considered to be the



responsibility of the individual contractors. The four reasons given through history that support the use of private contractors contribute to keeping the contractors beyond the reach of military administration.

One paper looking at PMCs and the U.S. military noted similarities in Iraq and Afghanistan with the 1990 motion picture *Dances with Wolves*. Lt. John Dunbar (Kevin Costner) was accompanied to his post on the mid-nineteenth century American frontier by a civilian wagon driver. The wagon contained the weapons, ammunition, subsistence, and other supplies necessary to maintain a deployed military force. On the return trip the civilian driver was killed by Indians, the wagon abandoned, and the horses confiscated. This example raises important questions that are equally appropriate today as then. Were troops available to escort the wagon? Was the civilian driver considered from the outset a disposable resource, as was possibly Lt. Dunbar himself, that did not require an armed escort of military or private personnel? Did the driver receive premium pay or some special compensation for undertaking hazardous duty? Who paid for the lost wagon and horses? Did the Indians target the driver because of his association with the military or was his mere presence on their land sufficient cause to attack him? Did it make good sense to use a civilian driver under the circumstances? (National Defense University, 2006)

Two major milestones in using contractors occurred after President Bush's famous "mission accomplished" speech. Soon after his speech, the number of private security contractors in Iraq was close to twenty thousand (Singer, 2003). Soon after that, media coverage of contractors in Iraq usually began with a reference to the four contractors ambushed in Fallujah in 2004 and strung up on a bridge over the Euphrates River. Now numbering thirty to fifty thousand, the number of Westerners in this force actually dropped as contractors are drawn from cheaper countries like Iraq (known as host country nationals, or HCN) and South America (known as third country nationals, or TCN). While ostensibly the second largest "contributor" in Iraq at either twenty thousand in 2003 or fifty thousand in 2007, they are not unified or a coherent military unit while still derisively referred to as the Coalition of the Billing. For business reasons, including reducing per unit costs as well as multicultural sensitivity but not awareness, the real number of U.S. and U.K. contractors decreased as cheaper labor from other countries, including HCNs and TCNs, are increasingly hired to lessen expenses but also provide culturally sensitive staffing. Certain companies have admitted to avoiding hiring American security personnel in favor of Latin American because of skin color but also to avoid the "ugly American."

A real and potential problem of PMCs is the lack of training and indoctrination. U.S. military personnel swear an oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States. Private military contractors are under no such obligation, even the company.

An increasing problem is deconfliction between contractors and troops when neither side has an effective identification system and sometimes incomplete

intelligence. For example, in Iraq, regional operations centers (ROCs) provide a clearinghouse for private military company operations with visibility to both the private and public (Coalition military) sectors. However, except through informal and ad hoc relationships, the private sector has virtually no insight into Coalition military operations and military intelligence.

Tactically, U.S. military support of private forces is usually in the form of the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and relies on informal lines of communication and availability of resources at the moment of request by Coalition members, which includes private military companies. U.S. military support of private military company operations is, from the point of view of the contractor, luck of the draw and not guaranteed.

While UCMJ and MEJA, at best, only cover contractors working under DoD contracts and alongside U.S. armed forces, formal disciplinary control by commanders in the field is minimal or nonexistent, from major crimes down to minor crimes. The existence or absence of contractual terms governing PMC employees assume a minimum level of contractual insight and authority, which is absent in the field for a variety of reasons.

Field commanders essentially rely on a network of informal communications and gestures to influence the actions of contractors. At best, a commander can declare individual employees *persona non grata* for cause and have them removed from the theater or the commander can create an uncomfortable environment for the company, jeopardizing its ability to perform for its client, which is often not the U.S. government directly. The gestures include preventing access to bases, limiting support, and possibly harassment and detention. At worse, it means completely independent operations by the private firm in the conflict.

Press reports indicate serious confusion in authority between PMCs and the military. For example, in an incident in May 2005, nineteen security contractors working for Zapata Engineering were detained for allegedly shooting recklessly in the streets of Fallujah and nearly hitting U.S. forces. The whole incident may have been a misunderstanding as another PSC may have been the target of the marines' wrath (Armstrong, 2006).

The nonexistent authority of a military commander over contractor employees goes beyond formal and enforceable coercive regimes, or rewarding for that matter, of the contractor and hints at the lack of integration and accountability to the mission of the public military versus the private military. There is no unity in the chain of command and at best informal connections for information, tactical awareness, and support. This is confirmed in reports from the Government Accountability Office (GAO).

In December 2006, the GAO issued a report that further emphasized a lack of integration between contractors and the military at all levels (Government Accountability Office, 2006). This particular report is one of a few from the GAO condemning continued failed oversight of contractors providing "supplies and services," including security and intelligence, in the field and domestically.

More telling is the absence of the sizable contractor force in virtually all of the discussions and plans from the White House, Pentagon, or even Congress. Also in December 2006, Central Command (CENTCOM) issued a preliminary finding on the number of private security contractors currently operating in Iraq and put the number at the seemingly too round of a figure of one hundred thousand. One month later, General David Petraeus in his Senate Armed Services Committee confirmation hearing made the first official acknowledgement that private security companies and U.S. military forces would be working together on the then forthcoming “surge” in Iraq.

Without regulation or oversight, and regulation itself is an empty can in the absence of monitoring, there is no guarantee that such firms will act in the United States’ national interest. Regulatory regimes already exist to monitor the export of arms and services, what is necessary are the understanding that each private entity is an agent of the United States’ mission in current and future wars.

Problems can usually be traced back to inadequate oversight rather than to any intrinsic problem with contract support. Relying on the private sector requires good commercial acumen, supported by quality legal advice, when writing, signing, and, most importantly, monitoring contracts. It is this last detail that is the most problematic.

How contractors fit into military administration is further complicated by failures to enforce requirements to process through the CONUS Replacement Center (CRC). Limited to contractors working directly for the U.S. government, this is an opportunity for active military, who must also process through CRC, to meet contractors. However, besides excluding the majority of contractors working in Iraq and Afghanistan by definition, requirements to go through have become more lax.

Although private security companies are generally responsible for training their own employees, one of the benefits of outsourcing, the government has certain responsibilities for training contractor employees. Resistance to CRC processing by PSCs has included complaints that requirement to process through the CRC did not always fit with deployment schedules required by contracts due to the timeline imposed or the inadequacy of the CRC to meet the throughput requirement, and training did not always stay current with the evolving threat environment or theater commander directives (National Defense University, 2006; personal correspondence with security contractors, 2007).

## **Conclusion**

Availability, deployment, and co-location of public military forces with private military contractors impacts U.S. foreign policy and U.S. national security. It is essential that the soldier, as a member of the public military ultimately hiring or otherwise allowing the PMC to operate, be aware of this as the United States owns

the battlefield and not the PMC. The goal of this chapter is to create a frame of reference for the U.S. military officer to consider the PMC, should it be located in his or her area of operation, as the resource that it can be. That said, the PMC may not always operate in a symbiotic manner, as the second scenario, a real-life example from Iraq, demonstrates.

Ultimately, perceived deniable accountability and the perception of reality often vary considerably. Failure to understand this, to see how the populations you are trying to win over or at least prevent from helping the enemy, is all too frequent. By contracting these forces, the state licenses these firms to operate on the behalf of the state. In Iraq, for example, the population views these firms as having direct authority from the United States, the arms-length deniability theorized or fantasized by U.S. policy makers simply does not exist except in the U.S. media and political environment. In the big scheme of things, domestic politics does not make the country safer.

The twentieth century brought increasing institutionalization as a response to increasing growth in cross-border commerce and new technology. The rise of transnational corporations and increasing power of nongovernmental organizations created networks of interconnection at the cost of state agency. Voluntary or not, states were surrendering sovereign authority to suprastate organizations in areas of social, political, military, and economic policy areas. While borders drawn on maps ossified, functional boundaries between states became more permeable or disappeared altogether. The history of mercenaries, especially their disarming two hundred years ago and their resurgence today, seems to have an inverse relationship to nationalism and state autonomy.

Globalization places create new options while removing or discounting other options available to states. Global trade, instant news, and communication force states to reconstruct and reframe their goals to address a broader audience. While Pre- and post-Westphalian leaders relied on private, non-state armed forces for want of capital to maintain their own armies, modern leaders find themselves with similar capital shortfalls, mostly in the area of political capital that extends beyond their border, a similar problem of spending capital, but new is the power of international opinion that holds states accountable to people and not other states. Debates surrounding the bombing of the Marines' barracks in Lebanon in 1983 and in the aftermath of the "Blackhawk Down" incident in Somalia ten years later represent societal and political restrictions felt in all military missions, humanitarian or otherwise. State agency in economics and foreign policy, the first to fall to globalization, are now followed by a lessened inviolability of domestic issues as concepts of preemption, prevention, dissuasion, and projection become part of state security policies.

Machiavelli's oft-quoted description of mercenaries as "useless and dangerous ... and without discipline" is misleading (Machiavelli, 1950, 45). As is frequently the case, the context of his quote is ignored, but not necessarily obsolete. Machiavelli's *condottieri* have a lot in common with modern private military companies today

in that they existed and operated with explicit, or sometimes implicit, permission of the “administrative unit” hiring them, at least at the outset. When waging war, the condottieri concentrated on taking prisoners, as their preoccupation was with raising ransom money. Generally, because they were ideologically and politically detached from their battles, the hired soldiers were not interested in killing *per se*; instead, they conducted themselves within the accepted professional strictures of warfare (Zarate, 1998).

Private military forces complicate traditional norms of military command and control, challenging the basic norms of accountability designed to govern the use of violence. With greater distance between decision and policy maker comes increased deniability in the eyes of the policy maker. Publics, especially foreign publics, do not see nor appreciate this insularity and detachment. Public diplomacy is victimized when the forces under indirect control are perceived as extensions or members of the U.S. armed forces.

There are two levels of accountability: domestic and foreign. The first is accountability of policy making to the domestic audience, including Congress. Private military force is managed directly by the Department of State or the civilian leadership of the Department of Defense. Demands on accountability in international politics are as old as nationalized militaries. This is an important point because the purpose of holding armies and navies accountable was their impact on relations between states, not on relations between persons. State borders are more permeable as states lose autonomy, but ultimately they still exist and the international system and international publics see and hear the results of foreign policy decisions and public diplomacy programs. Dodging criminal prosecution is not restricted to corporate warriors but indirect and unintended extensions of state policies and images of the state and its people must be first on the list when discussing private military force. It is not a stretch to say that peacekeeping forces composed of contractor states is “foreign policy by proxy,” performing tasks the “government [or collective governments], for ... political sensitivities, cannot [or will not] carry out” (Silverstein, 2000, 145). Applying this argument to the private security industry today is where the discussion of their applicability must begin.

The net effect is deeper reliance on the state to enforce legal restraints than may be widely realized. Private security companies have more pressure points than state militaries. When analyzing the pros and cons of private military force, it is important to understand the whole argument. The ability to control private security companies is greater than a multinational force with its varying rules of engagement negotiated by each contributor nation, various weapons and ammunition requirements, and personnel selection policies. The PSC, on the other hand, seeks to satisfy the requirements or spirit of the contract. Preventing, catching, and punishing PSC abuses or contract failures are the responsibility of the state through proper selection, vetting; inability to control the PSC is the failure of the state, not the failure of the system. PSC motivation aligns closely with satisfying the implicit

and explicit requirements of the client. This is a far different motivation than that of contractor state soldiers.

Contemporary warfare has changed the structure and role of the military. Returning to requiring a high degree of specialization and volunteerism it is much more like the preconscription armies. The deepening divide between military and nonmilitary culture has led to a continuing disengagement between the two. Mobilization of military force does not require mobilization of the masses. Looking at the United States, as it is the leader in private security utilization, we see the political elites disengaged from the military process: few have family in the armed forces and none serve in battle. They send the military overseas to conduct the war and control it remotely, as if they were there due to technology.

From Iraq to Afghanistan, and even into Pakistan and elsewhere in Asia, Africa and South America, the United States increasingly uses and relies on private military force for a variety of reasons. Although their value as deniable, expendable, and available resources—especially in discussions of “surge” capacity—continues to be reinforced as contractor missions and even deaths garner little attention from the media, their fit into the structured civil–military relationship central to American democracy and fundamental in the decision to use force is questionable.

In the aftermath of the vicious attacks of September 11, 2001, the national trajectory of outsourcing military capabilities was broadened and accelerated. The trend toward outsourcing combat soldiers was in place before 9/11 and the seed was already germinating before planes hit the Towers and the Pentagon.

It is too early to tell if private military companies are a temporary aberration or the signal of a long-term reversion to the ways of earlier times. Complicating our understanding is the conduct of the administration of President George W. Bush on the world stage. Far from an actual coalition builder, national security strategies and speeches over the years of his tenure have reinforced a unilateralism on the international stage and in domestic politics and a clear disregard for international norms that combined to eliminate pressures to keep a lid on nonstate forces.

Private military companies can be effective tools of foreign policy, if they are intelligently and thoughtfully used. It is still too soon to tell if for the last century and a half the by and large absence of nonstate military forces hired by states and sovereigns is an anomaly, a fashionable trend, or something else. Their use in the foreign policy of the United States today is more indicative of the short-sighted foreign policy and endemic failure of the U.S. leadership to appreciate the value of foreign perceptions, notably the civilians with whom our soldiers and private security forces are interacting, in the fight against terror. The U.S. legal environment provides adequate tools to control and manage PMC actions as agents of the United States; however, the use of these mechanisms is intentionally not exercised, to the detriment of all concerned.

Both the conduct and rules of war has changed and the range of services that private military companies provide and what the US requires of them is significant. Unlike technology stewardship issues that prevent aircraft carriers from putting

to sea without civilians (for the last four decades), security contractors are on the front lines, directly and independently engaging foreign publics. These “guns with legs” are point persons in American foreign policy and public diplomacy and are perceived as representatives of the United States. Their role isn’t a given nor is it required, but we seem to have accepted it. We cannot afford to make these assumptions today or in the future.

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## Chapter 10

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# Defense Policy and Doctrinal Insulation\*

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Charles R. Miller

### Introduction

Constitutionally the U.S. Army's purpose derives from the simple phrase in the preamble to "*provide for the common defense.*" Yet the U.S. Army, twelve years older than the Constitution itself, has lived through many iterations of guidance as to what providing for the common defense actually entails. Just as the rest of the federal government has burgeoned over time in response to external and internal needs not covered by that rather sparse document, so has the organization charged with maintaining the nation's land forces.

Even though the ashes of Marxism-Leninism have cooled considerably, the Army still holds fast to its comfortable Cold War purpose and its ensuing doctrine. It was during that time, rather anomalous considered against the entire history of the United States, that decision makers found it easiest to develop a grand strategy and its subsequent defense policy and supporting doctrine. Is it only in the post-Cold War world, however, that the Army has done the less than battle-focused tasks such as peacekeeping? A longer study of the Army's history outside the Cold War would suggest that the Army's primary purpose during the entire nineteenth

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century, regardless of self-concept and other than the very infrequent episodes of actual battle, was exactly the now familiar role of constable and peacekeeper, a force somewhat removed from the pressures of international relations and sizably tiny. The twentieth century marked not only the modernization of war and the U.S. Army, but also the first time in its history when the international environment drove its existence, transformation and employment. Just as the external threat was not a driving factor during the nineteenth century, and the Army had real missions to accomplish, though with greatly scaled back forces on the frontier, the initial half of the twenty-first century portends a similar lack of external drivers, with the globe substituting nicely for the American West (Jervis, 1999). There are still roving bands of terrorists and suspect regimes to fight, but since the diminution of the Soviets, the Army has struggled to reconcile its concept of purpose with systemic dictates, partially by transforming itself to a lighter, more versatile force. A lighter, more lethal force of itself is good for the common defense; using that force because it will be even easier to deploy to places even further removed from any tangible national interest is not.

## **Basic Argument**

This chapter examines the twentieth century U.S. Army by exploring its responses to external and internal pressures through the vehicle of doctrinal change and its integration with strategy. A balance of power approach provides one useful tool for understanding doctrinal change given that the United States was a great power throughout the period studied and therefore increases in the offensive capabilities of putative adversaries should have triggered conceptual leaps in doctrine that would also be well integrated with the state's grand strategy and defense policy. Two other approaches that look inside the organization provide alternatives to this balance of power baseline. An organization theory approach suggests that the organization's need to reduce uncertainty primarily by maximizing autonomy, but also prestige and budget, acts as the primary driver of organizational behavior regardless of integration with strategy. Alternatively, an organizational culture approach suggests that the social and institutional self-concept of the organization derived from historical preferences and successes will affect the doctrine that its leaders design in response to civilian guidance so that it also might not mesh perfectly with strategy, though peculiarities of the U.S. Army dampen some of the more virulent tendencies of both organizational approaches. The general finding from the case studies is that exogenous, material pressures found under the balance of power approach explain a great deal of doctrinal change and integration, particularly through the first half of the Cold War, but that these pressures alone were not enough to prevent typical organizational autonomy characteristics from surfacing towards the end of the Cold War due to an inability of the organization to respond to an enlargement in its scope of responsibilities. Thus, although Army decision makers were

cognizant of systemic cues when they modified their doctrine, eventually they used doctrinal change as a means of insulating the Army from the uncertainties found in fluctuating defense policies.

## **Realist and Liberal Foundations of the U.S. Army**

A realist approach suggests that all states will have armies with certain capabilities and that over time they will learn and emulate other successful armies (Waltz, 1979, 127–128; Goldman and Andres, 1999, 83). Certainly this is the case with the U.S. Army, which, over its history, copied many procedures and tactics from the French, British, Germans and Russians in succession. More than any other entity within the state, the Army mirrors what a theoretically realist state would assume. Part of the dilemma in this project, however, is in reconciling the foundations of a realist analysis that focuses on the sameness of states with the notion of American exceptionalism. The belief of there being a unique American concept and character must be examined as well (Morgenthau, 1993, 143–149; Waltz, 1979, 97). Samuel Huntington intimated that, “a gap has always existed between the ideals in which Americans believed and the institutions that embodied their practice” (Huntington, 1996, 1). A military force, as Huntington observes elsewhere, has “functional imperatives that conflict most sharply and dramatically with the liberal democratic values of the American Creed” (Huntington, 1957, 15–16). Is it problematic, then, that the U.S. Army is situated in a Lockean liberal republic, obedient to the wishes of its masters and subject to the passing whims and fancies of the public and its elected leaders? Many liberal thinkers have considered the army as an oppressive tool of the executive. John Locke’s conception of the theoretical state of nature was many times more generous than Hobbes’ dark vision (Hobbes, 1997), as Locke placed his faith in the legislative body rather than a single sovereign, and more importantly, made a provision for the people to depose said government if it failed to uphold its role as a trustee of life, liberty and property (Locke, 1952, 4–11). Of course Locke’s vision most animated the American Founders, who took the ideas of life, liberty and property and encoded them in the Constitution.

The U.S. Army received a firm liberal imprint from the debates over the Constitution. Due mostly to territorial fortune, this imprint lay undisturbed until nearly halfway into the twentieth century. With its constitutional constraints and peaceful neighbors, the U.S. Army was different from the ground forces of other nations for most of its history. The encroaching world of the twentieth century would severely test its liberal character (Edwards and Walker, 1988). The bias against a large standing army and its pernicious effect on liberty was so strong that it was more than 150 years under that Constitution before there stood one on U.S. (and European and Asian, and now, Middle Eastern) soil.

The modern U.S. Army differs in at least three important ways from the heavily studied European armies of the early twentieth century. First, the U.S. Army

has no feudal heritage and no significant history of meddling in domestic politics compared to those in Europe (Hartz, 1955). These traits were solidified constitutionally and, in conjunction with its geography, material abundance and relative isolation until the twentieth century, enabled the U.S. Army to develop somewhat differently than the armies of Europe. Second, the U.S. Army existed in a bipolar world during much of the period of this study. Because of this, the U.S. Army had a single, identifiable enemy that served to focus doctrine. This trait is unique when compared to the European experience, given the shifting alliances that the continent continuously underwent. Third, the U.S. Army during much of this time coexisted with nuclear weapons, which were welcomed at first but later rejected. The technological challenge that nuclear weapons posed to the writing of doctrine and the future of ground combat were an order of magnitude greater than those with which any other army had to deal. These three differences allow at least a partial reconciliation of realist logic and American exceptionalism. Another way to reconcile systemic dictates and the U.S. Army is to consider how it operates in a liberal democracy that, due to its pluralistic nature, might at times have trouble developing a coherent grand strategy.

## **Grand Strategy and Defense Policy**

Clearly defining strategy and applying it consistently to foreign policy is a problematic endeavor for all states, but particularly for liberal democracies subject to routine elections. Strategy covers a range of options. The highest level, grand strategy, seeks to synthesize the diplomatic, economic, cultural and military practices of a state towards a common goal of satisfying core interests and objectives. Below grand strategy are the policies that flow from each of the elements of grand strategy. With a single identified enemy, those policies generally work toward the same goals; in the absence of that enemy, they may, in fact, work at cross-purposes to one another. Although the thrust of this project is not on strategy itself, but rather a bottom-up study of doctrinal integration with strategy, a working, broad definition of what strategy means in the U.S. context must be provided in order to assess doctrinal integration therewith.

Most surveys of strategy in the West begin, and sometimes end, with Carl Von Clausewitz and his formulations of war as more of an art than an exact science. Von Clausewitz began by distinguishing strategy and tactics. Strategy was “the use of engagements for the object of the war,” whereas tactics were at a lower level and concerned “the use of armed forces in the engagement” (Von Clausewitz, 1976, 128; Sun Tzu, 1994; Handel, 2001; Paret, 1986). More recent academic studies of strategy highlight the difficulty of developing any coherent strategy or of doing so inside of liberal democracies (Betts, 2000). Others lay out possible grand strategies for the United States, though without a Soviet Union, the likelihood of maintaining

one, even with a substantial threat of international terrorism, still does not look likely, absent another great power (Jervis, 1998; Posen and Ross, 1997).

The grand strategy across the cases, deliberately not developed to a greater extent, can be covered by essentially three categories. First, in the absence of enemies, the grand strategy is typically most sensitive to classic economic considerations found under U.S. liberalism, so that this is characterized as economically driven, a situation found generally in the post-war periods in the study. The Second World War stands alone with an obvious grand strategy of defeating the original Axis powers. The Cold War, once it was firmly established under NSC-68, can be fairly characterized as having a grand strategy of containment that drove the varying defense policies.

Although there are notable limitations to developing a coherent grand strategy, or even a defense policy, as part of the democratic system of the United States, the U.S. Army is constitutionally bound to follow the guidance that comes from its duly elected civilian leaders, even if it causes the organization considerable pain. Thus, although receiving conflicting and oft-changing guidance is problematic, the Army normatively should attempt to make its war-fighting doctrine support the immediate defense policy and therefore the grand strategy. The cases under consideration will give us several examples across varying periods of threat to the United States, either with minimal threat as in the interwar and post-Cold War period, or with considerable threat throughout the Second World War and the Cold War. Thus, as U.S. grand strategy and its derivative defense policy changed, so should Army doctrine. The integration of the Army's doctrine with those higher levels of guidance is the question to be studied, by using a survey of the Army's conception of doctrine and testing it with three approaches.

## **What Is Doctrine?**

Doctrine is the conceptual framework that ties together theoretically and practically what the Army teaches, how it trains its forces and how it fights in battle. These areas all work together synergistically, generate feedback and eventually modify doctrine, though it is most sensitive to the capabilities of the forces in other states. Therefore, to assess change in doctrine I will look at three areas:

1. Purpose—All armies obviously want to win, but they have different conceptions of how to do so. How well is its doctrine integrated with the national strategy? In the absence of national strategy, what does doctrine provide? Does it react to enemy capabilities or does it serve the interest of the organization?
2. Concept—How does the Army's leadership think about applying force? Is the doctrine oriented offensively or defensively? How does it envision winning on the battlefield, by destroying the enemy's forces or its ability to fight, by deterring, by meeting every threat on every range of the spectrum? Does it favor maneuver or firepower? How does it view the role of the arms, branches and

services? Does technology play a role? What scale of operations and spectrum of conflict do leaders envision?

3. Structure—How are forces organized to support the first two factors? What is procured to support those? What is taught in the schools and how are they organized? What structures or command relationships exist to link training, operations, and doctrine?


This approach to doctrine differs somewhat but not drastically from the conceptualizations of other authors. Mostly, this method of studying the Army's doctrine is one level below that of the state that other scholars consider. This approach gets more to the organization's self-concept by looking from the bottom up to its linkage to political guidance given in the way of defense policy. Changes in the U.S. Army's doctrine are most obvious in a single measure, the capstone written statement found in the *Field Manual 100-5* series. This manual is the blueprint for Army doctrine and provides the broad overall guidance required for commanders at all levels (Farrell, 1996). Because of its distribution and the time needed to implement its guidance, it is not changed on a whim, but only when there is significant pressure dictating the change, generally seen as well in the overarching defense policy.<sup>1</sup>

## Why Does Doctrine Change?

A key question arises as to why would there not be a status quo bias regarding doctrinal change and integration in the U.S. Army. After all, the Army is a governmental organization, a bureaucracy in most regards, and bureaucracies are designed for continuity, not change. They are begun to establish rules and procedures with which they will perform repetitive, routine, orderly tasks (Rosen, 1991, 2). Still, the quick survey of Army doctrine over the past century does show that its doctrine changed at least a dozen times, many of those changes innovative and not just incremental, bureaucratic additions. Although there are many elements of continuity through the doctrinal changes under consideration, and a fair amount of status quo, it is not as strong a bias as might be expected. The biggest reason doctrine changed in the twentieth century seems to come from the growth of U.S. Army roles and missions. The scope of possibilities that doctrine had to cover grew across the century as the United States took more of a role in world affairs. The Figure 10.1 shows the expansion of this scope.

## Necessary Distinctions

While noting these distinctions from the formulations of other authors the residual approach here is still characterized as testing a balance of power explanation against one in which an organization seeks self-generated ends to explain doctrinal change



**Figure 10.1** Scope of FM 100-5 doctrinal responsibility.

and integration with higher political and strategic goals. The most noted example for studying military doctrine remains Barry Posen’s work. His balance of power and organization theory approaches explain doctrine in terms of three causal forces: purpose, people and environment. Posen focuses mostly on how the organization attempts to reduce uncertainty, to the extent that it prefers an elaborate offensive doctrine and will only innovate with civilian intervention (Posen, 1984, 41–59; Zisk, 1993).

Another school of thought typified by Jack Snyder is that militaries want to reduce uncertainty and will therefore seek elaborate offensive doctrines that civilians cannot understand, the implication being if they do not understand it then they will not meddle (Snyder, 1984, 24–25). Scott Sagan suggests that militaries prefer offensive doctrines because it allows them to deny the enemy its preferred offensive doctrine and place the battle at a time and place of their choosing. Sagan also argues that army officers will be perennial pessimists, who, while seeking to maximize the advantage their organization may have at any given point in time, may overly prescribe preemptive strikes and thus lead to more frequent wars (Sagan and Waltz, 1995, 55–57). All of these scholars demonstrate a military bias for the offensive that also seems to coincide with some less flattering aspects of organizational behavior. Both Posen and Snyder share a realist outlook and some common underpinnings:

1. Civilian intervention is a good thing because it shapes the military towards the objective strategic interest of the state.
2. Military organizations inherently prefer offensive doctrines and can pursue their own parochial interests rather than the national good if unchecked.
3. That systemic conditions shape doctrine.



Their arguments imply that a military that seeks its own interest serves its state badly because it will break the link with grand strategy. Of course this begs the question noted earlier as to whether or not the state can actually develop a coherent grand strategy. Neither do these authors account for an endogenous, cultural argument that the defense is simply not the way a warrior class does business. The U.S. Army poses a different question, because, as previously noted, homeland defense has been nowhere on its task list until very recently. Finally, my argument assumes a gentler view of the aspects of military professionals, largely due to American characteristics as typified by Carl Builder (Builder, 1989; Betts, 1991).

As Elizabeth Kier develops her argument, military culture becomes an intervening variable between civilian decision makers and doctrine (Kier, 1997; Porch, 2000). Unlike Posen and Snyder, she suggests:

1. Systemic conditions do not directly shape doctrine.
2. Domestic implications of military policy often shape civilian decisions.
3. Military organizational culture intervenes between civilian leaders' interpretation of systemic conditions and the output of doctrine.

Kier examines the same period in the British and French armies. She contends that functional logic does not hold, as both offensive and defensive doctrines can serve to increase a military's autonomy, budget and prestige. Interests do not come directly from either the functional needs of the organization or the systemic environment; instead, Kier claims that military power is about the allocation of power within society as much as it is about state survival. She rightly posits that military culture intervenes between civilian decision makers and doctrine; her argument further suggests that the military culture responds to the external environment of the organization, which can be primarily the domestic political environment. It revolves around the question "who within the state has the support and control of the armed services?" (Kier, 1997, 20). Although this argument is persuasive in the case of the interwar French, where the Right wanted a professional army to guard against the Left, and the Left a conscript army to guard against the Right, it fails to apply to the United States. This might be due to Hartz's liberal tradition with no feudal past in America, a factor that imputes a solid liberal core with only minor deviations to each side of the political spectrum.

It could also be that the United States has no contiguous enemies. Before the Cold War, the Army was reduced after every conflagration to skeletal levels and played a minimal role in domestic politics. The United States, until the Cold War, possessed neither internal nor external enemies nor a large standing army. By the time the Cold War arrived, the strict civilian control of the military had become inculcated, only to be reinforced by bipartisan Soviet fear. Both Democrats and Republicans shared not surprisingly similar views and beliefs as to the military's role. Like the realist versions, Kier's construct fails to speak directly to American exceptionalism. Although her view of culture as an intervening variable is one that I share, I share it more in a realist sense. The Army has a culture that reinforces

both functional and material needs. It seeks autonomy but has strong normative constraints and takes its role in providing the public good of defense seriously, even if to the detriment of integrating professional doctrine with political supervision.

For an overview of the implications of these three approaches, some broad factors can be compared. Consider Table 10.1.

## Hypotheses

Balance of power can best be characterized as the approach in which “states respond to potentially dangerous increases in power of their putative adversaries” (Posen, 1984, 21). The change in the offensive military capabilities of another state will be tested with three measures: new offensive doctrine, technological innovation or an increase in cumulative resources (Van Evera, 1999, 7–11). This approach generates two major hypotheses. First, if another state increases its offensive capabilities, then defense policy and doctrine will be integrated in response. This hypothesis would also suggest that both defense policy makers and the U.S. Army respond well to changing capabilities that threaten U.S. interests, and also that minimal civilian intervention is required for doctrinal change. Conversely, when the offensive capabilities of a potential enemy decrease, defense policy and doctrine may drift apart in the absence of a unifying threat. Due to this trend, the Army is not particularly innovative without systemic pressure. When the system is indeterminate, internal features can surface.

The organizational approaches suggest that doctrinal change serves the organization regardless of threat situation by reducing uncertainty through autonomy or by serving the social and institutional self-concept derived from historical preferences and successes. Both of these carry negative consequences for doctrinal integration with strategy. The approaches will be tested using two major hypotheses, one from organization theory and one from organizational culture. First, under organization theory, the Army will pick a doctrine regardless of threat situation, normally offensive, with which to maximize autonomy and insulation rather than integration with defense policy. It will use ambiguous and traumatic events to pursue a self-defined agenda. It will also likely fail to change doctrine except when prodded by civilians (Posen, 1984, 47–49). Second, under the cultural view, if “the set of basic assumptions, values, norms, beliefs, and formal knowledge that shape collective understandings” does not resonate with systemic cues, doctrinal change will not be integrated with defense policy (Kier, 1997, 28). In the U.S. case, however, those cultural effects are tempered by an Army self-concept of skill, military art, fire superiority and people rather than machines, systems and platforms, with a nearly sentimental focus on the people element (Builder, 1989, 33–34).

Given Builder’s observations, it is possible that the nastier version of organization theory found in the third hypothesis does not apply as well to the U.S. Army as to European armies or to the Air Force and Navy. There are certainly many

<b>Table 10.1 Theoretical Overview</b>			
	<i>Balance of Power</i>	<i>Organization Theory</i>	<i>Organizational Culture</i>
Values sought	Security	Organizational autonomy	Social and institutional self-concept
Groups controlling	Civilian leaders	Military leaders	Military leaders
Civil–military relations	Normal: subservient military	Problematic: aggressive military	Not problematic: obedient handymen
Interest fostered	State	Organization	Organizational norms
Modes of behavior	Somewhat rational	Selfishly rational	Tradition bound
Source of behavior	External and material	Internal and material	Internal and ideational
Key drivers of doctrinal change	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Nature and level of threat</li> <li>2. Intelligence on capabilities of putative adversaries defined as new offensive doctrine, technological innovation and cumulative resources</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Seeking of autonomy through specialization, prestige or budget</li> <li>2. Technological advances</li> <li>3. Use of traumatic and ambiguous events to gain autonomy</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Basic values, norms, beliefs and formal knowledge of the organization</li> <li>2. Historical preferences and successes</li> <li>3. Learning from wartime experience</li> </ol>
Integration of doctrine with strategy	Doctrine should be integrated deferential to the state's defense policy and strategy	Doctrine may be separate from strategy as an insulation mechanism	Doctrine will serve the organization's self-concept more than the state's policy and strategy

episodes that reflect a healthy dose of self-interest, however, and part of the task is to illuminate those tendencies that organization theory suggests should be present, particularly across the period studied given that as a great power the U.S. Army's doctrine should be sensitive mostly to systemic cues. Another point of interest is

the offensive bias in U.S. doctrine, which seems to predate reasonable organization theory explanations and is a constant, even in Active Defense, ever since 1892's pre-doctrine and 1905's manual, existing at a time when the Army's role was not primarily that of war fighter. This would indicate that bias is a cultural one, though it differs from Kier's conception, since U.S. offensive doctrine was designed to be used with citizen-soldiers long before the large standing army came about, and not as a tool for the military to pick domestic political sides.

Because the United States was a great power throughout the time frame studied, this baseline will provide an adequate testing of those hypotheses. It is to be expected in cases lacking significant external pressure that organizational explanations might offer more causal value. The survey of each doctrinal iteration will test these baseline predictions and determine the usefulness of the balance of power and organizational approaches across a varied period of eighty years. A great power's doctrine should be integrated with its defense policy and subsequent military strategy, in times of threat certainly, but also in times of relative peace, even despite the already mentioned problems with developing grand strategy during peacetime. If doctrine and strategy are not integrated, then organizational tendencies have taken hold that could endanger the well being of the state.

## Findings

This study looked at the decision making of senior Army officials over the course of eighty years as they changed the Army's capstone doctrine. Doctrine was not fixed or immutable, but instead a living conceptual document that reflected the principal essence of the organization. The Army was not as stagnant as might be thought, and looking at these twelve iterations over a considerable swath of time shows the organization changing under a variety of pressures. Consequently, the *Field Manual 100-5* series is a valuable tool for studying pressures on the Army as an organization, both external and internal, international and domestic. The basic concept in doctrine that this study sought to capture, however, was its theory of warfare, that is, how the Army's leaders thought the Army should be employed on the battlefield and whether or not that concept was integrated with or divorced from defense policy.

In this regard, the Army's core doctrine was fairly well attuned to systemic conditions based on the Army leadership's projections as to the level and nature of threat and the offensive capabilities of putative adversaries. When other armies that threatened U.S. interests were innovating and developing new doctrine, weapons and cumulative resources, Army leaders responded generally with alacrity. Yet despite this sensitivity to systemic factors, some of the features of organization theory and cultural approaches played a significant causal role in hampering doctrinal integration with civilian guidance. These organizational approaches generally surface most

readily in the absence of systemic drivers, though surprisingly, also during the last few iterations of doctrine in the face of the threat from the Soviet Union.

During that critical period beginning after Vietnam, the Army, unable to cope with fluctuating defense guidance, specifically developed a doctrine that insulated it from defense policy and focused its efforts nearly squarely on operational excellence on a conventional battlefield. The Army's theory of fighting wars became its self-concept to the exclusion of what it saw as excessively variable strategic guidance. This runs counter to what a baseline balance of power analysis would suggest, given the Army's success on various battlefields that should indicate a close integration with defense policy and the grand strategy of a great power. The Army was sensitive to balance of power considerations, and those drove its increase in war-fighting proficiency. But it was only through insulating itself that the Army could in the latter period of the study increase its war-fighting proficiency by shielding itself from unpredictable domestic guidance. Consequently, a danger to the state, though not excessive, may exist when its primary armed force has divorced its concept of war fighting from the state's strategic concerns.

To survey the relevance of this chapter, first I will provide an overview of the tested cases by comparing actual and predicted outcomes of integrating doctrine with defense policy under a balance of power baseline. In analyzing those cases, I will consolidate evidence from the case studies to demonstrate how the external growing pressures on the organization to widen its scope and simultaneously respond to uneven guidance eventually forced it to seek relative independence, though still sensitive to threats from other states. Next, I will assess those themes in light of the September 11 attacks on the United States and suggest likely implications. Finally, I will address several relevant policy issues based on the causal and historical trends found in this study and draw a general conclusion as to the danger of divorcing doctrine from strategy.

### ***Review of Outcomes from BOP Baseline Predictions***

Table 10.2 provides a synthesis of the empirical findings.

The first four cases all fit squarely with the baseline predictions from the balance of power approach. After the First World War, the United States returned very nearly to only self-regard and thus did not need a grand strategy other than pursuing economic growth. The United States did stay involved on the world stage economically throughout the 1920s, but defense policy fell by the wayside with muted debate over universal military training and rapid post-war demobilization. Despite dire predictions of combat on the North American continent, the lack of plausible enemies led to organizational concerns mostly shaping the 1923 version of doctrine. This case belies the cultural explanation most, given the relative lack of change from its previous version and the minor amount of learning that was taken from the Great War, such that the organization was able to retain a notion

Cases	Policy/Grand Strategy	Defense Policy/Strategy	Predicted Doctrine	Actual Outcome
A. 1923	Economically driven	Retrenchment	Divorced	Divorced
B. 1939	Economically driven	Isolationist	Divorced	Divorced
C. 1941	Preparation for war	Buildup	Integrated	Integrated
D. 1944	Defeat Axis	Total war	Integrated	Integrated
E. 1949	Economically driven	Atomic deterrence	Divorced	Divorced
F. 1954	Containment	Massive retaliation	Integrated	Integrated
G. 1962	Containment	Flexible response	Integrated	Integrated
H. 1968	Containment	Flexible response and counterinsurgency	Integrated	Integrated
I. 1976	Containment	Realistic deterrence	Integrated	(Divorced)
J. 1982	Containment	Conventional retaliation	Integrated	(Divorced)
K. 1986	Containment	Conventional retaliation	Integrated	(Divorced)
L. 1993	Economically driven	Projection force	Divorced	Divorced

of relying on the man with the rifle, and even the horse cavalry, to the exclusion of most other factors. This internal cultural reliance would not likely have been integrated with defense policy, had there been one, and rather had to rely still on mass mobilization in time of need, though the military's call to train many men in the United States to stand more ready than they would be under then-current mobilization plans went largely unheeded.

The doctrine published in 1939 likewise falls prey to a similar lack of both grand strategy and defense policy. The Army had barely survived the Great Depression, partially by hiring out its officers to the Civilian Conservation Corps, and as such, no outside powers pressed for significant U.S. development in doctrine. Army leaders were aware, however, of the capabilities of other states, as seen particularly in the planning against the British and Japanese in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Still, with a defense policy that can only be characterized as isolationist, the Army's lack of doctrinal developments and eventual minor effort in 1939 still indicate cultural effects at work as the major explanation, particularly those proclivities that retained a romantic notion of horse cavalry and individual soldiers fighting bravely on against equally stoic foes.

The versions of 1941 and 1944 are easy cases for a balance of power approach and show strikingly how well doctrine responded to changes in adversaries' capabilities, even well short of war. Whereas 1939's doctrine only hinted at mechanization and combined arms warfare, 1941's doctrine made an enormous conceptual leap

in war-fighting capability with a rapidly assembled document developed mostly from the innovations in doctrine and technology demonstrated by the Germans against a series of hapless European foes. The Army then took these concepts and tested them in maneuvers across the southeastern United States before producing the document that would be used to train millions of mobilized soldiers. Grand strategy was becoming clearer at the time, as President Roosevelt made it rather transparent throughout those two interim years that the United States would support the Allied cause. That the Germans had made no aggressive overtures toward the security of the United States provides even more causal weight to a balance of power explanation, given that this conceptual leap in doctrine was made without that direct threat and based almost solely on the capabilities and not the intent of the most advanced state at the time. 1944's case is an even easier explanation for doctrinal integration with defense policy and grand strategy, given that the United States was actually at war with the Axis powers with a stated goal of total victory, in Europe first, followed by Asia.

The next four cases cover the first half of the Cold War and show the United States in a novel position with only one peer competitor. The first case, however, was one in which U.S. grand strategy was not particularly focused on military policy given the prevalence of the United States as the sole atomic and dominant economic power, thus relying mostly on sheer deterrence and benevolent intentions. The Army, without a single focused enemy, despite some of its projections as to the likely capabilities of the Soviets, largely kept its successful 1944 wartime doctrine in place, word for word, in the 1949 edition, minus the Air Corps and with some minor role for atomic weapons. This supports another nonintegration with strategic concerns example, as the cultural explanation explains most of this reticence to develop given the previous war that offered mainly success stories in terms of organizational learning as to the value of raw attrition. Additionally, the nascent Department of Defense system at this time was rethinking how to formulate defense policy, with the Army being the out party compared to the other services, at least initially, even as it tried to implement, again, universal military service.

In the 1954 case, the Cold War was engaged at full throttle, given the Korean conflict and the subsequent NSC-68 that had quadrupled the defense budget. The United States now had a grand strategy that would take it through the end of the Cold War. Under containment, all of the varying policies were designed to contain the Soviet Union across the military, economic, diplomatic and cultural spheres. Defense policy under the Eisenhower administration, however, was problematic for the Army, given the administration's reliance on massive retaliation as the defense policy. The Army had very little flexibility under this system, though the now nuclear capable and conventionally massive Soviets did spawn a healthy concern for nuclear battlefield capabilities in the 1954 edition of doctrine, as well as in the subsequent Pentomic divisions. Some facets of organization theory began to surface during this period as the Army found itself trailing the Air Force and the Navy in prestige, budget and influence. Still, 1954's doctrine can be fairly characterized as

integrated with defense policy given its movement towards the European nuclear battlefield, even if many Army leaders saw from the beginning that this strategy lacked flexibility.

The doctrine of 1962 marks a sharp departure in defense policy from the Eisenhower administration's guidance. Under President Kennedy's Flexible Response, military policy was to counter Soviet influence across the spectrum and not just on European soil. This expansion of scope, to include focus on the lower end of the spectrum, was a welcome addition to the Army's repertoire in many regards, given that it gave the Army a tangible and achievable mission on conventional and low intensity, unconventional battlefields. The 1962 edition of doctrine welcomed the expansion in scope and incorporated detailed chapters in counterinsurgency in addition to the high-intensity and atomic battlefields. As such, it was well integrated with defense policy at the time. Still, there is also a healthy amount of organization theory in Flexible Response as well. The Army was beginning to understand better the inter-service competition inherent in the new Department of Defense system and also welcomed increased roles and missions that expanding the scope of responsibility would give the organization in terms of specialization.

The doctrine of 1968 does not add significantly to scope of doctrinal responsibility. The grand strategy remained the same, with a Soviet-centric focus, though the war in Vietnam took up a sizeable share of defense policy as well, such that a focus on destroying the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong on the ground in South Vietnam was the driving strategic goal. The Army was largely successful in accomplishing this mission, partially at the counterinsurgency level, but mostly at the conventional tactical level, by maximizing attrition of enemy forces but failing to break their admirable will. The war indicates a sizeable amount of organizational influence, both from the cultural view, that valued learning from the wartime experience and direct ground combat, and from an organization autonomy view that suggested the Army could continue to gain prestige and influence by executing the assigned strategy, if only with greater numbers of troops. Yet, this case also reflects a fair amount of integration with defense policy, perhaps to the Army's detriment, as the goal in Vietnam was never realized despite reliance on sheer attrition. As such, it also reflects a concern with balance of power factors, given the offensive doctrine found in Vietnam.

In all, 1968's version of doctrine reflects almost in equal parts the influences of each approach, though all of these did in fact push toward integration with defense policy instead of pulling in the expected opposite directions. In summary, the middle four cases studied show one case of nonintegration with strategy in the immediate aftermath of World War II given the lack of relative drivers at that time. The other three cases show a relative integration with defense policy and strategy, though in the last two iterations not solely for balance of power reasons. A creeping concern with maximizing the autonomy of the organization was growing and would continue throughout the next period.



1976's version of doctrine still fell under the grand strategy of containment but saw the post-Nixon administration refocused on realistic deterrence in Europe and elsewhere, with much less of a concern for lesser conflicts. 1976's doctrine was also, more than any other iteration studied, the work of one man, General William DePuy. While partially insulated from defense policy through the creation of the new Training and Doctrine Command, DePuy was nonetheless very attuned to the capabilities of other states in the system, and he learned greatly from the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. From this benchmark, DePuy pushed his doctrine known as Active Defense toward first battle dominance through firepower. The belief underlying first battle dominance was that if the first battle could be won decisively, then the conditions for either later victories or negotiation could be set. Active Defense also had a nearly European focus to the exclusion of other theaters, something of a cultural after-effect of Vietnam. DePuy's doctrine reserved a large role for nuclear weapons, though it also laid the groundwork for conventional dominance that was to follow. As such, DePuy's doctrine is fairly well integrated with defense policy at the time, though as much by accident as by intentional flow from a grand strategy through defense policy to doctrine. This version marks the first true break from what balance of power would predict, as the Army's doctrinal efforts at the time came largely from a specialization function found under organization theory and a learning approach designed to preclude another Vietnam by maximizing the scale of the first victory in the next war such that it would not be a protracted affair.

1982's edition of doctrine marks the last conceptual leap in this study and would only be improved on in a minor fashion by its two successors. Moving beyond the first battle firepower focus of Active Defense, 1982's *Airland Battle* shifted the focus to maneuver and to the operational depth of the battlefield. It was designed to defeat not only the first echelon of Soviet forces but also their second, and possibly third echelons, and thereby disrupt their war-fighting ability without necessarily attritioning every troop. As such, *Airland Battle* changed doctrine in three major ways: by shifting from firepower to maneuver, from the first echelon to the second and beyond, and from attrition to maneuver. The shifts in emphasis were designed specifically based on the capabilities of the Soviets, indicating a keen sensitivity to the capabilities of aggressor states. Yet the doctrine was developed largely free of interference from defense policy.

Similar to General DePuy's Active Defense, *Airland Battle* was the product of relatively few minds working fairly autonomously. As such, *Airland Battle* cannot fairly be characterized as being integrated truly with the defense policy of conventional retaliation, and in fact, the development of the capabilities found in *Airland Battle* shaped defense policy to a much larger extent than the converse, such that doctrine began to reverse the posited chain of influence. This indicated a fair dose of autonomy through specialization, as well as cultural preferences for conventional combat and leadership of men, even if the doctrinal writers were well attuned to systemic conditions. Likewise, 1986's *Airland Battle* continued this trend, with another expansion in the scope of responsibility to respond to the lower level


contingencies again, the lingering visions of Vietnam having receded somewhat from memory. Developed in much the same manner, Airland Battle 1986 also shows the organizational tendencies emerging as the training and education bases began to implement the 1982 concepts on a large scale.

The doctrine of 1993 was the next extension of Airland Battle, and reflected culturally the success of the previous edition of doctrine as seen in Panama and the Persian Gulf War. These validations of the concept of operational shock found in Airland Battle and its training and education systems were seen as all that was necessary to carry the Army forward onto the battlefields of two near-simultaneous, major regional conflicts. Faced with force cuts and no driving enemy, 1993's edition was the first in decades without a unifying grand strategy, and with a minimal defense policy, described first as the projection force, but later as engagement and enlargement. An organization facing ambiguous international conditions will likely pursue the successful rules it had in place. As such, 1993's doctrine remained focused on the higher end of conventional conflict, again developed with little or no guidance from the administration, given the change in administrations during its development, such that its war-fighting ethos, encoded after so many Cold War iterations, was not easily adapted to operations other than war occurring much lower on the scale of contingencies. Again, this iteration of doctrine reinforced organizational tendencies although in the light of a new administration and changed systemic conditions did not influence the development of defense policy as much as did its two predecessors.

### ***Too Many Fluctuations***

The major finding of this project comes from the linkage and lack of linkage between defense policy and Army doctrine. The scope of doctrinal responsibility depicted in Figure 10.2 came from both the external environment and from the defense policy that demanded capabilities across the larger spectrum. Yet that defense policy was not a constant throughout, and at times varied widely, even from one year to another, particularly during changes in administrations. Essentially, the fluctuation and range that could plausibly be expected in a defense policy was too much for Army decision makers to handle. Given that the Army had nearly complete ownership of doctrine, much more so than personnel strength, budget, technology or weapons systems, it used doctrine as a tool to gain certainty in the face of possible radical changes in civilian guidance. Consider Figure 10.2, which overlays the central thrust of defense policy and doctrine separately on the previously developed doctrinal scope of responsibility.

Granted, the placements of the central thrust of both measures on this chart is somewhat subjective, yet their placement resonates generally with the findings of this study and the visual depiction helps illuminate the key proposition. As detailed in the summary above, defense policy changed throughout the period of study



**Figure 10.2 Defense policy and doctrine.**

somewhat dramatically at key junctures, particularly during the Cold War. Initially, lacking interest in foreign affairs, defense policy was concerned mostly with protecting regional corporate interests or coastal defenses, while the Army maintained something of a war-fighting focus. The Second World War saw a necessary fusion of all levels of war in the face of a determined and capable set of enemies. The post-war saw an increasing reliance on nuclear weapons that the Army tried to follow but could not fully, also partially inducing some instances of organization theory expectations, particularly under the Eisenhower administration. The Kennedy administration brought a radical change to defense policy with Flexible Response and moved away from massive retaliation, followed by later focus on Vietnam that was nearly equal to the focus on the Soviets. Defense policy returned to the Soviets exclusively after Vietnam, but by then, the organization, which had attempted to adjust to two previous extensive changes, had sought insulation through doctrine in order to reduce uncertainty. Although the 1976, 1982 and 1986 versions seem to match neatly with defense policy, they were developed largely absent of civilian guidance and in the 1980s cases actually provide some amount of reverse causation. Likewise, the final doctrine continues the insulation path, despite a radical change in defense policy.

This chart helps highlight the initial sensitivity to balance of power concerns as perceived by the Army through its civilian-generated defense policy. Eventually, though, the organization followed what organization theory would predict and sought autonomy. This relative even keel in doctrine as depicted can also indicate

some of the cultural ethos of the organization, as its always felt most comfortable fighting the mid- to high-intensity battle against conventional foes.

### ***American Exceptionalism?***

In this study, doctrine was found to have developed eventually with minor regard for defense policy although grand strategy served as a cognitive device through which Army leaders still focused on putative enemies if not their own civilian bosses. Douglas Porch's incisive critique of Elizabeth Kier's work noted that Kier conflated doctrine with strategy, or grand strategy. More so than in the French case, U.S. Army doctrine is definitely not strategy. Doctrine as the U.S. Army defines it and as outlined in the course of the study, essentially stops at the operational level of war, with a minor nod to strategy in the varying prefaces. For the U.S. Army, doctrine is largely a playbook for how to think, train and fight battles and campaigns; consequently, the Army is largely agnostic on strategy. Regardless of the strategic guidance for either defensive or offensive operations, the Army will generally find an operationally offensive way to accomplish the mission. The Army seems to remain satisfied with operational excellence and eager to leave the discontinuities found in not fully integrating all of the elements of national power to someone else.

Part of this inability to fuse the Army's doctrine with more strategic linkage comes directly from the U.S. system of government. The Army is a loyal organization that follows its orders, yet it can receive a variety of conflicting guidance from the various components of government. Executive guidance may conflict with legislative budget priorities. Bases might be closed, and broad strategic guidance could conceivably change radically every four years. Partially to insulate itself from these potentially wavering strategic priorities, the Army essentially develops its own view of what the threat is, what the threat will be, and what it needs to do to meet it. Because the U.S. system is wonderfully transparent, civilian decision makers are mostly kept informed of the Army's priorities and views of how to fight a war and provide tacit or explicit approval beforehand. In any case, as demonstrated, the Army rarely makes drastic, radical changes, and in the United States, there are several systems of oversight involved at least in terms of all of the material support systems of the Army, if not its doctrine.

### **Operationalization of Strategy**

In many ways, the separation of the Army's doctrine from strategic concerns can be characterized as the operationalization of strategy.<sup>2</sup> This is acutely problematic because when "strategy is not consciously formulated, it emerges by default. Instead of being the driving force in war, strategy becomes a mere by-product or afterthought. In prolonged wars, this is a recipe for disaster, since even extraordinary

tactical and operational successes may not add up to a winning strategy” (Handel, 2001, 354). In the U.S. case, Vietnam fits this description closely. The outcome of that conflict was one of the factors that inadvertently reinforced more separation of operational doctrine and strategy given that strategy had failed miserably. Similar examples are the Germans in both the First and Second World Wars. Always the superior force man for man, even the stunning victories found under *blitzkrieg* could not sustain a strategy that essentially challenged the entire world, despite considerable success in conquering virtually all of mainland Europe.

The greatest danger in divorcing doctrine from strategy is not surprisingly found in Von Clausewitz as he argues that “No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it” (Von Clausewitz, 1976, 579). This statement summarizes the primacy of politics over the lower functions of war. War without political aim and will is simply random killing that can only be classified as immoral. Derivatively, doctrine developed in the absence of political aims, no matter how efficient and artful on the battlefield, also lacks the same moral considerations, regardless if applied under either a realist or liberal schema.

As noted in this study, the Army remains largely agnostic on strategy and prefers to insulate itself with an operational focus, particularly in the absence of clear or wavering strategic guidance. Although it is still highly debatable whether or not strategy can even be accurately described let alone formulated, the gap between doctrine and defense policy was not so troubling during the development of the seminal doctrines of 1976, 1982 and 1986. This was due mostly to the nature of bipolarity and the very obvious nature of who exactly constituted the enemy against which to plan. This trick of fate allowed the danger of divorcing doctrine and strategy to pass relatively mildly for that time period, yet the full implications of the danger became readily visible in the absence of the predictable, comfortable Soviet presence. As indicated before, doctrine continued at a steady state of maintaining operational conventional war-fighting excellence while the external international system dictated otherwise. Although the danger of political aims of a state not driving the concerns of its warriors is the primary danger from divorcing doctrine and strategy, there are at least four other major negative implications.

### ***Threatening Signals***

First, an army not attached firmly to the political goals of its state is likely to develop an aggressive, offensive doctrine. In the U.S. case, this was a cultural relic at least from the nineteenth century and not directly a factor of an organizational quest for autonomy.<sup>3</sup> Yet this very type of doctrine can send rather clear and dangerous signals internationally that a state does not want to send. This case was typified in Airland Battle, viewed by the Europeans as overly aggressive and likely to provoke the Soviets. As seen particularly in the case of 1939’s and 1941’s doctrine, a state

does not even have to be under direct threat to see clearly what the offensive doctrines of other states can do, and thus provoke responses (Miller and Lynn-Jones, 1989; Mearsheimer, 1983). Although conventional deterrence did seem to work, it was not until after a shaky initial period and could have gone horribly wrong. This anomalous Cold War example was one in which the Army's leaders understood the grand strategy intent of containment, yet through their own means moved aggressively past that with the operational shock of Airland Battle. These signals cannot but help other states to focus on their own shortcomings and consequently seek remedies more readily than they otherwise would.

Additionally, a strikingly offensive doctrine, if nearly the sole focus of an Army, can exacerbate a security dilemma. If an Army builds its entire essence around an offensive mode of war fighting, and then demonstrates those capabilities across a variety of scenarios, it cannot fail to be noticed by other states. Consequently, although Airland Battle and its derivatives led the Army to apparently easy victories in Panama and both Persian Gulf Wars, this demonstration seemed to indicate, that at least for the United States, the offense was easier than it had been before, even in places where the United States had to deploy troops over great distances (Jervis, 1978). Although one should not read an invasion by 20,000 troops of a Caribbean country near the United States or the weakness of Saddam Hussein's military as validation that the offense is easy, those situational factors only partially mitigate the fundamental concern. Conveniently, at the time, there was no state actor left with which to engage in a serious security dilemma, though those actions would have exacerbated underlying tensions had such been the case. As such, the Army provided its portion of the possibly destabilizing policy with its distinguishable offensive doctrine that it developed internally. Civilian leaders then had the opportunity to advertise the Army's capabilities widely on the world stage. Without the precursor of offensive doctrine, civilian leaders could not have done the same.

### ***Foot Dragging***

The second danger of divorcing doctrine and strategy comes from foot dragging, or the resistance that can be found when the military is given missions that do not fit its self-identity. On a larger scale, the positive aspects of the U.S. Army's culture, namely the norms and institutions of the political systems and the Army's own culture and heritage of continuous, unchallenged, constitutional civilian control, make its threat to democracy a rather moot question. The U.S. Army also lacks Kier's concern with the domestic arrangements of which party is in power and the subsequent relationship with the people. Although there are some fears of growing Republicanization of the officer corps and of recently retired generals speaking on behalf of presidential candidates, the Army generally considers itself a profession and more reflects the humble servant notion found in Builder (Snider and Watkins, 2002). Yet, there are still areas of concern under civil–military relations. As was seen

in the cases, civilian intervention was not necessary to provoke doctrinal change. Indeed, there was only scant evidence that any civilian leaders paid any attention to how the Army designed doctrine. In the U.S. system it appears that civilian leadership will engage with the military and each other in contentious debates as to base closures, force end strength, the number of divisions, weapon systems, social policies and military pay, among others, but rarely does it ever seek to tell the Army “how to fight.” Perhaps this is a true sign of Army professionalism or officials’ trust in it, given that its core competency is left to its own design, something analogous to not telling a medical doctor how to perform an operation. This trait, however, also reinforces the divide between the Army’s operational excellence and overall lack of strategic integration.

On the grander scale then, foot dragging is not a sign of an imminent coup. On a smaller scale, however, it can hamper an administration’s short-term policy. The drawback found in foot dragging was perhaps most perceptible in the short war over the Balkan province of Kosovo inside of sovereign Serbia. As was indicated, an Army with a war-fighting culture had not adapted well to a strategy of engagement and enlargement under the Clinton administration. Advice from the Joint Chiefs of Staff ruled out ground troops for the “war” before taking action, thus reducing strategic options. Once troops were actually needed to move to Kosovo, most notably in Task Force Hawk, the Apache helicopter detachment, there also appeared to be a considerable amount of foot dragging (Halberstam, 2001, 463–467). Additionally, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, was not allowed to talk to the president directly, was ordered to not discuss ground options on television, and found himself very much at odds with the Army and the Army Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as he attempted to reconcile conflicting guidance from a variety of sources (Clark, 2001, 273–283). Leading into the Balkan crises, a variety of Army leaders released reports as to the combat readiness of their units, with the implication being that the peacekeeping task had degraded the wartime mission readiness of their units such that a lengthy retraining period would be needed once the unit returned from the seemingly unending occupation of southern Europe. Although the wisdom of the United States being involved at all in a place that Chancellor Bismarck found worthless is certainly questionable, this resistance to strategic options and mission orders runs counter to the U.S. constitutional arrangement and liberal imprint of the Army and could portend a future similar set of problems, even under Republican budgetary munificence.

### ***The Downside of Culture***

A third drawback follows from foot dragging and takes a broader look at the effects of a war-fighting culture, in particular the lack of flexibility that this feature builds into the organization. The current military structure, though reduced in size but increased in scope, is left over from the Cold War; likewise, the culture built into

the organization by the Cold War remains and results in dissonance with the new roles and missions. Following Builder's argument, the Army wants to see itself in the last year of World War II, or defending the Fulda gap, or invading Panama, or winning either Gulf War with dramatic armored advances and helicopter assaults across the desert. It does not want to see itself propping up an illegitimate democracy in Haiti, dividing a variety of belligerent ethnicities in the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, or handing out meals in any country on the African continent. This war-fighting focus is necessary and maximizes operational effectiveness regardless of strategic consequences, yet again, might not support the broader strategic goals of an administration. The Army and most of its Special Operations Forces have performed exactly those envisioned missions by conducting combat operations in the Middle East and Afghanistan. The resonance with cultural values is certainly partially to credit for the amount of success thus seen.

In many ways, this Cold War culture, derivative of so many years of a constant threat, has cut into the "obedient handymen" concept and built in a cultural resistance to lesser missions. The danger here lies in over-socialization of the officer corps to threats. Most evidence does not suggest a war-mongering class of officers, however, but instead points to a general reticence to war combined with a desire to fight well if needed. This set of war-fighting skills, however, perhaps does not cover all of the skills needed to support national policy and therefore causes the organization to lack flexibility. Particularly in the latter cases from Active Defense on, Army doctrine shaped young officers through their schooling and training, and as they advanced in rank found it hard to think outside of the Airland Battle framework. This apparent self-limitation of the Army's repertoire is partly a function of our U.S. system of vacillating defense guidance that led to the Army's operational focus. Generations of officers have grown up thinking operationally, and perhaps find it hard to make the switch to advising on strategy and grand strategy once they reach the higher levels of service, relying still on a notion of how to fight a brigade or a division or a corps across the depth of the battlefield in a certain scenario but with a less certain vision as to how to reach the desired overall outcome of the use of force.

### ***Losing Touch with the People***

The final drawback to the operationalization of doctrine and the ensuing institutional isolation puts a personal face on the problem. Von Clausewitz outlined the trinity of the government, the military and the people working together to enact policy. While the breaking of the link between the government and the military has been discussed, the current state of Army doctrine also threatens to break the link with the people as well. Despite American tradition and a long history of the expansible Army, the citizen-soldier is as dead as the Massachusetts Minuteman.<sup>4</sup> Granted, the Army Reserve and National Guard have performed yeoman's work



throughout history, yet they do not generate the self-concept of the active force. This development reinforces distance between a professional Army and its guarded citizenry. The actual strengths of the Army, adjusted as a percentage of the U.S. population, are closer today to the strength levels of 1938 than any other year in the past century. A basic grasp of history obviously suggests that this percentage is rather low, and it is highly likely that of 286 million Americans, most of them will not know one of 480,000 soldiers. Forced to abandon the expansible Army in the aftermath of Vietnam and under Cold War pressures, the Army also lost touch with the U.S. people since the introduction of the all volunteer force, which not coincidentally mirrors the era of operationalization of strategy. This evolution begins to cast some amount of doubt on Builder's earlier observation as to the Army's own history of being closest to the people, expanding and contracting with the threat.<sup>5</sup> It may have taken the all volunteer force instead of conscripts to make the complexities of Airland Battle work; this example, however is one in which the Army took its raw materials and incorporated them into doctrine, not one in which the Army fought for a certain doctrine and then sought to shape conscription policy, essentially the opposite of Kier's French case.

## Positive Connotations

While the negative implications of divorcing doctrine and strategy are serious, there are at least three positive implications. The first stems from the two doctrinal leaps in war-fighting effectiveness seen across this entire study. The first leap, the transition from the arms to combined arms, was driven almost purely by the Germans and the reaction that their *blitzkrieg* provoked. This conceptual leap is most readily explained under a balance of power approach, given that the Germans represented the most capable state in the system at the time. The second conceptual leap took place largely without civilian guidance through the intellectual renaissance sparked by Active Defense and realized in Airland Battle. This instance was an equivalent jump in war-fighting effectiveness as it transitioned from raw attrition to a more artful maneuver-based disruption of enemy systems through operational shock. This leap, however, was internal to the Army, and although spurred by concern with the Soviets, was also based partially on factors inside the organization as indicated previously. Perhaps this second increase in war-fighting ability shortened the suffering of victors and losers alike, though it has also caused considerable consternation for Allies unable to keep up and enemies who must resort to asymmetric means. Nevertheless, this doctrinal good, the increase in the core competency, came out of the Cold War and out of insulation, particularly the method of thinking about how to design doctrine and then how to fuse it with military education, training and feedback.

The second positive implication that comes from the operationalization of strategy lies in the nature of decision making in a liberal democracy. As part of

a pluralistic system, the Army's resistance to other than war-fighting missions becomes part of the consideration when debating use of force for other than security-related missions. Although the Army normatively should try to accomplish all missions that its civilian leadership directs, the fact that it is a slow, conservative organization can induce some amount of constraint into an administration's decision making. It is plausible, from a balance of power perspective, that imperial policing is most likely to rouse future challengers and also probably not a mission that the U.S. people would support if they were aware of it. It is also somewhat evident that while military forces can deploy to various locales to provide immediate assistance, they are not likely to solve the problems stemming from underlying social, political and economic conditions within borders (Mandelbaum, 1996, 16–32). As such, if the Army's cultural resistance to expanding the empire at least causes some consideration during executive decision making, then it is much closer to serving its historic charter of providing for the common defense of the American people, as opposed to provoking balancing due to the international signals sent by military overactivity.

A third positive implication is that under this insulation strategy the Army retains a very high level of proficiency in its core war-fighting skills. Across the period studied, had the Army's doctrine moved perfectly in synch with defense policy as designed by civilian leaders, then the Army of the 1930s would have given up the art completely, the Army of the 1950s would have been solely nuclear, and the Army of the 1990s emasculated as imperial constables. In each case the Army and its war-fighting skills were needed in the ensuing decade. A complete tailoring to the dictated defense policy at any one point in time can unforeseeably and severely limit the options years down the line, another indication of why formulating an integrated grand strategy, defense policy and doctrine is a particularly difficult task. Having a quality force with a smaller basic set of fairly fungible war-fighting skills serves as a stability mechanism to a much greater extent than having a force with a wide range of responsibilities but no deep expertise. This option is also superior to one in which a force is tailored to one specific scenario and thus develops a less fungible set of abilities. In many ways this resembles a strategy of maintaining the core function, similar to picking an index fund designed to track rather than beat the market. This stability in itself offers some amount of flexibility to decision makers domestically, as the quality of the fighting forces will be known and relatively constant, not subject to some set of experiments. At the same time, this predictability sends clearer signals in the international arena such that other states might perceive less danger than they would from forces that radically change every few years.

## **Conclusion**

Regardless of selected policies, and despite its external and internal struggles, the Army will continue to serve the American people in its constitutional role. The

Army has performed exceptionally well on the battlefield at the operational level; whether or not a coherent, overarching strategy emerges remains to be seen. Over time the Army has been required to serve and reconcile multiple sets of two masters. It had to serve pressures from the international system and from the domestic politics realm, a face-off between Hobbes and Locke. It had to serve defense policy and its own quest for excellence through doctrine. Within the organization, it had to reconcile tendencies towards organizational autonomy with its own culture of being obedient handymen. Finally, it had to reconcile American tradition that held the expansible, citizen-soldier Army as the model with the modern need for a ready, professional standing force. Christ's parable suggested that no man could serve two masters without neglecting one for the other. Indeed, the Army was not able to serve all of these masters equally well, and chose doctrinal insulation as the favored one. Given the available options, this was perhaps the best choice.

## Notes

1. Farrell suggests that published doctrine is not a good measure of what the organization is actually doing on the ground. This is a valid point that I will address in the chapter, but still I would suggest that written doctrine flows from what a significant number of units experiment with before doctrine is published. Of course, once published, doctrine arguably should then be disseminated and followed Army-wide. Across the cases I study, published doctrine takes on the role of generator of what units are doing in the ground primarily from the 1976 edition forward, though the prior editions do capture the ground truth *ex post facto*.
2. Handel called this phenomenon "tacticization of strategy" from which I developed "operationalization" to describe the U.S. Army's view of it more accurately.
3. The doctrinal affinity for the offensive in the U.S. Army seems to predate any valid application of autonomy seeking expected under organization theory. It was present when the Army was tiny with no budget and no enemy before World War I. It was also present during the interwar, the Second World War, the cold war, and remains today. Aspects of organization theory come and go in the U.S. Army, but the offensive bias remains. Along cultural lines as well, the bias for the offensive is present with or without citizen armies; it was thought that American men possessed the requisite qualities to attack whether they were draftees or regulars. If anything, the constant predisposition with the offensive probably indicates a cultural explanation tied around the construction of military identity, a topic beyond the scope of this project.
4. The National Guard and the Reserves certainly count as citizen soldiers and perform many vital support functions in case of call up to active service. This was partly as a function of the post-Vietnam reforms such that important go-to-war functions were placed in the reserves, forcing public attention to the war effort immediately. The notion of entire maneuver divisions of National Guard going into combat after a short train-up has been largely abandoned though. Still, the Army has managed to incorporate the National Guard into some of its less desired missions such as peacekeeping

in the Balkans and on the Sinai peninsula. From all accounts, the National Guard performed those missions with aplomb.

5. One of the more disturbing features of being separated from the people is found in the nature of volunteers. Potential volunteers who have a plethora of options in life are not likely to join a branch of military service, particularly given the generational impact of the all volunteer force coupled with fewer veterans from the larger wars in history. In particular this trend leads to a near complete absence of society's elites in the Army and other services, given that they can completely opt out of the system, especially since most of the elite universities in the United States have banned ROTC from their campuses. The Army, as a service, loses potentially bright candidates and simple recognition in the elite sector, perhaps leading to further civil–military gaps in the future as elites rise to positions of prominence. The Army's war-fighting excellence is not hampered by the absence of elites, but its long-term health may be.

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## Chapter 11

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# Military and Homeland Security\*

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Risa A. Brooks

### Introduction

Since September 11, 2001 the United States has undertaken a variety of military actions, notably in Afghanistan and Iraq, with the stated goal of anticipating and preventing future terrorist threats against Americans. Although the rationale offered for these military actions is largely new, in other respects, these wars and interventions represent familiar territory for Americans. The tradition of using the military abroad to protect U.S. security is, after all, what the armed forces have been trained and equipped for. Historically, the military has been a tool to protect Americans from threats emanating from outside their borders.

In the post-September 11 era, however, U.S. politicians are increasingly employing and contemplating a new role for the military: as a participant in safeguarding U.S. domestic security—a force that not only secures Americans from threats originating from abroad, but protects us from each other and would-be terrorists here at home. For many, the imperatives of homeland security make expanding the military's role in countering terrorism an appealing option. Yet Americans should carefully consider the implications before supporting such initiatives. Expanding the U.S. military's role in homeland security could, over time, alter the purpose and culture of the military establishment and its relationship to American society

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in ways that undermine the legal and social fabric of civil–military relations in this country.

Although little noticed by the public at large, some important changes have, in fact, already occurred in the military's roles in homeland security. Members of the Air National Guard have flown over 42,000 air patrol missions over U.S. cities since September 11. Army National Guard Units have been guarding major infrastructure sites, including dams, bridges and power plants. Since 9-11 the Guard has also provided 1,100 troops to assist the Immigration and Naturalization Service at the country's borders. In fact, as of July 2003, over 28,000 active duty, Reserve and Guard troops were involved in homeland security.<sup>1</sup> These activities have led to talk of relocating the National Guard in the Department of Homeland Security, with some prominent politicians and think tanks, conservative and liberal, advocating assigning homeland security to the National Guard as a primary mission.<sup>2</sup>

In addition to the Guard's activities, the Department of Defense (DoD) has undertaken a major reorganization, creating a new unified combatant command, Northern Command (NORCOM), which is charged with protecting the security of the territorial United States (an innovation DoD managed to avoid throughout the Cold War). Justice and Defense Department lawyers have been reviewing legislation that limits the military's role in domestic law enforcement-related activities, while the Department of Homeland Security is reviewing how best to employ for the military in supporting its domestic security mandate. Although prior initiatives, such as "Total Information Awareness," which would have allowed the Pentagon to monitor financial and other data on civilians, have been defeated, new efforts to enhance those prerogatives are under consideration. Recently, for example, Congress has proposed granting the Pentagon the prerogative to demand direct access to individuals' personal and financial records in order to monitor the activities of civilians residing in the United States.<sup>3</sup> In sum, in a variety of ways the United States has begun slowly to enhance the domestic security roles of the U.S. military.

As striking as these changes have been, they represent the proverbial tip of the iceberg in terms of altering the military's role in homeland security. Public officials continue to warn that the United States remains at risk of serious terrorist attacks on its own soil. These risks may in fact grow as the U.S. military expands its training activities and other operations overseas, maintains a presence in Iraq in coming years, and as al-Qaeda continues to regroup, expands its mobilization activity and replaces leaders that the U.S. apprehends.<sup>4</sup> Skeptics continue to voice concerns about whether civilian agencies can handle the nature of the threats facing American citizens in an era of growing terrorist activity.<sup>5</sup> And if civilian agencies do prove incapable, political leaders and analysts may be inclined increasingly to call on the United States' most well-trained, professional organization to assist in rooting out these threats: the military establishment.

Alarming, these potential and manifest changes in the military's role in antiterror activities are occurring in a relative vacuum of public debate about the

appropriate role of the armed forces in homeland security. These issues are too important to leave to lawyers, or even to the president and Congress to decide. Americans must decide for themselves what, if any, role the country's armed forces should play in protecting their cities and neighborhoods from terrorist threats.

There are some good reasons to consider creating a substantial role for the armed forces in homeland security. Without question, our powerful military is a major resource that could be marshaled in support of the war on terror here in the United States. But the arguments against allowing it such a role are stronger. Although the National Guard has helped ensure stability during episodic crises in this country's history, granting the military a major, on-going domestic role in ensuring internal security is not part of American civil-military tradition. It also conflicts with the fundamental philosophical traditions upon which our society rests, which privilege a free and open society reflexively opposed to militarist values. More concretely, policing citizens and fighting wars are largely incompatible tasks. They require different mindsets, training and involve a different sensibility toward the use of force. For these and other reasons Americans should resist the impulse to institutionalize a major military role in homeland security.

## **The Scenario**

Assume, for a moment, that officials obtain reliable intelligence that the country could face a September 11-scale attack within the next year. A mobile, highly compartmentalized and skilled terrorist cell is suspected of planning operations in several major metropolitan areas. To confront the threat, public officials develop a plan to expand security and intelligence operations within the country's major cities. They seek to establish a surveillance regime, employing sophisticated and expensive equipment, to monitor civilian groups who live within select urban areas and are suspected of having ties to the network. Offices within each city will oversee the search, apprehension and interrogation of suspects. These activities are to be coordinated by integrated command and control centers.

The considerable demands of implementing the plan overwhelm state and federal civilian law enforcement and intelligence agencies. They lack essential resources, infrastructure and experience. Under the strain, they look to Washington to supply military resources to staff, equip and coordinate the operation. Washington would likely be tempted to commit them. Protecting the lives of U.S. citizens would weigh heavily on the president and his advisors. Given the stakes involved, they could call on the Pentagon to act—perhaps at first to run the command centers, and later to actually participate in the monitoring and apprehension of suspected civilian suspects.

Of all the changes wrought by September 11, using the military in this way would represent the largest and most significant departure from our political and legal traditions. Historically the U.S. military has not played a central role in

domestic security. Rather, the military and civilian establishments have traditionally conformed to a division of labor in protecting the country from domestic and international threats. The military protects the country's borders and sovereignty from external challengers. Civilian entities, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, other federal agencies, and state and local officials enforce our laws and protect us at home.

Beyond this practical division of labor, our current laws prevent the military from playing an active role in law enforcement. The *Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) of 1878* prohibits such a role. The PCA was passed during the Reconstruction-era South when the military was being used to enforce federal law. Disturbed by the politicization of the military, Congress prohibited the use of the army and navy (it applies to the marines and air force by DoD regulation) as a *posse comitatus*, which literally means “force of the county,” in order to enforce laws. As it now stands, with the exception of the National Guard when under state control, military personnel cannot participate in activities associated with searching citizens, seizing their property for evidence or arresting them. In practical terms, this means that the military cannot now legally participate in criminal-style investigations of civilians residing in the United States in order to enforce federal laws.

Expanding the military's place in homeland security to more actively monitor, investigate and pursue suspected terrorists would require relaxing these limits on the military's law enforcement-related activities, and altering the longstanding division of labor between the military and civilian establishments. In short, undertaking these activities would represent an unprecedented change in the role of the military in the United States.

## Reasons for Change

There are some good reasons to consider making such changes. First, and perhaps most importantly, the U.S. military is an extremely effective organization. It is the largest and best-funded public institution in the United States. It is composed of highly competent officers and enlisted personnel—an untapped pool of resources available for protecting U.S. citizens against terrorism. The Department of Defense also already has sophisticated satellite and other reconnaissance capabilities, as well as specialized surveillance equipment, not broadly available to civilian agencies. The military is used to contingency planning and the speedy deployment of forces. It is expert at establishing control of an area quickly and monitoring movements of people and equipment.

In addition, some may argue that there is already a precedent for expanding the military's role in law enforcement activities. As noted above, the military, and the National Guard in particular, has long played an important role in quelling civil disturbances and suppressing domestic insurrections during episodic crises. Recently, for example, Federalized Guard troops and U.S. marine units helped

restore order in Los Angeles in the aftermath of the 1992 Rodney King verdict. Since the early 1980s the military has also played a role in counter-drug operations. Military personnel assigned these responsibilities are tasked with patrolling borders, and providing intelligence and other support to civilian law enforcement officials. Moreover, the U.S. military plays a role in humanitarian operations, especially in the aftermath of national disasters. In the 1990s Congress assigned the U.S. military a role in training and coordinating a response to a chemical, biological or nuclear attack within the United States. Today the National Guard maintains twenty-seven civil support teams whose main responsibilities involve supporting civilian emergency operations and clean-up in the event of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) attack.

Finally, although the PCA prohibits the active duty military and reserves from participating in civilian law enforcement, it does not apply to the National Guard when under state control, or to the Coast Guard. Hence these services now could be assigned substantial roles in intelligence, gathering evidence and even in the interrogation and detainment of civilians without legal restrictions. In addition, the courts and Congress already allow *all* the armed forces to provide *passive* support to civilian authorities. Only active participation is illegal (e.g., search, seizure and arrest).<sup>6</sup> The military can share equipment and facilities, train civilian personnel in the use of the equipment, and provide technical assistance and operate surveillance and communications equipment on their behalf.

In short, since part of the military is already exempt from the PCA, and support activities are permissible for all the armed forces, amending the law to allow the regular, active duty forces, the Reserves or the Federalized National Guard to participate in law enforcement-related activities may seem a logical next step. In short, advocates of change may argue that there already is a legal and practical basis for a military role in law enforcement to combat terrorism on U.S. soil. Much is already allowed and acceptable.

## Turning Soldiers into Policemen

Institutionalizing a major role for the military in domestic counterterrorism activities may seem a short departure from the status quo. In reality it is a major, and potentially risky, step. There are three main reasons to be wary of taking it.

First, it would be bad for our military. The U.S. military has already assumed new responsibilities in the post-September 11 era. To start, Special Forces continue to patrol Afghanistan, in search of al-Qaeda and Taliban forces. The military has also accepted a series of new training missions for foreign militaries to bolster their capacity to fight terrorism. On top of this, tens of thousands of military personnel are now deployed in Iraq and will stay for an unknown duration. Iraq aside, the U.S. military must remain prepared for a potential conflict in Asia. A range of

incendiary situations—from North Korea to Taiwan—make that a top priority for the foreseeable future.

Expanding the military's role in homeland security may harm readiness to perform these external missions. It would absorb critical personnel and equipment. The U.S. military already experienced shortages in equipment, such as unmanned surveillance aircraft in Afghanistan. Strains on personnel are also serious considerations. As noted above, the National Guard, since September 11, has played a significant role in providing security to civilian infrastructure and major sites in the United States. Yet, it is critical to remember that the Guard also maintains a critical external role. The Guard provides 98 percent of the staff for civil affairs units involved in stability operations overseas. The personnel requirements of maintaining stability in post-war Iraq alone will demand considerable Guard resources for years to come. The active duty force is similarly constrained. From January to the end of July 2003, of the Army's thirty-three active duty brigades, twenty-four were deployed overseas, or approximately 73 percent. While deployments may decline moderately in the future as some forces are withdrawn from Iraq, in July 2003 48 percent of the active duty military was deployed overseas (with 167,000 in Iraq alone) as was 30 percent of the Army Reserve force and 21 percent of the Guard.<sup>7</sup> In addition to current deployments, the reserves and active duty force—the country's mainline combat forces—may be assigned other combat-related tasks in coming years, and must remain prepared if politicians require them to act. For these reasons, requiring the Guard, Reserves or active duty forces to commit their personnel and equipment permanently to homeland security could overstress our resources in these areas.

Beyond straining resources, expanding the military's active participation in domestic counterterrorism would distract the Department of Defense from its other external responsibilities. The Pentagon has already developed new layers of bureaucracy to liaison with various civilian agencies and the Department of Homeland Security. An even greater role in law enforcement-style activities would demand even more investment in bureaucratic structures to interface with potentially dozens of federal bureaucracies and local and state entities. Everything from chains of command, doctrine and training, to rules of engagement and conduct for military personnel would have to be designed, established and monitored. Civilian entities already have the basic infrastructure and know-how for enforcing laws. The military would have to develop these structures and skills.

The problem will run even deeper than modifying bureaucracies. Military and police work require fundamentally different mindsets. These skills are not easily interchangeable. Police are trained to deescalate situations. They draw their weapons as last resort. They administer Miranda rights and operate under a strict mandate to safeguard citizen rights and liberties. Military personnel are trained to be decisive and liberal with the use of force. They are trained to act reflexively in a combat situation. They have specialized doctrine and language which helps them

communicate to their units, and not necessarily with outsiders. They are not trained in basic citizen protections.<sup>8</sup>

The culture clash is illustrated by a potentially devastating incident during the 1992 Los Angeles riots when federal troops were brought in to help restore order in the aftermath of the Rodney King verdict. One night during the riots, officers from the Los Angeles Police Department, accompanied by U.S. Marines, were asked to respond to a domestic dispute. When they arrived at the doorstep of the house, shotgun birdshot rounds were fired through the door, hitting the police officers. One reportedly yelled “cover me” to the Marines. With that command, the police officer was directing the Marines to point their weapons and be prepared to shoot if necessary. The Marines, however, responded as they had been trained to react to that phrase: over two hundred bullets were fired into the house. No one was hurt in the incident, but the couple’s children were in the house at the time.<sup>9</sup>

The current occupation of Iraq also highlights some of these dilemmas. The particular mix of an unstable security environment and need for political and economic reconstruction has required soldiers deployed in Iraq to reconcile the training, tactics and mindset essential to countering guerilla-style operations with the skills necessary for dealing effectively with civilian populations, at times with considerable difficulty. Although arguably less acute than would be the dilemma of the U.S. military policing civilians within the country’s borders, the problems in Iraq highlight the conflict between police work and combat operations. For example, reports of soldiers searching homes and treating Iraqi civilians disrespectfully in an effort to apprehend criminals and opposition forces speak directly to the differences in the mindsets involved in combat operations and stability operations.<sup>10</sup>

Some might argue that these problems are less acute for the National Guard, and therefore while keeping the active duty force out of internal security is important, the obstacles are less for the Guard. As citizen soldiers, many members of the Guard work in civilian jobs and serve in locally based units that have strong roots in their communities; as a result, organizationally and culturally the Guard is probably best prepared to interface with civilians and their institutions in the United States and therefore to play a role in internal security. Yet, the Guard too must maintain readiness to operate in a conventional military environment to fulfill its present mandate—its members may be best prepared to bridge the gap between the skills essential to stability operations and combat operations, but that does not mean it is easy to do so. To train and equip the National Guard to participate more actively in antiterrorism activities here in the United States—especially in those activities that could potentially fuse with criminal-style investigations involving the monitoring and apprehension of civilians—would require an important shift in doctrine, training and military education in order to establish civil protections and restraint in the use of force. Such efforts to prepare the Guard as an institution and its members to play an enhanced role in internal security would potentially entail changes in the current mandate of the Guard and a shift away from its combat roles. However, politicians do not seem inclined to take on such ambitious and

politically sensitive initiatives. Rather, in the current climate momentum is pushing in the opposite direction; rather than making the Guard a less combat-oriented force, the Department of Defense is advocating a rebalancing of responsibilities between the Guard, reserves and active duty force, which would result in a greater emphasis on combat operations within the Guard and reserves.<sup>11</sup>

In summary, there are important differences between the resources, skills and instincts required for war fighting and policing. Assigning military personnel roles related to law enforcement would require major changes in culture and training, as well as strain resources. And such changes would certainly compromise the military's capacity to perform its primary responsibility: protecting the United States from external threats and challengers. In sum, turning soldiers into policemen is a bad idea.

## Politicizing the Military

Involving the military more extensively in homeland security would also be bad for civil–military relations. The U.S. system is premised on having a military that keeps its distance from politics and focuses on its professional responsibilities. Although, as Eliot Cohen reminds us, military activity is inevitably political, for the most part U.S. military personnel are socialized to keep their noses out of active political debate (Cohen, 2002). Rather, politics is a civilian endeavor. The Constitution helps perpetuate this convention. Civilian control of the military is assured through the designation of the president as commander in chief. The Constitution also vests Congress with the right to manage the military (including deciding its organization and approving its budget). All of this is reinforced by the conventions of civilian supremacy central to U.S. military culture. Civilians are ultimately accountable and responsible for military and security policy.

Involving the military in homeland security could erode the practical base—if not the formal legal pillars—of this architecture of civilian control. Samuel Huntington himself, the United States' most prominent theorist of civil–military relations, warned of the dangers of involving militaries in internal security. He worried that it would enmesh these organizations in domestic politics, invite their politicization and harm their effectiveness in war (Huntington, 1957).

In fact, scholars working on the politics of lesser developed countries have long documented the dangers of actively engaging the military in states' internal security.<sup>12</sup> Important lessons can be learned from these scholars' observations—lessons that are relevant not only for the present and transforming autocracies that are commonly studied, but for consolidated democracies as well. Among them is the risk that involving the military in internal security could undermine civilian competence in such activities, by slowing the development of civilian agencies whose training, mission and function is better tailored to the delicate nature of investigating citizens and protecting their institutions and environments. Louis Goodman, for

example, warns against engaging military authorities in activities that “shut out” civilian actors and prevent them from “developing the critical skills and expanding their activities” (Goodman, 1996, 39; also see Desch, 1996, 14).

Equally important are the effects on the politicization of the officer corps and military service organizations of growing involvement in domestic security. Once again, Goodman suggests decision makers think carefully about expanding activities of this nature. He warns that they could result in the “armed forces gain[ing] added privilege and becom[ing] a special-interest group promoting their own institutional interests at the expense of private and public entities” (Goodman, 1996, 39). Specifically, the risk is that in the process of institutionalizing a role in domestic security, military leaders and their organizations become vested in internal debates about the allocation of resources and methods in countering terrorist activity in the United States—they develop their own institutional interests in how domestic security is managed and funded. This would also likely enhance pressures to become participants in partisan debates about these issues, as politicians court military support in trying to sell alternative conceptions of how homeland security resources are structured and allocated (a phenomenon, for example, that is increasingly observed in the area of foreign and external security, as politicians have sought and received endorsements about their credentials and platforms from retired military personnel in recent elections) (for details see Brooks, 2002).

One of the underlying normative principles upon which U.S. civil–military relations rests is that officers are professionalized—a term that is, in part, conventionally understood to mean that officers withhold public participation in politics and do not align with particular parties or interest groups; explicit partisanship and politicking stop at the barracks doors. This value has already been tested in service branches’ organizational battles over the defense budget and procurement (Scroggs, 2000), and even in foreign policy,<sup>13</sup> but for the most part military leaders and their organizations in the contemporary United States do not participate in debates and lobbying on domestic policy. This could be tested, however, if the military services or their subcomponents become organizationally committed to a mission of internal security. In sum, one of the consequences of expanding the military’s organizational roles in internal security is that it subverts this normative ethos and alters the existing basis of professional conduct for U.S. military personnel.

Of course, to some, this may seem far-fetched for the U.S. military. But the reality of U.S. civil–military relations in the twenty-first century suggests it is possible. There are indications that the U.S. military is already increasingly politicized.<sup>14</sup> Its officers are more partisan than they were thirty years ago. Most now profess allegiance to a political party (primarily the Republican Party) while in the early 1970s a majority preferred to be identified as independents. Today officers are better educated than civilians with similar levels of professional achievement. Their services run elaborate and sophisticated lobbying campaigns on Capitol Hill. At the same time, nearly two-thirds of the country’s military officers surveyed in the 1990s said they believed politicians were either somewhat ignorant or very ignorant



about military activity. Large numbers of those officers replied that they should insist (not just advise or advocate) when it comes to civilian policy decisions related to the conditions under which force is used. This may embolden them to speak out on domestic security issues, especially if their organizations and personnel are directly involved. And U.S. citizens may be prone to listen. The military enjoys more esteem than any other public or private institution in the country, including religious institutions.<sup>15</sup>

To be clear, the danger of politicization is not that its leaders will engage in an overt intervention in politics (such as through a *coup d'etat*). The risk is more subtle, if equally worrisome. Military leaders may be drawn into domestic political debate, and be forced or compelled to adopt positions on sensitive issues essential to domestic security. The commander of NORCOM alone, for example, could become a prominent voice on domestic security. Concerned that an administration is mismanaging domestic security, and in his capacity as chief of the unified combatant command for the continental United States, it would not be difficult to imagine that he could give statements that question or challenge an administration's policy. A president with strong credentials might be able to counter effectively these statements. But not all presidents will have that luck. It is one thing for the military to advise civilians behind closed doors. Much more worrisome is a military leadership that publicly advances its own agenda on domestic security. Such actions threaten to undermine the spirit, if not the letter, of civilian supremacy.

Moreover, even if military leaders do not deliberately seek out opportunities to speak out, they could easily get drawn into debate inadvertently. Had the marines shot someone during the Los Angeles riots or were they to in some future antiterrorist operation they would inevitably become embroiled in social controversy. History shows that institutions' reputations emerge bruised and bloodied from such episodes. This would be bad for the U.S. military, and for the society that it protects. Moreover, in such an event, the military brass may find it has no choice but to speak out in defense of its own, inviting its politicization. For all these reasons, extreme caution is in order before we enhance the military's domestic roles.

## **Compromising Values**

Last, involving the military in homeland security would be bad for society. This country was born with a basic apprehension about a domestically powerful military. The founders were convinced a powerful military establishment ran counter to the principles of democracy and liberty enshrined in the Declaration of Independence. In fact, it was not until the Constitution was written that the exigencies of protecting the young republic prevailed over the reflexive fear of a standing army, and a federal force was established. Involving the military in homeland security would run counter to our tradition of maintaining a military carefully divorced from civilian society.

Of course, tradition may be a luxury we can no longer afford. The reality is that the country is facing a threat to the well-being of its citizens of a kind unforeseen in the past two hundred years. The nature of the adversary—a nonstate actor that operates within the boundaries of the country's borders and targets its citizens internationally—differs from the traditional, state-based adversaries the United States has faced throughout much of its history. Although some dimension of confronting terrorist activity arguably involves conventional military operations and other combat-related activity, the nature of terrorist movements also entails the redirection of existing resources and capabilities—both civilian and *military* resources. In short, from this perspective, confronting global, ideological terrorism may demand new ways of thinking about the uses and functions of the U.S. military (as well as the country's other public institutions and ways of life). It may require a revisitation of the country's historical, philosophical and legal traditions: maintaining tradition may be an indulgence U.S. citizens can no longer afford.

The problem with this argument is that the traditions at stake are not mere luxuries. Thinking critically about both the benefits and costs of reorienting security structures and redefining the activities of public institutions is essential. Yet transforming the role of the U.S. military in internal security represents more than a natural evolution of values and practices to suit the contemporary era. Rather, doing so would challenge some premises of core societal and cultural values. Americans live in a society based on the philosophy of Liberalism (that is Liberalism in the philosophical sense, not in the sense of contemporary politics). They value individual rights, and set up institutions to facilitate commerce. They retain a basic mistrust of an imposing state that might hinder individual rights. They are fundamentally antimilitarist.

A large domestic security role for the military goes against this cultural grain. Cultural change happens slowly and usually with little notice. We have already begun to alter some of our traditions by relaxing protections on rights of privacy and other civil liberties with the passage of the *USA PATRIOT Act*, related legislation and regulation that grants civilian entities greater prerogatives to monitor the activities of the U.S. population.<sup>16</sup> Although these actions are controversial, they are mild compared with the cultural implications of allowing the military a visible, institutionalized role in monitoring and policing our schools, work places, churches and communities. Such activities smack of the role of militaries in autocratic regimes and in pseudo democracies—regimes and societies the United States has traditionally reviled for failing to divorce their militaries from civilian society. In short, by acquiescing in an expansion of the military's role in domestic society, we may inadvertently promote distortions in the basic principles of civil liberty, individual rights and freedom upon which our society rests.

## What Is To Be Done?

Certainly there is room for a sensible compromise. Some role for the military in homeland security is arguably appropriate and desirable. But a number of actions must be taken in order to define that role.

First, we need clarification of *Posse Comitatus* based on a comprehensive assessment of the principles of civil–military relations in United States. Traditionally, Congress has offered ad hoc amendments to the PCA. They did so in the early 1980s to facilitate the military’s expanded role in drug interdiction, and more recently with a series of legislative initiatives in the 1990s (Taylor, 1998). But ad hoc amendments are no substitute for a coherent concept of how to use the military domestically. We need a clear, principled view on which to base law and regulation. Specifically, we should clearly delineate what activities are permissible and appropriate in supporting homeland security. Any new legislation should provide comprehensive guidelines for how and when the military should and can participate in protecting the U.S. population against terrorist activity. This would create a legislative fire wall against the slow erosion of limits on the military’s role in homeland security. Note, moreover, that such a clarification would be helpful not only to civilian authorities, but to military officials who must now try and interpret the act’s and related legislation’s relevance on a case-by-case basis. Military authorities, as well as their civilian counterparts, would have a clearer understanding of what was and was not allowable.

Second, these newly clarified principles should be based on the premise that the active duty military and reserves are, in all cases, tools of last resort. We should not institutionalize any regular roles for these forces in homeland security, which are the country’s mainline combat forces. Instead, we should plan to use them primarily when no one else can do the job, as an emergency force, not a daily protector—in, for example, the event of a catastrophic WMD attack (a role Congress has already provided for in legislation in the 1990s). Regardless of the circumstance, when these forces’ personnel are called upon to act, it must be done with clear plans for integrating their units and entities into a *civilian*-led command structure. Research is essential on doctrine for how best military agencies can assist and support civilian law enforcement agencies in emergencies, and on the dangers and pitfalls of such activities. Clear lines of authority and spheres of responsibility must be delineated and maintained. Otherwise, during crises military authority and activity will tend to fuse or coexist awkwardly with civilian law enforcement functions.

Third, although some roles for the National Guard in homeland security may be appropriate, these should be sharply limited. It may be appropriate, for example, to maintain Guard participation in civilian infrastructure protection and in air patrols over urban areas, as long as these activities remain distinct from any law enforcement-related roles. Of the country’s armed forces, the Guard is arguably best equipped for tasks that require interface with civilian populations and communities. It is under the peacetime command and answers to state officials (state

governors). Members of the Guard often have ties to local communities and may even work for civilian law enforcement and emergency services. Hence, using the Guard as a supplemental protection force at dams, nuclear facilities and the like may make sense. However, prohibitions against directly involving it in surveillance or law enforcement-related activities should be maintained. The Guard is *still* the military, and its members are not trained in civilian protections and civil liberties. And, as noted above, National Guard units play a central, external role in stability operations abroad. In particular, they will likely play a pivotal role in Iraq for the foreseeable future. In short, the Guard, like the active duty force and reserves, should never act as a supplementary law enforcement entity, in charge of monitoring or investigating civilians.

Fourth, we must invest in civilian law enforcement itself. It is meaningless to intend to use the military as a tool of last resort, if we have not actually prepared civilian entities to handle all but the worst jobs. This means anticipating the types of terrorism crises the United States may face, and providing the necessary resources and infrastructure far ahead of time. Specifically, we should continue to explore reform of our processes and structures for immigration and border control; this includes examining the Coast Guard's functions in these areas and clarifying its appropriate roles in safeguarding our territorial waters and ports (important work that has begun, but must continue). We also need to better fund and administer not just the FBI, but organizations such as the Department of the Interior's police forces.<sup>17</sup> Public pressure on civilian intelligence agencies must be maintained, so they operate by the highest standards. High-technology equipment useful for surveillance and other activities, now only in the hands of military services, should be supplied to civilian agencies with clear prescriptions about how and when it can be used. Innovative training programs for this equipment also must be institutionalized, so that civilian officials will not always have to call upon the military to fly airplanes and operate computers.

Last, and most importantly, we should establish a better dialogue about civil-military relations in the United States. The military is more important to U.S. citizens than ever before. The military, politicians and the society that the former serves need to be in constant conversation about how and when to use the military in the war on terrorism. Civilians have a duty to educate themselves about the issues. And our politicians and military professionals have a responsibility to consider carefully the short- and long-term ramifications before altering our traditions.

## Notes

1. Eric Rosenberg, "Global Crises Push Army to the Limit," *The State*, July 27, 2003.

2. See Bill Miller, "National Guard Awaits Niche in Homeland Security Plan: White House's Caution Chafes against those Urging Action," *The Washington Post*, August 11, 2002. Also, the Hart–Rudman report (authored before September 11), "Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change," U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, January 31, 2001, 10. Joseph Lieberman, a potential presidential candidate, has, for example, on multiple occasions advocated creating a host of new National Guard units trained and assigned exclusively domestic roles (Sydney Freedberg, Jr. "Changing of the Guard," *The National Journal*, August 20, 2002).
3. Eric Lichtblau and James Risen, "Broad Domestic Role Asked for CIA and the Pentagon," *The New York Times*, May 2, 2003.
4. For example, the Iraq war has apparently fueled the mobilization effort (Don Van Natta Jr. and Desmond Butler, "Anger on Iraq Seen as New Qaeda Recruiting Tool," *The New York Times*, March 16, 2003).
5. See, for example, the report by the Council on Foreign Relations independent task force, chaired by Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman, *America—Still Unprepared, Still in Danger* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002).
6. As long as the military refrains from active support (search and seizure), courts have declared it in compliance with the PCA. Legislation passed in the 1980s and 1990s codifies the military's passive support rules. For a review of these changes, see Steven L. Miller, *The Military, Domestic Law Enforcement, and Posse Comitatus: A Time for Change* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Command and Staff College, Air University, , April 2000), 5–9.
7. Eric Rosenberg, "Global Crises Push Army to the Limit," *The State*, July 27, 2003. In November 2003, twenty brigades from the active duty component were deployed. See [www.Globalsecurity.org/military/ops/global-deployments. tm](http://www.Globalsecurity.org/military/ops/global-deployments.htm) (accessed November 1, 2003).
8. For discussion of this point, and other concerns about military readiness see Mathew Hammond, "The *Posse Comitatus Act*: A Principle in Need of Renewal," *Washington University Law Quarterly* 75, no. 2 (Summer 1997), 953–984.
9. James D. Delk, *Fires and Furies: the LA Riots* (Palm Springs, CA: ETC Publications, 1995), 221–222. Cited in Christopher M. Schnaubelt, "Lessons in Command and Control from the Los Angeles Riots," *Parameters* (summer 1997), 88–109.
10. On some of these challenges, see Sarah Kershaw, "The Struggle for Iraq," *The New York Times*, September 15, 2003.
11. In an effort to lessen the need for lengthy and frequent mobilization of reserves for duty in Iraq, the Pentagon is seeking to move more conventional combat-oriented tasks into the Guard and shift some responsibilities largely located in the Guard (e.g., civil affairs) to the active duty force. See Thom Shanker, "Pentagon Grapples with Troop Shortage," *The International Herald Tribune*, July 21, 2003; Bryan Mitchell, "Weekend Warriors in No One's Shadow," *Knoxville News Sentinel*, October 12, 2003.

12. There is enormous literature on militaries' roles in internal politics in these countries and their implications for democratization, society and the organizations themselves. For a sample, see Alfred Stepan, *Re-Thinking Military Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Guillermo O'Donnell and Phillippe Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).
13. See for example, debates about Colin Powell's influence over decisions to intervene in Bosnia in the early 1990s. See the overview in Don Snider and Miranda Carlton-Carew, eds., *U.S. Civil-military Relations: in Crisis or Transition* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995).
14. For the figures cited below, and further evidence of these trends, see the comprehensive and detailed studies by the Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS) compiled in Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-military Gap and American National Security* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).
15. Gallup surveys show that Americans consistently rate the military on surveys, which measure confidence in public and private institutions; see [http://www.gallup.com/poll/specialReports/pollSummaries/aoa\\_index.asp](http://www.gallup.com/poll/specialReports/pollSummaries/aoa_index.asp). Also see figures cited in Paul Gronke and Peter D. Feaver, "Uncertain Confidence: Civilian and Military Attitudes about Civil Military Relations," in Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-military Gap and American National Security* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 134.
16. Among them, the *USA PATRIOT Act* relaxes restrictions on CIA capacity to engage in domestic surveillance and grants police agencies greater prerogatives in telephone and Internet surveillance. The Justice Department has also enhanced the powers of the FBI to track individuals suspected of potential terrorist activities without prior evidence of affiliation with terrorist groups. For more discussion of the civilian angle of homeland security and the debate about "security versus liberty," see Thomas F. Powers, "Can We Be Secure and Free?" *The Public Interest* (Spring 2003, 3-25).
17. For a discussion of the Interior Department's problems, in particular, see Joel Brinkley, "Interior Department Struggles to Upgrade its Police Forces," *The New York Times*, November 3, 2002.

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## Chapter 12

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# Civil–Military Relations Theory and Military Effectiveness\*

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Suzanne C. Nielsen

### Introduction

The state of civil–military relations in the United States resurfaced as a notable focus of concern in the 1990s. In the early years of the decade, many saw a potential crisis brewing in civilian control (see Kohn, 1994; Weigley, 1993; and Bacevich, 1998). Some observers attributed this to the fact that President Bill Clinton’s administration, which suffered from a lack of credibility in military affairs, came into office at the same time that the Joint Chiefs had a popular and activist chairman in the person of General Colin Powell (Cohen, 1995). Another factor that some saw at work was the new authority of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under the *Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986* (Luttwak, 1994). However, consensus about the scale of the problem was never reached, with some arguing that claims of a crisis were exaggerated (see Kohn, 1994, 29; Avant, 1998; and Burk, 1998). Even during the Clinton administration, at least one observer saw the balance being restored during the tenures of successive chairmen of the Joint Staff (see Goldstein, 2000).

Alongside the popular debate described above, there have been new and more explicitly theoretical attempts to examine post-Cold War civil–military relations in

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the United States. In fact, Peter Feaver characterizes the renewed attention to this problem in the 1990s as an “American Renaissance” (Feaver, 1999, 230–233). At least three approaches, those by Michael Desch, Deborah Avant, and Peter Feaver, are particularly valuable in that their theoretical perspectives are (or could be) applied to civil–military relationships in comparative perspective as well as to the American case. In *Civilian Control of the Military* (1999), Desch formulates a structural theory of civil–military relations that makes predictions about the strength of civilian control based on the degree of internal and external threat faced by a given society (Desch, 1999). Taking a different approach, Deborah Avant and Peter Feaver have applied adaptations of the principal-agent framework to explain the state of civilian control and military responsiveness in the United States (see Avant, 1996/1997; and Feaver, 2003). Although these analyses differ in their focus and in their findings, they have in common an emphasis on civilian control as the central concern.

This focus on civilian control has two noteworthy aspects. First, it is a bit surprising given that those writing about civil–military relations in the United States generally are not concerned about overt disobedience of orders—let alone a military coup. For example, in the book cited above, Desch points out that even in what he sees as the post-Cold War environment of lessening civilian control, “there is little danger that the U.S. military will launch a coup d’état and seize power. Nor is it likely to become openly insubordinate and disobey direct orders” (1999, 30). The same basic presumptions underlie the work of Avant and Feaver. In fact, Feaver’s use of the principal-agent framework implicitly assumes “that the military conceives of itself as a servant of the government.” He goes on to point out that, “The model works best in democracies which, by definition, identify the government as the rightful principal with the authority to delegate (and *not* to delegate) responsibility” (1998, 421). This presumption of lack of direct military insubordination does not make the question of quality of civilian control in the United States unimportant or uninteresting. However, because extreme problems of loss of control are ruled out it does leave room for analyzing other aspects of the civil–military relationship. This leads to the second noteworthy aspect of the focus on civilian control, which is that this concern has tended to overshadow the exploration of other important outcomes.

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the issues associated with examining one of the other potentially significant ramifications of civil–military relationships, their impact on military effectiveness. My underlying premise is that military effectiveness rivals civilian control as a legitimate central concern in the study of civil–military relations. Though I will not provide evidence for this claim here, I will attempt to put it into perspective and raise some of the issues associated with doing research along these lines. The discussion below is therefore organized into three sections. In the first, I will review existing civil–military relations literature as it relates to the problem of military effectiveness.

In the second, I will mention some of the concerns that scholars working in this area will have to address. Finally, in the third section I will provide some concluding thoughts.

## Civil–Military Relations and Military Effectiveness

I argued above that existing works, especially studies of the civil–military relationship in the United States, focus most heavily on the question of civilian control. In this section, I will briefly review some of the founding works in this area, and then discuss more recent contributions. Though military effectiveness has been addressed by a number of authors in a variety of ways, it remains a profitable area for further research.

### *The Classics*

It is important to start by acknowledging that the two classic works of American civil–military relations, Samuel Huntington’s *The Soldier and the State* (1957) and Morris Janowitz’s *The Professional Soldier* (1960), address both military effectiveness and civilian control. Huntington discusses civil–military relations as an explanatory variable, and argues that their nature has an important impact on military effectiveness. However, the manner in which he formulates this relationship is problematic. Janowitz also discusses military effectiveness but it is not clear in his discussion that civil–military relations serves as an explanatory variable for his assessment of what would constitute an effective military. Instead, he bases his argument for a constabulary force on his assessment of the military needs of the United States in the Cold War, and then argues that acceptance of such a role by the military would also have a beneficial impact on the character of civil–military relations and civilian control. I will address each of these works in turn.

In *The Soldier and the State*, one of Huntington’s basic methodological assumptions is that it is possible to define an equilibrium called “objective civilian control” that ensures civilian control and maximizes security at the same time (Huntington, 1957, viii) He argues that, “In practice, officership is strongest and most effective when it most closely approaches the professional ideal; it is weakest and most defective when it falls short of that ideal” (11). An officer corps is professional to the extent it exhibits the qualities of expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. In addition to enhancing effectiveness, these traits also enhance civilian control because a professional military seeks to distance itself from politics (84).<sup>1</sup> In the U.S. context, however, military professionalism is difficult to maintain because liberalism is inherently hostile to the military function and military institutions. The classic liberal approaches to military affairs are extirpation (reduce the military to the lowest possible level) or transmutation (to civilianize it) (Huntington, 1957,

155). Huntington later lists a third option: “The prevailing societal values can shift away from traditional liberalism in the direction of conservatism, society thereby adopting a policy of *toleration* with respect to the military” (1977, 7). This seems to be the option Huntington advocates in *The Soldier and the State*.

If obtaining a shift in the values of an entire society is not possible, the only way to maintain military professionalism in a liberal context is to ensure that the military has minimal political power. Therefore, Huntington argues that the achievement of objective civilian control in the United States requires allowing military professionals autonomy within their own realm, while “rendering them politically sterile and neutral” (1957, 84). Firm civilian control and military security are complementary and mutually supporting goals.

As mentioned above, though civilian control is a central concern, Huntington also sought a pattern of civil–military relations that would promote military professionalism and hence military effectiveness. As he later acknowledged, he was concerned at the time of the book’s writing that the United States, given its liberal ideology, would be disadvantaged in a prolonged competition with the Soviet Union in the Cold War (Powell et. al., 1994, 29). However, “professionalism” as Huntington defines it is problematic as an adequate indicator of effectiveness. This comes through clearly in Huntington’s interpretation of military theorist Carl von Clausewitz. Huntington argues that, “The fact that war has its own grammar requires that the military professionals be permitted to develop their expertise at this grammar without extraneous influence ... The inherent quality of a military body can only be evaluated in terms of independent military standards” (Huntington, 1957, 57). This extension of von Clausewitz’s thought is problematic because it implies that there exists a set of “independent military standards” that is valid across time and place. This is unlikely, because the characteristics of effective armed forces will vary with factors such as the resources they have, the missions they must accomplish, and other aspects of their environments. In addition, reliance on “independent military standards” is also problematic given that the effectiveness of military means can only be evaluated in relation to the political ends that these means are to serve.

To say this is not to deny one of the major contributions that Huntington makes in *The Soldier and the State* when he argues that military organizations are shaped by both functional and societal imperatives. Functional imperatives are special characteristics of military organizations driven by their need to be capable of defending the state against external threats, and societal imperatives arise from “the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within society” (1957, 2). When attempting to understand the characteristics of a given country’s military institutions, thinking about how they may be affected by these two imperatives is helpful. To the extent that a country’s military does not share the attributes of the society as a whole, a useful starting proposition is that these differences are due to what the military believes to be required for success in war.<sup>2</sup> However, it is not true that there is a set of universally valid functional imperatives and that societal

imperatives merely weaken military organizations (or have a neutral impact). This is clearly what Huntington is implying when he argues that, “The peculiar skill of the military officer is universal in the sense that its essence is not affected by changes in time or location” (1957, 13).

In making this claim Huntington runs counter to von Clausewitz, a thinker with whom he claims to be in agreement. These authors’ differing assessments of reserve forces provides a useful example of this divergence. Huntington has a negative view of reservists because they are not fully professional, whereas von Clausewitz has positive words to say about people’s war (war by nonprofessional forces) and reserve forces under certain circumstances (Huntington, 1957, 13; von Clausewitz, 1976, 187–189 and 479–483). What is required for military forces to be effective is context dependent.

This context dependence is relevant not just to thinking about valuable characteristics of individual soldiers and officers, but also to thinking about organizational structures, equipment, technology, training techniques, and a whole host of other factors. There is nothing to guarantee that evaluation by “independent military standards” will alone ensure integration of all these in a way that maximizes the effectiveness of the military organization in a dynamic societal and international context. In fact, Barry Posen argues that military organizations will stagnate without civilian involvement and will be ill-suited to meet the requirements of their political leaders’ grand strategy (Posen, 1984, 80). Without accepting the power of this prediction from organization theory that organizations never adapt on their own—indeed it has been convincingly argued against—Posen is correct in emphasizing the point that military organizations may need to change over time to remain relevant and effective (see Rosen, 1991, 1–8; Posen, 1984, 24–29).

In sum, although Huntington does discuss military effectiveness as a product of civil–military relations, the manner in which he does so is problematic. His basic formulation seems to be that the pattern of civil–military relations that produces the most effective militaries is that which impinges least on their ability to operate according to a constant and universal functional imperative. The difficulty is that the superiority of this “professional military” ideal type regardless of context is doubtful. There is not one type of military organization that is most effective across time and space, regardless of adversary or strategic context. A second point arising from the above discussion is that the maintenance of military effectiveness may require change over time—a point that Huntington does not address.

The focus of Janowitz’s *Professional Soldier* overlaps significantly with the concerns of *Soldier and the State*. Janowitz is similarly concerned with both civilian control and the military’s ability to fulfill its responsibilities in meeting the security needs of the state (Janowitz, 1964, lviii). However, in contrast to Huntington, Janowitz argues that relying on the creation of an apolitical military in order to ensure civilian control is an unrealistic approach. “In the United States, where political leadership is diffuse, civilian politicians have come to assume that the military will be an active ingredient in decision-making about national security”

(Janowitz, 1964, 342). Janowitz argues that it is inevitable that the military will come to resemble a political pressure group, and this is not necessarily a problem as long as its activities remain “responsible, circumscribed, and responsive to civilian authority” (343). One strong guarantee of the maintenance of civilian control is the military’s “meaningful integration with civilian values” (420). Janowitz also advocates other measures for enhancing civilian control, such as increasing legislative oversight, extending civilian control into lower levels of military organizations, and increasing civilian involvement in officer professional education (439). Yet, as Feaver points out, in the end Janowitz is similar to Huntington in relying on the professional military ethic as the fundamental means for ensuring control (Feaver, 1996b, 166).

On the question of effectiveness, however, Janowitz and Huntington differ. Janowitz argues for the constabulary concept:

The military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory, because it has incorporated a protective military posture. The constabulary outlook is grounded in, and extends, pragmatic doctrine. (Janowitz, 1964, 418)

Janowitz does not entirely separate professionalism and effectiveness, and so his disagreement with Huntington is not complete on this point. Janowitz writes, “The constabulary officer performs his duties, which include fighting, because he is a professional with a sense of self-esteem and moral worth” (1964, 440). However, Janowitz does part ways with Huntington in his assertion that effectiveness is very context dependent. In Janowitz’s view, the “‘no-war–no-peace’ period” of the Cold War demands a military that is aware of the international political consequences of military action (1964, 342). A constabulary force would have this awareness, and it would understand the primacy of political objectives and the occasional need for limited applications of force (Janowitz, 1964, 257–279). Janowitz sees these as essential attributes of an effective U.S. military during the Cold War. In sum, though Janowitz’s work is similar to Huntington’s in that he discusses both professionalism and civilian control, Janowitz argues that evaluating effectiveness may rely on an appreciation of the military’s changing environment.

A point that must be highlighted, however, is that when Janowitz discusses military effectiveness he seems to base his prescriptions on his assessment of the international environment. He does not set up a causal argument that a certain pattern or type of civil–military relations will produce a military with a given amount of effectiveness. To point this out is not to criticize Janowitz’s work; it is merely to recognize that such an argument is beyond the scope of *The Professional Soldier*. Janowitz’s primary aim in that book was to describe the current state of the military profession (vii). The five hypotheses that Janowitz set forth focused on how broader

societal trends would manifest themselves in the military, and how the military would respond (7–16). Some of these trends had implications for military effectiveness, but these implications were not the central focus of Janowitz's analysis.

### ***Dependent Variables of the Civil–Military Relations Literature***

Although both effectiveness and control are addressed in the classics of U.S. civil–military relations, only Huntington's work attempts to use civil–military relations as an explanatory variable to explain military effectiveness and his approach is problematic. What work has been done in this area since *The Soldier and the State* and *The Professional Soldier*? Without claiming to mention all relevant literature, this section will review the focus of other authors working in the field of civil–military relations and highlight significant representative works.<sup>3</sup> In addition to not being comprehensive, the review below is limited in another sense. Janowitz is commonly identified as the founder of military sociology in the United States, and his *The Professional Soldier* has inspired a large body of sociological research into military organizations in modern democratic societies (Burk, 1993). This review does not adequately capture the contributions of this literature, but instead focuses on works in the political science portion of an inherently multidisciplinary field. This scope is sufficient to suggest that it would be valuable for political scientists to more fully explore the impact of civil–military relations on military effectiveness.

Although I argued above that the issue of civilian control has tended to dominate the literature, its predominance is not absolute and even scholars who examine it may look at slightly different dimensions of the problem. Because of this, a useful way to sort the work in this field is according to the authors' differing dependent variables. This is the approach I will adopt here, adapting and borrowing heavily from similar surveys provided by Desch and Feaver (Desch, 1999, 3–4; Feaver, 1999, 217–222). Possible dependent variables include the following: coups, military influence, civil–military friction, military compliance, and effectiveness.<sup>4</sup> The first four of these, as will be discussed further below, are closely related to the issue of civilian control. I will briefly discuss each of these dependent variables before turning to the issue of effectiveness in the next section.

The first dependent variable, coups, may be a significant concern in a comparative context, but it does not capture the important aspects of the U.S. case.<sup>5</sup> Despite the provocative and much-cited piece written by a U.S. Air Force officer in 1992 about a coup in the United States in the year 2012, most analysts would argue that there is no serious possibility of a military takeover in the United States (Dunlap, 1992–1993). However, as Feaver points out, even in a comparative context the danger of focusing on coups is that it may cause analysts to miss other important ways in which a military exercises influence over political leaders (Feaver, 1999, 218). In other words, such a focus may cause analysts to understate problems with civilian control. Though a coup constitutes perhaps the strongest dysfunction possible, its

likelihood is not the only significant issue—or even a significant issue—in some civil–military relationships.

A second possible dependent variable is military influence. The foremost work in the American context on this subject is Richard Betts' *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises* (1991). This book is an examination of the record of civil–military interactions in the context of use-of-force decision making during the early phase of the Cold War. In a summary of his findings, Betts concludes, “The diversity of military recommendations and the extent of consonance with civilian opinion indicate that military professionals rarely have dominated decisions on the use of force,” though influence was greatest when military leaders argued against its use (Betts, 1991, 5). Betts updates these findings in the preface to a 1991 edition, though his core conclusions remain remarkably consistent with his earlier work. Overall, he paints a mixed picture of military influence. Military leaders did not control use-of-force decision making, but their input had especially significant weight when they opposed the use of force (Betts, 1991, x; see also Petraeus, 1989).

The dependent variable of military influence has its own difficulties. As Betts points out, judging whether military influence on decision making has been “good” or “bad” is problematic, and even one’s views on its appropriate level are likely to vary with political identifications (Betts, 1991, xv). Nevertheless, it should be possible to trace change over time. In addition, though measurement may be more difficult than in the case of military coups, this variable captures dynamics more relevant to the U.S. case.

A third possible dependent variable is civil–military friction. This dependent variable has the advantage of being easily observable and measurable if defined as “the degree to which the military is willing to display public opposition to announced civilian policy” (Feaver, 1999, 220). One analysis that focuses here is Peter Feaver’s article, “Crisis as Shirking: An Agency Theory Explanation of the Souring of American Civil–military Relations” (1998).<sup>6</sup> He argues that friction is predictable based on the relationship between the incentives that the civilian has to intrusively monitor military work, and the incentives that the military has to avoid perfect compliance (“shirk”). For Feaver, shirking occurs when the military either fails to diligently and skillfully do what the civilian asks, or does what the civilian asks in a manner that undercuts the civilian’s position of greater authority. In other words, shirking occurs when military leaders fail to respect either the functional or the relational goals of their civilian leaders (Feaver, 1998, 409).

As Deborah Avant points out, one difficulty with this approach is that a focus on friction can obscure the matter of civilian control. There may be a lack of friction because civilian leaders are securely in charge, or because they are following the military’s lead (Avant, 1998, 382–383). It is also not clear that all civil–military friction is bad, either in a normative or in a policy sense.

A fourth dependent variable is military compliance. An advantage of the term “military compliance” is that it makes clear that even in a context in which coups are unlikely (i.e., total civilian loss of control is unlikely), subtler issues of control

may still be an issue. Recent work has continued to highlight military compliance as a key concern in the U.S. civil–military relationship (Kohn, 2002). Some of this may have been motivated by the debate—discussed in the introduction to this article—over the existence of a “crisis” in civilian control in the early 1990s. One example of a scholar who has contributed in this area is Christopher Gibson. Gibson argues that the key to ensuring continued civilian supremacy in the U.S. civil–military relationship is the enhancement of the national security education and credentials of senior civilian officials (Gibson, 1998).

As mentioned in the introduction, two authors who have recently applied the principal-agent framework to this concern are Deborah Avant and Peter Feaver. Avant uses the principal-agent framework to gain insight into military reluctance to get involved in small-scale contingency operations. Her post-Cold War cases bear out the prediction that, in the face of a divided principal that disagrees over goals and strategy (in this case the president and Congress), the agent is likely to pursue cautious policies (Avant, 1996/1997). Her answer as to whether the “reluctant warriors” are out of control is “not quite.” She argues that their behavior is an expected outcome due to prior lack of agreement among civilians across divided institutions (Avant, 1996/1997, 52).

Although Feaver also uses the principal-agent framework, he focuses on the forms of delegation and monitoring civilian leaders are likely to embrace rather than on the issue of a divided principal. Above it was mentioned that Feaver developed a game theoretic model and used it to explain the 1990s “crisis” through its predictions about friction. That same model also makes predictions about military compliance, which is in fact the focus Feaver himself ascribes to the article (Feaver, 1999, 221). He further develops, in later work, his argument about the importance of delegation and monitoring mechanisms, and the understanding they provide about the state of U.S. civil–military relations and civilian control (Feaver, 2003).

As the title makes clear, the issue of military compliance is also central to Michael Desch’s *Civilian Control of the Military* (1999). He argues that, “The best indicator of the state of civilian control is who prevails when civilian and military preferences diverge. If the military does, there is a problem; if the civilians do, there is not” (1999, 4–5). The central argument of his structural theory of civil–military relations is that the particular combination of internal and external threats faced by a state (independent variables) determines the quality of civilian control (the dependent variable). Civilian control should be best in times of high external threat and low internal threat, worst in times of low external threat and high internal threat, and indeterminate in the other two cases. Finding support for his hypothesis when applying it to the United States, Desch finds relatively firm civilian control during the Cold War (high external and low internal threat), and mixed in the post-Cold War period (low external and low internal threats). His conclusion about the United States in this period is that, “Clearly, the less challenging international threat environment of the post-Cold War period has weakened civilian control of the U.S. military” (1999, 36).



Though Desch's argument may be useful in comparative perspective, its utility in the case of the United States is rather limited. Even after suggesting that civilian control in the United States has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, he does not argue that the military will disobey direct orders or engage in a military coup (Desch, 1999, 30). Given that civilian control is not fundamentally at risk, it seems valuable to examine other possible aspects of the civil–military relationship. Paul Bracken's comments are salient on this point:

The central role that civilian control has played in [U.S.] civil–military relations is understandable. But in its raw form it is a trivial problem because under nearly any conceivable set of arrangements civilian control is assured. To overconcentrate on it when it is inappropriate to do so will only elevate a host of ordinary misunderstandings and differences into a high political arena where they do not belong. Moreover, it will distract attention from other important dimensions that characterize the relationship of the military to the state. (Bracken, 1995, 163)

One way of interpreting Bracken's comments would be to argue that “civilian control” is still an important concern, but needs to be reconceptualized to have greater significance in the U.S. case. For example, can U.S. political leaders responsible for national security policy control the military in the sense of shaping it to meet the country's security needs? A second interesting question is whether this can be done at a reasonable cost in terms of other values being pursued.<sup>7</sup>

Before moving on to discuss the dependent variable of effectiveness, an additional literature that should be mentioned is the extensive amount of work done in the last decade on the existence of a “gap” between civilians and members of the military in the United States. Although there is a wide variance within the literature on a gap, it is mentioned in this section on military compliance because a common strong concern seems to be the implications of a gap for civilian control (Feaver and Kohn, 2000, 36; Cohen, 2000, 46). Some authors focus on a growing cultural divide, and others find a growing divide in ideological identifications and policy preferences (Ricks, 1996; Holsti, 1998–1999). A multiyear project by the Triangle Institute of Security Studies, involving approximately two dozen scholars, was recently devoted to determining the sources of the civil–military gap, more specifically defining its nature, and determining its possible implications (Feaver and Kohn, 2000, 1).

Many of the project's findings have been published in *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil–military Gap and American National Security* (Feaver and Kohn, 2001). This book is a rich contribution to the civil–military relations literature, and constructively enters a long-standing debate. At the heart of the debate, as key participants in the study have acknowledged, are differing assessments as to whether a civil–military gap is even problematic. Differences of opinion on this have their

roots in the founding works of Huntington and Janowitz (Feaver and Kohn, 2000, 30–31). These disagreements apply to the ramifications of a gap for civilian control, as well as its ramifications for military effectiveness. As discussed above, Huntington saw a degree of separateness as enhancing both civilian control and effectiveness. Some authors writing more recently have implicitly agreed by pointing out the differences between some core U.S. values, such as the priority placed on individualism, and the functional needs of the military (Snider, 1999, 14–19). On the other hand, Janowitz argued for greater military integration with civilian values and believed that this would not necessarily harm military effectiveness. *Soldiers and Civilians* is a contribution to the debate that argues that the gap matters, and explores its implications for both military compliance and military effectiveness.

### **Military Effectiveness**

This discussion leads to the final dependent variable mentioned above, effectiveness. Some authors working in civil–military relations avoid highlighting this issue. Desch, for example, dismisses this focus mainly by labeling it inadequate (Desch, 1999, 4). However, although effectiveness does not tell us everything we want to know about a civil–military relationship, neither does degree of civilian control—especially in the U.S. context. Feaver takes a slightly different approach, arguing that this outcome is deserving of further research (Feaver, 1999, 234). In his discussion he focuses primarily on use-of-force issues and recommends testing propositions such as whether civilian involvement at the operational and tactical levels does or does not lead to better outcomes.<sup>8</sup>

In any event, the literature that uses civil–military relations as an explanatory variable for military effectiveness is sparse. One important exception is Stephen Biddle and Robert Zirkle’s work on civil–military relations and technology assimilation in Iraq and Vietnam (Biddle and Zirkle, 1996). Using the degree to which civil–military relations are marked by conflict as the explanatory variable, they explain the two states’ differing abilities to take advantage of the complex air defense technology they possessed. Biddle and Zirkle argue that Iraq’s radically conflictual civil–military relations help to explain its inability to exploit its advanced air defense technology in the Persian Gulf War. They compare this with the Vietnam War, and argue that North Vietnam’s harmonious civil–military relations help to explain its significant success in using its technology to good effect against the United States in that conflict.

Other authors who examine the nexus between civil–military relations and military effectiveness turn their attention to characteristics of the societies from which armed forces stem or the nature of their governments. One example is Stephen Rosen’s work on societal structures. Rosen’s independent variables are the dominant social structures of a country and the degree to which military organizations divorce themselves from society, and he argues that these affect the national

military strength a country can obtain from a given amount of material resources (Rosen, 1995, 1996). Dan Reiter and Allan Stam, with a slightly different focus, seek to establish a relationship between regime type and battlefield effectiveness. In their statistical work, they find support for the idea that “soldiers emerging from democratic societies enjoy better leadership and fight with more initiative” (Reiter and Stam, 1998, 260). A third example of work along these lines is Risa Brooks’ look at the negative impact that the political control mechanisms chosen by Arab regimes have on their armies’ military effectiveness (Brooks, 1998, 45–53). She finds that highly centralized and rigid command structures, the squelching of initiative at lower levels, and tinkering with chains of command for political reasons significantly inhibit the effectiveness of Arab armies (46).

In addition, some of the work on military doctrine speaks to the relationship between civil–military relations and military effectiveness, if only indirectly.<sup>9</sup> For example, Jack Snyder argues that in the period before 1914, “military doctrine and war planning were left almost entirely in the hands of military professionals, who usually incline toward the offensive but rarely have so free a rein to indulge their inclination” (Snyder, 1984, 199). A clear implication of this analysis is that a civil–military relationship characterized by greater involvement of rational civilians (not captured by military organizational bias favoring the offense) could have led to an avoidance of some of the disasters of 1914. Deborah Avant makes a similar argument that the involvement of civilians is important to the military’s adoption of an effective doctrine, but relies on the characteristics of domestic institutions and their historical development to explain both the relative necessity of this involvement and its likely success (Avant, 1994). Posen’s argument that military organizations, left to their own devices, will tend to stagnate and become disintegrated with a country’s grand strategy has similar implications (Posen, 1984, 80).

A fourth example is Elizabeth Kier’s work on the role of culture in shaping military doctrine. In what could be characterized as different civil–military dynamics, Kier argues that the extent to which civilian policy makers agree about the domestic role of the military will shape whether or not international considerations will drive their military policy (Kier, 1997, 27). She also argues that “the greater the hostility in the organization’s external environment, the greater the potential for organizational dogmatism” (32). This is clearly another proposition about the impact of civil–military relations that has ramifications for military effectiveness. Although Kier argues that the formulation of military doctrine is primarily the purview of military leaders, civilian leaders create constraints that shape the choices that these military leaders make (Kier, 1997, 12–14).

It is interesting that despite the different approaches of the authors above, these works have several points of agreement. First, the authors seem to generally agree that conflict-laden relations between political and military leaders will harm a country’s national security. These authors find that relatively cooperative relationships between senior military and political leaders, on the other hand, facilitate a number of desirable developments: the integration of advanced technologies into

military capabilities (Biddle and Zirkle, 1996); the capable employment of force (Brooks, 1998); the development of a military doctrine that is supportive of political ends (Avant, 1994; Snyder, 1984; Posen, 1984); and the retention of flexibility in military organizations (Kier, 1997). A second point of agreement is that societal characteristics may be reflected in the ability of a country to create military power (Rosen, 1995, 1996), or in battlefield effectiveness (Reiter and Stam, 1998). A challenge on this latter point is that military organizations often have very strong socialization processes, and therefore may not entirely reflect the societies from which they stem. At a minimum, this socialization is a consideration that must be taken into account.<sup>10</sup>

The authors listed above have begun to shape a research agenda for those interested in attempting to evaluate the impact of civil–military relations on military effectiveness. However, there are characteristics of the problem that make it a tough one to tackle. The next section discusses some of the reasons why this is the case.

## Challenges

Scholars who seek to evaluate the impact of civil–military relations on military effectiveness face several major challenges. Here I will address three of these: defining effectiveness; defining civil–military relations; and attempting to characterize the independent impact of civil–military relations as compared to other factors that may shape military effectiveness. I will briefly discuss each of these below.

Addressing the first challenge—defining and operationalizing military effectiveness—would seem at first to be a simple matter. Effective militaries are those that achieve the objectives assigned to them or are victorious in war (Korb, 1984, 42). However, as Allan Millett, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth Watman point out, “Victory is not a characteristic of an organization but rather a result of organizational activity. Judgments of effectiveness should thus retain some sense of proportional cost and organizational process” (Millett, Murray, and Watman, 1987, 3). One example that they give is that although Soviet forces defeated the Finns during the “Winter War” of 1939–1940, a detailed look at the manner in which the conflict was fought makes it implausible to argue that the Soviets had the more “effective” military.

In addressing this challenge, it may be useful to keep in mind Millett, Murray, and Watman’s argument that a comprehensive framework for measuring military effectiveness is required. Military activity occurs at multiple levels: political, strategic, operational, and tactical (Millett, Murray, and Watman, 1987, 3). Because effectiveness implies different characteristics at each of these levels, multiple measures of effectiveness are needed. Some projects may benefit by narrowing their claims in such a way that they are addressing effectiveness at only one or two of these levels. In any event, it is important to acknowledge different aspects of military effectiveness and be clear about the claims being made.

The second challenge mentioned above is that of carefully defining the term “civil–military relations.” As Paul Bracken has suggested, in order to assess the full impact of civil–military relations it might be helpful to move down a level of analysis and disaggregate civil–military relations into its various dimensions (Bracken, 1995). Although most work in U.S. civil–military relations focuses on the interactions between senior members of the executive branch and military leaders, the military also interacts with Congress, the industrial base, and society (see Bracken, 1995, 155–162). Each of these relationships, as well as their combined effects, can impact on military effectiveness. Looking at the problem in this way may be especially helpful to investigations that examine institutional questions concerning the development and shaping of military capabilities, but could also be helpful when the concern is the use of force.

A third major challenge is that the effectiveness of a military organization, at whatever level being discussed, is likely to stem from a number of factors. How much do civil–military relationships matter? In many cases, there will be internal organizational factors that impact on effectiveness as well as changes in the security challenges a particular country faces (see Goldman, 1997, 43). As the relative importance of internal organizational developments and civil–military dynamics will vary depending on the particular research problem being investigated, this will remain an issue for empirical research in each case.

## Conclusion

As developed by Peter Feaver, the civil–military “problematique” is the challenge of reconciling “a military strong enough to do anything the civilians ask them to do with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorize them to do” (Feaver, 1996b, 149). It is worthwhile to note that this formulation seems to imply a tension between the two concerns—control and effectiveness—that at least theoretically does not have to exist. A nation’s armed forces could become more effective without any loss of civilian control. In fact, when thinking about trying to develop a coherent relationship between military means and political ends, civilian control becomes essential to military effectiveness.

However, like the founding works of Huntington and Janowitz, Feaver’s formulation helpfully puts both effectiveness and control at the center of the civil–military relations research agenda. To this point, the problem of civilian control has drawn more attention. The impact of civil–military relations on military effectiveness deserves a closer look.

## Notes

1. Not all analysts have agreed with Huntington that professional militaries are by their very nature apolitical (see Finer, 1962).
2. The functional imperatives associated with accomplishment of military missions may often require these institutions to have characteristics that distinguish them from the society from which they stem (see Boëne, 1990).
3. In a 1999 review, Peter Feaver focuses on the political science works in the literature on civil–military relations, but the sociological dimension of the field is also briefly discussed (see Feaver, 1999).
4. This list adopts Feaver’s labels for these dependent variables (Feaver, 1999).
5. Feaver argues that “modern American civil–military relations are about the conflict that remains *after* the basic principle of civilian control is accepted” (Feaver, 1996a, 159).
6. Rebecca L. Schiff, in a different article, also focuses on level of consensus (lack of friction) between the military, political elites and citizenry on key issues as a significant concern. However, the presence or absence of friction serves more as an explanatory variable than as a dependent variable in her work. Her dependent variable is military intervention into politics (Schiff, 1995).
7. As Amy Zegart argues in *Flawed By Design* (1999), factors impinging on the effectiveness of national security institutions can be based in the nature of political institutions as well as in the relationships between the leaders of these institutions and the federal bureaucracy. She makes this argument in her explanation of why the development and functioning of the Central Intelligence Agency, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and National Security Council have been suboptimal from a national perspective (Zegart, 1999).
8. Eliot Cohen has recently written a book that addresses this concern (see Cohen, 2002).
9. I wish to thank Dr. Stephen Biddle for pointing out to me this implication of the military doctrine literature.
10. In his analysis, Rosen takes this into account by analyzing the degree to which a military has divorced itself from society.

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## Chapter 13

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# Application of the Military for Countering Nonstate Terrorist and Guerilla Networks

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Matthew R. McNabb

Much debate persists as to what kinds of activity constitute terrorism, existing along a sliding scale of varying instruments for low-intensity conflict. As a result, any effort to define with precision the nature of those operations aimed at countering such techniques are thus equally confused. But, if experience teaches one anything, it is that defeating terrorists requires a nation to do far more than merely “send either cops or soldiers to capture the evildoers” (Bohn, 2004, xiv). Within the context of military applications, traditional models of identify, target, and kill lack the requisite sophistication alone necessary to route out the disease with its symptoms. As such, the military’s responsibilities in counterterrorism involve a wide spectrum of both kinetic and nonkinetic activity.

Terrorism, whatever the precise characteristics of its definition, is ultimately a tactic, not descriptive of organizational dynamics, an ideology, or *modus vivendi*. Indeed, terrorism at its core, whether directed against pedestrian or official targets, implicates the use or threatened use of violence in an effort to incite fear for political ends. Nonstate international terrorists, whether backed by recognized governments or operating independently, are comprised of any number of varying

formations. In some cases, the threat posed may involve isolated cells of friends and family inspired to act by the pull of their revolutionist ideology or of ecumenical rite. This may be called the self-starter model. Other times the threat posed may be slightly more conventional in nature, through the use of state-sponsored guerrilla formations. Under this revolutionary war model, an organized and disciplined leadership comprises the effectual “general staff of the revolution” replete with its own tailored “popular ideology that is used to explain the past, present, and future” (Jordan, Taylor, and Mazarr, 1999, 240). The nature of military involvement vis-à-vis counterterrorism is largely dependent upon which variation of these models is adopted by the adversary, though military involvement is rarely static, fluctuating from waves of widespread counterinsurgency approaches to targeted strikes, a fact echoed in the genealogy of U.S. military counterterrorism. But directing military assets through kinetic, forceful options, without due appreciation for the narrow circumstances surrounding their respective support networks, can be dangerous.

In conventional military engagement, the principal focus is given to battlespace—the geo-political boundaries within which conflict is concentrated. Terrorism, in its nonstate form, however, is often far more complicated, eschewing the binds of geography, or even of traditional studies in political relations, in favor of highly asymmetric, often ideological, bands of dissident political actors. These bands in turn depend upon extensive networks for support, both material and ideological, well beyond the scope of the traditional battlespace. As one author notes,

The problem, of course, is that dominating the battlespace only gets the U.S. military through the war, or what the Powell Doctrine prefers to call “mission accomplished” (bad guys out of power, captured, or killed), and if that’s all you need to light up the victory cigars and strike up the band, then your duty is done. But if you’re waging a global war on terrorism, then all you’ve done by conquering that battlespace is kill a bunch of bad guys and nothing else. You’ve stormed into the inner-city ghetto, shot the place up, maybe snatched the most wanted criminals if you’re lucky, and left the situation more beat-up than you found it. To the innocent locals, you can’t help but come off like a man-made disaster in the end, despite your good intentions, because what you leave behind is no more likely to produce good guys than before—in fact, it’s more likely than ever to produce even worse guys. (Barnett, 2005, 24–25)

As a result of this divergence from traditional military management, a premium is placed on the value of reliable and timely intelligence, flexibility through a range of varying options, and a worthy investment into nonkinetic efforts to isolate, divide, and disrupt the continuity of terrorist activities.

Nonstate international terrorism, whether in self-starter or revolutionary form, seeks to use the asymmetry in the adversarial relationship to its advantage. Mujahideen fighters in the late 1980s, for instance, were able to utilize comparatively simplistic technologies, like surface-to-air RPGs (rocket-propelled grenades) that targeted helicopters, to force Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, as Somali warlords set rubber tires ablaze in the streets of Mogadishu to render U.S. night-vision superiority obsolete. Even in Iraq today, primitive pressure-detonated, improvised explosives hidden in potholes and Coke cans have inflicted such injury to allied forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom, that the Pentagon was compelled to establish a \$3 billion per year Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) headed by a four-star general and former commander of U.S. Army Europe, to address the threat. Asymmetries in the terrorism–counterterrorism relationship can be staggering.

What makes terrorism all the more frightening and difficult for traditional forces to address is not merely its asymmetry. Terrorism, by definition, relies not merely on force, but also upon fear. Idiosyncrasies in its targeting, flexibility in its operational management, and an underpinning of ardent supporters, conjures a milieu of chaos and omnipresent threats—anyone could be its next victim. This milieu of fear is often the most difficult element in countering a terrorist threat, requiring the military to tailor its kinetic options in line with its nonkinetic approaches; thus, no singular strategy is sufficient in countering all terrorist adversaries.

## **Genealogy of U.S. Military Counterterrorism**

Applications of the military as an instrument in countering terrorism are not new. Indeed, similar activities might be said to date back as early as to mid-seventeenth century colonial efforts to defend against and neutralize threats posed by raiding Native American tribes. In 1756, skilled woodsman Major Robert Rogers drew command of four motley companies of rugged Northeastern outdoorsmen, skilled in rapid, offensive actions against hostile tribesmen. Known for their unreliability and distinctly mercurial attitudes, the Rogers irregulars comprised the nation's very first special operations forces, and proved a pivotal response to the asymmetry presented by Native tribes throughout the French and Indian War.

Specialized guerilla units were again seen in the American war for independence. British ranger forces found their way deep into rebel territory by way of Canada, teaming up with their Indian allies to sabotage and terrorize colonial settlements throughout the countryside of Pennsylvania and New York. Similar British–Indian irregular units were formed in the South. But in the face of these asymmetries, specialized American units were tasked to respond. Major General Nathaniel Greene, for instance, employed a blend of both regular and irregular forces utilizing small, elite, guerilla fighters known for approaching their enemies quietly before igniting lightning-fast frontal assaults coordinated with especially violent flanking maneu-

vers. As one author has said of Greene's most famous guerilla commander Col. Francis "Swamp Fox" Marion, "He seemed ubiquitous, lurking everywhere: hiding in an unknown rendezvous, creeping stealthily along on a raid, or leading a midnight attack" (Taillon, 2001, 60). Even in the times of formalized etiquette for the gentlemanly conduct of conventional war, U.S. strategists employed creative low-intensity solutions to the asymmetries presented by unconventional guerilla and terrorist activities.

A few years later, the low-intensity instrument of counterterrorism was transposed in favor of conventional application of force. The violent nuisance of Barbary pirates faced in the early days of the American Republic haunted the successive administrations of Presidents Washington, Adams, and Jefferson alike. In October of 1784, an adept Moroccan corsair interdicted an American merchant ship, the *Betsey*, as it sailed off the coast of Cadiz, Spain. Nine months later, Algerian corsairs seized two additional American merchant ships, the *Dauphin* and the *Maria*, along with their twenty-one crew members and passengers, seeking to incite sufficient fear in the hearts of merchantmen that the young Republic would be compelled to comply with the Barbary racket's demand for financial tribute in return for safe passage across the high seas. For the pirates acting on behalf of their nominal states, terrorism was both a matter of nationalistic policy and a jihadist agenda operating under the banner of an oft abused Islamic Surah: "When the hallowed months have slipped away, then slay the idolaters wherever you may find them, and take them captive, and besiege them, and waylay them at every outpost. But if they repent and establish worship and pay their fair due, then leave them free" (Holy Qu'aran, Surah 9:5). It was, in truth, the first American encounter with jihadi terrorism and the response was robust (Wheelan, 2003). As the seizures increased, particularly following an 1801 formal declaration of war by the Barbary states' apparent leadership in Tripoli, American policy makers became progressively more displeased with the ongoing maritime racket. By the time President Jefferson was in office, however, the administration was preparing for war. With the development of a small fleet of battle-bound frigates, the military was able to team with its transatlantic European neighbors to defeat the Barbary racket. Conventional forces were employed successfully in a full-scale operation to face a weak, idiosyncratic adversary.

Applications of conventional force are not always so successful, as the military quickly learned years later in facing successive insurgencies throughout the so-called Banana Wars of the Philippines, Central America, and the Caribbean. In Nicaragua, the lesson was especially harsh. Fighting the rebel forces of Augusto Sandino, U.S. Marines were compelled to dig in and fight a protracted war to destabilize the early Sandinista movement and return control to the democratically elected pro-American government. Though prepared for difficult and extensive combat, the marines quickly learned that their failure to attain a sufficient cultural sensitivity left them unable to undercut the movement's popular support. As one scholar has noted,

They failed not as conquerors ... but as rulers of conquered places. Striving to teach by example, they found it necessary to denigrate the cultural values of those whom they had come to save ... [T]hey mistakenly assumed that community values could be inculcated with sanitary measures or vocational education or a reformed military where soldiers from humble social origins learned to identify with “nation” instead of prominent politicians or families. Their presence ... stripped Caribbean peoples of their dignity and constituted an unspoken American judgment of Caribbean inferiority. (Langley, 1985, 71)

The lesson was clear: Military involvement in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency is not dependent upon the application of force alone.

Years later, the very first counterterrorist war in the wake of the two world wars took place against a Greek communist movement, the People’s Liberation Army (ELAS). Shortly following the German withdrawal of its forces in the country in 1945, ELAS made a sharp grab for power. Unfortunately though, the British government, formerly an ardent supporter of the prodemocratic Royalist government in Athens, was financially ruined and militarily overdrawn from the war. Amidst the civil war between the Greek government and the ELAS which ensued, in February of 1947, the British government deemed it necessary to withdraw its own support for Royalist forces. Thankfully, the U.S. government had long since anticipated the withdrawal. For the United States, support for the Greek military was crucial to maintain the delicate post-WWII bipolar balance with the Soviet Union, as Soviet elements appeared to be offering direct assistance to the ELAS. As then Secretary of State General George Marshall would say of the British withdrawal, their act “was tantamount to British abdication from the Middle East with obvious implications as to their successor” (Ambrose and Brinkley, 1997, 79). Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson, in a presentation to President Harry S. Truman, concurred, emphasizing the fear that “if Greece were lost, Turkey would be untenable. Russia would move in and take control of the Dardanelles, with the ‘clearest implications’ for the Middle East. Morale would sink in Italy, Germany, and France” (Ambrose and Brinkley, 1997, 79). It was, as political scientists would later dub the fear, that of domino theory: Soviet success in one state may spill over into its neighboring states, and advent the rapid horizontal proliferation of Communist power worldwide. But for the immediate time, the threat was guerilla operations and terrorism, and the U.S. response was robust.

The first stages of U.S. counterterrorism in Greece came by way of a significant foreign aid program. To facilitate the aid program, a Joint U.S. Military and Planning Group (JUSMAPG) was formed as a joint forum for assisting the Greek operations, training, and logistics. As was feared, “the conduct of Greek military operations became the responsibility of JUSMAPG,” and the U.S. general became the de facto commander of the Greek National Army (GNA) (Taillon, 2001, 67).

This process underlined a sense of urgency otherwise unknown to the Greek military, but recognizing the problem they faced, the GNA acceded. What was once a counterterrorist and anticommunist strategy hinging on traditional foreign aid quickly transformed to indirect military and nation-building assistance, which in turn ripened to direct military involvement.

JUSMAPG employed a two-edged approach in facing the ELAS threat. The principal tactic employed was the use of heavy, overwhelming force, summoning the strength of significant tactical air support, artillery, and U.S.-supplied automatic weapons. By 1948, although the utilization of heavy airpower and artillery proved reasonably successful in disrupting the larger elements of ELAS, it quickly became clear that large-scale conventional operations were insufficient in tackling the lighter, guerilla aspects of ELAS operations. As a result, JUSMAPG expanded and extensively utilized elite, light, rapid-reaction Greek commandos (LOK) to infiltrate the organization's urban strongholds. The move to special forces was highly successful, so much so that regional commanders, seeing success rates by LOK commandos, moved to replicate those achievements, to the severe detriment of the special forces. In an effort to belay very high casualty rates endured by the abuse of the special forces, the U.S.-dominated JUSMAPG took control, reinstating its conventional approach, an approach that at the time, in spite of tremendous LOK successes, was credited with the ultimate success of the Greek military over the ELAS threat.

Meanwhile guerilla tactics and terrorist acts were also occupying the U.S. military within the Korean peninsula. Although, of course, most of the Korean conflict was predominated by conventional warfare, unconventional guerilla and terrorist formations emerging as early as 1948 deep within Republic of Korea (ROK) territory became an important concern both for ROK military defenses and later for U.S. forces on the ground. Even before the initiation of conventional hostilities, the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) initiated sporadic, idiosyncratic attacks against civilians and military personnel alike, forcing ROK forces to deploy three entire divisions from what would soon become the front lines of the Korean War. As NKPA and ROK forces engaged, the NKPA's guerilla forces were well situated for harassing civilian populations, interdicting military supply lines, and collecting valuable intelligence for North Korea commanders. But, more importantly, NKPA guerillas were not alone in their efforts. Headed by the young South Korea Labour Party Leader Kim Il Sung, communist dissidents, inspired by the NKPA guerillas and the introduction of Chinese forces into hostilities, coagulated into a Partisan Guidance Bureau, serving as a native guerilla and terrorist force aimed at assisting North Korean and Chinese interests. Kim Il Sung's bureau became known for its impressive sabotage techniques and extensive use of violence to incite fear in noncompliant locals, military and civilian alike. The threat was very real. While the United Nations command located in the South was forced to dedicate much-needed resources to countering the guerilla and terrorist threat, U.S. and ROK troops conducted ad hoc operations with conventional patrols. But conventional

forces lacked the requisite mobility, flexibility, and interoperability to be effective. By 1951, the marines took over. And although marine replacements made important efforts in their counterinsurgency operations, by the end of the conflict, however, the trend was set in favor of overwhelming conventional force. In the words of one scholar, “The Army had become accustomed to massive amounts of firepower which came at the expense of mobility,” and in essence had “substituted firepower for strategy” (Id., 71).

For much of the period following U.S. involvement in Korea, the nature of the threat posed by terrorist networks shifted largely from that of guerilla actions to limited activities of semiautonomous terrorist networks; from communist insurgencies to Cuban or Palestinian airplane hijackers.\* With this shift in threat, the concept of applying military force to address terrorism fell largely into disfavor, turning instead to federal law enforcement and state-centric diplomacy. Terrorism was viewed simply as a second-class threat. In the words of one observer, “Neither the Kennedy nor the Johnson administration had chosen to expend any political capital on the problem” (Naftali, 2005, 21).

September 1970 pivoted this reticence to utilize the military, when a team of terrorists operating on behalf of the so-called Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked three airliners flying from Europe to New York (TWA Flight 741, Pan Am Flight 93, Swissair Flight 100) and carried out a failed attempt on a fourth from Tel Aviv (El Al Flight 219). The hijackings ignited an immediate international incident, persuading President Richard Nixon to place federal marshals onboard international flights originating in U.S. airports. Unable to hire all of the requisite 5,750 law enforcement officials, Nixon turned to the military. It was a controversial first step in applying military force for a traditionally civilian-centric homeland defense apparatus. Military intervention in the subsequent hostage crises that followed was rendered unnecessary when negotiations with the PFLP effectuated the release of the hostages in exchange for a pan-European and Israeli prisoner exchange.

In the early post-Korean War world, general military doctrine had shifted in favor of “flexible response,” giving the military the “ability to respond to aggression at the appropriate level through the possession of a wide spectrum of conventional and nuclear forces” (Taillon, 2001, 72). But as President John F. Kennedy took office, fears of Soviet-sponsored proxy wars galvanized the Pentagon into the intensive study of guerilla warfare. Counterinsurgency and counterterrorism became the fad of military doctrine, a fad that, surprisingly, was lost on the Vietnam War planners who sought to reapply the gradual approach of flexible response.

The period between the middle of the 1970s and 1980s witnessed a remarkable escalation in anti-U.S. terrorist activity. According to a report by the Vice

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\* Fears of terrorism also surrounded Soviet domestic sabotage or the small-scale use of chemical weapons against targeted persons or locations, but these concerns were considered secondary threats and received little or no attention as an issue beyond planning stages for military application.



President's Task Force on Combating Terrorism, between the years 1976 and 1986 international terrorists "attacked U.S. officials or installations abroad approximately once every seventeen days" (Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combating Terrorism, 1997, 1). It was within the midst of this uptick in terrorist activity that there was a radical shift in acceptability of the use of extreme measures to neutralize the threat. With terrorism beginning to come on the radar of national security specialists and out of the exclusive hands of criminologists, the paradigm for countering it began to shift.

On May 12, 1975, only two weeks after the United States' protracted involvement in Southeast Asia had been ended by its final evacuations from Cambodia and Vietnam, a deliberate act of sea piracy by Cambodian rebels reactivated military attention to the region. A U.S.-flagged merchant ship, the *S.S. Mayaguez*, en route to Sattahip, Thailand from Hong Kong was traveling some fifty miles off the coastal shores of Cambodia in the Gulf of Siam, when a U.S.-made gunboat flying a deep red flag intercepted the ship. Cambodian Khmer Rouge operatives, wearing their customary black ninja pajamas and carrying Chinese made AK-47s and rocket launchers, fired a rapid burst of .50 caliber machinegun fire and a couple of small rockets across the ship's bow, before boarding and taking the Americans hostage. In response, President Gerald Ford declared the interception an overt act of piracy, holding the Cambodian government fully responsible for the act, just before initiating air strikes against it and introducing an elite contingent of marine ground forces directed to rescue the seamen. But the operation quickly shifted from defensive to retaliatory. Even after the crewmen were eventually retrieved, a 150,000-pound conventional explosive—the largest nonnuclear weapon in America's arsenal at the time—was detonated on a small Cambodian island measuring only a few square miles (Fisher, 2004). In the post-Vietnam world, President Ford wanted to make clear that the United States would not hesitate to respond with overwhelming force against any act of aggression, by any state or any group. The military would be a key instrument to neutralize any such threat.

Unfortunately though, the operation itself was rife with errors. Successive intelligence failures plagued both defensive and offensive actions, to a degree that former crewmen rescued by the military sued the government for its gross negligence (*Rappenecker v. United States*, 1980). Forty-one soldiers lost their lives in an effort to save thirty-nine crew members, and of the forty-one who died, an estimated eighteen were killed—as a result of poor intelligence acquisition—raiding the wrong locations (Bennett, 1976, 15-16). The botched operation proved the importance of timely and accurate intelligence acquisition as a constituent to successful low-intensity conflict.

By the late 1970s, international terrorism had reached new heights. On Sunday, November 4, 1979, a motley cadre of militant Iranian students overran the U.S. Embassy in Teheran, holding hostage some fifty-two civilian and military inhabitants. The move was openly supported by the Grand Ayatollah Khomeini, among other Iranian clerics, as officially condoned conduct. Under the command of the

entrepreneurial Colonel Charles Beckwith, the newly established Delta Force was tasked to rescue the hostages. Operation Eagle Claw, as it was known, exemplified a second embarrassing failure in military counterterrorism. Due to unfavorable weather conditions and a mechanical failure, leading to the crashing of one helicopter before the operation had even commenced, Eagle Claw was scrapped entirely, underscoring the importance of a more professional, well-equipped special forces division, a call the military would heed as it found itself engaged in over a dozen hotspots around the world in the following decade.

Where an increase in international terrorist incidents between the 1970s and 1980s introduced the military into the counterterrorism equation, a marked escalation in their boldness has reintroduced deficiencies in the prosecutorial approach. In 1983, the military again faced the specter of international terrorism, this time in the Middle East. U.S. forces stationed in Lebanon at the time were not directed for a counterterrorist mission. Theirs was a peacemaking operation, aimed at regaining stability in the midst of Israeli, Syrian, and conflict throughout the Lebanese territory. But, for many Muslim communities across the country, the U.S. presence was viewed as a proxy for Israeli aggression. In their eyes, the United States had taken sides with their Jewish adversary, uninterested in playing the role of neutral arbiter. This perception fueled the fire of radical Islamist discontent, only serving to intensify the conflict. On October 23, the powder keg of that discontent exploded. As over three hundred marine and navy officers slept in their secured Beirut barracks, a yellow five-ton Mercedes truck entered the parking lot south of the building, quickly accelerating and barraging through a barbed wire and concrete barricade before detonating over twelve thousand pounds of TNT. The Hizbullah-sponsored martyrdom operation, the first of its kind, instantly became a legend and a point for replication among violent jihadists worldwide. Two hundred and forty-one Americans were killed, the largest number of marines killed in a single day since Iwo Jima (Huchthausen, 2003).

In the wake of the bombing, serious consideration was given to conducting extensive strikes against Hizbullah training facilities in the Baalbek region of the Bekaa Valley, perhaps even reaching into Syrian territory, but nothing was done. Meanwhile, French and Israeli forces continued their offensive counterterrorism operations throughout Lebanon. On March 31, 1984, shortly following evacuations by Italian and French forces, the Americans assessed their losses, some 266 soldiers killed and 151 injured in just over 530 days, and decided to retreat. Those Americans who remained, some eighty soldiers tasked to guard the Embassy, were again hit the following September when an annex to the Embassy was hit by yet another suicide truck, killing twenty-three people and wounding eight marines. A rebel cadre of Islamist militants and a handful of shaheeds had forced the U.S. military out of Lebanon, and the counterterrorism response was scarcely detectable.

In the wake of the withdrawal from Lebanon, President Ronald Reagan approved NSDD 138, a comprehensive strategy to “shift policy focus from passive to active defense measures,” tasking the Department of Defense (DoD) to “maintain and

further develop capabilities to deal with the spectrum of threat options.” The policy served as a subtle indication to the military that it was to serve an important role in the future of counterterrorism. Upset with Libyan-sponsored terrorism, particularly one foiled plot involving the use of a suicide bomber to attack the U.S. Embassy in Cairo, the National Security Council (NSC) developed two plans of response: Operation Tulip, an effort to provide training and support to Algerian and Egyptian paramilitary actions deep inside Libya, and Operation Rose, a plan for a joint U.S.-Egyptian war against Libya (Naftali, 2005). In a move chalked as the first official attempt to seek regime change for a state sponsor of terrorism, President Reagan signed a Presidential Finding initiating Operation Tulip. In the words of one NSC staffer pushing for radical preemption, the United States sought to “get the sponsors of terrorism before the terrorists get you” (Naftali, 2005, 169). And although the Tulip operation was scrapped after a key NSC leak to *The Washington Post* investigative journalist Bob Woodward, it was the beginning of U.S. involvement in Libya, followed by retaliatory airstrikes a year later in response to a Libyan-sponsored bombing of a nightclub in Germany (Naftali, 2005). U.S. military assets, vis-à-vis counterterrorism policy with Libya, were viewed as both pre-emptive and reactive instruments.

October 7, 1985 marked an important period in the history of U.S. counterterrorism. On that day, just months after Lebanese gunmen hijacked a TWA flight in transit from Athens to Rome, four discontented Palestinian terrorists hijacked a 631-foot long Italian cruise ship as it traversed the high seas. The *Achille Lauro*, as the ship was named, quickly became an international incident, after they killed and threw overboard a disabled American as he lay helplessly in his wheelchair. Denied entry by the governments of Cyprus, Lebanon, and Syria, the hijackers were compelled to return to Port Said, Egypt. After several days of intensive negotiations, the hijackers gave in, and U.S. Navy SEAL teams prepared to board the ship in a rescue effort. In exchange for leaving the ship and its 750 passengers, the hijackers were given safe passage by the Egyptian government onboard an Egyptian airliner to Tunisia, along with their PLO negotiator, Abu Abbas—who it was later learned had been involved in planning the operation from the start. Unable to electronically pinpoint the precise location of EgyptAir flight 2843, Air Force Tomcats were dispatched to fly their 63,000-pound fighters close enough to civilian airlines to see the tail number with a flashlight (Bohn, 2004). Eventually, the flight was successfully forced to land at the nearby Italian Naval Air Station and NATO airbase at Sigonella, Italy. Once grounded, U.S. forces surrounded the plane, ending the standoff through negotiations with Italian forces. The incident proved an important water-mark in the use of the military for the purposes of counterterrorist interdiction.

Presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton would go on to use military force to supplement foreign law enforcement activities through counternarcotics enhancements in Colombia against Pablo Escobar and his infamous Cali cartel, and against Panamanian President Manuel Noriega, support irregular renditions of terrorists like Fawaz Yunis and Ramzi Yousef, and exact retaliatory strikes

against al-Qa'eda operatives in Sudan and Afghanistan. Throughout the 1990s, these activities and others underscored the validity of military action as an instrument of counterterrorism, particularly in regards to low-intensity operations. At the time, the military's role was to assist and respond, not to neutralize. September 11, 2001 spurred a momentous pivot back in favor of threat neutralization, as the nation prepared to embark on its newly declared global war on terrorism (GWOT), under the banner of which force was deemed appropriate against any individual, state, or organization associated with the al-Qa'eda network.\* Shortly thereafter the nation found itself engaged in the very first truly special operations war in its history, Operation Enduring Freedom. Working in isolated spots throughout the Afghan countryside, special forces formed strategic alliances with native warlords and conducted a series of air and ground raids on specific high-value targets, in an effort to disrupt al-Qa'eda and Taliban operations. Drawing from the lessons of the nation's late nineteenth century defeats in Nicaragua, commanders were keen to adapt, establish parochial networks of support, and take every action necessary to garner approval by the local populations. Successes enjoyed by the military's light-footed, mobile special operations forces were not "just impressive, in the history of modern warfare [they were] virtually unprecedented" (Barnett, 2005, 14). Through a blending of special operations and regular forces, Operation Enduring Freedom has thus far remained the model for large-scale unconventional military counterterrorism. Nonetheless, as the significance of illicit nonstate actors on the transnational plane are increasingly implicated in the broader networks maintained by terrorist organizations is realized, and the tolerability for using force to neutralize them enhanced, the broad spectra of instruments in varying intensities remains at the military's disposal.

## **"General Warfare" as an Instrument of Military Counterterrorism**

The traditional U.S. model used in legal arenas for distinguishing the nature of conflicts is born principally in a bifurcation made between so-called "general war" and that of "limited war" (*Bas v. Tingy*, 1800, 37). General war is that form of

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\* On September 18, seven days following the 9/11 attacks, Congress promptly passed an Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) granting the president authority to "use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or person, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organization, or persons." Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), 107th Congress, Public Law 107-40 [S. J. RES. 23], September 18, 2001. This AUMF has been construed to define by congressional assent the scope of the GWOT as applying solely to those associated with the al-Qa'eda network, at least in so far as military applications of force may be concerned.

conflict, typically recognized by formal declaration, involving widespread and broadly aimed armed conflict. Limited war, on the other hand, is by definition limited in space, in participants, and in time. Military antiterrorism measures span the spectrum of both forms.

General warfare is a highly atypical application of force within most counterterrorism contexts. This reality is tied largely to the nature of the threat posed by an adversary. Indeed, it seems unreasonable to use aircraft and tanks to neutralize three men in a Karachi apartment mixing chemicals for their next attack. Most encounters with terrorist cells are therefore irregular, or imperfect, in nature. But, from time to time, full-scale war has been deemed appropriate. In the first instance, President Jefferson's military actions against the Barbary pirates and their respective state sponsors, was a massive exercise of force aimed at ending the piratical racket. Force, in this case, was most appropriately conventional as the degree of threat presented by the Barbary states was considerable. In essence, what began as directed action against nonstate actors upon the high seas, quickly evolved into a state-to-state conflict. Importantly, President Jefferson chose to apply conventional force in both stages, knowing that the power posed by even pirates when supported by a state was great enough to be addressed only by conventional arms. At times, even nonstate actors can harness such militaristic capability that only the application of conventional forces will suffice toward their eventual neutralization.

As with the secondary stages of Jefferson's war against the jihadist pirates, Operation Enduring Freedom illustrated the occasional necessity to engage in direct state-to-state conflict as an instrument of counterterrorist policy. By stemming the flow of covert (or at times even overt) assistance by a state to a nonstate terrorist network, it becomes possible to divide the tree from its roots. Without continuous state sponsorship, many terrorist networks—albeit not all, as in the case of al-Qa'eda—cannot survive. Thus, disuniting the state from its violent proxy through general warfare, in some instances, may castrate the threat.

Not all acts of war are intended as offensive operations, however. Defensive measures, like protecting life or property, at times may call for extensive military engagement. Although defensive measures of this sort rarely necessitate full-scale warfare, there have been exceptions. In October of 1983, for instance, President Reagan launched Operation Urgent Fury, a robust military occupation of the small Caribbean nation of Grenada, under the auspices of providing protection for U.S. medical students in the region. Six years later, President Bush went on to storm Panama, in large part out of genuine concern for the security of some thirty-four thousand U.S. citizens who resided there. Although neither operation was specifically tailored for counterterrorism per se, the same protective principle could apply in those instances where a state shed its sovereign protection by sponsoring, or otherwise deliberately failing to counteract, terrorist or guerilla activities aimed at Americans living abroad.

Ultimately, however, general warfare is rarely an appropriate counterterrorism measure. Deliberate disproportionality of such a response, in many instances, may

galvanize greater public support for the terrorist or guerilla movement and, where such operatives hide among civilian populations, may cause such unnecessary disruption to civil infrastructure, or the displacement of populations thereof, as to violate the customs of international humanitarian law. The level of response is best when tailored narrowly to the level of threat.

## **Imperfect Warfare and Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)**

The key challenge posed by imperfect warfare, in counterterrorism and elsewhere, is that of “institutionalizing the irregular” (Bell, 1984, 24; Jordan, Taylor, and Mazarr, 1999, 253). Irregular operations of this class often comprise the “bread and butter” of military counterterrorism, ranging from offensive special operations to interdictions and humanitarian and law enforcement support. By addressing the threat on this plane, a narrowly tailored response may be constructed to respond to the specifics of a given threat.

### ***Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC)***

In the most general of terms, low intensity conflict (LIC) refers to the selective application of force used with restraint to achieve narrow and specific military objectives. Traditionally, LIC is applied through the use of special operations forces in either an offensive or defensive arrangement. Within the context of counterterrorism, LIC may include operations such as the dispatching of Delta Force or SEAL teams to capture or neutralize independent cells, seize volatile armaments, or even to rescue hostages. In many instances, the application of LIC is the first line of military counterterrorism.

### ***Targeted Strikes***

When commando teams of special operators conducting LIC may prove either too cumbersome and slow, or too small and inefficient, targeted strikes remain a possibility. Given the asymmetric nature of terrorism, in many instances force may be applied by way of a technique known as targeted killing, the narrowly tailored use of force against particular individuals, typically leadership personnel of a terrorist or guerilla organization. As a matter of theory, by decapitating the principals, a terrorist or guerilla group may be sufficiently disrupted so as to cause it to collapse—or at minimum weaken its core. Of course, in other instances, a targeted strike directed against leadership may blowback—causing popular support in the wake of the leader’s death to swell well beyond a manageable point. Targeted killings, once

applied, rely upon the state's authority to act preemptively to disengage a serious threat to national security, although its application is both politically volatile, and where such an operation is conducted outside the geographic theater of a general war, raises serious legal questions of legitimacy.

Where targeted killings provide a scalpel approach to threat neutralization, selective retaliatory strikes provide the war fighter a slightly broader instrument. By firing, for instance, cruise missiles or air-launched rockets at facilities used by a terrorist organization, it may be possible both to temporarily disrupt a terrorist organization's physical capabilities (weapons armaments, training camps, etc.) and deter them from future actions. In some instances, though typically when sponsored by rational states, terrorist organizations can be deterred, although misapplication of the deterrence principle can leave forces appearing impotent and willy-nilly, swatting flies in the face of an ever real threat (Trager and Zagorcheva, 2005/2006).

In March of 1986, National Security Agency (NSA) operators intercepted an important message. Libyan President Muammar Qaddafi, once described by President Ronald Reagan as the "mad clown of the Middle East," had ordered twelve sabotage teams throughout Western Europe and Turkey to execute attacks against U.S. interests and facilities (Naftali, 2005, 185). Acting on this intelligence, shared by Washington, French and Turkish authorities were able to subvert plots in their respective countries (Naftali, 2005). On April 5, a Libyan team detonated a bomb in the popular La Belle discothèque in West Berlin, trendy among locally stationed U.S. troops. One hundred people were injured, one U.S. soldier killed. At midnight, Tripoli time, nine days later, a team of F-111 bombers, Navy EA-6B electronic jammers, EA-3 intelligence aircraft, EA-2C radar-control aircraft, A-7 and F-18 antiradar missile attack vehicles, and Navy F-14s were sent screaming across the Libyan sky, striking deep in the heart of Tripoli, including Qaddafi's compound (Huchthausen, 2003). It was the first military overt retaliatory strike in response to terrorist activity, but scarcely the last. Military retaliation has long since been viewed as a legitimate instrument of military antiterrorism. President Bill Clinton would go on to send cruise missiles into the headquarters of Iraqi intelligence following the acquisition of information on President Saddam Hussein's apparent involvement in a 1993 assassination attempt against former President George H. W. Bush. Retaliation was part of the counterterrorism instrument.

Ultimately though, retaliation alone is rarely sufficient to neutralize the threat posed by international terrorism. Retaliation, largely utilized as a cathartic means to condemn acts of aggression, an effort to neutralize or disrupt the threat posed by a particular adversary, or an after-the-fact measure to reassert or reaffirm deterrence, is an instrument traditionally reserved for state-to-state conflict. It is, after all, something less than complete threat neutralization. When addressing nonstate actors, like international terrorists, simple retaliation may serve only to further inflame their base of support while failing to render ineffective their capacity to attack.

## ***Foreign Internal Defense (FID)***

Not every conflict with terrorism or guerilla factions with which a nation is involved is its alone. Indeed, international terrorism, by its very nature, transcends borders, and in so doing often involves operations conducted in friendly territories not controlled by the United States. When a friendly state is at war with these terrorists, foreign internal defense (FID) assistance, providing military assets or intelligence in support of foreign operation, may go far in allowing allies to neutralize a threat by proxy, or give the nation the opportunity as an uninterested party to provide counterterrorism aid as a measure of goodwill. Such was the case of JUSMAPG in the Greek war against communist ELAS guerillas. But not all forms of FID are so direct in their counterterrorist intent or in the scope of U.S. involvement. Fearful of a spread of Libyan ideology and terrorism, for instance, the United States provided substantial military assistance to Chadian forces throughout the late 1980s, “helping them to deal Qadafi’s Libyan forces a humiliating military defeat in 1987” (Jordan, Taylor, and Mazarr, 1999). The assistance was an effort to aid another party for its own military ends, as such ends coincided with U.S. counterterrorist interests in retaliation for their sponsorship of anti-U.S. terrorism. Ultimately, whether direct or indirect, FID gives the nation an opportunity to disrupt or neutralize a terrorist threat through other means.

## ***Law Enforcement Support***

When terrorism is contemplated through the rubric of criminal activity, rather than as an act of war, the response quite naturally entails activities of the law enforcement community. In many instances, the military may provide substantial assistance to law enforcement, in an effort to harness the discipline or resources to bolster the law enforcement mandate. From a defensive standpoint, military assets have regularly been used to assist law enforcement officials for highly visible public events, such as the Olympics or World Cup, or domestically through North American Command (NORTHCOM) assistance to the Department of Homeland Security, FBI, state, and local law enforcement agencies. Such was the case when President Nixon placed military personnel onboard international flights as air marshals in September of 1970, lacking the federal law enforcement personnel to do the job. When the potential terrorist target is so considerable, law enforcement requires the greatest resources at its disposal to secure the area, resources often only possessed by the armed forces. In the event of a high-consequence attack, incident management is likely to be bolstered by military support or command.

Military assets are also the principal national instrument to conduct interdictions by sea or air. Whether aimed at defeating Somali or Malaysia sea pirates, as an instrument in the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative to minimize the black market circulation of radioactive and dual-use materials used for the production of



nuclear weapons, or in response to a hijacked airplane, interdictions, if rare, can be an important counterterrorism measure.

Another particularly important application of the military in support of law enforcement operations is by way of irregular rendition. Rendition, in its simplest of terms, is that process by which the body of an individual is taken from one state to another. This process may occur in either a “regular” or an “irregular” form. Regular rendition occurs when the individual is moved pursuant to the express terms and procedures of a given extradition treaty. Irregular rendition, on the other hand, is principally comprised of the rare instances in which an individual is moved in lieu of, outside of, or in spite of an extradition treaty. These irregular forms of rendition can generally be classified into four categories: (1) luring/trickery, (2) deportation as de facto extradition, (3) forcible abductions for prosecution, and (4) third-party interrogative renditions. The military has proven an important asset for law enforcement cooperation in three of these four forms of rendition. Luring/trickery involves drawing an alleged criminal into a jurisdiction of control, or into international waters, for an extraterritorial arrest. In such an instance, military assets may be used as a platform and to transport the federal law enforcement agents and alleged criminal from the point of arrest to a federal detention facility (Jenkins, 1990). It has also long remained the practice of the United States to forcibly abduct alleged criminals for criminal prosecution, and more recently since the mid-1990s the practice to abduct for the purposes of interrogation by another country. Military personnel and assets can be crucial in forcible abductions, both through the use of military airfields by FBI or CIA officials and, on less frequent occasions, by direct involvement in the kidnapping itself, as was the case of one well-known al-Qa’eda operative Ramzi Yousef (Reeve, 1999). In whatever capacity, military activity rarely remains the sole mechanism for implementing a broad counterterrorism strategy.

## **Nonkinetic Considerations**

Though military administration is traditionally viewed through the scope of the “management of violence,” its function is rarely limited to the exacting of harm through an array of carefully crafted kinetic options (Huntington, 1957, 11). Nonkinetic elements of the military are also present, and are of particular importance in the field of antiterrorism.

### ***Detention and Adjudication***

Within the war context, detention and interrogation, for instance, are routine though fundamental nonkinetic military functions. The military’s right to detain combatants has always been viewed as legitimate and, as the Supreme Court has found, “is

a fundamental incident of waging war” (*Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 2004). Where, as the post-9/11 milieu has provided, a terrorist is viewed not merely as a criminal rendered to face trial, but as a combatant in the midst of an ongoing war against the United States, it is the responsibility of the military to provide for his detention.

Once a combatant is surrendered and detained, he may be viewed as an important source of operationally significant intelligence information. As a result, it rests within the province of military authority to interview and, where necessary, interrogate him. These interrogations are bound not only by traditional DoD and secretary of defense regulations, but also by other international and domestic legal considerations, such as the Geneva Conventions, Convention Against Torture, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The application of and degree to which such laws apply remain a matter of active and considerable debate.

Though the intent behind combatant detention is geared to prevent the return of combatants to the battlefield and, therefore, must end upon the cessation of hostilities, individuals detained by the military for their involvement in international terrorist activity may also be in violation of the Laws of War, in modern times most particularly those offences listed as grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. In such instances, the military has traditionally convened special military commissions to try the combatants for their unlawful conduct. For nearly a thousand years, militaries have maintained distinct classes of laws to maintain the order and discipline requisite for effective military conduct (Fisher, 1). With time, British provisions of this sort matured into formal regulations, which, when modified by the Continental Congress in June of 1775, were codified into a series of sixty-nine articles, providing for distinct prohibitions on military conduct and instituting an independent system of adjudication for their violation, military courts-martial (Fisher). But, in the American tradition, these courts were not reserved to U.S. soldiers alone. Amidst the War of Independence in 1780, apprehended British spy Major John André was ordered by General George Washington to be tried, and subsequently executed, for the crime of espionage (Fisher). Similar tribunals have been used throughout U.S. history against combatants for their irregular and unlawful activity. On November 13, 2001, in a presidential order closely tracking the language of a 1942 military order by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to institute a military commission to try Nazi saboteurs, President George W. Bush became the first president to contemplate the application of such tribunals to suspected terrorists, and in so doing made adjudication yet another nonkinetic instrument of military antiterrorism. On November 13, 2001, President Bush signed a Military Order relative to the Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Noncitizens in the War Against Terrorism, followed by a series of six Military Commission Orders and nine Military Commission Instructions defining the scope of adjudicatory authority, and solidifying the organizational and procedural aspects of a trial. On June 29, 2006, the Supreme Court of the United States found that the formulation proposed by the president for the construction of the military commissions was in violation of the laws of war,

although they may return upon the construction of appropriate legislative assent (*Hamdan v. Rumsfeld*, 2006).

## ***Intelligence***

As the predominant player within the intelligence community, the DoD is in part also responsible for collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence. Signals intelligence (SIGINT), that form of intelligence that is derived through the interception of electronic or electromagnetic signals, and measurement and signaling intelligence (MASINT) are controlled principally by the NSA, an arm of DoD-based intelligence. Though not precisely “military” in nature as such, NSA SIGINT operations play an instrumental role in eavesdropping on the telecommunications of foreign terrorist operatives.

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), functioning in its current form since July of 1961, is responsible for the organizational and management aspects of all DoD intelligence assets (Richelson, 1999). As a result, DIA acquires from its constituents detailed, all-source, raw, defense-related information for the production of intelligence, in turn disseminated among policy makers, operators, and liaisons throughout the government. Since 1992, information acquired by DIA arrives in not only SIGINT and MASINT, but human intelligence (HUMINT) as well (Centralized Management of DoD Human Intelligence Operations, 1992). While NSA and DIA operations, in conjunction with other quasi-military and civilian intelligence entities (e.g., CIA, National Reconnaissance Office [NRO], National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency [NGA], Bureau of Intelligence and Research [INR], etc.), remain the mainstay of strategic intelligence within the intelligence community, day-to-day operations within the military context are principally driven through the use of tactical, or operational, intelligence. For U.S. military personnel,\* with respect to the application of the military for antiterrorist activities, this frontline for operational intelligence collection remains in the hands of service branches and unified combatant commands.

Army intelligence, the principal responsibility of the deputy chief of the Army for Intelligence (DCSI), is centralized within the service’s Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM). Although varying assistant chiefs of staff (ACSS) focus on veritable concentrations ranging from logistics to force modernization, it is under the guise of the ACS for Operations and INSCOM’s Support Battalion where actionable, day-to-day intelligence information is acquired and processed for the war fighter, often run through the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) based in Charlottesville, Virginia, which provides a holistic picture for ground

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\* It is interesting to note that the United Kingdom and Canada both replaced military intelligence in favor of unified entities for defense information, and that Australia and France restrict their military service intelligence operations to tactical information alone. For more see Richelson (1999, 74).

forces. Given the idiosyncratic nature of the enemy, INSCOM and NGIC operations are pivotal in the success of army counterterrorism activities.

Naval intelligence is divided into two components, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and the Naval Security Group Command (NS). GCONI, the more central of the two offices, is tasked to provide overall collections, coordination, and dissemination of that information acquired by or relevant to naval operations, in close coordination with combatant commands. NSGC, on the other hand, is geared directly at SIGINT, MASINT, and providing security for naval communications systems. Naval intelligence of this sort is a crucial asset to detecting terrorist activities in coastal states, particularly in Southeast Asia, and in detecting piratical activities on the high seas.

Though vested within the Naval Department, the Marine Corps also maintains an independent Intelligence Division under the ACS for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I). C4I coordinates overall marine intelligence by way of four specialized compartments, though analysis is provided to the war fighter principally by way of the Support Division located within the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA).

Finally, working under the air force's deputy chief of staff for Air and Space Operations, the Directorate of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (DISR) is tasked, in addition to operational responsibilities, with collecting and analyzing air and space intelligence provided by the Air Intelligence Agency (AIA) and the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC). The air force is the sole service where intelligence and operations are found in the same directorate (Richelson, 1999).

But intelligence on operational grounds is even more the product of combatant command activity than specific service branches. Each combatant command maintains its own capabilities. The war fighter, whether operating within the context of the GWOT, or within any other counterterrorism context, is served tremendously through the timely acquisition and application of relevant intelligence.

### ***“Hearts and Minds”***

Whereas the collection of intelligence implicates the reception of an adversary's thoughts and feelings, other operations may be used to influence them. There is a story about a U.S. colonel who, on meeting with his North Vietnamese counterpart after the cessation of hostilities said to him, “You know you never defeated us on the battlefield.” The Communist soldier considered and replied, “That may be so, but it is also irrelevant” (Summers, 1984; Taillon, 2001, 79). Military operations, of whatever scale, do not exist solely within the province of kinetic force. Opinions often matter, and matter a great deal. When placed into the context of antiterrorism efforts, operations must take into account the impact any given action may have on the impressions of those in a position to assist the enemy—the so-called

“fence sitters”—the impressions of the U.S. public, and to the broader court of world opinion. Though the impressions made upon a determined and zealous enemy rarely matter, as is typically the case with hardened international terrorists, others who may be willing to assist those terrorists by providing logistical or material support, or safe haven, are often open to persuasion. Paradoxically, as the North Vietnamese soldier’s remarks suggest, operational success does not always translate to an improvement in the opinions of others. This divide is a crucial wedge in counterterrorism.

American public opinion also matters. In keeping with its tradition of democratic liberalism, the United States is both a nation of laws as well as general morality. Though a given operation may prove efficient to neutralize a threat, if the means employed subvert legal principle, or are otherwise ethically suspect, public support for those efforts quickly corrodes. Indiscriminate bombing, particularly cruel or unusual interrogation techniques, or threats to kill, torture, or detain innocent family members as a means to deterrence would not only fuel the fire of the terrorist movement, but would severely undermine necessary public support.

World opinion also matters. No doubt, U.S. security must not be subject to the whims or will of other states, but the scope of permissible conduct in the view of others plays an important role in the credibility of U.S. foreign policy. Antiterrorism measures deemed illegitimate or unlawful provide a basis for further complaint to those states with which the United States does not have particularly good relations and, more importantly, may wear away the bonds of support provided by allies.

Military administrators and policy makers alike face common problems in attempting to gauge something as ethereal as opinion. Metrics often vary, between the use of international legal obligations like the Geneva Conventions and Convention Against Torture, domestic legal considerations ranging from Constitutional war power discussions to appropriations, and, in limited instances, the cautious use of reliable polling data. In this sense, particularly in an age of the twenty-four-hour news cycle, military operations are themselves also political actions of sorts, and therefore demand some measure of attention to the impressions given to others, whatever the operational intent. But the military’s relationship with public opinion is not always so passive.

As a class, terrorism relies heavily upon the general support of a key population. Identifying that population and successfully employing measures to win its support can be effective in undermining a terrorist or guerilla web. Humanitarian assistance programs in Pakistan in the wake of a catastrophic 2005 earthquake killing upwards of an estimated seventy-three thousand people, was instrumental in softening the pull of anti-U.S. sentiment in the affected areas. Assistance a year before in southeast Asia, in response to a devastating tsunami, achieved much the same end. Although such assistance was principally humanitarian in nature, rather than for counterterrorism purposes, U.S. goodwill in the face of tragedy proved an important testing ground for the theory that assistance matters.

## ***Information Operations (IO)***

Since the installation of poet Archibald MacLeish as the director of the Office of Facts and Figures, a pre-World War II construction aimed at counteracting the effects of Nazi propaganda efforts, the outward use of information has remained a paramount instrument in the U.S. defense posture. Information is itself a tool (Sorensen, 1968). Information operations (IOs), though traditionally nonkinetic, may be both offensive and defensive in nature. Where offensive measures seek to influence the opinions of others—or destroy their capacity to effectively communicate between themselves or others—defensive measures seek to provide security for the free flow of information within the nation.

Offensive IO is principally centered around two classes: psychological operations (PSYOPS) and electronic warfare (EW). PSYOPS refer to the direction of information in such a manner as to influence the opinions of either an adversary or his supporters. By disseminating information, whether through the press or other means, it becomes possible to provide the tools to the target audience so as to influence their objective interpretations of particular events or subjective opinions of the same, in a manner favorable to the overall strategy employed. Use of information in this manner may be “white” or “black”—that is to say, it may be truthful (white) or not (black), though the use of black propaganda has long been repudiated by most commanders as both immoral and susceptible to blowback.

Defensive IO refers to those efforts in which critical information is secured from outside interference. U.S. institutions, government, corporate, and public alike, presume a high level of free-flowing information. It is often the responsibility of the DoD, through physical measures or NSA-spearheaded cyber techniques, to protect it.

As terrorism relies upon the fear its perpetrators incite, acquisition, dissemination, and interpretation of information is key and, therefore, is incident to the theater of adversarial conflict. The military is not without its instruments to influence the medium.

## **How Things Changed after 9/11**

Few aspects of counterterrorism are true today that were not equally true on September 10, 2001. The “planes operation” did not, in and of itself, wholly revolutionize the strategic playing field for the United States, or elsewhere. Instead, what marks post-9/11 counterterrorism as significant is the almost universal acceptance of previously contentious perspectives, igniting advanced discussions in the field of unconventional warfare. The push toward a complete military transformation from traditional to untraditional, LIC forces, has been long in coming, but 9/11 gave it wings. Recognizing the importance of full-spectrum dominance, through

the application of highly mobile, networked forces, the Pentagon has slowly moved through the process of transformation toward a new revolution in the structure of the military, in time replacing traditional hierarchical models and platforms with lean, agile, and interoperable forces. Under the banner of light-footed, rapid-reaction special operations forces, the military has since been applied in Operation Enduring Freedom's anti-Taliban and al-Qa'eda operations in Afghanistan, Operation Iraqi Freedom's activities directed against insurgents and foreign fighters, and through varying assistance programs in the Philippines and Africa (Feickert, 2005).

In congruence with the National Security Strategy, toward comprehending threats in different ways, in February of 2006, the DoD issued a first-ever National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, outlining the mission objectives in the GWOT and the ways in which the military contributes toward the achievement of those objectives. According to the plan, objectives in the GWOT include:

- Deny terrorists what they need to operate and survive
- Enable partner nations to counter terrorism
- Deny WMD/E proliferation, recover and eliminate uncontrolled materials, and increase capacity for consequence management
- Defeat terrorists and their organizations
- Counter state and nonstate support for terrorism in coordination with other U.S. government agencies and partner nations
- Contribute to the establishment of conditions that counter ideological support for terrorism

To achieve these objectives, the Special Operations Command is designated the principal "synchronizer," targeting the eight chief vulnerabilities for terrorist networks: ideological support, weapons acquisition, financing, territorial safe havens, personnel, leadership, communications, and easy access to targets. Addressing these vulnerabilities requires not only hardening targets and conducting offensive operations, but also includes the other instruments of kinetic and nonkinetic counterterrorism, like humanitarian assistance and IO. The approach has become holistic, and increasingly so.

## **Other Countries' Experiences**

Within the international arena, many states address the threat of terrorism very differently, handling the application of military force in varying ways. Consider, for example, the cases of Colombia and Israel.

## **Colombia**

The nature of counterterrorism in Colombia is uniquely framed within the context of its long history in dealing with Marxist rebels and complex narcoterrorist regimes. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), National Liberation Army (ELN), and the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), have long since threatened the lives of any person, civilian or otherwise, who dared interfere with their narcotics trade and respective political agendas. Employing the use of light explosives, assassination, and kidnappings, among other measures, Colombian guerrilla forces are among the most lethal terrorist organizations in the world. But in light of their considerable political and economic force, the Colombian government has long been compelled in part to deal with these groups on the plane of recognized political interaction, dispensing with most tradition distinctly counterterrorism legislation. Instead, the government relies principally upon their ill-defined Constitutional powers and executive order, or apply broad-based criminal legislation, like article 187 of its penal code criminalizing actions against public order. Under the purview of its broad authority, the military has, on occasion, applied force against rebel factions, but in so doing has largely treated them as internal rebels rather than as terrorists. In this fashion, the application of force has often centered around conventional military operations. Although the Colombian approach has largely envisioned the conventional use of force, it appears to be moving more in the direction of law enforcement and LIC through the use of special operations.

In the past few years, however, the Colombian military has bolstered its efforts through the creation of several bodies specifically aimed at countering the terrorist threat. One army battalion, for instance, is designed to bolster national police efforts in countering narcoterrorism. A joint intelligence center has also been established to provide coherent collection, analysis, and dissemination of relevant intelligence. The army has formed a rapid deployment force based north of Bogotá in the state of Cundinamarca, though many fear it will be suited more for counternarcotic operations than for the narrow task of countering terrorism. For Colombians, a tradition of conventional applications of force through the back-and-forth assessment of terrorist groups as recognized political actors and rebel forces has left a difficult legacy that has long served as an impediment toward the surgical operations of threat neutralization, a trend that with time has slowly corroded.

## **Israel**

Like Colombia, Israel too has a long and somewhat checkered history of military counterterrorism. Employing every level of violence—both conventional and irregular—the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have applied force not only defensively, but also on a rather frequent occasion preventively and offensively. Ultimately, the lawfulness and effectiveness of some Israeli offensive activities remain in dispute.



Many international organizations, including the United Nations, have routinely condemned Israeli military incursion into Gaza and the West Bank for their profound impact on the humanitarian situation within the Palestinian Territories. In the summer of 2006, for instance, in response to the HAMAS-sponsored kidnapping of a nineteen-year-old IDF corporal Gilad Shalit patrolling the security fence separating Israel proper from the Gaza Strip, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert ordered the initiation of a substantial and continuing military campaign against a very wide range of targets throughout Gaza, declaring, "I want no one to sleep at night in Gaza" (Israeli Warplanes Continue Airstrikes on Palestinian Buildings, 2006). These actions, like the many before it, have drawn extensive international criticism, though the Israeli government reiterates its claim that such actions are necessary to disrupt the continuity of terrorist operations within the Territories. Many have also questioned the effectiveness of these tactics. Although there remains little doubt that the application of both conventional and irregular force to the Palestinian terrorist organizations has proven effective in limiting their short-term capability, many counter, however, that the profound "boomerang effect" kinetic force typically has on the general Palestinian population has gone far in improving their regenerative capability through otherwise unwilling fighters, abettors, and financiers (Ganor, 2005, 129). In any case, facing the perpetual threat of Islamic terrorism on its geographical doorstep, Israel has been more inclined than most modern states to employ conventional techniques to an unconventional threat.

## **The Future of Military Counterterrorism**

As the worldwide campaign against al-Qa'eda-affiliated terrorists ensues and globalization increasingly escalates the potency of criminal enterprise with nonstate violence on the transnational plane, careful consideration must be given to how these emerging asymmetries should be incorporated into grand military strategy and its reflection in force structure. Presently, a great divergence between two general schools of thought has emerged. One philosophical camp subscribes to a theory of historical dialectic, neatly defining warfare into generations. Taking from the late 1980s work of military thinker William Lind, these strategists comprehend the history of modern warfare in four temporally bound trends. The first generation, according to Lind, extended from the treaty of Westphalia in 1648 up to the American Civil War, marked by the strict maintenance of orderly formations firing smoothbore muskets and cannons. It was the French, in Lind's interpretation, who replaced this with a second generation, shortly preceding World War I. Under the second generation model, artillery rounds were used to subdue a defined geography, and foot-soldiers followed to occupy. A third generation followed, when Nazi strategists employed "blitzkrieg" tactics, replacing firepower with speed. The aim of the third generation was to weaken the adversary through lightning attacks on critical supply lines, repositories, and leadership depots, rather than by attrition. According

to the Lind camp, a fourth generation of warfare has now emerged, where guerilla tactics seek to defeat an adversary politically, rather than merely by way of traditional force, through years of low-intensity operations. In essence, a dialectic shift in strategic warfare has moved from the utilization of massive manpower, to impressive firepower, to crafty maneuver, and now into politico-military campaigns. For the fourth generation warfare (4GW) strategist, insurgency-styled terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan, coupled with broader al-Qa'eda-sponsored agendas in Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Chechnya, Central Asia, Somalia, and elsewhere, serve to underscore this thesis.

Under the 4GW doctrine, irregularities of counterterrorism will themselves become the norm, requiring the military to prepare for drawn-out conflict and engage in considerable efforts to provide much-needed assistance for the sustainability of critical infrastructure and the rule of law. In this vision, terrorism and guerilla fighting is the future of warfare, not its archaic past.

A second school of thought is born from the fascinating developments bequeathed by the technological and globalizing age. For these theorists, combat is centered principally around the platforms, or principal machines, of war, be they tanks, ships, aircraft, or the like. Through an enhanced mechanization of the war-fighting process, these platforms over time have transformed into nodes within the context of a broad network. Each node in the network, the technological progeny of war's machines in days past, maintains the capacity to enter the adversary's decision loop with profound speed and accuracy. That is to say, the war fighter can "make two or more decisions for every one [his] opponent can manage—our silicon-based computers trumping their carbon-based brain every time" (Barnett, 2005, 12). In essence, by harnessing the benefits of just-in-time logistic support and the high technology of modern transportation and sensors, these network-centric warfare (NCW) strategists subscribe to the belief that the key to simultaneous operations across a wide swath of geographic dimensions is found through the networked approach. Counterterrorism then, will be tackled through the acquisition and heavy employment of technologies, such as sensors, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and GPS to achieve full-spectrum dominance with pinpoint precision. Where 4GW theorists would envision extensive, "boots on the ground" counterinsurgencies, NCW strategists comprehend warfare through the specter of high technology bolstering light, rapid-reaction forces intended for lightning-fast actions against particularized targets.

Between the 4GW and NCW approaches to warfare, something of an amalgam of these theories has emerged in recent years. In a book entitled *Blueprint for Action: A Future Worth Creating*, military strategist Thomas P. M. Barnett (2005) has proposed a third way. Military forces in modern times, Barnett contends, may be divided between what he calls leviathan forces—large, conventional military capabilities—and system administrators (SysAdmin). "While the core security and logistical capabilities are derived from uniformed military components, the SysAdmin force is fundamentally envisioned as standing capacity for interagency

(i.e., among various U.S. federal agencies) and international collaboration in nation building” (xix). Ultimately, “the better the leviathan, the bigger the SysAdmin must be” (35). To effectuate this model, Barnett recommends enhanced international cooperation, wherein the United States would be the hub and its allies the spokes (36). With its application to counterterrorism, the United States would maintain the capacity to wage leviathan-centric warfare, in addition to LIC capabilities, but would share its responsibilities for extensive counterinsurgency and stabilization capabilities with allied forces. Where 4GW strategists call for large forces prepared for protracted engagement and NCW theorists insist upon the careful application of rapid-technology-based light forces, Barnett envisions a future for them both, divided between partners under a presumable banner of mutual interest in countering international terrorism.

In December of 2006, the army and marine corps each released its official *Field Manual for Counterinsurgency* (FM 3-24; MCWP 3-33.5) integrating many of the predicates once reserved by 4GW strategists, emphasizing the importance of flexibility, rapid institutional learning, grass-roots intelligence, and unity of command. But, even with these changes, the future of military applications to counterterrorism remains uncertain; almost certain to ride the waves between conventional and unconventional manifestations witnessed in its past. Though such a future form remains unclear, as transnational criminal enterprise continues to destabilize lawless corners of the world, conveniently marrying their interests with the violence of terrorist and guerilla activities, the military can be expected to take on an increasingly pivotal role in countering nonstate terrorist and guerilla networks.

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## *Chapter 14*

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# **Military Leadership and Culture**

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While leading his platoon north on Highway 1 toward Ad Diwaniyah, Iraq, Marine Capt. Brian Chontosh's platoon was ambushed. With mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, and automatic weapons fire coming in, and coalition tanks blocking the road in front of him, Chontosh realized his platoon was caught in a kill zone. He had to do something, and he had to do it fast. Chontosh ordered his driver to move their vehicle through a breach along his flank, then through machine gun fire, directly at the enemy position. After silencing the enemy machine guns, Chontosh ordered his driver to drive right into the enemy trench. Exiting the vehicle, Chontosh led his troops in an attack on enemy forces in the trench. When his own rifle and pistol ammunition ran out, he "borrowed" discarded enemy weapons to continue the attack. When it was over, Chontosh had cleared 200 meters of the enemy trench, killed more than 20 enemy soldiers, eliminated the threat to his platoon—and earned the navy's second highest award for heroism, the Navy Cross.

**U.S. Marines (2006)**

In the fear and chaos that characterize combat, what keeps soldiers fighting? Why would Chontosh's platoon obey an order to charge directly into machine gun fire? Viewed from the comfort of home, such obedience comes across as insane. Yet, it is essential if the military is to fulfill its function—the controlled application of violence to achieve some political objectives.

Keegan (1976) maintains that soldiers fight for survival, but do so believing that their individual survival depends on the unit. The link between the individual and the unit then is at the heart of military effectiveness. This link, referred to as cohesion, is forged through shared experiences and is crucial to combat effectiveness (Shils and Janowitz, 1975; Moskos, 1970; Department of the Navy, 2002; Department of the Army, 1999).

Cohesion depends on two critical components: military leadership and culture. Leadership fosters the environment of trust that is the essential precondition for cohesion. But leadership does not exist in a vacuum. Rather, it exists within the context of an organizational culture (Fairholm, 1994; Masi, 2000). Leadership and culture therefore are inextricably intertwined.

The first section of this chapter (entitled Leadership) opens with a discussion of how leadership may be defined. Afterwards, a brief recapitulation of the major leadership models and theories is provided before the crucial question of whether individuals can be taught to lead is addressed. Because each of the military services has a slightly different leadership model it holds up as ideal, all four models are described, compared and contrasted. The section ends with a discussion of the connections between leadership, power and ethics.

The second section addresses the question of culture. After broadly defining what the term "military culture" means, differences between the cultures of the separate military services are explored. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the challenges to military culture in today's society and the use of the military as a "social lab."

## Leadership

### *What Is Leadership?*

Defining leadership has always been a challenge, for it does not lend itself to measurement. Nor is it easy to articulate just what we mean when we use the term. Primarily, this is because leadership is not a property of a person. Rather, leadership is a relationship between the characteristics of the leader, the attitudes and needs of the followers, the organization and its characteristics, and the environment (McGregor, 1960).

Leadership "refers to interpersonal processes in social groups, through which some individuals assist or direct the group toward the completion of group goals" (Segal, 1981, 45). Thus, it has two major features: (1) leadership is interpersonal, and (2) its major purpose is to integrate individual needs and organizational goals

(Broedling, 1981). In other words, leadership is fundamentally about relationships—between the leader, his or her followers, and the organization. Additionally, leaders need a purpose or cause to inspire and give direction to followers.

Each of the military services recognizes this reality. The official air force definition for leadership is “the art and science of influencing and directing people to accomplish the assigned mission” (Department of the Air Force, 2004, 1). The army’s definition is similar; leadership is “influencing people by providing purpose, direction and motivation—while operating to accomplish the mission” (Department of the Army, 1999, 1–4). In *Leading Marines*, the marine corps repeatedly stresses the importance of the relationship between the leader and the follower asserting that “there is less of a line between the leader and the led than a bond” (Department of the Navy, 2002, 2).

Leadership is not the same thing as management. One possible definition for management might be “allocating resources toward the fulfillment of organizational goals” (Segal, 1981, 45). Effective leaders must (to some extent) engage in management as they attempt to ensure followers have the material resources necessary to achieve the group goal. Indeed, military leaders who do not provide for the material needs of their subordinates violate the trust and confidence those subordinates place in them (Shay, 2002). Ultimately, leadership is all about relationships, and management is about material things.

## ***A Short Tour of Leadership Theories***

The earliest thinkers on leadership focused their attention on studying famous leaders to discover what they had in common. Generally known as “trait theory,” these studies identified traits that all leaders seemed to possess. Although trait theory is generally discredited today, there is some recent research that is leading us back to traits. Bartone and Snook (2002) found that intelligence, social judgment, logical reasoning, agreeableness and conscientiousness predicted cadet leadership performance three to four years later. Levels of trust between leaders and followers are heavily dependent on follower perceptions of leader traits—these behavioral traits include trustworthiness (Reinke and Baldwin, 2001).

Beginning in the 1950s, researchers turned their attention to using social science research tools to investigate the nature of leaders and, in particular, what factors predicted a leader’s success. Stogdill and Coons (1957) were the first well-known scholars to explore leadership. Their work, popularly known as the “Ohio State Studies,” sorted leaders’ behavior into two types: consideration and initiating structure.

“Consideration” behaviors were those that were focused on building and maintaining positive interpersonal relationships between the leader and his or her followers. “Initiating structure” behaviors were those that were focused on mission accomplishment. Stogdill and Coons advocated maximizing both consideration and initiating structure behaviors.



A more sophisticated version of their work appeared in Hersey and Blanchard's (1969) well-known situational leadership model. This model suggests that leaders should adopt a style appropriate to the situation. In particular, Hersey and Blanchard focus attention on the job knowledge and self-motivation of followers as being critical elements in selecting an appropriate leadership style. In other words, there are times when the leader needs to be an authoritarian. There are also times when adopting the authoritarian approach will be disastrous. Both the air force and the army provide instruction in the situational leadership model in leadership training coursework.

Hersey and Blanchard, and many other researchers, propose that leadership is essentially a transaction between the leader and the follower. Basically, the leader promises to either reward the followers for good behavior or punish the followers for bad behavior. Such transactional\* models of leadership suffer from several difficulties. The most significant of these is that individual followers differ widely in their perception of reward and punishment (Vroom, 1964). The leader is challenged to find out "what makes followers tick," a task that may prove extremely difficult. Moreover, in bureaucratic organizations, such as the military, where rewards and punishments are expected to be standardized, it can be difficult to tailor rewards and/or punishments to meet the needs of individual followers.

But leadership is more than just a series of transactions between a leader and followers. Leaders play a pivotal role in the creation and maintenance of an organization's culture, its accepted ways of doing things. In other words, leaders are involved in the creation of a community within an organization (Fairholm, 1994). In this process, leaders can produce cultural change or reinforce existing norms (Masi, 2000).

With these issues in mind, scholars began to move beyond transactional or economic models of leadership into transformational leadership. Bass (1996) suggests that transformational leaders are charged to build organizational vision, mobilize the organization to achieve that vision, and institutionalize whatever changes are needed to turn the dream into reality. The leader's vision inspires performance. In other words, transformational leadership is about restoring broken organizations by reshaping them through a shared vision into new ways of being and doing.

### ***Can Leadership Be Taught?***

Much officer and noncommissioned officer training and education rests on the assumption that leadership can be taught. All the services officially state that although some aspects of leadership may be innate, leadership skills can be

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\* "Transactional" models are also often referred to as "economic" or "exchange" models of leadership. The term "transactional" is used here because it is the term used in the army's leadership manual (FM 22-100) and in Bass' research on transformational leadership (1996).

**Table 14.1 Contact Hours Devoted to Leadership Air Force Professional Military Education Courses**

<i>Course</i>	<i>Audience</i>	<i>Contact Hours</i>
Airman leadership	School first-term enlisted personnel	103
NCO Academy	Noncommissioned officers (NCOs); paygrades E-5 and E-6	115
Senior NCO Academy	NCOs in paygrades E-7 and E-8	121
ROTC	Officer candidates	346.5
Squadron Officer School	First lieutenant/captain	61.75
Air command and staff	Major	95.75
College Air War College	Lieutenant colonel/colonel	80.5
<i>Source:</i> T. Renckly, personal communication, January 10, 2004.		

improved (Department of the Air Force, 2004; Department of the Army, 1999; Department of the Navy, 2002, 2004). The air force’s doctrinal statement is typical: “The abilities of a leader, which are derived from innate capabilities and built from experience, education, and training, can be improved upon through deliberate development” (Department of the Air Force, 2004, 2).

As a result, all the services devote considerable resources to leadership training, at all levels. An example of this high degree of effort is provided in Table 14.1, which shows a breakdown of contact hours devoted to leadership in various air force professional military education courses.

The content of leadership training differs by service and by rank. For lower-ranking personnel, the services place more emphasis on tactical skills and interpersonal relationships. For higher-ranking personnel, the emphasis shifts towards planning, influencing and creating organizational culture and climate, and strategic thinking (Department of the Air Force, 2004; Department of the Army, 1999).

Despite this level of effort, the services have not succeeded in creating a system that consistently identifies, promotes and develops their best leaders (Ulmer, Collins, and Jacobs, 2000). Although many leadership “traits” are behaviors that people can and do learn, these traits are largely behaviors that we learn as children (social judgment, conscientiousness, and the ethical behavior that leads to trustworthiness). It is in our families where we learn to be honest, trustworthy, hard working and responsible. Is it possible to teach these behaviors to adults?

In short, can adults be taught to lead? Unfortunately, research has not provided a generally accepted answer to this question. Robert and Janet Denhardt (2006) suggest that although many people do seem to be born with leadership skills, these skills can be practiced and learned by anyone. Hedlund and his associates (2003)

<i>Army</i>	<i>Navy</i>	<i>Marines</i>	<i>Air Force</i>
Be (refers to the character of the leader) Know (the list of interpersonal, conceptual, technical and tactical skills leaders must acquire) Do (leadership requires action)	Five core competencies: Accomplishing the mission Leading people Leading change Working with people Resource stewardship	Leadership qualities: Inspiration Technical proficiency Moral responsibility	Leadership components: Core values Leadership competencies Leadership actions
(Department of the Army, FM 22-100, 1999)	(Department of the Navy, NLCM, 2004)	(Department of the Navy, MCWP 6-11, 2002)	(Department of the Air Force, AFDD 1-1, 2004)

have demonstrated a connection between “tacit knowledge,” that is, knowledge drawn from everyday experience, and subsequent ratings of leader effectiveness. This suggests that mentoring and experience do help individuals learn how to be more effective leaders, reinforcing the military’s traditional emphasis on mentoring and providing leadership opportunities early in one’s career.

### ***Military Leadership Models***

Each of the military services has a different model that it puts forward as its leadership ideal. Table 14.2 provides a comparative look at these models.

The army provides by far the most direction and detail on leadership of all the services. FM 22-100, *Army Leadership*, provides precise information on what the army expects its leaders to “be, know, and do.” According to the army, leadership “begins with what the leader must BE, the values and attributes that shape a leader’s character” (Department of the Army, 1999, 1–3). The army expects its leaders to live out the service’s core values. Leaders also have things they must “know”; they must also master a set of skills. These skills are divided into four domains—interpersonal, conceptual, technical and tactical. The specific skills leaders must know vary depending on the organizational level of the individual leader. Finally, leaders must act (Do) in order to make the mission happen.

Unlike the other services, the army devotes space in its leadership manual to discussing directing, delegating and participating leadership styles, along with situational, transactional and transformational leadership models. The manual stresses

that all these approaches are valuable tools. Specifically, leaders are encouraged to “be themselves,” but be flexible and adapt to subordinate needs. Transformational leadership is specifically recommended for units requiring change or facing a crisis. Transactional leadership is cited as being effective under more normal conditions (Department of the Army, 1999).

The navy’s leadership competency model provides guidance for what is expected of navy leaders. The navy defines a competency as a “behavior or set of behaviors that describes excellent performance in a particular work context” (Department of the navy, 2004, 1). Three of the five competencies (leading people, working with people and accomplishing the mission) are consistent with guidance provided by the other services. By including “resource stewardship” as a required competency, the Navy is implicitly acknowledging that management skills are essential for successful leadership. A special feature of the navy’s model is the inclusion of “leading change” as a necessary competency. Subcompetencies listed in this area include creativity and innovation, vision, strategic thinking, external awareness, flexibility and service motivation. The navy is the only service to accord change, and the necessity of leading people through change, such a prominent place (Department of the Navy, 2004).

The marine corps’ major leadership document, *Leading Marines*, is unique in that it is the only leadership manual that is not prescriptive in nature. The marines subscribe to the idea that leadership is an art. Hence, “there is no formula for leadership. It is not all-inclusive because to capture all that it is to be a marine or to lead marines defies pen and paper” (Department of the Navy, 2002, 1). Instead, the marine corps prefers to stress adaptability and innovation while encouraging leaders to come to terms with their personal leadership style (Department of the Navy, 2002).

The recently released AFDD 1-1, *Leadership and Force Development*, is the air force’s first attempt to officially define leadership, link it to the service’s core values and create a comprehensive framework for teaching leadership at all levels (C. Nath, personal communication, March 11, 2004). AFDD 1-1 is quite similar to the army’s FM 22-100; although, it is more concise. The leadership components of core values, leadership competencies and leadership actions are strikingly similar to the army’s “Be, Know, Do” model, with core values equating to the “Be,” leadership competencies being the “Know,” and leadership actions, the “Do.” Additionally, the air force teaches the situational leadership model in AFDD 1-1 and in its professional military education programs.\*

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\* Information concerning the content of air force leadership instruction was provided in a series of personal interviews with officials of Squadron Officer School, the Air and Space Basic Course, ROTC, Officer Training School and the Air War College, conducted at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, March 25–26, 2004.

## ***Leadership and Power***

Power and leadership go hand in hand. Power may be defined as “the ability to get things done the way one wants them to be done” (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977). Where does power come from and how is it connected to leadership?

French and Raven (1959) propose five sources of social power. These sources include reward, coercion, legitimacy, referent and expertise. According to them, the power a leader has is a function of how many of these five sources of power a leader commands.

As its name implies, reward power is based on a leader’s ability to reward followers for good behavior. The opposite of reward is coercion, or the ability to punish followers for bad behavior. Coercion is the most effective means of shaping behavior immediately, especially in a crisis or emergency situation. However, coercion is the least effective source of power over time because people eventually become satiated with punishment and lose their fear or go passive (French and Raven, 1959).

Legitimate power stems from occupying a position in the organization that its members expect and accept will have power (French and Raven, 1959). In the military, possession of a higher rank is a source of legitimate power. Referent power, on the other hand, is based on the identification of the follower with the leader; in other words, the follower *wants* to follow or emulate the leader (French and Raven, 1959). In the long run, referent power is the most effective source of social power, and is the recommended approach in two of four military publications on leadership, FM 22-100 (Department of the Army, 1999) and MCWP 6-11 (Department of the Navy, 2002).

The final source of power is expertise—the possession of specialized knowledge that other unit members accept and respect (French and Raven, 1959). All of the official leadership models or manuals published by the military stress the importance of tactical competence: FM 22-100 (Department of the Army, 1999), MCWP 6-11 (Department of the Navy, 2002), NCLM (Department of the Navy, 2004) and AFDD 1-1 (Department of the Air Force, 2004). In fact, Toner (2000) claims that expertise is so essential to unit survival in combat that it rises to the level of an ethical responsibility.

Another widely recognized source of power comes from the control of resources (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977). Resources can include an organization’s budget, equipment and information. Although it is not explicitly recognized as a source of power, military leadership manuals do acknowledge the importance of providing troops with the resources needed to perform the mission (Department of the Army, 1999; Department of the Navy, 2002, 2004; Department of the Air Force, 2004). Only the navy explicitly includes a reference to managing resources in its list of leadership competencies.

Another important resource can be access to senior leaders. Access often translates into the ability to get information to the senior leader, or (in some cases) to screen undesirable information and keep it away from a senior leader. Smart leaders

know what power they have, what power they do not have and who else may have the power needed to help the unit accomplish its goals.

## ***Leadership and Ethics***

Cohesion and unit effectiveness cannot exist without trust. Trust is essential to all relationships and for effective combat performance (Fairholm, 1994; Shay, 2002). Moreover, trust has been linked to individual and organizational performance in a wide range of civilian industry studies. At the individual level of analysis, trust has been linked to more accurate problem identification, successful problem solving (Zand, 1972) and increased success in negotiations (Butler, 1990). At the organizational level, trust has been linked to job satisfaction (Daley and Vasu, 1998), enhanced transaction efficiency, reduced monitoring costs, more initiative and flexibility in negotiations (Sako, 1992) and organizational learning (Dodgson, 1993). Trust has been demonstrated in both experimental and real-world settings to be a powerful factor in determining job satisfaction and fostering individual productivity.

In combat, there is no substitute for trust. Leaders must behave in ways that promote trust because trust lies at the heart of creating unit cohesion and combat effectiveness (Shay, 2002). Trust is the necessary prerequisite for the creation of cohesion, a critical component of unit effectiveness. Hence, all the military services place heavy emphasis on ethical conduct, on and off duty.

Trust is particularly critical in hierarchal organizations such as the military. This is because persons in low status or power positions are heavily dependent on their leaders. They depend on their leaders for access to desirable resources, such as promotions, pay increases, space, training, adequate equipment and other things critical to completing assigned tasks (Kramer, 1999; Paparone, 2002). In the military, this dependence is so complete that leaders can be said to have an ethical obligation to “take care of their troops” (Shay, 2002).

Lewicki and Bunker (1996) suggest there are two types of trust—deterrence and identification-based trust. Deterrence (sometimes called calculus-based trust) rests on consistency of behavior; that is, a person’s actions are consistent with what they say they are going to do. Identification-based trust, on the other hand, is based on empathy and occurs when people understand, agree and take on the other’s values. Relationships begin with deterrence-based trust. Over time, as communication develops and the parties get to know one another; relationships may progress to identification-based trust (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996). Thus, perceptions of others’ trustworthiness are largely history dependent (Kramer, 1999; Paparone, 2002).

In other words, followers decide whether or not to trust their leader based on what they see and experience of their leader. Thus, “leadership is not a value-free enterprise” (Wakin, 1981, 102). The core value for creating trust (and thereby enhancing unit performance), and developing loyalty and obedience in followers

is integrity (Shay, 2002; Department of the Army, 1999; Department of the Navy, 2002; Department of the Air Force, 2004). Leaders who exhibit high levels of integrity stand a much better chance of success than those who do not.

All four of the military leadership models emphasize trust and integrity. In his foreword to AFDD 1-1, General Jumper of the U.S. Air Force states, “Integrity is the basis of trust, and trust is the unbreakable bond that unifies leadership with their followers and commanders with their units. Trust makes leaders effective, and integrity underpins trust” (Department of the Air Force, 2004, iii).

## **Conclusion**

Cohesion is crucial to combat effectiveness. But cohesion is a product of trust between unit members and their leader. Hence, leadership plays a pivotal role. Although each of the services has a slightly different ideal leadership model, the models have a great deal in common. Each of the models stresses the centrality of a set of values—placing the group’s needs before individual needs, personal integrity, courage and commitment to mission accomplishment. The values are the product of military culture and provide the necessary structure that underpins combat effectiveness.

## **Military Culture**

Military culture is the bedrock of military effectiveness. Culture can be broadly defined simply as how things are done in an organization (Ulmer et al., 2000). This includes values, customs, traditions and the reasoning behind them. There are four widely accepted essential elements of military culture: discipline, professional ethos, ceremony and etiquette, and cohesion and esprit de corps (Snider, 1999; Huntington, 1957).

*Discipline* may be defined as a “consistently rationalized, methodically trained, and exact replication of the received order” (Weber, 1958, 253). Discipline enhances predictability in war, reducing what von Clausewitz (1989) called “fog and friction.” Consequently, it is seen as critical to victory (Weber, 1958). Military writers, from Sun Tzu, twenty-five thousand years ago, to today’s leadership manuals, concur that discipline is central to what it means to be a part of a military force. Consequently, discipline is the first value taught to all new recruits entering military service.

Because the central, preeminent purpose of the military is combat, its *professional ethos* centers on combat (Snider, 1999). This ethos includes the acquisition of expertise, a strong sense of responsibility towards the organization and the task at hand, and a powerful sense of corporateness, or cohesion (Huntington, 1957). The acquisition of expertise (tactical competence) is critical because it is quite literally a matter of life and death under combat conditions (Department of the Army, 1999; Toner, 2002). Team and unit identity come out of mutual respect, trust

and discipline (Department of the Army, 2000). The subordination of the individual self for the benefit of the group is prized as an essential virtue in all the military services' list of core values. Whether it is expressed as "selfless service" (army), "commitment" (navy and marine corps) or "service before self" (air force), all four services subscribe to the idea that military action is not possible without teamwork. Teamwork requires individuals to give up self-interest for the good of the unit (Department of the Army, 1999). The professional ethos of the military is discussed in more detail in chapter 15.

*Ceremony and etiquette* are the outward manifestations of cohesion, discipline and history. As such, they reinforce the core element of discipline and make visible the unique nature of military culture. Ceremony and etiquette play an important role in establishing the distinctiveness of military service, socializing military members into the service, and reinforcing military values (Snider, 1999). In addition, ceremony and etiquette visibly link today's military member with the vast history and tradition of his or her military service. This link with tradition is viewed as an important part of the member's sense of identity and membership in a special calling (Department of the Army, 1999; Department of the Navy, 2002).

*Cohesion and esprit de corps* are also crucial to the ultimate goal of a military organization, victory. Scholars have identified two types of cohesion, "social cohesion," or emotional bonds, and "task cohesion," or shared commitment to common goals. The latter is what is related to group outcome and effectiveness (Harrell and Miller, 1997). Simply put, you do not have to like people to work with them to get the job done. Taken together, these two are the measures of a unit's willingness to perform a mission and to fight. Thus, cohesion is a critical element that culture contributes to military effectiveness (Snider, 1999; Department of the Army, 1999; Shay, 2002; Department of the Navy, 2002).

### ***Is There One "Military Culture?"***

Although all the services share the central elements, each of the services displays a unique cultural "accent" (Murray, 1999). The mission of each service affects its culture. Moreover, subcultures exist within each service. In the navy, there is a "surface" subculture, a "submarine" subculture, and an "aviation" subculture. In the air force, subcultures are based on weapons platforms. In the army, there is a distinctive "infantry" subculture, along with one for armor, artillery, etc. These subcultures play a role in distinguishing and supporting the unique roles different elements play in combat (Ulmer, Collins, and Jacobs, 2000).

"Service before self," the West Point motto, summarizes army culture. Viewed as the most resistant to change of all the services, the army stresses tradition and history in its leadership manual, FM 22-100. The army claims that its culture is "deeply rooted in long-held beliefs, customs and practices" (Department of the Army, 1999, 3-14). Further, in the army's view, soldiers are strengthened by



knowing they are part of a tradition. This resistance to change and traditionalism may be one reason the army has not had a good relationship with Congress nor has it always excelled in public relations (Ulmer, Collins, and Jacobs, 2000). Nonetheless, the army receives high marks in human relations, especially when it comes to minority inclusion (Moskos, 1993; Ulmer, Collins and Jacobs, 2000).

The navy's culture is viewed as the most traditional of all the services. Being fiercely independent is a product of its nature.\* A service that spends long periods of time at sea, away from direct supervision of officials on shore, is bound to build a culture of independence. The navy deliberately instills this in its officer corps. This sense of independence underpins some unique features in the navy leadership competency model (Department of the Navy, 2004). Leaders who are expected to be independent need complementary competencies—creativity, vision, decisiveness, an ability to link the situation with national and naval objectives. All of these features appear in the navy leadership competency model (2004). Although independence is a combat strength, it may have insulated the navy somewhat from social trends. This sense of independence may have contributed to the perception that the navy was less than forthright in its response to recent scandals, such as Tailhook (Ulmer, Collins and Jacobs, 2000).

The marine corps, rightly, sees itself as unique. Proclaiming that “being a marine is a state of mind” (Department of the Navy, 2002, 7), the leadership manual, *Leading Marines*, repeatedly stresses the unique nature of the Corps. “Marines believe that to be a marine is special” (Department of the Navy, 2002, 23). So special, in fact, that being a marine is seen as a lifetime status. The marines stress a sense of “family”—once a marine, always a marine (Ulmer, Collins, and Jacobs, 2000). This is reflected in the Corps' Web site, which now features a section entitled “Marine for Life,” which provides information for transitioning marines on employment, education, benefits and Corps-friendly organizations in their area ([www.M41.usmc.mil/portal/server.pt](http://www.M41.usmc.mil/portal/server.pt)). The marine corps is the most “macho” of the services. This may be because most jobs that attract female recruits are support jobs that are found in functions provided to the marines by the navy (Ulmer, Collins, and Jacobs, 2000).

Given that it was a product of technology, it is not too surprising that the air force is the most technologically oriented of all the services. One of the air force's three core values is “excellence in all we do.” In describing what this means, the air force lays considerable emphasis on continuously looking for ways to improve unit efficiency and effectiveness. The examples provided stress technical solutions to problems, enhancing the impression that this service sees technology as holding the key to its future (Department of the Air Force, 2004). Due to the large combat support and service support structures, the air force has been the most successful of all the services at integrating women into its ranks (Ulmer, Collins, and Jacobs, 2000).

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\* An old navy joke runs like this: There are three ways of doing things: the right way, the wrong way, and the navy way.

## Pressures on Military Culture

*Technology* has had a significant impact on military culture. This impact is most evident in the air force, and least extreme in the army and marine corps. Technology encourages organizations to adopt more “managerial” approaches as opposed to leadership approaches (Murray, 1999; Collins, 1998), which in turn contributes to the tendency to move toward an occupational versus a professional model (Moskos, 1977). The danger is that in moving toward “managerial” or “business” approaches, the military will lose sight of the traditional values needed to ensure combat effectiveness.

Each of the services faces technological challenges, which in turn creates special challenges to organizational culture. For example, the advent of unmanned aerial vehicles and military operations in space and cyberspace has already led to the air force changing its definition of who is considered to be a “warfighter” (Mahnken, 2000). The current emphasis on light, mobile forces threatens a central notion in the army’s identity since World War II—its emphasis upon armor (Mahnken, 2000). In both these cases, technology is challenging deeply held beliefs about the identity of the service and, in this sense, they challenge organizational culture.

As technology has become increasingly complex, and as the services downsized in the post-Cold War period, the military services began civilianizing or outsourcing combat support work (Mahnken, 2000). This has led to a blurring of the boundary between “warfighters” and “nonwarfighters.” The results of this trend can be seen in the present situation in Iraq where contractors provide security services to the military in a manner that is reminiscent of mercenaries in the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries. In fact, Operation Iraqi Freedom bears some resemblance to eighteenth century warfare with its small professional force and a large contingent of “camp followers,” in this case, contractors, providing essential support services. In today’s rush to civilianize and contract out, military culture may be gradually eroded, with adverse consequences for combat effectiveness.

*Recruit quality* is also a challenge. Many new recruits lack the value sets needed to succeed in the military. As traditional value sets are displaced, and social dysfunction increases, the services increasingly find themselves with recruits who pose greater challenges to their training functions (Ulmer, Collins, and Jacobs, 2000). Thus, recruits require more training to reshape their value sets to fit military culture.

Morgan (2003) claims that this is a direct consequence of society’s adoption of postmodernist viewpoints. Although it defies precise definition, postmodernism has three features relevant to military culture: a rejection of absolutes, a rejection of power and authority, and a celebration of difference. All three of these qualities run counter to the concept of service, the marginalization of the sense of community and an abandonment of authority. Given the emphasis military culture places on discipline, self-sacrifice and service, it seems clear that recruit quality will continue to be a major challenge for all the services.

Although marriage does tend to increase the propensity to stay in the service, demonstrate greater maturity and reduce problems with indigenous populations overseas, a “married force” places additional strain on military culture (Snider, 1999). At the beginning of 2004, approximately one half of the active-duty enlisted force, and 68 percent of the officer corps, were married (Department of Defense [DoD], 2006). This puts pressure on the services to address quality-of-life issues. Because most military spouses also work, the pressure is even more intense. Issues that commanders might never have thought of thirty years ago, such as day care, now loom large on many commanders’ agendas (Ulmer, Collins, and Jacobs, 2000). Snider (1999) claims the advent of the married force is the biggest sociological change in the military as an institution since the creation of the all volunteer force in the 1970s.

“*Ops tempo*,” the increased number and length of deployments, and the unprecedented pressure placed on the military to participate in “operations other than war” have placed additional strain on a married force. This has led to increased concerns in all the services about the effects of such stress on individual performance, divorce, domestic violence, suicide rates and morale problems. Military personnel feel that their military commitments conflict with their commitment to their families. This leads to perceptions that the military is not taking care of its people, which in turn erodes morale and reduces reenlistment rates (Steele and Walters, 2001). The initial spark that led ultimately to prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib appears to have been the cancellation of the brigade’s return to the United States, fueling perceptions that army leadership was unconcerned about the soldiers’ welfare (Taguba, 2004).

Moreover, the pressure to do “operations other than war” has led to confusion over the military’s purpose. Such confusion has implications for practical matters. Training soldiers for combat is simply not the same as training for peacekeeping duties (Collins, 1998) or patrolling the border with Mexico. Beyond these practical issues, conducting operations other than war threatens the military’s conception of itself. Victory lies at the heart of the military’s self-concept, but victory may not be the goal in operations other than war. Consequently, military personnel may feel alienated or “lost” from both their leadership and the civilian population they serve.

Although women have proven themselves effective, *gender integration* remains a significant challenge to traditional military culture. Women were originally recruited in large numbers to fill out the ranks with the onset of the all volunteer force (Moskos, 1993; Ulmer, Collins, and Jacobs, 2000). Although women are still excluded from direct ground combat units, submarines, certain navy ships, and Special Forces, virtually all other occupational specialties are now open to women (Ulmer, Collins, and Jacobs, 2000). In 2004, women accounted for 17 percent of nonprior service active duty accessions and 22 percent of nonprior service accessions to the reserves (DoD, 2006).

This transformation has not come without problems. Reported sexual harassment rates have dropped significantly from 46 percent in 1995 to 24 percent in 2002 (Lipari and Lancaster, 2002). However, questions about the effects of gender integration on readiness and cohesion, particularly in the army, navy and marine corps remain. Harrell and Miller (1997) concluded that gender issues did not significantly affect readiness and cohesion in units with good leadership. But units suffering from poor leadership experienced a wide array of problems, including gender issues.

Gender problems may be more apt to surface during the stressful periods leading up to and including combat operations. During such periods, military personnel experience high levels of stress, which can lead to misconduct. Such misconduct is more likely to occur when alcohol is available (Department of the Army, 1994). Shay (2002) found that troops suffering from combat stress and trauma are more likely to self-medicate with alcohol and sex. The recent investigation into the highly publicized sexual assault cases in the Iraqi area of operations concluded that alcohol was available, and probably did play a role in the assaults that occurred in the theater (DoD, 2004).

### ***The Military as “Social Lab”***

The military is seen as a large and potent laboratory for social experimentation (Moskos, 1993). Such views rest on the successful integration of African Americans into the military, but fail to consider that integration of African Americans succeeded because it was based on the realization that military effectiveness would be improved by integration (Moskos, 1993). In other words, combat effectiveness was the driving consideration, not equal opportunity.

The view of the military as a “social lab” has led to pressure from feminist groups to end combat exclusion rules and from gay rights groups to allow openly gay persons to serve in the military. Both views are based on the concept that individual rights take precedence over group needs or goals, a philosophy that fits with popular U.S. culture, but is antithetical to military culture, with its emphasis on placing the needs of the group before the needs of the individual. Miller (1995) found that most female soldiers disagree with such feminist agendas and philosophies precisely because feminists insist that there are no appreciable differences between men and women, and they emphasize individual rights, as opposed to group goals and needs. Military women, like military men, share the core value of placing group needs above individual needs.

## **Conclusion**

Combat, with its chaos and violence, is at the heart of what separates the military profession from all other professions. To survive and thrive in combat requires the

development of a culture with a set of clearly defined values. Thus, military culture and its distinctive features are a response to the challenges and exigencies of combat. At the same time, technology, changes within the military and within the broader civilian society, threaten to undermine military culture.

Such challenges can only be met and overcome with leadership. Leadership has always been recognized as a key to combat effectiveness. Leaders form the indispensable link between unit members and the organization and create the atmosphere of trust essential to the development of unit cohesion. Although tactical skill and managerial competence are important components of leadership, the interpersonal nature of leadership demands more. Ultimately, leaders must behave with integrity, and live out the values at the heart of military culture—duty, honor, country.

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## *Chapter 15*

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# The Profession of Arms and the Management of Violence

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Saundra J. Reinke and Randall Miller

Specialist Joseph M. Darby did not like what he was seeing. Sickened by the photographs a buddy showed him of naked, abused Iraqi prisoners, Specialist Darby wrote a letter detailing the abuse, backed it up with photographic evidence, and slipped the information to a noncommissioned officer. His courageous act started the investigation into prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib.

**Green (2004)**

When we are faced with evil, what do we do? As individuals we may fall back on our religious or moral upbringing, hoping it will tell us what to do. Professionals, however, also have a set of values that lie at the heart of what it means to follow and belong to a particular profession. The military is no exception. In fact, the military may have the best articulated, most consistent set of professional values in today's world.

Nonetheless, the military also faces unique challenges. Specifically, the violence of combat places extreme pressures on individuals to depart from the accepted value set of the military professional. How does a profession that centers on combat keep that violence within socially acceptable boundaries?



The first section of this chapter is a discussion of the nature of a profession. After examining in more detail what makes the military profession distinctive from all others, the specific value set that lies at the heart of military professionalism will be explored. The section ends with a discussion of the “civil–military gap,” and its implications for our society.

The second section of the chapter explores some of the ways the military seeks to manage the violent nature of combat. After laying out the broad outlines of the law of armed conflict, this section explores the related topics of fratricide and combat stress. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the long-term impacts of combat violence on veterans and what can be done to prevent or lessen these impacts.

## The Profession of Arms

### *What Is a Profession?*

A profession is more than an occupation; a profession implies a life-long commitment to a specific way of life. Huntington (1957) describes a profession as a type of vocation. A vocation, or “calling,” is a way of life grounded in a set of values (Palmer, 2000). This is similar to Moskos’ (1970) distinction between an institution and an occupation. An institution is centered on a purpose that transcends individual self-interest for a higher good. Members of an institution are following a calling, and they see themselves as being different from the mainstream of society. Military service has traditionally been seen as just such an institution (Moskos, 1977).

Professions share three special characteristics: expertise, responsibility and corporateness (Huntington, 1957). He argues that officers are professionals. In today’s U.S. (all volunteer) military, with its increased need for a highly educated force, it makes more sense to argue that *all* military personnel are professionals.

The special, central *expertise* of the military professional is in combat—the controlled application of violence to achieve political goals (Huntington, 1957). “The end for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed, and trained, the whole object of his sleeping, eating, drinking, and marching is simply that he should fight at the right place and the right time” (von Clausewitz, 1989, 95). The violence of combat must be controlled and used in a way that is in keeping with the overall political objective. This is an expertise that is shared almost universally, through all ranks. Those who do not share in the direct application of violence, have all their efforts directed toward supporting those who do (Huntington, 1957, as amended to include all ranks). Leaders of all services, regardless of their specialty or rank, are explicitly directed to aim their efforts toward the accomplishment of the mission (Department of the Army, 1999; Department of the Navy, 2002, 2004a; Department of the Air Force, 2004).

The unique expertise of the military places a special social *responsibility* on it—the obligation to apply violence only for socially approved purposes *in a socially approved manner* (Huntington, 1957, emphasis added). Toner (2000) argues that the essence of military professionalism is in making responsible choices that are appropriate to the situation. Hence, all the military services stress the critical importance of discipline as well as adherence to an established code of behavior. This emphasis is particularly pronounced in the leadership manuals and documents published by the services (Department of the Army, 1999; Department of the Navy, 2002; Department of the Air Force, 2004).

Military personnel are motivated largely by a strong sense of social obligation, along with a genuine love for what they do (Huntington, 1957). Survey research comparing military personnel with the civilian population has found that individuals attracted to military service are significantly more patriotic, nationalistic, conservative and traditional. Moreover, it seems clear that the military training process is merely accentuating differences that were already in existence. In other words, the military is not “brainwashing” recruits into adopting a different value set. Recruits come to the military *because* they share the military’s existing value set. This value set is then further refined and clarified in the training process (Bachman et al., 2000).

*Corporateness*, or the sense of unity (within the service) and separation from others (the civilian world) is the third characteristic of the military professional (Huntington, 1957). Unity, or cohesion, is highly prized because it is directly related to combat effectiveness (Shils and Janowitz, 1975; Moskos, 1970; Department of the Navy, 2002; Department of the Army, 1999). More than 2,500 years ago, Sun Tzu (1983, 30) wrote “without harmony in the army, no battle array can be formed.” Shils and Janowitz’ (1975) classic study of the Wehrmacht’s performance in World War II conclusively demonstrated that corporateness, the sense of belonging to a cohesive social unit, was the primary factor that kept soldiers fighting even under the most unfavorable conditions, when it was clear that defeat was inevitable. Soldiers fight for their survival, but they understand that their individual survival is inseparable from the survival of their unit (Keegan, 1976). Moreover, the social cohesion that comes from training and traveling together is what keeps people sane and alive under the stress and fear of combat (Shay, 2002).

The sense of being apart or separate from society at large flows from the military members’ belief that they are following a calling (von Clausewitz, 1989; Weber, 1958; Moskos, 1977). This belief is reflected in research on the attitudes of military elites and in official military documents. Holsti’s (2000) survey found military elites do believe they are following a calling. Official publications, such as *Leading Marines* (Department of the Navy, 2002), stress that those who serve in the military are following a distinctive and special calling.

The perceived differences between military personnel and their culture and the wider civilian culture foster a sense of separation from the civilian world (Holsti, 2000). As Holsti states, “many in the military feel a sense of disappointment, if not

alienation, about aspects of American society” (74). These perceived differences are not simply a matter of pursuing a calling; many civilian professions (such as the clergy) also feel “called” to serve. Rather, the differences are related to the set of values that the military espouses. These values distinguish military personnel from a society that is increasingly dominated by postmodern values.

Morgan (2003) proposes that three postmodern values in particular—the rejection of absolutes, power and authority—are responsible for much of what Holsti (2000) refers to as a “sense of alienation” that military members feel from civilian society. This sense of being separate from society at large can lead to tension and misunderstanding between the military and society. Commonly referred to as the “civil–military gap,” this issue has become the topic of much current research and will be covered in a separate section later in this chapter.

### ***The Professional Military Ethic***

Huntington (1957) argues that military personnel share a particular *weltaanschauung*, or professional military ethic. This “ethic” consists of the values, attitudes and perspectives military members share. These values, attitudes and perspectives flow logically from the unique role of the military in society, and are viewed by many as essential to combat effectiveness, as is good training or weaponry (Huntington, 1957; Hillen, 1999; Toner, 2000). This is not to imply that every military member shares all the components of the “professional military ethic.” Huntington (1957) suggests this is an ideal type that is true for all militaries throughout history to the extent that they may be regarded as “professional” as opposed to militias or other nonprofessional military forms of organization.

The first component of the “professional military ethic” is a particular *worldview* that can be characterized as Hobbesian (Huntington, 1957). In this worldview, humanity is essentially evil and conflict is the natural state of existence. Human reason is limited, and humanity’s inherent weakness makes discipline, organization and leadership essential (Huntington, 1957; von Clausewitz, 1989). Shils and Janowitz (1975) document the lack of trust military members typically have for those outside their unit. This is echoed in recent survey research (Holsti, 2000) where military members viewed civilian culture as “materialistic, self-indulgent, undisciplined, and dishonest, on balance ungenerous, and disloyal” (57). In short, military members do not trust those “outside” their institution.

A second component of the professional military ethic is a *shared set of values*. Huntington (1957) identifies discipline, tradition, unity and cohesion as the core values; Miller (1995) adds putting the group before individual needs. Discipline has always been understood to be at the heart of combat effectiveness. Some 2,500 years ago, Sun Tzu (1983) pointed out that “method and discipline” were one of the five key factors that predicted success in military operations. He claimed that “soldiers must be treated with humanity, but kept under control by means of iron

<b>Table 15.1</b>		
<i>Army</i>	<i>Navy/Marine Corps</i>	<i>Air Force</i>
Loyalty Duty Respect Selfless service Honor Integrity Personal courage	Honor Courage Commitment	Integrity Service before self Excellence in all we do

discipline” (49). The Roman military writer, Vegetius (1985, 75) said “victory in war does not depend entirely upon numbers or mere courage; only skill and discipline will insure it.” In the nineteenth century, von Clausewitz (1989) put discipline first in his description of the military virtues.

This same set of values is repeated in modern military writing. All of the services stress the importance of discipline, tradition, unity, cohesion and selfless service in their leadership manuals (Department of the Navy, 2002, 2004b; Department of the Army, 1999; Department of the Air Force, 2004). Moreover, there are shared components in the values each of the services identifies as “core” (Table 15.1).

Throughout the lists shown in Table 15.1, and their accompanying explanations, lie common expectations. These include placing group needs before individual needs, personal integrity, courage and commitment to mission accomplishment.

These values are important because they build trust, and trust is at the heart of creating unit cohesion. “Trust in the Marine Corps and in unit leaders who consistently set the example expected of military professionals is vital to establishing unit cohesion” (Department of the Navy, 2002, 59). According to the U.S. Army, team identity comes out of mutual respect and trust (Department of the Army, 1999). “Integrity is the basis of trust, and trust is the unbreakable bond that unifies leaders with their followers and commanders with their units” (Department of the Air Force, 2004, iii). Shay (2002) proposes that trust is the key that links cohesion, leadership and training and significantly improves combat performance.

Huntington (1957) identifies the third component of the professional military ethic as a set of shared *attitudes towards military policy*. These attitudes are grounded in the assumption that the nation-state is the basic unit of political organization, with an accompanying skepticism towards supranational structures, such as the United Nations. Moreover, military personnel tend to believe that conflict and war are inevitable, and complete security is impossible. “The art of war is of vital importance to the state. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin” (Sun Tzu, 1983, 9). Skepticism of the benefits of treaties, alliances and international law is prevalent, along with a preference for U.S. military supremacy (Bachman et al., 2000). Because the stakes involved in conflict are potentially catastrophic (total annihilation), military personnel tend to overestimate security threats and solicit

forces that can deal with “everything” (von Clausewitz, 1989; Drew and Snow, 1988). Finally, military personnel tend to prefer a foreign policy that avoids treaty alliances (Huntington, 1957).

### ***The Civil–Military Gap***

The “gap” between military and civilian attitudes and values has drawn increasing scrutiny from scholars. There are several approaches to examining this issue. The first involves determining whether the gap actually exists, and, if it exists, how large it is. Other researchers and authors focus on exploring the meaning of any gap that may exist; its implications for the future and what (if anything) should be done about it.

Broadly speaking, scholars agree that such a gap does exist (Holsti, 2000; Cronke and Feaver, 2000; Bachman et al., 2000). Military personnel are more politically conservative than their civilian counterparts. Moreover, they hold negative views of contemporary culture (Holsti, 2000). Morgan (2003) argues that society’s adoption of postmodern attitudes towards authority and traditional values are largely to blame for the increasing gap between military and civilian cultures. In particular, Morgan proposes that three postmodern values in particular—the rejection of absolutes, power and authority—are intrinsically incompatible with military values, which stress placing the group before individual needs, discipline and adherence to a recognizably traditional value set.

Opinion is divided, however, on the extent of the gap and its significance. Davis (2000) argues that the gap is not large, and joins other scholars, such as Hillen (1999) and Toner (2000), in arguing that the differences that do exist are essential to the survival and success of the military in combat. These scholars claim that efforts to “reform” military culture, to force it to become like civilian culture, are not only in error, but are potentially disastrous.

Cronke and Feaver (2000) argue that although the differences are not significant at the present time, they have the potential to become significant over time. The adoption of an all volunteer force, coupled with continued downsizing of the military, has reduced the number of individuals in the general population with military experience. This same trend is reflected in civilian political elites, as fewer and fewer of them have any military experience. As a consequence, Cronke and Feaver believe that the civil–military gap will become increasingly large, with potentially significant, negative, long-term consequences for the combat effectiveness of the military itself. A civilian populace that no longer has the ability to understand *why* military culture and values are different is not likely to support their retention. To the extent that such values are essential to combat effectiveness, the military could, over time, lose its ability to perform its central function—combat.

Nevertheless, this has not stopped critics of military culture from applying pressure on the military to “reform” its culture. While a fuller treatment of this topic is included in the previous chapter, it suffices to say that those who advocate for allowing homosexuals to serve openly in the military, or for allowing women in combat, believe that the military should reflect contemporary social values. In other words, the civil–military gap is not acceptable; the military should conform itself to civilian culture and values.

## **Conclusion**

The military is a profession that is centered on a unique expertise—the application of violence to secure political objectives. As a profession, the military possesses a unique set of values, a “professional ethos” that sets it apart from the civilian society it serves. These values include honor, loyalty, selfless service, integrity and commitment. In today’s postmodern society, these values are not universally shared by civilian society, leading to the long-term possibility of estrangement and misunderstanding between the military and the civilian community it serves.

## **The Management of Violence**

Violence is (of course) the defining feature of combat. But violence has a way of feeding on itself and escalating out of control. Therefore, it must be contained if unnecessary destruction is to be avoided and the political objectives of the war achieved (von Clausewitz, 1989). Since the end objective of any war is to restore peace, violence must be employed in a socially acceptable manner, otherwise the enemy will refuse to make peace and keep fighting (Department of the Army, 1999). In a democracy such as the United States, controlling the level of violence is also essential to maintaining public support for the conflict. Beyond this practical rationale are humanitarian concerns to protect noncombatants, prisoners, cultural and religious sites, and the environment.

The key to keeping violence under control is discipline and training. Discipline can be defined as “consistently rationalized, methodically trained, and exact replication of the received order” (Weber, 1958, 253). Thus, violence is “managed” primarily through discipline, and the enforcement of training and ethical standards. Professional military leaders understand that it is their responsibility to focus combat violence to defeat the enemy, while keeping it within socially acceptable boundaries.

## ***Laws of Armed Conflict***

### ***Justified Killing? Or War Crime?***

In the middle stage of the Third Battle of Ypres in WWI, a group of Australian soldiers surrounded a two-story pillbox. The Germans on the first floor of the pillbox came out and surrendered. The Australians, thinking the fight was over, relaxed. However, the Germans on the second floor of the pillbox did not realize their comrades on the first floor had surrendered. One of them fired from the second floor, killing an Australian. The Australians, incensed at what they took to be a betrayal, promptly bayoneted the German prisoners (Keegan, 1976).

What constitutes “socially acceptable” violence in war? In the broadest sense, violence in war is regulated through the accepted laws of armed conflict. Since earliest times, it has been recognized that some restraints should be observed during armed conflict. The ideas that civilians should be protected, poison should not be used and captives treated humanely were widely accepted in the ancient world (Green, 2000, 20-23). For example, in the Christian Bible (1 Kings 6:22-23), the prophet Elisha tells the king he should provide his captives with bread and water before sending them to their home. In the Middle Ages, the Code of Chivalry, along with injunctions of the church, led to the first recorded trials for war crimes (Green, 2000).

The first modern code of law governing war was developed by Francis Lieber (jurist and political philosopher) of the United States and made law by President Lincoln in 1863. This code was based on commonly accepted practices of the time. As a consequence, it spread rapidly through Europe and became the basis for many national codes (Green, 2000).

The Hague Conventions of 1899 represent the first international codification of the laws of armed conflict. Subsequent Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions and refinements in humanitarian law have produced a set of principles that are widely accepted, even if not always followed. Their purpose is to “minimize the horrors of the conflict to the extent consistent with the economic and efficient use of armed force” (Green, 2000, 348). The law of armed conflict applies to both parties in any conflict, regardless of the justness of the conflict.

The central principle of the laws of armed conflict is a balance between military necessity against other principles discussed below. It is not the intention of the Hague or Geneva Laws to prohibit war. Rather, these laws recognize the reality of armed conflict, and the right of a nation-state to pursue victory. They simply require that military activity and the pursuit of victory be balanced against humanitarian concerns (Green, 2000). Put another way, it is compliance with the principles of the laws of armed conflict that keeps the military from becoming “armed thugs, mercenaries without morals” (Toner, 2000, 161).

The first principle of the law of armed conflict is *humanitarianism*. This principle requires that “persons who are in the power of a Party to the conflict shall be treated humanely in all circumstances” (Green, 2000, 349). Moreover, this principle requires that each party respect the “honour, conviction, and religious practices” (349) of all such persons.

The second principle provides for *restrictions on the means and methods* of conducting war. This principle restricts the means and methods of combat to those necessary to achieve victory and prohibits the use of weapons or methods that cause undue suffering. Included in this restriction is the elimination of strictly civilian targets. However, it is not a breach of the laws of armed conflict if civilians are injured incidental to attacks on lawful military targets (Green, 2000).

The principle of *proportionality* seeks to establish a reasonable connection between the objective being pursued compared to the consequences of the action. This involves a subjective weighing of the importance of the objective against the possible harmful effects on civilians or civilian objects. This includes an accompanying injunction on warring states to separate as much as possible civilians and civilian objects from legitimate military targets and identifying facilities that are considered protected, such as hospitals (Green, 2000).

The *treatment of prisoners of war (POWs)* is also governed under the laws of armed conflict. POWs are not required to give any information to their captors other than their identity. Moreover, they must be treated humanely; they may not be tortured mentally or physically. They must be offered medical treatment if needed and given shelter in keeping with the local climate. POWs may be required to work. However, the work cannot be considered dangerous to them or supportive of the war effort (Green, 2000).

### *The Case of Abu Ghraib*

After defeating the Iraqi military in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Abu Ghraib, formally a notorious prison for Saddam Hussein, became a prison used by coalition forces for prisoners of war, security detainees and common criminals. Allegations that U.S. Military Police (MPs) abused Iraqi prisoners led to an investigation, and ultimately, to major embarrassment for the U.S. government.

In his investigation into the allegations of abuse at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, Major General Taguba (2004) concluded that Iraqi detainees were intentionally abused, physically and mentally, by U.S. military police as part of an effort to “soften them up” prior to questioning by military intelligence. General Taguba’s report found that there were a number of factors contributing to this failure to keep violence within acceptable boundaries. The first, and most important factor, was the lack of leadership from both officers and noncommissioned officers.



Although other factors were present that led to the abuse, strong leadership could have ameliorated them. These other factors included a lack of training in detainee operations, understaffing and a lack of basic soldier support services. Understaffing, coupled with the absence of expected support services, could have led soldiers to believe the commander did not care for them (Reinke, 2006). Shay (2002) found that soldier confidence in the commander is critical to protecting troops from stress. This confidence is grounded in the soldiers' belief that the commander is professionally competent, and credibly and genuinely cares for their welfare.

Other *forbidden activities* include acts intended to terrorize the civilian population, the use of civilians or civilian objects as screens to protect a legitimate military objective from attack, attacks with no military purpose and attacks on dams, dikes or nuclear power facilities. In addition, "scorched earth" tactics, the deliberate destruction of everything in a given area, may also be prohibited (Green, 2000).

### ***"Friendly Fire"***

On March 23, 2003, an Air Force A-10 fired on a company of U.S. Marines in An Nasiriyah, Iraq. Eighteen marines were killed and seventeen wounded. The investigation concluded that several factors contributed to this tragic event. These factors included problems with communication links and a rapidly changing battle plan. But the principal fault lay with a marine corps forward air controller who called in the air strike believing there were no friendly forces in front of his unit; even though he could not see the target area. Tragically, he was mistaken (Herbert, 2004).

The prevention of fratricide, or "friendly fire," is another key concern in the management of combat violence. Fratricide is "the employment of friendly weapons and munitions with the intent to kill the enemy or destroy his equipment or facilities, which results in unforeseen and unintentional death or injury to friendly personnel" (Center for Army Lessons Learned [CALL], 1992, 1). During 1991's Operation Desert Storm, 17 percent of American casualties were the result of friendly fire (Garamone, 1999). During Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, only 11 of 115 U.S. battle deaths (9.5 percent) were attributed to fratricide. Although the downward trend is positive, as Lt. Gen. Leaf expressed, "in terms of fratricide, zero is the only good score" (Cahlink, 2004, 69).

Regan (2002) argues that fear is an essential feature of combat. When "men are afraid they will always shoot first rather than identify a target, or drop bombs too early rather than risk the flak" (267). Historically, fratricide has most often occurred

during the early stages of combat, in periods of reduced visibility, or where units are operating in close proximity to each other (CALL, 1992; Regan, 2002). The prevention of friendly fire requires good communication between combat units, situational awareness on the part of commanders in the field, and fire discipline on the part of combatants.

The two most common causes of fratricide are a lack of situational awareness on the part of combatants and a failure to positively identify targets. Specifically, two contributing factors stand out in the vast majority of fratricide incidents: (1) a soldier did not know where he was on the ground, and/or (2) a soldier or airman engaged without positively identifying his target (CALL, 1992). The case of the previously mentioned A-10 incident illustrates both reasons. The marine air controller did not have accurate information on the location of his fellow marines. As often happens in combat, the attack plan changed in reaction to enemy activity, and the unit that was the victim had moved beyond where the original plan placed it. Furthermore, the air controller did not positively identify the target as enemy and called in the air strike. As a result, U.S. Marines died (Herbert, 2004).

These primary factors can be complicated by poor communication between friendly units. During Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, the services experimented with at least nine different tracking systems for friendly units, many of which could not share information with one another (Cahlink, 2004). In his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Tommy Franks listed the lack of standardized combat identification systems and procedures as one of the “lessons learned” from Operation Iraqi Freedom (Rumsfeld, 2003). After evaluating several different technological solutions, the air force adopted a combat identification system known as Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) and installed it on E-8C Joint Stars aircraft. This is the same system the army adopted for tracking blue forces several years earlier (Fox, 2006).

## ***Combat Stress***

A contributing factor to both fratricide and violations of the laws of armed conflict is combat stress. Stress levels among military personnel, either in combat, supporting combat or awaiting combat, are high and a frequent source of problems. The 2002 Survey of Health-Related Behaviors among Military Personnel found that 40 percent of men and about half of the 12,500 military members surveyed used food as a way to cope with stress. More than 25 percent used alcohol or cigarettes to deal with stress. Heavy drinking was more prevalent among younger service members; 27 percent of those aged 18 to 25 acknowledged heavy alcohol use, double the rate among civilians in the same age group (Miles, 2004).

Given the youthfulness of the military force, this use of alcohol is particularly disturbing. Shay (2002) reports that combat trauma sufferers do use sex and alcohol as a form of “self-medication.” The availability of alcohol, along with the stressful

environment, may have played a role in the heavily publicized sexual assault cases reported in the Iraqi area of operations (Department of Defense, 2004).

Combatants are subjected to significant physical and psychological stress both during combat and in the period leading up to combat. These stressors include exposure to weather, sleep deprivation, extreme fatigue, fear, time pressure versus what may seem to be endless waiting, grief, guilt, frustration and injury, to name only a few. These work in combination and can produce both positive and negative responses in individuals (Department of the Army, 1994). Positive responses help individuals adjust to the combat environment. Negative or dysfunctional responses include battle fatigue and misconduct.

Battle fatigue is found in all types of combatants, including heroes. Minor symptoms, such as hyper alertness or fear, can accompany excellent combat performance (Department of the Army, 1994). However, if battle fatigue progresses without treatment or rest, the combatant's performance deteriorates, and can do so to the point where he or she can no longer perform his or her duties (Department of the Army, 1994). The inattention and carelessness that sometimes accompanies battle fatigue can be a contributing factor in fratricide cases (CALL, 1992).

The other type of dysfunctional combat stress response is misconduct. Misconduct stress behaviors can range from minor violations of orders up to violations of the laws of armed conflict. Such misconduct can include killing or torturing prisoners, mutilating enemy dead, rape, looting, "fragging" (killing one's own leader), and desertion. These behaviors are more common in poorly trained, undisciplined units. In addition to poor training and a lack of discipline, other factors that may increase misconduct stress behavior include the availability of alcohol or drugs, boredom or monotonous duties, commission of atrocities by the enemy, perceptions that the civilian populace is hostile or untrustworthy, lack of expected support leading to a feeling of abandonment by senior leaders, lack of unit cohesion and loss of confidence in leadership (Department of the Army, 1994).

All of these factors seem to have been at work in the prisoner abuse cases at Abu Ghraib. The mistreatment, abuse and deliberate humiliation of these prisoners constitute clear violations of the humanitarian principles underpinning the Geneva and Hague conventions. Major General Taguba's (2004) official investigation into this abuse does not specifically single out stress as a causal factor. But, he does conclude that the unit was not trained in detention or internee operations or in the applicable rules of the Geneva Convention. In addition, the unit was undermanned for its task and the soldiers' quality of life was extremely poor. This could have led the soldiers to believe they were not supported by their leaders. Finally, the soldiers were working in a hostile environment, where relations with the local populace were rapidly deteriorating.

Although the brigade commander, Brigadier General Karpinski, was well aware of these deficiencies, she did little or nothing to correct them. Evidence in the report indicated that discipline in the unit was lax, and Karpinski had little or no contact with her soldiers (Taguba, 2004). An untrained, undisciplined unit, working in a

hostile environment with a poor quality of life, and a largely absent leader creates a situation ripe for misconduct stress behaviors, tragic violations of the law of armed conflict, and national disgrace (Reinke, 2006).

### ***Residual Impact of Violence***

War itself creates situations that can wreck the mind. (Shay, 2002, 31)

The violence of combat has other effects as well, some of them lasting a lifetime. The most well-known of these is posttraumatic stress disorder, or PTSD. Combat veterans are not the only ones to suffer from PTSD. Nonmilitary trauma is actually the most common source of PTSD (Stein, 2002). Nonetheless, PTSD, with its accompanying tendencies towards depression and substance abuse, is a major problem (Department of the Army, 1994). Shay (2002, 36) reports that 73.8 percent of active PTSD sufferers are either alcohol dependent or abusers compared with a 26 percent lifetime incidence of alcohol dependence or abuse among male civilian nonveterans.

PTSD is characterized by three clusters of symptoms—intrusive reexperiencing of the event, numbness or disassociation, and hyper vigilance (Williams, 2003). Many of the symptoms of PTSD were positive responses to combat stress that the victim cannot “turn off” after combat is over. For example, hyper vigilance, or constantly being on the alert for danger, is beneficial when one is in combat. In civilian life, however, it is both unnecessary and counterproductive to be constantly expecting attack (Shay, 2002). Combatants who suffered from emotional problems or abuse prior to combat are more likely to experience PTSD afterwards (Gimbel and Booth, 1994; Shay, 2002).

Although it is treated through the use of therapy and medication, PTSD is generally regarded as incurable (Stein, 2002). The goal of therapy is to help sufferers improve to the point where symptoms do not interfere with normal functioning (Williams, 2003). Nonetheless, it can be helpful for individuals who have gone through a particularly traumatic experience to have the opportunity to discuss what happened in a safe, supportive environment. This may promote healing and prevent the development of full-blown PTSD. The army encourages combat units to schedule time for unit members to discuss their experiences, conduct memorial services or work through unresolved issues before returning home (Department of the Army, 1994).

The recent cases of domestic violence after soldiers returned from combat in Afghanistan highlight the importance of managing the transition of combat veterans out of the war zone. The military has traditionally had a period of “decompression time” for returning POWs to help them adjust to freedom (Sample, 2003). However, such a time period has not always been available to returning combat veterans. This can lead to significant stress in marital relationships, resulting in higher divorce and separation rates for combat veterans (Gimbel and Booth, 1994). Coming home from combat with one’s unit and taking time to talk through what

occurred can play a significant role in preventing both PTSD and other adjustment problems that veterans experience when coming home (Shay, 2002).

### *Prevention*

What can be done to prevent PTSD and other undesirable consequences of serving in combat? Interestingly, the exact same factors that promote military effectiveness lie at the heart of prevention. Shay (2002) proposes that although combat stress cannot be prevented, it can be eased and the negative consequences reduced, if units train together, go to combat together and return home together. It takes time to create unit cohesion, and cohesion is at the heart of both combat effectiveness and prevention. Cohesion reduces fear and anxiety and, thus, protects against the psychological damage combat can do to military personnel.

Beyond cohesion, tough, realistic training and good leadership play crucial roles in prevention. Training helps military personnel adjust to the stress of combat and respond appropriately to the challenges combat presents (Shay, 2002; Department of the Army, 1994). Leadership that is ethical, competent and courageous promotes combat effectiveness and reduces stress. In particular, leaders must behave in ways that promote trust because trust lies at the heart of creating unit cohesion and combat effectiveness (Shay, 2002).

## **Conclusion**

Combat is at the heart of what separates the military profession from all other professions. The need to manage violence, to keep it focused on victory while, at the same time, keeping it within socially acceptable bounds has generated a unique set of values that separates military professionals from the civilians they serve. At the same time, the stress and chaos of combat place extreme pressure on individuals to violate that set of values. In an atmosphere of hostility and fear, as happened at Abu Ghraib prison, it can be easy for violence to get out of control.

Leadership has always been recognized by military professionals as the key to keeping the violence of combat within bounds. Such leadership must be founded on more than just tactical competence or managerial skill. It must be founded on the value set that has traditionally been at the heart of military service—duty, honor, country.

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## *Chapter 16*

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# **Regional Defense Policy: The European Security and Defense Policy**

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Johan Eliasson

The European Union (EU), with twenty-seven member states, over 450 million citizens, a total gross domestic product (GDP) greater than that of the United States, and the world's largest trading block, is an influential international economic force, with both positive (development aid, loans, free-trade agreements, potential membership) and negative (embargo, tariffs, withdrawal of aid) means of economic influence. Such means are frequently effective in promoting political goals such as regional stability, democracy and human rights (Zielonka, 1998a; Solana, 2005). However, these capabilities have not always proven sufficient. In fact, the inability of the EU to address the wider and more diverse set of security threats that have come to dominate the international system—humanitarian crises, migration, ethnic conflicts, civil war, and various types of terrorist activities—has given rise to criticisms of the paradoxical nature of the union: striving for a strategic impact on Europe and elsewhere without any specific strategy; aspiring to be a powerful international actor while rejecting ideas of a European supra-state; favoring strong Atlantic ties coupled with strong autonomous institutions; and, critically, aspiring to prevent and manage crises without the political determination to acquire the means necessary to do so (Zielonka, 1998a, 11; 1998b, Introduction; Sandström, 1998; Ojanen, 2000).



However, things changed in 1999. The wars in the Balkans in the 1990s and British Prime Minister Tony Blair's emphatic insistence that EU states urgently needed better military capabilities meant capability building was prioritized. EU members, led by Britain and France, decided the union "must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and the willingness to do so" (European Council, 1999). Before year's end, this new-found political will resulted in decisions on permanent security and defense institutions, signaling to the United States and other non-EU NATO members that the EU was serious, while simultaneously coveting non-EU states' support in the development of European defense (Schake et al., 1999, 22–24). Thus, unlike most EU policy areas involving new institutions and capabilities, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) began as a practical, capability-building enterprise, followed by a purpose-defining, policy-oriented period. The reversal of the normal, logical order (of purpose preceding institutions) has proven useful, and is one reason for ESDP's speedy development. British Defense Minister Hoon explained, "[ESDP] is all about enhancing military capability. It is not about political niceties ... If hanging a 'European' tag on it is what it takes to make it happen, then so be it." (Howorth, 2000, n69). Although many might consider defense integration a natural progression within a political and economic union—and the September 11, 2001, Madrid 2004, and London 2005 attacks furthered political will and boosted public support for stronger EU security capabilities—the rapidity of developments, replacing rhetoric with improved capabilities and common EU institutions in a policy area historically deemed the sacred domain of states, has nonetheless surprised most analysts (Howorth, 2001; Gnesotto et al., 2004; Smith, 2004; Forsberg and Herd, 2006).

Following a brief overview and outline of recent developments, this chapter will expand on how the ESDP works, its structures, organization, and operations. Included is an explanation of EU policy aspirations, the agreed European Security Strategy, and the formal administration of the ESDP. Military capabilities, including force structures, equipment, the armaments industry and the EU Defense Agency (EDA), are addressed before evaluating the integral ties to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The emerging EU military culture that, much like EU citizenship in the civilian realm, is forging an EU perspective and loyalty among military personnel, precedes a section on EU operations. We conclude with an evaluation of current and future developments in this rapidly developing area of EU responsibility.

## **Introduction to the ESDP**

As shown below, the ESDP is aptly defined as a process of enactment, the administration, of EU military and civilian crisis management operations. This requires a

strategy doctrine, military structures, improved and available capabilities, backed by an EU defense industrial base.

The ESDP is incrementally complementing, supplementing, and harmonizing member states' national defense policies. In certain areas, EU level decisions and projects have either replaced national counterparts (e.g., in armaments production) or enabled a reorganization away from a total national defense along with specialization in certain areas (e.g., the Czech Republic's focus on dealing with chemical and biological weapons), discussed below. Skyrocketing defense-related costs, budget deficits, and competition from the United States have made "defense economies of scale" necessary. Acquiring the entire range of capabilities necessary for a holistic defense is unrealistic for all but a few EU members (the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy). Most complex weapon systems have a per-unit cost too high for a single European nation; therefore, to cope with new and rising needs, states have little choice but to pursue multinational projects. All states' defense reforms now also follow a similar pattern of revolution in military affairs (RMA), initiated in the United States, focusing on rapid deployment and technological innovation, which, along with member solidarity (further underscored by NATO membership), and the need for military efficiency and international legitimacy, also means EU states are less worried today about task sharing (*de facto* specialization). Large and small states alike (NATO members or neutrals) know that pooled EU capabilities, as well as large-country national resources, will be used to defend individual EU members or EU regions should this become necessary (personal communications, Brussels, 2002). There is now an EU security strategy, defense agency, civil–military planning cell, and transnational battle groups, and the union has carried out autonomous military operations. The EU also runs a strategic research institute and a European Defense College. The ESDP's legal basis lies primarily in the Treaty on the European Union, articles 17–26, and various European Union Council decisions (so-called "Joint Actions"). Many of the committees and agencies involved have also been given international legal personality; that is, they can sign agreements on behalf of members.

To achieve improved capabilities, a "Headline Goal" was adopted in 1999 (European Council, 1999c). This includes a rapid-reaction force of up to sixty thousand troops (with twice that number for support and rotation), available with two months notice and capable of being deployed for a year, Brussels-based military structures, working proposals for stronger civilian conflict capabilities, and institutionalized EU–NATO cooperation. While not—at least in the short term—creating one unified European military to replace all national defenses, the strategic goals and policy objectives of the EU discussed below, and the economy of scale that dominates the armaments industry, have led some defense analysts to foresee a future integrated EU force, backed by air and sea support, and capable of successful engagement in regional warfare aimed at defending the "fundamental interests and independence of the EU" (see Title V, article 11 of Treaty on the European Union) within a decade (Gnesotto et al., 2004, 84). Such developments are also

made more plausible by the fact that, amid wavering support for EU integration in certain policy areas, public support across Europe for a common EU security and defense remains consistently higher than for any other policy area (Eurobarometer, 2001, 2003, 2005). Thus, with demand for EU-wide responses growing, and with the EU adopting common positions on all but one major post-Cold War conflict (including the Gulf War, the bombing of Kosovo, the invasion of Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the crises in the Congo, the Middle East, and North Korea), the 2003 invasion of Iraq (where half of EU states participated but the EU did not adopt a common position) may have been the last divided endeavor (especially given the post-invasion difficulties).

## ***Strategy and Command Structure***

### *European Security Strategy*

Though any EU military action is, naturally, meant to support the EU's Common Foreign Policy (CFSP), having to react to, and engage in, different crises has also strengthened the need for consensus on a wider security and defense strategy. The increasing focus on EU-wide concerns underlies the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), which serves as the key reference document for understanding collective European ambitions, and how they might move forward. The ESS identifies five major threats to regional and global security, which all require European involvement: terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, failed states, regional conflicts, and organized crime. None of these new threats are purely military, nor can they be tackled solely through military means as they require preventive and conflict-resolution operations, yet any holistic approach to security and defense requires the use of military means and thus military operations. The most common—but far from only—situations in which European forces are employed are those typically labeled humanitarian crises, stability (political) breakdowns, terrorist attacks, or limited wars, thus requiring rescue, peacekeeping, or peace-enforcement operations.

The ESS advocates a strategy of preventive engagement and effective multilateralism, with police operations (training local officers, overseeing implementation) and civilian operations (rule-of-law, election monitoring, and judicial operations) in addition to, and in support of, military action. The latter is the focus of this chapter, but for more on civilian aspects, see, for example, the EU's Civilian Headline Goals (2008) or Gourlay (2005). Soft power, economic and political, is proving effective in many instances where military posturing or threats yield little progress (e.g., northern Africa and eastern Europe). Economic and political assistance to promote democracy in the near-abroad are part of preventive actions aimed at avoiding having to address failed states and civil war down the road (ESS, 2003, 7–8, 11). Yet prevention may fail, requiring the use of military power to enforce or oversee an agreement. Given the extensive and diverse experiences of EU member states (ranging from contemporary British and French military operations

and active engagements in warfare to Nordic expertise in peacekeeping, Dutch peace-enforcement activities, and numerous European diplomatic endeavors and monitoring missions) the EU is better suited than any other state or international organization to combine military and civilian instruments in such endeavors. In many instances peacekeeping, maintaining peace based on a principle of impartiality between the conflicting but separated parties, has moved into enforcing a peace requiring the use of military means. The recognition that almost all operations will require a combination of military, police, and civilian capabilities has been born out in EU, NATO, and ad hoc coalition operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. European troops, particularly western European, have generally proven apt at working with the police and local authorities, and engaging with civilian populations in challenging peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations. However, in each instance “winning the peace” after an intervention has proven difficult. Add to this the changing nature of war, where the military at times becomes a means of law enforcement, especially in the war on terrorism (see below), and challenges abound.

The EU’s increased willingness to decide autonomously when and how to assert international influence is reflected in the ESS, which situates the EU’s likely use of force “somewhere between a strict adherence to the UN Charter and a looser, ‘progressive’ interpretation of customary international law” (Quille et al., 2005, 7), thus recognizing that justice sometimes requires action without waiting for a UN resolution (see below). At the same time former deputy supreme commander Allied Forces Europe explained, “... if we [Europeans] are to operate amongst the people in the name of the law, we must do so within the law. To do otherwise is to attack the essence of our own strategic objective, which is to establish and uphold the law” (Smith, 2004, 121). This desire to adhere to international law in all operations is a unifying feature in the EU and the ESDP.

### *Terrorism*

The ESS is clearly aimed at this new type of military conflict. The capability-driven development of the ESDP, along with contemporary crises calling for assistance and intervention, and the reemergence of terrorism as a real threat to Europe, all shaped the strategic objectives in the ESS. The EU has made fighting terrorism a key priority, which must be part of “all aspects of the Union’s external relations policy ... [and] requires a global approach to strengthen the international coalition and to prevent and contain regional conflicts” (EU 2002 Seville Council Declaration). The ESS makes clear that Europe is both a target of and base for terrorism, requiring a holistic approach to the problem, including intelligence cooperation, police, judicial and military power (ESS, 2003, 3, 7). The March 2004 Madrid bombings and the July 2005 attacks on London violently reinforced the notion that EU states are intrinsically interdependent, facing common threats. This has also

reinforced practical developments, easing agreements on many policy issues. One example is the EU-wide cooperation that facilitated the swift arrest of numerous bombing suspects.


In outlining EU strategy on terrorism, the ESS draws on members' experiences with insurgence and terrorism, domestically and in former colonies (Great Britain and the Irish Republican Army; Spain and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, known as ETA; as well as French, Italian, and Portuguese experiences); classical studies of guerrilla, or revolutionary, warfare; existing national security and counterinsurgency strategies; and the recognition that new means and technologies necessitate new means to prevent and fight terrorists. In so doing the EU pledges to uphold international humanitarian and human rights laws, which means killing is a last resort and enemies, including terrorists, should be brought to justice (ESS 2003, 9–10). Preventative measures, including expanded intelligence cooperation, integrated police registers, common border regulations, and an EU arrest warrant, are strategic developments complementing military developments.

With events in recent years, it is no surprise that the EU Constitution contains a mutual assistance clause, where states commit to “use all available means to aid and mutually assist in common efforts to respond to manmade nonstate terrorist attacks and similar crises” (EU Draft Constitution, article 42). The clause formalizes the mutual responsibilities espoused in treaty clauses and declarations of protecting EU values and interests, while recognizing the implicit understanding among member states that an EU state under attack will be provided all available assistance (Interview Military Personnel, Brussels, 2003). The security and solidarity clause is already *de facto* working among members and will, according to most policy makers and analysts, be formalized separately, along with several other security and defense-related clauses, should the constitution fail to be adopted in its entirety (to be decided in 2008 or 2009).

The European Council, consisting of heads of government (HoG), is the EU's highest authority, and ultimately decides on all matters of foreign, defense, and security policy under the rule of unanimity, making it the supranational equivalent of a national government administration. However, in 2001 the EU Council gave formal legal standing to the Political Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee (EUMC), and the EU Military Staff (EUMS), and in 2004, the European Defense Agency (EDA), which means there is now a formal structure of institutionalized defense planning and execution (Table 16.1).

HoGs meet only four times a year, so most decisions are taken by the Council of the EU—the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)—consisting of members' foreign ministers. They meet several times a month, and are supported by permanent representatives (CoRePer) who, like civil servants in national governments, prepare and decide on most issues, which are then adopted by ministers. Within the GAERC there are numerous directorates, headed by a directorate general, supervising different areas of the ESDP, including external political and military relations, defense, armaments, and civilian crisis management. There is no

Table 16.1 The Formal Structures and Chain of Command



Source: ISN Center for Security Studies (CSS) ETH Zurich, Switzerland.

defense ministers' council, but in addition to having "regularized informal" meetings two to four times annually, they also participate biannually in the GAERC, thus staying abreast of developments across the union while enabling defense ministers to discuss common problems and proposals within the ESDP. Their involvement is further strengthened through the daily work at the EU Military Headquarters in Brussels where PSC ambassadors and EUMC representatives stay in constant contact with national defense ministries. Thus, national foreign and defense ministries remain involved with all aspects of ESDP.

The EU's High Representative (HR), the EU's foreign policy spokesperson, serves as the secretary general of the Council of the EU, sits in on the GAERC, heads the EU Diplomatic Service, and chairs the Political Security Committee (PSC), the EU's highest permanent ESDP committee. He or she is supported by a secretariat staff consisting of several defense experts from member states, the EU Commission (the EU's executive branch), and several personally selected members. The staff works closely with the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU), which monitors the development of potential and existing crisis situations. The Situation

Center, located in the GAERC secretariat and led by the HR, includes the EUMS and the HR's staff. The HR's workload, and the increasing importance attributed to the secretariat, is evident in the total increase in staff, from fifteen to forty in 2001, to eighty by 2004. This multihatted structure is intended to both ensure seamless policy coordination among EU institutions, and consistency in external relations. Part of the constitutional reforms to be decided by 2009 include transforming the HR into a formal EU foreign minister who, in addition to the aforementioned responsibilities would serve as vice president of the EU Commission and also head the EDA.

There are different decision-making options within the GAERC: consensus, majority, or consensus with "constructive abstention" (a state abstains without preventing others from acting on behalf of the EU). An adopted Common Strategy specifies the goals to be implemented by joint actions. The latter may be decided over the objection of a member state, increasing flexibility in a Council of twenty-seven, as a "coalition of the willing" can no longer be prevented from acting (Peterson and Blomberg, 1999, 230).

### ***Other Committees***

The PSC is the central committee in the ESDP. Formally composed of members' national political directors, ambassadorial-rank representatives from each state are designated to carry out daily business; and in operational preparations or crises the PSC is headed by the HR. More specifically the PSC has three explicit functions: (1) to offer policy advice to the Council for EU military deployment and crisis management operations; (2) to organize, plan, and evaluate, in liaison with the PPEWU, all EU operations; and (3) to serve as the political control center for the day-to-day direction of military operations in order to ensure overall consistency in the EU's military response to a crisis, as designated by the GAERC. "To that end, on the basis of the opinions and recommendations of the Military Committee, it evaluates in particular the essential elements (strategic military options including the chain of command, operation concept, operation plan) to be submitted to the Council" (Council of European Union, 2001).

There is a Strategic Planning Branch, consisting of at least eight military and seven civilian planners, and an EU Operations Center Permanent Staff. The former undertakes strategic contingency planning for possible operations at the request of the HR, taking account of the EU's strategic objectives. This is then presented to the GAERC for operational approval. The operations center staff is responsible for generating and maintaining the inherent capacity to plan and run an autonomous EU operation. It ensures that the Ops Center is operating within five days, and fully operational in all areas within twenty days, of a GAERC decision, thus forming the key nucleus of the EU Ops Center during an operation.

The EUMC is chaired by a four-star flag officer from an EU member state, elected by the twenty-seven chiefs of defense (CHODs) and appointed by the Council for three years. The EUMC is formally composed of the Chiefs of Staff from members defense (equivalent to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff), who meet at least biannually. Like the PSC, permanent military representatives work on a daily basis in the EUMC in Brussels, providing advice and recommendations on all military matters to PSC, including the elaboration, assessment, and review of capability goals. In crisis management situations, following a Council decision, the EUMC draws on the EUMS to develop and present strategic military options, and authorizes the operation commander to engage in initial operational planning. The EUMC then monitors the proper execution of military operations.

The EUMS is composed of military and civilian experts appointed by member states. With its assembled military expertise the EUMS' main purpose is to provide military advice on the planning and execution of EU-led operations and, under the direction of the PSC, to serve as the center of military planning during an EU-led operation as directed by the EUMC. EUMS procedures are expected to be based on, and fully compatible with, those of NATO (Howorth, 2000, 33–34). EUMS staff work daily alongside each other, in working groups, projects, and frequently with its NATO equivalent (discussed below), all to ensure the cross-national continuity and interoperability so necessary for EU operations.

Similar to any major national defense organization there are many different—and rapidly growing—programs and working groups, framework agreements, declarations, or special initiatives in place within the Council and the various ESDP committees, all of which contribute to forging closer EU defense integration; some are noted in the discussion below (for further elaboration, see, for example, Gnesotto et al., 2004; Rutten, 2006). Here briefly note two major civilian and military committees and three agencies supporting the ESDP structure.

The Civilian Crisis Management Committee is responsible for nonmilitary components of EU operations and reports to the PSC. The Civ-Mil Cell, headed by a brigadier general seconded by a civilian deputy, brings together twenty-five military and civilian experts to develop strategic options and contingency plans for EU operations requiring joint civil and military means. It will also set up operations centers for autonomous EU operations whenever a national operational headquarters is lacking, or support the latter when one is used.

The European Institute for Strategic Studies provides security-related research, background papers, proposals for EU White Papers, and should over time “contribute to a European security culture” (*Eufocus*, 2006, 7).

The Politico–Military Group undertakes overall assessments and evaluations of EU procedures and operations, while the European Defense Agency coordinates armaments research and procurement (discussed further below).

The European Satellite Center, located in Spain, provides Earth observation space imagery for use in ESDP decision making, individual training in digital



geographic information systems and imagery analysis, and it conducts research projects assigned by the PSC.

## Capabilities

The combined EU troop size exceeds that of the United States; the EU accounts for 25 percent of the world's military expenditures (the United States, 45 percent), and 21 percent of the world's arms exports (the United States, 49 percent) (British American Security Information Council, 2003). At the same time, expenditures on material and acquisition equal only 40 percent of the U.S. equivalent, with the same ratio for operation and management, and even less (33 percent) on Research and Technology (R&T). Thus, even if, as some argue, defense expenditures amounting to 50 percent of that of the United States should "be more than enough to deal with contingencies inside and along the periphery of Europe. After all, that figure represents one fifth of the world's military expenditure!" (Heisbourg, 2000, 9), improved efficiency, "more-bang-for-your-bucks," becomes crucial; pooled resources are even more important when considering that most EU states—with exceptions like Finland, Britain, and France—are not increasing defense spending (as a percentage of GDP).

Before proceeding, two clarifications are in order. First, while "EU" spending refers to cumulative EU spending, most governments—ever more explicitly—factor in the larger European context when setting defense budgets. This includes the projects, policies, and capabilities needed for the ESDP; strong public support for ESDP adds to this focus. Second, defense spending is not the most accurate of figures as different member states exclude certain spending. For example, France excludes from the defense budget spending on military infrastructure and transportation, Finland includes certain dual-use products, while Sweden does not. Nevertheless, the above-mentioned figures on material and development highlight a challenging reality for all EU members in improving capabilities.

## Headline Goals

The "Headline Goal" (noted above) has been the focus of developments and the core from which other aspects of the ESDP have flowed. In 2000 member states engaged in an initial pledging of national assets that would be available for EU operations, resulting in a European Force Catalog. The 2001 follow-up conference resulted in the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP), erecting working committees tasked with proposing specific ways to improve and coordinate collective capability goals in areas such as command, control, intelligence, and transport. Each of the nineteen working groups was headed by EUMS staff specialists and their work was coordinated by the Headline Goal Task Force (HTF). Their 2003

assessment pointed to shortfalls in assets members already possessed, but failed to commit to EU operations and, more seriously, continued capability deficiencies in air and sea lift, unmanned aerial vehicles, air-to-air refueling capabilities, or ballistic missile defense (Council of European Union, 2003).

The updated Headline Goal 2010 (adopted in 2004) envisions all members' force contributions as being compatible, completely interoperable and self-sustainable in theater within a decade (i.e., 2012–2014); most states are now reforming their defense structures in similar fashion, moving to mobile, rapid, and professional military (Salmon and Shepard, 2003; Duke, 2000, 20–22; Flournoy and Smith, 2005). To ensure continued progress in addressing deficiencies, the Capability Development Mechanism (CDM) replaced the working groups as a permanent feature of ESDP. The focus is assisting and pushing states on qualitative and quantitative improvements in capabilities through (primarily) a bottom-up approach; the initiation and leadership of specific panels and projects in areas identified as deficient are states' responsibilities, but EU committees help coordinate work across nations. Part of the CDM entails having the HTF publish an annual capabilities improvement chart displaying progress in addressing recognized shortfalls and deficits in EU, mainly, but not exclusively, those pledged to the HG force catalog. Though lacking legal authority to enforce improvements, annual reviews of progress on capabilities create "peer pressure" to reform domestic defense structures to meet the quantitative pledges made and, importantly, the qualitative standards necessary for operational interoperability. Furthermore, there are now also common EU exercises conducted according to newly established EU training guidelines, based on NATO standards. The Exercise Program is designed to allow proper testing and validation of structures, procedures, and arrangements "through a sequence of increasingly challenging exercises in order to ensure appropriate readiness and efficient functioning in a crisis" (Von Sydow, 2001).

By late 2006, some deficiencies had been overcome (e.g., operational headquarters, strategic transport, nuclear, biological and chemical protection, and medical supplies), some were soon to materialize (airlift, support helicopters), others remained lacking (space assets, in-air refueling, see the section on armaments integration).

### ***Headline Goals Updated***

Part of the second phase of the Headline Goal development to improve rapid deployment capabilities in a sudden crisis include the formation of smaller, mobile EU Battle Groups (BG). Operational tasks currently envisioned for BGs include all those in the "Petersberg Tasks" (Article 17.2 of the EU Treaty), including conflict prevention, peace enforcement, regional stabilization, reconstruction and military advice, evacuations, or assistance to ongoing humanitarian operations; however, this does not rule out offensive operations when so necessitated.

### A Battle Group

is the minimum militarily effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of either stand-alone operations, or the initial phase of larger operations. It is based on a combined arms, battalion-sized force and reinforced with combat support and combat service support elements. Depending on the mission, the BG could have a strength of about 1500 personnel. (Hamelink, 2005, 2)

The Headline Goal planning horizon for BGs is five years, with EU member states offering their BG packages at the biannual, EUMS-chaired, BG coordination conference. There are thirteen national and multinational BGs, each of which has a battalion-sized force, support elements (including preidentified logistics). This arrangement enables BGs to be deployed separately, or jointly, as part of a larger operation. Most BGs have specialty areas such as mine-sweeping, chemical and biological weapons (CBWs), or special operations forces. All BGs must be deployable within five days of an EU Council decision to initiate an operation—which is preceded by EUMS identification of a task for the EU and operational recommendations by the EUMC—and be sustainable for at least thirty days, extendable to one hundred twenty. Since January 2007 the EU has been able to undertake two concurrent single BG-sized rapid-response operations, with full support structures for both (Table 16.2).

The contributing states guarantee that each BG is deployable and capable of meeting the set minimum standards for EU deployment, but the certification is also monitored by the EUMC and the EUMS, thus ensuring consistency and overall cohesion of the capabilities available to the EU. BG training remains primarily the responsibility of the contributing states, although larger biannual EU and EU–NATO training exercises provide valuable operational training. The Headline Goal agreement, the BGs, and the growing number of EU operations (discussed below), have led to enhanced cross-national military cooperation and coordination between affected ministries, as well as institutionalized coordination with EU authorities. This improves the knowledge of each other's military capabilities, facilitating rapid decision making when an EU operation is launched.

An intra-EU division of labor, or role specialization, is increasingly visible, yet without a fully integrated defense command and force structure EU capabilities will be hampered, even as capabilities and interoperability improve. Though some brigades are under multinational command (e.g., there are cases with a German commander of a Dutch brigade; a Swede in charge of a joint Swedish–Finnish brigade), these, like equipment and force structuring under RMA, need to become “second nature.” As many requirements necessitate increased commitments from larger states (e.g., transport, headquarters), smaller states with specific strengths, and eager to be perceived as equal contributors alongside military powers, such as

<b>Table 16.2 Capabilities Employed: Operational Structures</b>				
<i>Capabilities Shortfalls and Catalog Deficits</i>	<i>Progress 2002–2006</i>	<i>Impact</i>	<i>Qualitative/Readiness Shortfalls</i>	<i>Projects and Initiatives</i>
<b>Land</b>				
Attack helicopter battalions	≈	S		Yes
Composite army aviation battalions	≈		R	Yes
Medium/heavy helicopter transport battalions	≈			Yes
Reconnaissance and liaison helicopter battalions	≈			Yes
Nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) battalions	Solved			
NBC Coy (balanced)	≈		R	
Logistic battalion	≈		R	
Surveillance and target acquisition (STA)/Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) battalions	≈	S		Yes
STA units	≈	S		
Medical collective protection unit role 3	≈			Yes
Deployable laboratories		S	Q	Yes
<b>Maritime</b>				
Carrier-based air power	≈			Yes
Helicopter Carrier	≈			
Primary casualty receiving ship (PCRS)	≈			
Port and shipping advisory team	≈			
Seaport of disembarkation (SPOD) unit				
Amphibious brigade HQ (including signal company)	≈		R	
<b>Air</b>				
Combined air operations center (CAOC)	Solved		R	
Suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD)	≈	S		Yes
Air-to-air refueling (AAR)	≈	S		Yes

<b>Table 16.2 Capabilities Employed: Operational Structures (Continued)</b>				
<i>Capabilities Shortfalls and Catalog Deficits</i>	<i>Progress 2002–2006</i>	<i>Impact</i>	<i>Qualitative/Readiness Shortfalls</i>	<i>Projects and Initiatives</i>
Combat search and rescue (CSAR)	≈	S		Yes
Tactical air transport (TCC-M)	≈			Yes
Cruise missiles and precision guided munitions (PGM) equipped A/C	≈	S		Yes
Tactical air support for maritime operations (TASMO) aircrafts (A/C)	Solved		R	
Dispersed operating base (DOB) air traffic control (ATC) and fire and crash support element	≈			
DOB fuel distribution support element	≈			
DOB personnel support element	≈			
<b>C3I</b>				
Operation headquarters (OHQs)		S	Q	Yes
Force headquarters	≈	S	Q	Yes
Land component commander (LCC) headquarters	≈	S	Q	Yes
Maritime component commander (MCC) headquarters	≈	S	Q	Yes
Air component commander (ACC) headquarters	≈	S	Q	
<b>Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR)</b>				
Imagery intelligence collection	≈	S		Yes
Signal intelligence collection	≈	S		Yes
Early warning and distant detection strategic level	≈	S		Yes
Theatre surveillance and reconnaissance air picture	≈	S		Yes

<b>Table 16.2 Capabilities Employed: Operational Structures (Continued)</b>				
<i>Capabilities Shortfalls and Catalog Deficits</i>	<i>Progress 2002–2006</i>	<i>Impact</i>	<i>Qualitative/Readiness Shortfalls</i>	<i>Projects and Initiatives</i>
Theater surveillance and reconnaissance ground picture	≈	S		Yes
<b>Strategic Mobility</b>				
Strategic airlift		S	R: in relation to passenger aircraft	Yes
Strategic sealift (including strategic medical evacuation)	≈	S		Yes
<b>Other Capability</b>				
Tactical ballistic missile defence	≈	S	Q	Yes
<b>Catalog Deficits</b>				
Force headquarters (FHQ) carrying ship	≈			Yes
Repair support ship	≈			
Amphibious ship	≈		R	Yes
Patrol vessel/Corvette (PV/FS)	Solved			
Harbor and shallow water mine counter measures (MCM) unit	≈			
Aircraft carrier (CV)-based recce pods	≈		R	
Division HQ	≈		R	
Light infantry brigade HQ	≈			Yes
Light/medium armored squadrons	≈			Yes
Mechanized infantry battalion			R	Yes
Light infantry battalions	≈			Yes
Amphibious infantry battalion	≈		R	
Field artillery battalion (amphibious)	≈		R	
Short range air defense (SHORAD) battalion			R	Yes

<b>Table 16.2 Capabilities Employed: Operational Structures (Continued)</b>				
<i>Capabilities Shortfalls and Catalog Deficits</i>	<i>Progress 2002–2006</i>	<i>Impact</i>	<i>Qualitative/Readiness Shortfalls</i>	<i>Projects and Initiatives</i>
Ground-based air defense (GBAD) medium level battalion	≈		R	Yes
Ground-based air defense (GBAD) battery	Solved		R	
GBAD battery (amphibious)	≈		R	
Combat engineer battalion (amphibious)	≈		R	
General support engineer battalions	≈			
General maintenance engineer battalions	≈	S		
Reconnaissance squadrons (amphibious)	≈		R	
Medical treatment facilities role 3 (including in-theater ashore and afloat medical treatment facilities)	Solved		R	
Multinational support unit (MSU) battalion	≈		R	
Forward tactical aeromedical evacuation helos	Solved		R	
<p><i>Note:</i> S = Satisfactory.  R = Situation has improved.  ≈ = Situation remains approximately the same.  Q = Significant in the assessment of capabilities.  J = One column identifies qualitative (Q)/Readiness (R) shortfalls.  The Projects and Initiatives Column do not reflect definitive commitments</p> <p><i>Source:</i> Council of the European Union Press Office, Brussels, 2006.</p>				

France or Britain, pledge contributions in their respective specialty (mine-sweeping, peacekeeping, WMDs etc.), thereby committing themselves to maintaining these niche areas at the expense of a total defense system. The lack of comprehensive national defenses, combined with common external borders, make states increasingly dependent on other members even for territorial defense assistance, should such be necessary (as recognized through the “solidarity clause” noted above).

Excluded from the EU's arsenal are nuclear weapons; weapons all west European states have the capability to produce, yet which all but two have chosen not to pursue. Britain and France have long been members of the nuclear weapons club, with former French President Chirac declaring that his country's nuclear missiles would be used in response to a large-scale attack in Europe by an external power or entity (terrorists), even if the attack occurred outside French territory.

One major problem area for the EU is logistics, another command and control. Most EU forces are still largely static, a conspicuous problem when considering that with the necessary troop rotations inherent in any operation, as well as the need for at least a few reserve brigades, only fifteen to seventeen brigades, or fifty thousand European troops—15 percent of all uniformed soldiers—can currently (2006) be deployed simultaneously. Currently Britain and France have the most, albeit, limited capabilities for air and sealift, mostly C141s (fifty-four) and A200s (twenty-eight), respectively, with Germany and Italy also possessing a dozen each. The UK also has sixty intra-theater C130 airlift planes (compared to the United States' over four hundred), and some EU states have leased similar planes from Ukraine. While this and other deficiencies are being addressed, with vast improvements in airlift, command and communication, technological advances and interoperability phased in from 2008 to 2012 (including, e.g., A-400M transport planes, a new command headquarters, a European Strike Fighter, the Joint Strike Fighter, and the Euro-missile), interim strategic airlift capabilities (SALIM) have been secured. Several states (including Britain, France, Germany, and Italy) have guaranteed short-notice airlift capabilities (Antonov AN-124-100, C-141 and A200 model aircrafts) for all EU operations. The Global Approach on Deployability (GAD), part of Headline Goal 2010 and run out of the EUMS is critical here. Emphasizing that the EU, no later than 2010, must have the necessary capacity and full efficiency in strategic lift in support of anticipated operations, the GAD works to coordinate all European strategic air, land and sea-lift assets through the Strategic Airlift Coordination Cell located within the European Airlift Center at Air Base Eindhoven (the Netherlands), which also hosts the Sealift Coordination Center. The cell is supported by the Greek Sealift Center in Athens, which is helpful in case of Mediterranean and North African operations. Both cells are also available to NATO.

### ***The Armaments Industry as It Relates to Capabilities***

A competitive European defense industrial sector is key to achieving improved capabilities, while diminishing operational reliance on the United States. Notwithstanding universal agreement that the best way to improve EU capabilities is through commonality in force structures and equipment (Whitney, 2005), political objections in a sector steeped in nationalistic pride, protectionism, subsidies, and legislative barriers to transnational ownership have long prevented such



developments (Guay, 2005), and was also why formal EU-wide convergence criteria were rejected when establishing the Headline Goal.

The European Defense Agency (EDA), established in 2004, is under the authority of the EU Council and headed by the HR. It has a staff of eighty and a steering board, composed of one delegate from each participating state, usually double-hatted with the EUMC, and one nonvoting representative from the EU Commission, which serves as the EDA decision-making body. The EDA scrutinizes members' defense capabilities and their pledges to the EU, while also presenting armaments policy recommendations to the GAERC. Following the determination by the EUMC of the EU's military requirements and shortfalls, and the political priorities set by the PSC, EDA experts work to redress these needs by seeking to coordinate, promote, and help facilitate armaments R&D and procurement among member states (including legal contracts), and promote wherever possible the pooling of states' resources (Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP, articles 13.2, 17, 20, 21). ECAP project groups were merged with EDA Capability Technology groups (staffed with member states' experts and networked to all members) in 2006, and will, under the control of the EDA, focus on R&T, complementing the capability-driven priorities. This "bottom-up" approach, starting with EU members prioritizing and specifying defense needs, and project groups identifying shortfalls via the capabilities catalog, and areas suitable for EU-wide integration, is indicative of the ESDP. This approach keeps national agencies involved in EU projects, providing valuable input and feedback to EU agencies and committees. Progress reports on ECAP is submitted by the EDA and the EUMC to the GAERC annually.

The agency's administrative costs are financed through member contributions, with projects financed by participating member states. The EDA has legal personality, meaning it can enter binding agreements on behalf of members with third parties. Its budget was €25 million in 2005, and €40 million in 2006, with additional research funding pending negotiations among states (as of November 2006). Although the budget requires unanimity, Council members agreed that as many decisions as possible will be taken by majority voting (Dempsey, 2004).

The EDA has four directorates (capabilities, R&T, armaments, and defense industry/market), and the agency's potential benefits for the development of European capabilities are considerable. In 2006, EU member states spent €2.3 billion on defense R&T, equal to 1.25 percent of total defense spending, and 11 percent of R&T (€280 million) spending was multinational. To this effect, the EDA Armaments Directorate surveys member states' intended upgrades of major equipments, with the aim of facilitating collaborative development or procurement of new technologies, subsystems, or components. It also reviews existing multinational collaboration projects with the goal of finding other members that might be encouraged to participate in replenishment or follow-up purchases. A major problem in arms consolidation and expanding collaborative projects is Article 296 of the Treaty on the European Union. This allows states to exempt from intra-EU competition—the internal market governing goods and service—all products with

defense implications. The 2006 voluntary Code of Conduct of Defense Procurement (premised on the Framework agreement), aims to establish a true European defense equipment market (excluding nuclear weapons and cryptographic equipment) to further integrate the rapidly consolidating European armaments market. Members commit to maximize fair and equal opportunities for all suppliers in all states by publicizing procurement opportunities through a new electronic bulletin board operated by the EDA, and data for contracts awarded will be made available (Spongenberg, 2006). This all ensures transparent and objective criteria for selecting bidders and awarding contracts. The EDA thus establishes a link between military planning, defense research, and armaments R&T and procurement, thus helping to foster standardization of equipment, translating common capability needs into common procurement projects, and assisting in the rationalization of Europe's patchwork of armaments arrangements and institutions (Schmitt, 2005).

Defense industrial mergers and acquisitions, along with multinational framework agreements—and pushed by the EDA—are rationalizing the EU defense market, reducing overlap and redundancy, while improving collective capabilities. Armaments procurement falls outside the regulatory framework of the EU free trade area (see Article 296 of the EU Treaty), yet a diminished international arms market, increasingly sophisticated and costly weapons and weapon systems, and shorter production lines, are pushing leading industry representatives and policy makers to realize the necessity of reducing inefficiency, all while improving industry competitiveness (e.g., Schmitt, 2005; Guay and Callum, 2002). Between 1998 and 2005 Europe witnessed a massive merger and acquisition phase, leaving the EU with two armaments champions in the European Aerospace and Defense Company (EADS) and British Aerospace Industry (BAE), with roughly five other internationally competitive yet more specialized companies (including Finmeccanica, the Italian helicopter specialist, Thales and Rolls-Royce plc). BAE now also owns parts of Northrop-Grumman through a subsidiary, thereby making substantial inroads in North America, to the benefit of European competitiveness.

The Organization for Joint Cooperation in Armaments (OCCAR), a five-state organization (Great Britain, France, Germany, Spain, and Italy) was formed to coordinate and administer armaments procurements and collaborative defense equipment programs. It administers the *Tiger* attack helicopter, the Future Surface-to-Air Euromissile family, and the A400M transport aircraft. The “Framework Agreement Concerning Measures to Facilitate the Restructuring and Operation of the European Defense Industry” (FA), a treaty agreement among the OCCAR states plus Sweden, established a standard and rules setting organization to identify and support common R&D, facilitate and promote harmonization and standardization of technical specifications and military equipment, ensure security of supply, harmonize export procedures, and standards for security and classified information. FA members account for 80 percent of all EU arms production, 90 percent of defense industry jobs, 96 percent of exports, and 97 percent of all R&D

(Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute (SIPRI), 2004; British American Security Information Council, 2003; Flournoy and Smith, 2005, 72).

The FA, intended to facilitate the operation of an EU defense industrial market, set the stage for vast defense industrial mergers and acquisitions, which by 2010 should resemble the U.S. market (which in the 1990s went from ten large manufacturers to four). “The LoI [FA] was definitely the event destined to have the greatest potential impact on the European defense market.” (Noen, in Guay and Callum, 2002, 12). FA treaty signatories envision EU defense industrial consolidations leading to transnational EU defense companies replacing national champions, as well as mutual defense material interdependence (FA Treaty articles 4, 7, 42, 45-49). FA signatories also supported the EDA as it enables an EU forum for expanded defense- and armaments-related discussions and projects while seeking to harmonize standards (Interview with Diplomatic Personnel, Brussels, 2000).

In fact, EDA structures and EU policies have been premised on the FA, including two EU “Codes of Conduct:” one addressing arms exports is nearly identical to that used by FA signatories, thus virtually ensuring EU-wide adherence to the code (which, name notwithstanding, is far more stringent than the previous arms embargo). The other “code” adopted enables European companies to compete for all defense procurement contracts worth over €1 million, thus applying internal free-market rules to defense, and making Europe more like the U.S. market. However, nuclear and chemical weapons are excluded, and EU members are still allowed to exempt “highly sensitive” contracts, even if such cases need to be “well-justified” to the GAERC.

A true EU armaments market makes for harmonized weaponry, easing interoperability while improving efficiency and enhancing capabilities in EU defense operations, and will likely materialize within a decade.

### ***Links to NATO Assets to Improve Capabilities***

NATO was the only preexisting organization with military standards, training facilities and headquarters, operational experience, and assets. Given that the ESDP is explicitly meant to complement and supplement the alliance’s work, much work in the ESDP is tied to NATO.

The EU–NATO relationship has several components. NATO and EU (PSC) ambassadors have met regularly since 2000, and there are formal and informal military staff meetings between the two organizations. Committee meetings and officer interaction and exchange are important steps in establishing a working relationship between the EU and NATO, allowing the EU to learn from NATO’s experience while ensuring that the alliance remains informed of all developments. There is an EU–NATO Capability Group coordinating cooperation between the ECAP and NATO’s project groups and overseeing reforms and improvements in the two organizations to ensure compatibility in all areas between participating states. Part

of close weekly cooperation among EU and NATO military staff include regular EU–NATO working groups, emanating from the respective organization’s military committees and addressing operational procedures, training, and equipment. Most EU–NATO members double-hat their representatives when possible (meaning the same person sits on the EU and NATO committee). This is done to ensure continuity, but also to minimize potential personnel conflicts and reduce the number of people accessing sensitive information.

Even with the political and military institutions in place, many ESDP operations require access to certain NATO assets, placing pressure on complete interoperability between all EU and NATO states’ forces and equipment. An agreement formalized in 2003 (“Berlin plus”) gives EU access to NATO assets such as AWAC planes, communication systems, satellite pictures, and, if needed, use of its headquarters in Mons, Belgium, during operations. There is also an agreement on NATO–EU exchange of security information (Council of European Union, 2003a). Following the security agreement national NATO specialists with significant experience of operational planning now work side by side with EU military personnel on proposals, strategies, and other aspects of military planning in the EUMC and EUMS. The EU also has a planning cell at NATO headquarters for Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), to coordinate missions where NATO assets are used.

The year 2003 saw the first joint EU–NATO training exercise focused on the interaction between EU and NATO at the strategic politico–military level, and has been followed by annual exercises at various levels of scope and command (including joint troop exercises).

## **The Military Culture**

When the ESDP was conceived it was deemed essential that EU security and defense institutions be erected as quickly as possible in order to ensure autonomy and to promote an “EU security culture” (Howorth, 2001, 769). Many argue that to be effective the EU must establish a “strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and ... robust intervention” and “transform our militaries into more flexible, mobile forces and enable them to address the new threats, more resources for defense and more active use of resources ... systemic use of pooled and shared assets” (ESS, 2003, 11, 12). To this effect it is essential that the military “understands the political objectives they are working to achieve so that they can design their strategy to ensure that the effects of actions by soldiers on the ground are consistent with political goals” (Kaldor and Salmon, 2006, 28). Years later it is evident that member states policy makers and military personnel increasingly place national security needs in a broader European context, including new technologies, industries, and policies (Whitney, 2005). One contributing factor is the more practical nature of defense vis-à-vis foreign policy; the latter is laden with historical, ethnic, cultural, and other sentiment-laden, value-based characteristics. Aiding the practical (implementation)

side is that military personnel, including defense ministers, frequently speak a more “similar language” (Whitney, 2005) because of their similar military training; they frequently find common grounds on practical problems facing the states and the region (Howorth, 2001, 767–782; personal communication, Brussels, 2003; Whitney, 2005).

### ***Brusselization***

An institutionalization, or “Brusselization effect”—with EU perspectives and values—has pushed harmonization of views and practices and contributed to altered national security and defense policies, while speeding up domestic security and defense reforms in member countries. The permanence of military institutions, along with the informal defense ministers’ Council, quickly began to promote a greater harmonization of views as military personnel (Howorth, 2001, 767; Eliasson, 2004a); and the EU foreign and security policy dimension has consciously and unconsciously become part of policy makers’ basis for setting national policy (Manners and Whitman, 2000, 243). The ease of interaction available to military representatives at different levels in the ESDP, and with NATO representatives, frequently resulting in common cross-national military positions on issues under discussion, has begun to generate a harmonization through norms and accepted behavior essential to a functioning military organization. Military and civilian personnel from across Europe are socialized in the EU environment (Eliasson, 2004; Missiroli, in Gnesotto et al., 2004, 56), what analysts call “going native” (Checkel, 2003). Eliasson (2004), through analysis of official documents and statements, and numerous personal interviews with policy makers, diplomats, and military personnel over a three-year period, provides evidence of how EU membership and developments in ESDP has contributed extensively to harmonizing participating individuals’ perspectives. This is particularly true for smaller, and/or neutral, states, whose foreign policy apparatuses do not equal those of, for example, France or Britain, which need to make use greater of the resources in EU institutions to further ideas and proposals in all areas, including now defense. Several officers and diplomats interviewed in 2001 and again in 2003 had changed their perspectives, referring in much more positive terms to the EU’s new defense dimension.

We see a remarkable difference after they have been here for a while, at first they stick with the official line ... then they begin to see the benefit of ESDP and *convey their experience to government officials with whom they interact and whom are increasingly receptive* ... while officials cannot, for domestic political reasons, be as clear publicly, they have recognized the significance of what is happening and the need to adjust policies and practices accordingly. (Eliasson, 2004a, 183)

Institutionalized committee work, joint planning, exercises and operations, along with armaments agreements and defense industrial integration, show how the ESDP has adopted its own culture with compromise and adaptation, leaving less room for separate economic or political maneuverability (Howorth, 2001, 776). National patterns are increasingly harmonized among member states as daily interactions between member's officers and staff at EU military headquarters reinforce common perspectives and goals in ways similar to those found in the U.S military establishment.


Increased responsibilities and a functional growth in staff (which increases further as more operations are undertaken), contributes to member state operational specialization as well as cross-national specialist interactions. It is also the case that working side by side with U.S. and EU members' NATO officials promotes a NATO-based structural cultural, even as a distinctly European perspective on operations and means-ends looms conspicuously among military personnel. Views on when and how military vis-à-vis civilian power should be used are converging in EU capitals, and the ESDP is now viewed as a natural complement to, and increasingly a component of, national security policies, thus mutually promoting and reinforcing an EU defense culture among military personnel stationed in the EU military headquarters in Brussels. Although the aforementioned developments have also in some cases fueled a tug-of-war between home-based officials and Brussels-based representatives, both on policy issues and the larger question of how much responsibility to be transferred to Brussels, in what areas, and to what institution (Egeberg, 2002, 6–8; Attina, 2001, 146; Interviews with Diplomatic Personnel, 2004), the effects of socialization also indicate that states, although formally possessing a veto, are likely to agree with one another when in a setting where existing institutions and repeated interactions provide both opportunities and constraints beyond simple interstate bargaining.

## Operations to Date Using Parts or All of the Command

The first military operation (Table 16.3) undertaken by the EU, from March to mid-December 2003, was Operation *Concordia*, in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Launched after a request from the FYROM authorities, there was no UN Security Council resolution formally authorizing the operation, although UN SC Resolution 1371 supports the “security presence” in FYROM. The EU mission was composed of some three hundred fifty personnel from twenty-seven countries, of which thirteen were EU member states, with France acting as the “framework nation,” providing headquarters for the operation. NATO assets, including AWACs were used.

*Artemis* was conducted in accordance with the UN SC Resolution 1484 (30 May 2003) and the Council's Joint Action adopted on 5 June 2003. It involved eighteen hundred personnel, and was aimed at contributing to the stabilization of the

Table 16.3 Other Operations



Source: Council of the European Union.

security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia. France was again the framework nation.

*Althea* in Bosnia Herzegovina includes 4,500 troops and support personnel (as of August 2007). It is based on a UN Chapter VII mandate, UNSCR 1575 (2004) and UNSCR 1639 (2005). The force includes troops from twenty-two EU member states, and ten supporting states, and there was also a five hundred-strong integrated police unit (IPU) based in Sarajevo, training and assessing Bosnian police officers.

On April 25, 2006, UNSC 1671 authorized the temporary deployment of a EU force to support the ongoing UN operation during the period encompassing the elections in the DR Congo. Fifteen hundred troops are stationed in the capital and around the country, with twelve states participating (Table 16.3). The planning and coordinating of the whole operation takes place in Europe. The operation headquarters (at the strategic level) was in Potsdam (Germany), and was subordinated to the PSC.

### Problems

Another problem is intelligence. There is no EU intelligence agency equivalent to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, and to properly advise the PSC, the HR

needs intelligence. Currently, without independent power to require national service to provide intelligence, the intelligence shared with the HR is at the discretion of national governments, often channeled through representatives in Brussels. Some members, notably Britain, have separate and globally extending intelligence sources, such as the UKUSA agreement on signal intelligence.<sup>1</sup> The United States and western Europe use systems, in the interest of justice and security, that gather information on their own citizens, foreign nationals, and anyone surfing the World Wide Web. The U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), through the UKUSA intelligence sharing alliance, has used the ECHELON intelligence gathering service, in conjunction with a comprehensive databasing system on a private Intranet (Intelink), to provide a searchable catalog of wide-ranging intelligence between five countries (the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada), but again, PSC and European Council access to any information gathered is subject to the discretion of a UKUSA treaty member. There is still a certain hesitancy to share intelligence across government agencies, notwithstanding interdependence and mutual vulnerability.

Within the common domestic borders of Europe, the EU has established its Schengen Information System (SIS), to share intelligence and investigatory information on people within the common borders of all the member states. While not directly tied to the military structure, its use in assessing threats in and around the European region—threats that could require military intervention if left unaddressed—is evident. Headquartered in Strasbourg, France, with satellite units in each of the member states, the SIS is a computerized network that allows the easy transfer of basic information on suspects, fugitives, stolen vehicles, and other such information, between national law enforcement agencies. The updated SIS II will extend to national secret surveillance agencies, linking intelligence agencies and law enforcement across the EU, thus also providing intelligence useful in military operations, such as those in Bosnia, Kosovo, or Afghanistan. Additionally, the database will include visa information and digital photographic surveillance data, and perhaps biometrics. The HR (and the PSC) has access to commercial images bought and analyzed by the EU Satellite Center, mostly from the French Spot I and II satellites and Helios (Spain, Italy, France). Beginning in 2008 the new European satellite system, Galileo, is also intended to provide quality images for use in civilian and military operations.

## **Conclusion and Future Developments**

The ESDP constitutes a major development in the integration process of the EU, and a significant development in European military involvement internationally. The ESDP is evolving and expanding, and the rapidity with which a formal administration, legal framework, and strategic goals have been established is impressive. The continuing evolution of responsibilities demonstrate an unprecedented



and conspicuous European resolve to improving capabilities and contributing to regional and international security. Less than five years after a formal organizational structure emerged several military operations have been completed, some are ongoing, and new operational challenges await as the EU is assuming responsibilities as a global political force expanding on its significant economic clout. As an international power with multiple engagements and growing responsibilities to ensure regional and global security the Union's willingness to act in multiple environments in different types of operations is shaping the international security environment.

Transnational, as well as interinstitutional, specialists' interactions have further promoted harmonization among member states' policies, easing the construction and expansion of the ESDP. Increased responsibilities and a functional growth in staff, concomitant with new operations, has also contributed to skill specialization in member states' armed forces. A strong ESDP and close ties with NATO is increasingly accepted as improving the security of the EU and its member states in ways that previously were the responsibility of each country. From non-NATO states to long-time Atlantic alliance members, European integration has expanded and deepened solidarity beyond economic interdependence, to include military cooperation and the security and defense of European citizens and interests against an all-encompassing array of threats. Members' commitments allow smaller states in particular to specialize in certain areas and on certain skills, thereby improving their own, and by extension EU, resource utilization and contributing valuable skills to the ESDP.

Nonetheless, while, as discussed above, a European defense culture is emerging through harmonized perspectives and policies, nationalistic thinking has not completely dissipated. Klaus Naumann, former chairman of the NATO Military Committee and chief of Defense in Germany, complained when commenting on European defense: "Multilateralism is the only [viable] approach but Europe is haunted by nationalism" (2005). Thus, national traditions and consensus-based decision making, exacerbated by the 2004 ten-country expansion, remain obstacles to the optimization of European resources, capabilities, and, ultimately, international influence.

Much remains to be done to smoothly employ what the EU boasts as its strength: Being the only security actor who can deploy the entire range of civilian and military instruments to address a crisis. It is presumed that by 2012 the EU will be able to deploy one or two BGs, or a battalion for peace enforcement, within twenty-four hours; a brigade-size force within a week, and the full EU multinational corps (sixty thousand) within six weeks of a decision to engage. An integrated European defense, with common strategy, command, arms procurement, exercises, and operations, is not only the goal of many Europeanists, but is also supported by many U.S. strategic thinkers as an indispensable tool for improving transatlantic defense cohesion, including the strengthening of NATO as a result of improved European capabilities.

## Note

1. With an operational nerve center at NSA headquarters in Fort Meade and listening posts located all over the world, the two most notable in Menwith Hill of Yorkshire and in Sugar Grove, West Virginia, some three billion communications are intercepted per day. Those intercepts are sieved through by each member state's "dictionary," a compendium of terms, names, numbers, IP addresses, and any other key bits of information submitted by member states respectively, keeping only those intercepts that match one of the Dictionary terms submitted by one of the member states, and is then forwarded on to those member states for which there is a match. (Bamford, 2001, 404.)

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## Chapter 17

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# Transformation at Last? Achieving Radical Military Reform in the Czech Republic and Slovakia\*

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### Introduction

Central and Eastern European (CEE) militaries have undergone dramatic changes in the postcommunist era. All have conducted significant downsizing, reoriented their national security strategies and military doctrines to adapt to the post-Cold War strategic environment, and achieved the essential elements of subordination to democratic political control. Three CEE states, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland, were granted North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership in the first stage of NATO's post-Cold War enlargement in 1997. Seven more received invitations at the Prague Summit in November 2002: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,

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Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania. However, all cases are still victims of their Warsaw Pact legacies which have had a long-term impact on their societies, politics, and national security cultures. The greatest challenges exist in states that are adapting national security apparatuses inherited from the communist era. The Baltic states, Slovenia, and to some degree Slovakia, had the benefit of creating their national security systems from scratch.

This chapter focuses on the current efforts in the Czech Republic and Slovakia to finally undertake radical systemic military reform. Although each state has made significant contributions to NATO missions as either an ally or partner, each has done so without the benefit of rational defense planning systems that can set priorities and match resources to defense needs. Communist-era bureaucratic management practices have persisted as key national security institutions' efforts remain uncoordinated. Personnel systems remain unreformed as the "inverted pyramid" structure on hand in 1989 still lingers. Capabilities are low due to outdated equipment, shortfalls in human resources, and systemic limitations.

In 2001 both the Czech Republic and Slovakia began an attempt to break the cycle of inefficiency and lack of capability and institute radical military reform. As a long-time observer of each case I was fascinated by the scope and ambition of each effort. Factors that had limited such efforts in the past had obviously changed and I wanted to understand the conditions that were finally coming together to effect real change. In each case a reform plan has been put in place and implementation is in the early stages. This comparative study analyzes the strategic context within which the reforms are being carried out and what has transpired to date in each effort.<sup>1</sup>

## **Backdrop for Reform: NATO Enlargement and the New Security Realities**

In order to understand the direction that the Central and Eastern European security structures have taken in the post-Cold War era, it is essential to consider the parallel adaptations that have occurred within NATO. Since 1989, NATO has been engaged in the primary task of adapting its political and military infrastructure to the new threats and opportunities of the European, and now increasingly global, security landscape. Chief among the new opportunities was the possibility of reaching out to the former adversaries to the East to integrate the newly democratizing states into the West's premier security organization.

Meanwhile, as CEE states surveyed the options available to meet the security needs of their states, the cooperative security approach embodied in NATO suited both their severe resource constraints and their goal of integration into Western institutions. NATO launched its Partnership for Peace (PFP) initiative in 1994 laying out in vague terms the criteria and timelines for accession. Participation in non-Article 5 alliance activities, the conduct of a minimum level of military reform

in order to develop compatible military forces, and evidence that democratic forces had a firm hold on the domestic politics of the transitioning states were all important factors for accession.

The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were swept into the Alliance in 1997 amid a sort of political euphoria that these former “captive nations” had made the dramatic political and economic transformations, along with some progress toward reforming their national security structures, that merited admission to a key Western club. This first stage of post-Cold War enlargement had fundamentally a moral and political character. There was not a great expectation that substantive military capabilities be contributed immediately. The common view was that defense reforms initiated in the candidacy and accession periods would proceed with the result of the interoperability and capability gaps gradually closing within a decade or so.

All three “first-wavers” fell far short of NATO military standards at the point of accession. Poland was largely regarded as having the most professional armed forces, with the Czech Republic and Hungary holding down distant second and third places. The Czech Republic and Hungary have been continually berated as “new allies” for not living up to the commitments established in the accession process to improve their military capabilities. The Czechs have responded with the reform plan detailed in this chapter, while Hungary seems to have accepted the moniker of “most disappointing new member of NATO” (Wallander, 2002).

## **The Impact of 9-11 on the Continued Importance of CEE Defense Transformation**

In the period between accession of the “first-wavers” on March 12, 1999 and September 11, 2001 it was widely assumed that at the Prague Summit distinctions would be made among the NATO aspirants based on their varied rates of progress toward achieving the criteria laid out in the individual Membership Action Plans (MAP) that each member was following as its path to NATO membership. Pundits predicted that Slovakia and Slovenia would be welcomed because of the commitment to reform that the Slovaks had demonstrated in the two years leading up to the summit. The Slovenes, though still in need of reforming their defense structures, would be invited because of their political progress and the ease of absorbing such a small armed force into the NATO system. The Baltic states’ admission would depend on the U.S.’s enthusiasm for antagonizing Russia, which had consistently opposed the admission of its former republics. Finally, Bulgaria and Romania’s domestic political situations seemed too tenuous to be resolved with sufficient certainty of the continued dominance of democratic forces by 2002.

However, the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 completely changed the calculus of enlargement. Testifying before Congress in



June 2002, Robert Bradtke, deputy assistant secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, laid out the Bush administration's new view, "We want as many allies as possible in the struggle against those who would destroy our way of life and who would threaten us with terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction" (Bradtke, 2002). He went on to credit all nine candidates (to include Albania and Macedonia who did not receive invitations at Prague) for taking the MAP process seriously and for making "real progress."

This focus on the primacy of providing capabilities and assets, no matter how small, to contribute to the war on terrorism, coupled with the Bush administration's preference to increasingly regard NATO as a "tool box" from which forces and niche capabilities can be drawn upon to contribute to U.S.-led coalitions, has resulted in the downplaying of overall military capabilities at the point of accession. Assessments evaluating the progress in the MAP process concluded that none of the nine aspirants had fully met the formal criteria for membership and that the military capabilities of all are substantially weaker than those of the "first-wavers" at the time they were invited to join in 1997 (Moroney, 2002).

Observers predicted that NATO would signal its future direction—toward a more politically oriented Euro-Atlantic talking society or toward a reinvigorated defense organization committed to retool further to maintain its relevance vis-à-vis global threats—with the scope of the enlargement at Prague. A smaller enlargement taking in only the most capable candidates would send a message that accession standards are necessarily high because the Alliance must be careful to absorb only those armed forces that will not dilute the Alliance's capacity to deploy integrated forces through NATO integrated structures to take on NATO-led missions. A larger enlargement, such as the "big bang" approach undertaken at Prague, was thought to be a signal that NATO was defunct as a military organization. Groucho Marx once quipped, "I'd never join any club that would have me as a member." Extending invitations to states with armed forces substantially below NATO standards and to some states with uncertain democratic futures, given the negative experience of trying to keep the first-wave allies on track, would seem to indicate that delivering military capabilities was no longer NATO's *raison d'être*. Allowing such a development would signal further the Bush administration's intention to continue to bypass NATO as a key instrument of its foreign and security policy.

What actually happened at Prague, however, was more of a mixed and complex message. NATO favored the "big bang" enlargement, yet at the same time insisted that the Alliance was entering a new era of relevance and would be a prime player in the war on terrorism, as well as be a force to put down other global threats. Summit leaders approved the formation of a joint 21,000 Response Force to have initial operational capability no later than October 2004, streamlined the command structure, and adopted the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) that will newly focus the allies, new and old alike, on making major gains to improve military capabilities in key areas.

What do these developments portend for the prospects of sustaining military reform in CEE within both the new and newly invited allies? There is universal agreement that leverage over new members diminishes drastically once the “golden ring of NATO membership” is achieved. Indeed, some have proposed organizational mechanisms through which underperforming members can be sanctioned and, if nonperformance persists, dismissed from the Alliance (Wallander, 2002, 6–7). The adoption of such a mechanism would be a positive lever for ensuring continued progress on improving the defense capacities of the CEE states. The return of a NATO capable of leading coalitions would also be an impetus for continued reform. An Alliance concerned with the ability of its members to perform military missions in an integrated fashion would be more likely to keep the pressure on members straying from the interoperability standards required to be successful in such operations. The alternative is the scenario that has already played out in U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In these cases the essential capability is the ability to make specific niche contributions to enhance and support the U.S. military machine. To be a player in a security environment where the United States does all the heavy military lifting, while ancillary players contribute according to their means, CEE allies will have to develop individual niche abilities in order to participate.

A final motivation to follow through with the military reforms that will yield increased capabilities may be found in states that value the perception that they are “security contributors” to the multinational challenge of meeting transnational threats—regardless of whether or not they are members of NATO. Ratislav Kacer, state secretary of the Slovak Ministry of Defense, articulated this view for Slovakia:

The reform of the armed forces is mainly connected with the new reality and new security challenges in the world. We must abandon the Cold War model and adopt the armed forces of a modern European democracy, which has nothing to do with NATO membership, although the success of transformation increases our qualification for NATO. But Slovakia would have to undergo such a development even without the membership. (Czech News Agency [CTK], 2002)

Kacer added that Slovakia was interested in expressing “the ability of playing an active role in world politics, contributing to the solution of emergency situations, and showing a certain international maturity. I would not like to link this with NATO membership” (CTK, 2002). Although the direction and relevance of NATO may still lack certainty in the wake of the Prague Summit, the current international security environment calls for increased capabilities on the part of all states whose interests are threatened by the transnational threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, as well as the challenges of dealing with failed states, resolving postconflict societies, and nation building. These tasks will require a spectrum of capabilities sustained over an indefinite timeline. The United States

does not have the resources to take on these challenges alone. It is within this context that the success of military reform in CEE states, and within other states with shared interests, is important. This is the spirit within which the Slovak and Czech cases will be explored. The hope is that by studying these cases and following them through the implementation phase, lessons for other CEE states that have experienced intractable problems in carrying out comprehensive military reform, yet seek to contribute some capabilities toward countering regional and global threats, will be learned.

## **Slovakia: Slovak Republic Force 2010**

### ***Background Leading to Reform***

The Army of the Slovak Republic (ASR) has only existed since 1993 when Slovakia became an independent state, but its historical legacy follows a line of succession back to the Czechoslovak Army (1989–1993 and 1918–1938), the Czechoslovak People's Army (1948–1989), and in the partisan resistance to the Slovak German puppet state in World War II. Problems of organization and reorganization have plagued the ASR from its inception as it was forced to deal with the challenge of building a national security structure out of the assets inherited from the division of Czechoslovakia in 1993. The Slovaks shouldered the greater burden of reorganization of the two new states because they received only one third of the joint assets and had to create not only their national security institutions but their entire governmental structure from scratch. This posed such practical challenges as finding the requisite office space to staffing the myriad positions throughout government and the security community (Ulrich, 2002). The overwhelming challenge proved to be adapting the former Warsaw Pact legacy organizations, doctrine, and management systems to the needs of the new sovereign state (Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic, 2002, 3).

Although the Slovak government was on record for supporting accession to both the European Union (EU) and NATO since 1993, little was done to advance these objectives until the Meciar government was voted out of power in 1998. Bold reform plans can be found dating to the first few years of the Meciar regime; however, no evidence of substantive implementation throughout those years exists (Samson, 2002, 146–147). From the start, Slovakia was a member of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), a body created to facilitate consultation and cooperation with the former Eastern bloc on political and security issues. Slovakia signed its Partnership for Peace (PfP) Framework Document in early 1994 and participated in three rounds of accession discussions in 1996.

Slovak politics under Meciar was incoherent in that public pronouncements supported the rational and practical view that Slovakia must maximize its opportunity to be integrated into European institutions, but in practice the government

was disinterested in facilitating the conditions that would facilitate such gains. Emblematic of the lip service paid to European integration aspirations was the turning over of the reins of the Ministry of Defense to the extreme nationalist Slovak National Party (SNS) even though the party openly opposed the goal of NATO membership (Szayna, 2000, 74). Meanwhile the development of a domestic political environment conducive to reaching consensus on issues of national security, or any issue for that matter, was thwarted by Meciar's refusal to let opposition politicians fully participate in the political process (Szayna, 2000, 74). The international community's repeated citations of the Meciar government for violating democratic norms led to its pointed exclusion from the first post-Cold War wave of new allies whose selections were announced at the 1997 Madrid Summit.

The Meciar period seriously affected the evolution of all Slovak institutions in general, and of the national security infrastructure in particular (Ulrich, 2000). By 1998, opposition forces tired of bankrupt economic policies, eager to restore the rule of law, and determined to integrate Slovakia into the EU and NATO, coalesced into a united front and defeated Meciar in the 1998 parliamentary elections. The new Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda had led the opposition coalition and pledged to make admission to NATO and the EU the centerpieces of Slovak foreign policy, root out corruption, restore democratic principles, and rebuild the economy (Ulrich, 2002b).

Political will to undertake reform and to commit scarce economic resources to it is a key factor for substantive reform. This did not exist in Slovakia prior to 1998. The conditions for substantive reform of Slovak national security structures finally began to take shape in the Dzurinda government. Slovakia had lost five critical years and squandered a golden opportunity to become a NATO member. Within a year of taking power, though, the Dzurinda government approved in June 1999 a program for preparing the country for NATO membership called PRENAME (Program for Preparing Slovaks for NATO Membership) (Bilchik et al., 2001, 251). This program was a marked departure from past declarations of interest in NATO membership in that it required all government ministries to coordinate their activities undertaken to support the state's candidacy for NATO membership.

Several Western defense assessments were completed which agreed that numerous serious deficiencies plagued the defense establishment. On the heels of the British and American assessments came a negative NATO Planning and Review Process (PARP) Assessment in February 2001. The Dzurinda government concluded that "an extraordinary effort had to be initiated if there was to be any hope of creating the conditions for successful reform and the changes in strategy, doctrine, organizational designs, and operational concepts that would be required" (Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic, 2002, 3). In March 2001, Prime Minister Dzurinda directed that such an effort be undertaken.

## ***Scope of Current Reform Effort***

The Minister of Defense published Ministerial Order Number 9 in March 2001 outlining the objectives, priorities, and organizational structure that should characterize long term reform. The order stated that the goal was to transform the ASR into a small but capable force interoperable with NATO and appropriately structured, trained, and equipped to meet the national security needs of the state. A Senior Level Steering Committee was established along with subordinate working groups to develop a Long Term Plan for the total reform of the ASR. The Minister of Defense State Secretary was appointed committee chairman and the Chief of the General Staff was named deputy chairman. The Deputy Chief of the General Staff supervised the work of five working groups charged with proposing reforms to the force structure, personnel system, logistics system, and process of integrating the Ministry of Defense and General Staff organizational structures. (Svec, 2002: pp. 8-9)

## ***The Role of National Security Documents***

Slovakia had been slow to put in place a comprehensive set of quality national security documents to guide the transformation of national security institutions. This was a key factor limiting the success of previous reform efforts. The Slovak Ministry of Defense published *The Defence Doctrine* (1994) followed by the *National Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic* (1996), and the *Concept of Reform to 2003*. However each of these policy and doctrinal statements was developed in the absence of an overarching national security strategy. They therefore lacked both a logical hierarchy and the consensus found in mature national security systems. U.S. Department of Defense external evaluators criticized these efforts as not adequately addressing the defense requirements and concepts of their era. The 1999 *Defense Assessment of the Slovak Republic* said that key elements essential to provide the conceptual foundation for future military reform, such as a broad national security strategy, and a subsequent national military strategy, were missing (Defense Assessment of the Slovak Republic, 2000, viii).

Consequently the specific mission given to the five working groups driving the reform process begun in 2001 was to develop a comprehensive set of national security documents as a key step to comprehensive reform. The documents to be developed included:

- The Military Strategy of the Slovak Republic
- The Organizational Structure of the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic

- The Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic: Model 2010 Concept Document
- The Long-Term Plan of Structure and Development of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic.

Key to the overall enterprise was the drafting and approval of the *Military Strategy* because this document would serve as the basis of the detailed planning process getting underway. As the reform team was being organized the National Council of the Slovak Republic approved Slovakia's first *Security Strategy* in March 2001. This document was unique in that it engaged key national security stakeholders in its drafting and for the first time articulated long-term Slovak interests (Ulrich, 2002a). The *Defense Strategy* was subsequently approved in May 2001. This document elaborated on the defense policy component of the *Security Strategy* and provided the conceptual framework for the development of the *Military Strategy*.

The *Military Strategy* surveys a variety of threats and developed different scenarios, each of which would require different force structures and capabilities depending on the nature of the threat. The *Military Strategy* concludes that the probability of a major armed conflict requiring a unilateral Slovak capacity for national defense is low, while there is a moderate probability that a regional armed conflict requiring a unilateral capacity could occur. Acknowledging and accepting the risk of not allocating the vast majority of resources toward low-probability threats made possible the decision to put forth a strategy that recommends downsizing the inherited force structure to gain savings that could be applied to such near-term priorities as enhancing NATO compatibility and interoperability, reforming the personnel system to emphasize the roles of junior officers and noncommissioned officers, introducing training management systems to improve unit training, and funding quality-of-life issues to help recruit and retain the force (*Military Strategy of the Slovak Republic*, 2001, 14–15).

The *Military Strategy* recognizes that the most likely threats will call for forces prepared to participate in “cooperative security” responses rather than territorial defense, and assumes that Slovakia would not face an aggressor alone (interview with Western Advisor to the Slovak General Staff, 2001). Despite reservations of some members of parliament that the *Military Strategy* was too vague, the National Council unanimously approved it on October 25, 2001. From March 2001 to the *Military Strategy's* approval seven months later the assumptions of its working drafts outlined above served as the conceptual guidance to the working groups as they fleshed out their specific proposals and completed the complementary documents, *Organizational Structure of the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic*, the *Program Force Model 2010* document, and *The Long Term Plan of Structure and Development of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic*. Ultimately all of these inputs served as the basis and rationale for the overall plan to reform the *ASR – Slovak Republic (SR) Force 2010*.

## ***Drafting the Plan: The Importance of Leadership, Process, and Players***

Observers agree that prior to March 2001 and the launch of *Slovak Republic: Force 2010*, reform efforts did not benefit from collaborative participation across relevant ministries or between the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense. Furthermore, the half dozen earlier attempts at reforms depended on the efforts of Moscow-educated military leaders, who were neither committed to implementing real change nor had the relevant skills to conduct such a review (interview with J. Pivaric, 2001). *SR Force 2010*, however, would be approached quite differently. In the few years leading up to *SR Force 2010* General Milan Cerovsky, chief of the General Staff, methodically assigned Western-educated officers to key positions in the Slovak Army and Ministry of Defense. These officers were then hand-picked to lead the various working groups that shaped the various dimensions of *SR Force 2010*.

“Old-school” officers opposed to sweeping reform still serve, but their influence in the drafting of the plan was marginalized in several ways. First, such officers were not given positions of responsibility on the reform teams and, second, both the military and civilian leadership sent clear signals that dissenters were “not on board” and active steps to thwart the process would not have a positive impact on such an officer’s career. Such an approach was effective in an environment where it was well understood that a likely result of the reform effort would be the downsizing of the swollen top ranks of the officer corps. However, given the tenuous political situation in Slovakia many of the reform-minded officers expressed concern that a shifting political wind could move them out of their positions of influence and facilitate a climate where the conservatives could become ascendant again.

Another key feature of the *SR Force 2010* planning process was the presence of an outside team of U.S. consultants that the Slovak government hired to assist the Slovak defense community in the drafting of the comprehensive reform plan. Cubic Applications, Inc. received a multiyear contract to help structure and implement plans for total military reform. It completed a comprehensive report in December 2000 based on four months of studying the Slovak defense system up close, which then became the basis for designing both the methodology and substance of the planning process begun in March 2001 (interview with U.S. Army Major General Bob Howard, 2001). The top civilian leadership in the Ministry of Defense eagerly acknowledged the crucial role that the U.S. consultants played. State Secretary Josef Pivaric noted that it has been easier to reach consensus on particular proposals in play in the reform process when U.S. experts stand behind them. He added, these are “fantastic experts and experienced” of such high quality (interview with Pivaric, 2001).

Clearly, the presence of the U.S. team was a critical ingredient to the whole process. Expertise was inherent in the group of outside consultants that was simply not present among the “native” members of the Slovak defense community. The U.S. consultants were careful, too, to forge good working relationships with other

influential outside advisors to the Slovak defense community. The key individuals in the Slovak case were the British brigadier, French lieutenant colonel, and German colonel assigned to advise the Chief of the General Staff, Land Forces Commander, and Defense Planning Groups, respectively. When it came to key decisions in the reform process related to the professionalization of the ASR these players usually had coordinated positions and advice, which made it easier to reach consensus on the range of issues being considered in the comprehensive reform planning process (interview with U.S. Army Major General Bob Howard, 2001).

Observers of the reform effort uniformly note that it benefits from a favorable leadership environment, from the top echelons of the national government through the military and the Ministry of Defense. There is a broad consensus across political parties on the priority of integrating Slovakia into European security and economic institutions. The concept of *SR Force 2010* was successfully pitched as a way to achieve these objectives by overhauling defense structures and concepts in order to create a more NATO-compatible force. Dzurinda infused the Ministry of Defense with experienced international bureaucrats by assigning seasoned Ministry of Foreign Affairs hands to Ministry of Defense leadership positions. The Minister of Defense, Josef Stank, as well as Ministry of Defense State Secretary, Ratislav Kacer, had served in key Ministry of Foreign Affairs roles. Stank was previously the Slovak ambassador to Prague, where he observed the Czechs become selected for and accede to NATO. Kacer had worked on international security issues at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and accepted a transfer to the Ministry of Defense with the understanding that his role was to lead a resistant bureaucracy through major reform. These civilian leaders, along with General Cerovsky, whose key role has already been noted, remained engaged in the planning process and truly led the effort at every stage.

The particular methodology of the planning process is another feature worthy of greater in-depth study. The Steering Committee met monthly to assess the progress of the individual working groups and the development of the overall plan. General Milan Cerovsky, chief of the General Staff, as well as the state secretaries for Defense, members of Parliament, and NATO ambassadors were active participants in the steering committee. Those involved with the process noted that often these high-level participants would become personally engaged in the various debates that ensued about the way ahead across the gamut of issues considered.

Slovak officers, senior Slovak defense officials, members of the American CUBIC team, and other Western advisers agree that the process of conducting the comprehensive strategic review has in and of itself resulted in significant changes that are already having an impact on how the Slovak defense community conducts its business. A key problem prior to the launch of the *SR Force 2010* strategic review was the integration of the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense. The General Staff and Ministry of Defense had only recently been co-located in Bratislava and were attempting to overcome years of uncoordinated efforts. Parallel directorates existed in each entity that rarely worked together to achieve results in common



areas of responsibility. The strategic review, however, was set up in such a way that representatives from the Ministry of Defense and General Staff were forced to serve on the various working groups together. In many cases individuals with common responsibilities had never even met. The common enterprise of serving on the working groups has helped to promote cross-institutional communication and has had some positive effect on integrating the Ministry of Defense and General Staff.

## ***An Overview of SR Force 2010***

To establish, by 2010, a professional, effective, but affordable, armed force organized, equipped and trained to comply with the military strategy of the Slovak republic, modernized to be interoperable with NATO military organizations.

### **Objective—Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic—Force 2010, p. 15**

*SR Force 2010* is a departure from all previous Slovak attempts at reform because of its scope: The effort is total, affecting all aspects of the ASR and its oversight; its political support from above (the Slovak government has given its full support to the effort); its political support from within (key Western-educated officers are staking their careers on its success); and, finally, its acceptance of realistic assumptions in terms of its matching of reform objectives with economic resources.

Another key concept to understand about *SR Force 2010* is that it embodied Slovakia's hopes for NATO membership. The timeline governing the working groups' activities appears to have been developed to be synchronous with key milestones in the months leading up to the issuance of the second wave of NATO invitations in Prague in November 2002. Indeed, one could make the case that the Slovak strategy for "earning" its way to a NATO invitation was to invest its resources in the detailed articulation of a credible defense reform plan, leaving the challenges of actual implementation to the months and years subsequent to receipt of an invitation.

## ***Key Elements of SR Force 2010***

### ***Economic Assumptions***

Previous reform efforts were severely underfunded and conducted without the benefit of a strategic planning process that effectively and realistically matched objectives with economic resources to carry them out. This led to inappropriate, incomplete, or stalled implementation. *SR Force 2010* was developed with a reasonable annual funding level in mind. The defense planners received assurances from the government that 1.89 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) was a defense

spending level that they could expect the government to maintain through 2005. From 2006 onward the expectation was that defense spending would increase to a minimum of 2 percent of GDP (Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic, 2002, 19).

### *Force Structure and Modernization*

The threat analysis conducted in the military strategy called for the development of a force structure that would transform the ASR into a smaller, but high quality force with the capability of contributing to a range of collective security operations across the entire spectrum of war. A major goal of *SR Force 2010* is to reduce the overall manpower levels from the current level of 40,000 (includes civilian employees) to approximately 24,000 personnel, with the possibility of further reductions as the final force structure evolves (Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic, 2002, 48).

Accomplishing the *Force 2010* force structure goals will require integrating and streamlining the current Ministry of Defense and GS structures to eliminate redundancy. Much of this reorganization was implemented beginning in October 2001. Departments and positions have been redesigned, eliminated, or created. However, creating a culture where the GS and Ministry of Defense effectively carry out their shared tasks in an integrated fashion requires a transformation of attitudes and ethos.

The plan also calls for centralizing training under the Training and Support Command and adopting a new military structure formed around a light infantry brigade, a mechanized infantry brigade, an artillery regiment, an engineer battalion, a signal battalion, a reconnaissance battalion, an NBC battalion, an electronic warfare battalion, and a command support battalion (Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic, 2002, 22). Air Force operations will be streamlined to consolidate tactical fighter and transport operations at a single base and helicopter operations at another base. Other air force operations will be streamlined and consolidated at single locations. Base closures will result from the force structure reorganization of both the land and air forces. Equipment modernization emphasizing a greater mix of lighter, wheeled vehicles and multi-role, more modern aircraft will also gradually be undertaken, with more resources flowing to this objective after 2006.

### *Supporting Programs: Personnel Reform*

Fundamental transformation of personnel systems has eluded most postcommunist militaries and been a major cause of these armies' lack of capabilities. Top-heavy rank structures consume defense budgets and prohibit the development of more rational structures that match needed skill sets and experience levels to the appropriate positions across the force. Colonels still outnumber captains in the ASR by a hefty margin. *Force 2010* calls for radical change that will reduce the number of senior grade officers and increase the number of junior officers and

noncommissioned officers. Yearly targets have been set in order to reach the desired force structure by 2010. The 2002 goal was to reduce the officer corps by 1000 by the end of the year. Observers report that although carrying out such reductions is inherently difficult, the Slovaks are on track. Careful management of this particular element is key to the success of the overall plan. The method of reducing the force must be perceived as fair and transparent. Slovak defense leaders must be careful to balance their multiple goals of reducing, recruiting, and retaining (interview with Brigadier Stephen Gledhill, 2002).

The ASR has also simultaneously taken on the additional challenge of eliminating conscription and moving to an all-professional force by 2006. This requires a reconceptualization of officer and noncommissioned officer roles as currently practiced in the ASR, along with conversion of present grade structures to accommodate junior, mid-level, and senior noncommissioned officer positions.

The ASR has set for itself the ambitious objective of radical force restructuring while simultaneously trying to systematize a merit-based promotion system, establish a program for separating career personnel, rationalize its compensation system, and institute a recruiting system. Inevitably, serious challenges lie ahead as the attempt to implement these reforms simultaneously gets underway.

### *Supporting Programs: Leader Development and Military Education*

*SR Force 2010* institutes systemic leader development into the ASR. This constitutes radical change. Under the current system, military education is technically oriented and focused on the development of military specialists. The reform plan will introduce leader education at all levels of the professional military education system. The plan also calls for consolidating the various military academies into a single National Defense Academy beginning in 2003 (Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic, 2002, 50).

### *Supporting Programs: Sustaining and Stationing*

The top logistical priority is to transform ASR logistics structures to ensure compatibility with NATO systems. The present twenty-six logistics bases will be reduced and consolidated into five bases by 2010. A logistics command will be created as a material management center and various services will be studied to see which can gradually shift to the civilian sector.

The requirements analysis conducted in the course of the *Force 2010* planning process concluded that of the eighty-nine separate military installations in Slovakia, only forty should be retained. According to the *Force 2010* defense planners this number is sufficient to meet the ASR's essential needs for housing, training, and support of *SR Force 2010*.

## The Czech Republic: The Concept of Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic

### *Background Leading to Reform*

Like its Slovak cousin to the east the Army of the Czech Republic (ACR) can trace its roots to predecessor forces, the Czechoslovak People's Army (CSPA) and the Czechoslovak Army (CSA). While the fledgling ACR's personnel and equipment were drawn from these previous entities, the whole strategic context of employing defense resources had dramatically changed in the postcommunist era. The new democratic political leadership directed that a purge of the officer corps be conducted to eliminate communist sympathizers. The controversial "lustration" process that ensued removed political officers and many officers of the military defense intelligence service. However, some contend that many good officers were swept away in the purge. Additionally, 150 of the 156 general officers serving at the time of the "Velvet Revolution" were dismissed (Ulrich, 2000, 28).

Early reform initiatives resulted in substantive downsizing, reorganization, and redeployment of the ACR in light of the changed strategic environment. When the communist regime fell in 1989, the CSPA was in the midst of drawing the force down from 200,000 to 93,000 to meet the limits imposed in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty (*The Army of the Czech Republic*, 1994, 1). The split of the country in 1993, therefore, complicated a reorganization process already underway. In January 1993 at the birth of the independent Czech state, the ACR numbered 106,447. Later that year the government approved a plan to draw the force down to 65,000 troops. This number was achieved in 1997. In recent years the force structure has fallen to its current level of 57,000.

In the first years of its postcommunist transition the Czech Republic was considered a model of reform, with steady growth, low unemployment, and a stable center-right government (Rhodes, 2000). The Czech Republic's overall relative success compared to the other former Warsaw Pact states vying for NATO membership, along with its active participation in the Partnership for Peace program, earned the Czechs a NATO invitation at the 1997 Madrid Summit. By 1997 incomplete and mismanaged structural reforms led to an economic downturn, from which the Czech economy is only recently emerging (Interfax News Agency, 2002). Like its democratizing neighbors economic prosperity is uneven and democratic political institutions are still developing. Political interests, corruption, incompetence, and public apathy are all features of the Czech political landscape (Ulrich, 2002c, 57).

Whereas the Slovak *SR Force 2010* was largely driven by its goal to earn a NATO invitation, the Czech reform plan is largely rooted in the realization that as a new ally it enjoys all the rights of a NATO member nation without the requisite capabilities to meet its obligations to the alliance (*Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic*, 2001, 10). In 2000 and early 2001 the Czech Republic received negative assessments both from NATO and separate evaluators from the U.S. Office of the

Secretary of Defense. NATO specifically took the Czechs to task for not fulfilling alliance commitments. In the NATO assessment, *National Chapters 2000*, evaluators noted:

Although the Czech Republic is allocating substantial sums of money to upgrading of its armed forces, the planned resources will not suffice to meet all requirements laid down in the Force Goals. Many major upgrading and modernization programs will be implemented only during subsequent defense planning cycles. If the Czech Republic wishes to be able to meet its alliance obligations and commitments in a better way, it will have to reprioritize its plans and reallocate available resources in order to ensure a more balanced and timely implementation of its modernization programs. (*Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic*, 2001)

Czech political leaders, who historically have paid minimal attention to military affairs and who have long neglected the transformation needs of the ACR, were embarrassed by the public disclosure of the assessments and moved to correct the situation. As a result of Governmental Decision 489 taken on May 14, 2001, Prime Minister Milos Zeman appointed Major General Jaroslav Skopek to head a special commission charged with developing a plan to create small, modern, sustainable, and deployable armed forces that balanced national interests with NATO obligations and resource allocation with likely threat scenarios (Skopek, 2001). Early on reformers realized that fulfilling such a task would require comprehensive defense reorganization. In May 2001, Major General Skopek and his team established the Center for the Preparation of the Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic, which became the hub of reform activities.

### ***Scope of the Current Reform Effort***

The Center's task was to complete a comprehensive defense review aimed at completely reforming the defense planning system, professionalizing the ACR and improving the prestige of the ACR in Czech society (*Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic—Objectives and Principles*, 2002). The governmental commission was assigned four fundamental missions as departure points. The reformed armed forces must (1) be capable of securing the vital and strategic interests of the state as set forth in the *Security Strategy*; (2) fulfill the commitments and obligations of the North Atlantic Alliance; (3) operate within the context of limited funds; and (4) operate within the context of limited manpower (*Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic—Interdepartmental Comments Proceedings*, 2002). The main proposed changes include overhauling force structure, instituting an effective personnel management system, implementing a rational defense planning process,

rethinking the current basing situation, and modernizing equipment and support to service personnel and units (Skopek, 2001).

### ***The Role of National Security Documents***

It is important to note that the various reform and reorganization attempts between 1989 and 1999 occurred without the benefit of either a national security strategy or a national military strategy to guide these processes. The government approved the *Security Strategy of the Czech Republic* and the *Military Strategy of the Czech Republic* in February and March 1999, respectively, on the eve of the Czechs' accession to NATO. Prior to the issuance of these documents, a series of defense concepts and national military strategies was produced; however, none was approved by Parliament until 1997. Furthermore, each document was developed in the absence of an overall national security strategy, reflecting the political guidance of the state's political leadership. In the months preceding the Reform Center's establishment, the *Strategic Defense Review (SDR)* was being worked on in the Ministry of Defense as an internal initiative. At the same time General Jiri Sedivy was conducting a parallel but uncoordinated study in the General Staff—*Vision 2010* (interview with senior western defense attaché). When the political leadership launched the more comprehensive effort both studies were put on hold. One seasoned Czech defense observer quipped, "In a paper war the Czech Republic would do great. We have lots of documents. But one doesn't know what the other is doing. Skopek's job is to come up with an overall concept" (interview with Otto Pick, 2001).

Those who have observed the Czech Republic's fits and starts in the reform echo the same bottom line—none of the restructuring processes has resulted in a qualitative change in the capabilities of the ACR. "Due to scattered resources and low efficiency of spending, their operational capabilities do not fully match the requirements and nature of operations which the Czech army can be expected to participate in" (*Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic: Analysis of Required Capabilities . . .*, 2001). Total systemic overhaul of the Czech national security system was needed.

### ***Drafting the Plan***

As in the Slovak case, Czech defense planning efforts to date had not been characterized by collaboration across the relevant ministries and between the General Staff and Ministry of Defense. The most fundamental flaw of all previous efforts was the inability to marry objectives with the resources to achieve them. Indeed, the national security system was unable to facilitate the degree of cooperation needed to even come up with an institutional consensus on what the ACR's priorities should be. The stovepipe system of managing national security, a holdover from the communist system of management, severely restricted processes aimed at organizational

change. Piecemeal reform was attempted at various points in the system on an ad hoc basis. For instance a Nuclear-Biological-Chemical (NBC) company was identified as a particular need and funded, but this unit was a stand alone entity outside the general force structure of the ACR (interview with senior Czech officer, July 2001). The Center's mandate was to overcome the systemic inertia and prioritize objectives against which resources could be applied to effect qualitative change in ACR capabilities. This mandate led to the identification of the defense planning structure, itself, as a key priority in the reform effort.

Unlike previous efforts, the current reform effort has the support of the key players in the Czech political scene. Major General Skopek was granted unprecedented government powers and access to carry out his task. He reported directly to the prime minister and enjoyed the personal support of President Vaclav Havel, who used his influence to bring the leaders of the various political parties on board. (interview with senior Czech officer, July 2001). Furthermore, Major General Skopek was allowed to assemble a team of the "best and brightest," including many Western-educated officers, to put together the plan.

Successful implementation also depends on the placement of key leaders throughout the Czech defense bureaucracy. Minister Jaroslav Tvrdik, who is not connected with any particular political party, was brought in to be an agent of change. The 32-year-old former ACR lieutenant colonel replaced Defense Minister Vladimir Vetchy, who had been embroiled in various acquisition scandals (interview with senior western defense attaché, July 2001). His military expertise certainly surpassed that of the eight mediocre ministers who preceded him, but some worried that his recent service at the relatively junior rank of lieutenant colonel may make him too beholden to the generals who may be the main obstacles to reform (interview with Otto Pick, 2001). Stefan Fule, who held the top deputy position to Defense Minister Tvrdik, was brought in from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where he had responsibility for security issues and had served previously as ambassador to Lithuania. He brought his "outsider" perspective to the ministry and took aim at eliminating the duplicitous organizational structures in the Ministry of Defense and GS. He was confident that he could navigate the turf battles to convert the defense ministry into a machine "that if you put a coin at the top, would get a product out." He argued that this does not always happen—or at least quality outputs are not the norm (interview with Stefan Fule, 2001). Finally, some observers questioned whether General Jiri Sedivy, chief of the General Staff, could really be a change agent. He had overseen multiple failed defense planning processes and his *Vision 2010* effort did not adequately match resources with requirements. He had argued against big change in the past, saying that such change cannot occur without proper guidance from the government (interview with senior western defense attaché, 2001).

U.S. consultants working for Cubic Applications, Inc. also supported the Czech reform effort. The team is smaller than the one in Slovakia, but was more embedded in the reform process. When the comprehensive reform plan was launched in May

2001 one Cubic consultant was already on the scene supporting a contract to help with the development of the *Strategic Defense Review*. When the Center began its work, the Cubic consultant moved to the Ministry of Defense to assist the reform team (interview with Cubic team member, 2001). Observers note that the Czech approach to outside consultants has been to limit their involvement to ensure that Czech expertise is built up in the process. The Czechs were also concerned that the planning products were “home-grown.”

Stefan Fule remarked in a July 2001 interview that attempts at military reform in the Czech Republic had failed in the past due to the lack of political support, the lack of personal courage to make hard decisions (such as implementing painful personnel reforms), the favoring of political over professional leaders in the ministry, and the lack of an overall vision to drive the change (interview with Stefan Fule, 2001). The reform effort begun under Defense Minister Tvrdik represented a rare window of opportunity when many of the factors that had previously been absent came together. It turns out, though, that the opening was narrow and may have closed markedly with the government’s decision in May 2003 to drastically reduce the Army’s budget as part of an overall austerity package. This action led Tvrdik to resign in protest, citing an inability to successfully carry out reform with the reduced resources.

### ***An Overview of the Concept of Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic***

The objective of the reform is to make the Czech armed forces a compact, intrinsically balanced and efficient part of the Alliance’s forces, capable of fulfilling tasks across a broad range of operations and all over the area of interest of NATO.

#### **Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic— Objectives and Principles (2001)**

The key themes that echo through *AFCR* are rational defense planning, the improvement of the operational capabilities of the ACR, professionalization, improving the acquisition system, and streamlining the organizational structures and command and control system. Overlaid on the entire effort is the realization that a transformation in thinking must occur in every aspect of the Czech national security system. Indeed, the *AFCR* planners have included as part of their plan programs that educate defense personnel and the civilian public on the necessity of reform in general, and, more specifically, on the need for the plan to be implemented in its entirety.



## ***Key Elements of the Concept of Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic***

### *Economic Assumptions*

It is impossible to conduct long-term defense planning without a predictable flow of economic resources. One critical contextual feature of *AFCR* had been the decision of the Czech government to commit to a defense spending level of 2.2 percent of GDP through 2004. However, with the government's decision to cut all ministries' budgets, Czech planners had to adapt the reform plans to the new projected level of 1.9 percent of GDP.

### *Force Structure and Modernization*

*AFCR* documents emphasize that the Czech's accession to NATO necessitated a revamping of the ACR's force structure in order to fulfill alliance obligations. It is interesting to note that strategic documents approved on the eve of NATO accession and more than two years into the preparation for membership phase did not consider such responsibilities. In this respect, the Czech defense planners have been well behind the Slovaks. The retooled NATO-compatible force requires sufficient downsizing and reorganization so that the forces that remain are well-led, sufficiently funded, and have the benefit of quality training. A particular problem has been the creation of ad hoc units to serve in NATO peacekeeping missions that do not fit into an overall concept for the development of the ACR (*Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic—Analysis of Required Capabilities ...*, 2001, 5). The Tvrdik reform plan set the objective of drawing the ACR down from 57,000 to a force structure of 34,000 to 36,000 troops, with a civilian work force of 10,000 (Schroeder, 2002, 3–4). Early indications are that Defense Minister Miroslav Kostelka's revised plan will make up the shortfall in funding with deeper cuts to reach a new end strength of 23,000 professional soldiers and 7,000 civilian employees.

As in the Slovak case, the reform plan calls for the creation of a Training and Doctrine command that would centralize and ensure the consistency of training and doctrine across the ACR and allow for the reduction of headquarters staffs. The ACR will be separated into deployable forces and in-place or territorial forces composed of units with different levels of readiness. The reformed ACR will consist of a mechanized and combined air division with subordinate brigades. The long-term plan is for the Air Force to acquire supersonic aircraft; however, financial constraints will defer the achievement of that goal for at least six to eight years.

A major reorganization calls for the Ministry of Defense and General Staff to ferret out distinct responsibilities. The Ministry of Defense will be structured as a political-military body focused on strategic management tasks and the formulation of national defense policy. The General Staff will be a subordinate body responsible for the professional management of the ACR.

### *Supporting Programs: Personnel Reform*

As in the Slovak case, radical personnel reform was never accomplished in the ACR. *AFCR* puts a “principal emphasis on personnel, whose quality will determine whether the armed forces will acquire the required capabilities or not” (*Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic—Objective and Principles*, 2001, 13). The intractable “inverted pyramid” that had senior officers out-numbering junior officers and noncommissioned officers will be righted. The Tvrđik plan reserved 20 percent of the slots for officers, 25 percent for warrant officers, and 55 percent for noncommissioned officers. The target for noncommissioned officers represents the proportion of conscripts currently comprising the ACR. The number of officers was to fall by 4,800 to reach a total of 7,000. The number of civilian employees will be slashed by more than 50 percent (*Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic—Objective and Principles*, 2001, 12). The Kostelka plan is likely to keep the same ratios in place, with deeper reductions across the board. A significant challenge will be recruiting the approximately 5,500 soldiers annually to fill in the lower and mid-levels of the personnel pyramid while eliminating many positions at the top.

The plan calls for the creation of a human resources management system that will lay out a clear career path for ACR professionals that details expected compensation and quality-of-life benefits, sets out criteria for promotion, links pay to increasing levels of responsibility, describes education and training opportunities, and principles for assigning personnel. Long-festering housing issues will be addressed with the institution of a housing allowance for defense personnel. Programs supporting the quality of life of military, civilian, retired personnel and their families will also have a high priority (*Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic—Objective and Principles*, 2001; Schroeder, 2002, 5–6).

### *Supporting Programs: Leader Development and Military Education*

*AFCR* does not seem to place the same priority on instituting leader development into the Czech military education system that *SR Force 2010* does. The military education system comes into the reformers’ sights, but the emphasis at this point seems to be on reducing faculty positions and consolidating the various university-level military institutions into a single Defense University. There will also be a greater opportunity for civilian-educated university graduates to earn an officer’s commission (*Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic—Objective and Principles*, 2001, 12). Reforming the Czech military education system has proven to be extremely difficult. Little progress has been made to date and *AFCR* may take only a few initial steps toward correcting this critical component of the Czech national security system.

### *Supporting Programs: Sustaining and Stationing*

Logistical reform is focused mainly on streamlining the logistics support system and ensuring that stocks of supplies and materials are optimized to the needs of the reformed ACR. The Czechs are looking at balancing in-sourcing and out-sourcing logistics services to optimize efficiency and cost. The basing plan will undergo a comprehensive review, with substantial reductions projected while other facilities are upgraded or created from scratch to serve the needs of a modern, professional force. The plan calls for deferring the first set of modernization priorities until 2005 (*Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic—Objective and Principles*, 2001).

## **The Way Ahead: Implementation and Preliminary Conclusions**

Though *SR Force 2010* and *AFCR* are only in the early stages of implementation, there is a widespread belief that the reform efforts now underway will yield results. After a decade of stasis, Slovakia and the Czech Republic may finally get national security outputs based on rational defense planning systems that set priorities congruent with the political guidance inherent in key strategic documents, and which subsequently shape and transform defense structures in a realistic way that balances each state's limited resources with its defense aspirations.

However, successful implementation faces many obstacles. Indeed, the Czech Republic is squarely facing the challenge of continuing with implementation of its reform plan, while simultaneously scaling it back due to the cutback in resources. Systemic bureaucratic change depends on reformers throughout the defense system to ensure that implementation is carried out throughout every relevant branch, directorate, and unit in the field. The comprehensive reforms call for building up such capacities, but the fact that such experts will not yet be in place at the onset of the reform's implementation is a significant risk.

Observers point to several key areas that may prove to be the most problematic. Modernizing and rationalizing the management of defense in Slovakia by forcing the Ministry of Defense and GS to work together is difficult. "Talking the talk" of integration is much more difficult than "walking the walk." The introduction of a mature Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) that facilitates the process of long-term defense planning is another significant challenge. Slovakia is only now working through this system for the first time.

Some within the small community of civilian Czech national security experts contend that the Army is incapable of reforming itself. Those of this view believe that a NATO invitation in hand only led to complacency—that once the ACR was in NATO, as an institution it was less willing to work for reform (interview with Ivan Gabal, 2001). This view suggests that only sustained external pressure from both NATO and Czech political leaders will sustain the reform efforts. The

proposed reform represents a major change in Czech society and culture that must involve the total participation of the Czech people and their political system. In the Czech case more so than in the Slovak case the reform aims to improve the standing of the Czech military in Czech society. The ACR seeks increased prestige and the creation of the perception among Czechs that its military is a relevant institution engaged in significant missions worthy of the state's limited resources. The myriad of personnel issues in play in both cases is foreboding. Accomplishing force-level reductions while recruiting to the lower ranks and trying to retain at the middle ranks is a monumental task. Furthermore, this must be achieved while reconceptualizing the roles and functions of each member of the rank structure and establishing career paths and conditions of service.

Finally the importance of personal leadership at every level of the effort—from the highest echelons of the government to the lieutenant colonels and colonels charged with reorganizing directorates, to the junior officers and noncommissioned officers assuming positions of leadership—cannot be underestimated. Wholesale reform will require wholesale implementation. Piecemeal implementation of a large, complex, interdependent plan dependent on simultaneous implementation of its various components will doom the efforts. The presence of committed leaders supported with the human and material resources to carry out their mission is a critical element of success. The absorption of the defense cuts and the departure of Defense Minister Tvrdik dealt a severe blow to the Czech reform efforts. He took several key reform leaders with him and those who remain face the task of implementing reform with significantly less resources. It remains to be seen if this loss combined with the scaling back of the government's commitment will deal a fatal blow to the effort.

## **Conclusion**

Neither the Czech Republic nor Slovakia has yet achieved their shared goal of instituting radical military reform. Success will depend on maintaining the domestic political consensus within the government and the armed forces that is currently still at high levels compared to earlier points in the postcommunist era. Continued external pressure is also vital. NATO can exert leverage due to its interest in policing interoperability standards so that the Alliance can improve its capabilities. The EU, which has its own ambitions to be a relevant actor on the international security stage, can send the signal that abandonment of national security responsibilities in order to single-mindedly pursue economic goals is not desirable. Finally, the United States can persist in its external assessments in order to enable its CEE allies to make meaningful contributions to the war on terrorism.

Slovakia must avert the tendency to become complacent in the wake of Prague, while the Czech Republic must convince its allies that its post-accession complacency has been reversed. Obstacles will certainly challenge each. Czech planners

are struggling to overcome the one–two punch of the economic toll of the Summer 2002 floods and the Summer 2003 defense cuts. Slovakia’s fragile governing coalition must sustain its support for military reform and its commitment to spend 2.0 percent of GDP on defense.

The prospect for CEE states making significant contributions toward abating regional and global transnational threats and securing their fledgling democracies is great if they can stay the course on military reform. The newly named allies should be particularly interested in studying the pitfalls and progress made by the Czechs and Slovaks outlined in this survey. There is no common path that can be universally prescribed to each state in search of the gains resultant from comprehensively reforming its national security structures, but the study of these two cases suggests that there are common ingredients whose presence and integration across the state’s political, military, and societal spheres are more likely to lead to success.

## Note

1. For an extended discussion of NATO’s post-Cold War evolution focusing on its outreach to the East, see Marybeth P. Ulrich, “The New NATO and Central and Eastern Europe: Managing European Security in the 21st Century.” In *Almost NATO: Partners and Players in Central and Eastern European Security* (Boston: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002).

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## *Chapter 18*

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# Overview of Latin America's Military Administrations

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Bartosz Hieronim Stanisławski

### **Introduction**

An attempt to describe military administrations within the Latin American region is a considerable challenge considering the space limitations for one book chapter. After all, Latin America is a region encompassing thirty-five states (members of the Organization of American States, with Cuba's membership suspended since 1962) with very diverse territorial and population sizes, economic potentials, and industrial bases (see Table 18.1.). For instance, El Salvador's territory is similar to that of Massachusetts, while Brazil's is comparable to that of the entire United States. Similarly, whereas El Salvador is populated by about 7 million people, Brazil's population is close to 190 million. Their ethnic composition, historical conditions and legacy, culture and national traditions, and internal and international political dynamics also differ. That is not to say that Latin American states have nothing in common with each other; the point is merely to avoid the misperception that all Latin American states are identical, which is not true and may lead to false simplifications.

All of these factors to a larger or smaller degree had and still have an impact on the process of formation, reform, and existence of national armed forces and their character in a specific state of the region. In that sense, clearly, the situation is not



**Table 18.1 A Look at Diversity among Some Latin American States**

Country	Comparative Size	Population (Millions)	Defense Budget '06 (\$ Billion)
Argentina	Almost 1/3 the size of the U.S.	Almost 40	1.86
Brazil	Slightly smaller than the U.S.	190	16.0
Chile	Twice the size of Montana	15	1.93
Colombia	Twice the size of Texas	44	4.01
Mexico	Three times the size of Texas	108	3.35
Peru	Slightly smaller than Alaska	23	1.1
Venezuela	Twice the size of California	26	2.08

different from that of other states of the world, be it Bulgaria, Fiji, Uganda, or the United States. Latin America, thus, includes a number of states possessing considerable armed forces that are being modernized and reformed on a fairly regular basis, but there is also a rather long list of states of the region possessing indeed very small, or no, military potential. The reasons depend, of course, on a number of factors, including specific states' internal and foreign policies, international standing, territorial size, and economic basis for the national armed forces.

Military administrations in Latin America, with few exceptions, tend to share a number of basic features, some of them found also in many countries outside of the Latin American region. First of all, a great majority of Latin American armed forces presently find themselves under the control of democratically elected national governments. An exception that clearly stands out from this pattern is Cuba, which since 1959 has been governed by a communist government. Second, most Latin American armed forces are supervised and commanded by a defense ministry (or its functional equivalent), which, in many cases, is headed by a civilian minister responsible to the president. Third, most armed forces of Latin American states maintain structural and functional service distinction between land, naval, and air forces. In many cases, additional service branches are constituted by national guard or national police formations (for instance, Chile's *Carabineros*). The fourth frequent characteristic is that the armed forces in Latin American states, in addition to fulfilling their constitutional duties of standing by to defend their nations against external threats, have also increasingly been orienting toward peacekeeping missions, civilian disaster relief activities, and assistance in law enforcement operations. The last, fifth, feature of most military establishments of Latin America is that although they have clearly moved toward the modus operandi of armed forces of democratic states, in most cases they still remain skeptical about the general public having considerable insight into what goes on within the military establishments. Thus, transparency is on the rise, but it is often still fairly shallow. It is important to keep in mind that civilian control of the armed forces is not a rule throughout the region; in some cases (e.g., Brazil, Colombia, Chile), it is a civilian

who holds the position of a defense minister (or its equivalent), while in others those positions are held by military officers (e.g., Mexico, Venezuela, Cuba).

This chapter focuses on the military administrations of four Latin American states: Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and Brazil. The reason behind this selection is threefold. First of all, these states are of high significance to the U.S. foreign policy in this part of the world. Second, they maintain considerable armed forces or possess relatively significant military potential. The third reason is that it is impossible to look in reasonable depth at all Latin America's military administrations in one chapter without making it into a book itself. Thus, following a more detailed discussion of the aforementioned four national military administrations, a number of other Latin American states are overviewed together.

## Context

When analyzing the history of armed forces of Latin American states, it is important to emphasize one characteristic that is known to most students of that part of the world as the so-called "special role" of the armed forces. It refers to the historical conditions present in many states of the region, conditions that resulted in armed forces being seen as, if not *de facto* being, the most stable and effective state institution. A combination of centuries of colonial reality filled with complex racial, economic, and social relations characterizing the past of most Latin American countries laid foundations for coups, frequent changes in political leadership, and long periods of internal and international instability. Initially, those socio-political turbulences were related to the period in which most Latin American states gained independence, a process that started in most cases in the early 1800s. The formation of national governance and state structures was accompanied by frequent and fierce internal struggles in which emerging military structures played significant roles and were a critical ally to have.

The second important factor in the history of armed forces of the region was constituted by periods of dictatorial rule, which, although at different times in different countries' histories, influenced most Latin American states. Obviously, maintaining control over armed forces was a *sine qua non* condition for any dictator to retain power and it was frequently done at the price of increased role or status (or both) of the military in public life.

After the end of World War II, most armed forces of Latin American states saw their role as that of defenders against communism. Along these lines, two treaties were signed: the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (known also as the Rio Treaty) was signed in 1947, and the Mutual Security Act, signed in 1951, creating the basis of U.S. cooperation with and support for Latin America's armed forces. As a result of the U.S.–Soviet Cold War competition (1945–1991), armed forces in Latin America, mostly supported by the United States, often fought leftist guerrilla formations (under different names) that were mostly supported by the

Soviet Union. Thus, the Cold War reality only served to strengthen the rhetoric of the “special role” of the armed forces because they saw and portrayed themselves as defenders of external sovereignty and, through the fight against leftist rebels, guardians of internal order and integrity. The Cold War period left significant wounds on the social fabric of many Latin American states because many governments were in the hands of military dictatorships that not infrequently contributed to human rights violations while targeting political opposition. Those people were often victims of arrests, tortures, and physical elimination, while the official pretext for those actions was the defense of democracy and national integrity against communism. Unfortunately, in this way what the communists did in other parts of the world, right-wing dictatorial governments did in Latin America. As a result of such actions, it is estimated that nine thousand people disappeared in Argentina, several more thousand in Chile, while countries like Peru or Guatemala suffered even greater casualties.<sup>1</sup>

Not surprisingly, in the atmosphere of various sorts of instability and socio-political storms that Latin American nations experienced, armed forces saw themselves, and often were perceived, as the guarantors and defenders of the state’s institutional continuation. Moreover, in most Latin American states, armed forces were a part of the so-called power triumvirate, together with the politico–financial elites (mostly of White, Iberian origin) and the Catholic Church. Presently, in most of the region’s states, both the position of the Catholic Church as well as the role of the armed forces have seen a decline, with simultaneous increase of the role of democratic institutions and procedures, which have slowly, but effectively, been replacing the archaic and undemocratic systems and mores of governance.

Presently, as was mentioned earlier, the armed forces of many Latin American states, albeit not very enthusiastically, take part in or aid law enforcement operations and are used against drug crime organizations (e.g., in Colombia). On the one hand, such tasks are not typical for armed forces, but on the other hand they practically prepare the respective national militaries for the challenges of the twenty-first century in which mobile, hit-and-run, and unconventional warfare seems to be on the rise, contrary to the large front, thousands of tanks, and millions of soldiers scheme more typical for the first half of the twentieth century.

As a curiosity, it is worth mentioning that the armed forces of a number of Latin American states are financed not only through national budgets and defense appropriations, but also by income generated by private companies owned by the very armed forces. In some cases, for instance in Chile, such solutions provide for the resources needed to purchase new weapons and weapons systems (in the case of Chile, such funding basically doubles the amount appropriated from the national budget to the Ministry of Defense). The downside of such solutions is that the amount is not guaranteed because it depends on the market fluctuations and resulting profits for the companies owned by the military. For that reason, full data on the financial operations of the specific armed forces is not always available, since the “outside-of-the-budget” part is not entirely known or predictable.


As a result of democratic elections, in recent years a number of governments in Latin America have become dominated by left-leaning political parties. Although it has not become a cause of a radically changed security landscape in this part of the world, it is true that under the leadership of president Hugo Chavez, Venezuela's relations with the United States have become unusually bad and tense. As a result of that situation, Venezuela's arms acquisitions as well as its armed reserves have been expanding. At the same time, claims that the general level of security in Latin America has decreased as a result of the wave of political victories of left-leaning parties in a number of states should be treated with a grain of salt. Such generalizing claims themselves may become a source of a self-fulfilling prophecy and as such they do not serve international security well. Moreover, they do not necessarily reflect the facts from the ground, but rather certain political preferences or outdated Cold War thinking and mentality. For instance, the situation is different in the case of Venezuela's populist President, Hugo Chavez, who is known to use anti-American rhetoric and it is different in the case of the Brazilian President, Luis Inacio da Silva, whose activities are closer to that of a Western-style social democrat.

## Mexico

Being the United States' large and direct southern neighbor, it is natural to start the comparative look at military administrations of selected Latin American countries with Mexico. Mexican armed forces total close to 193,000, including 144,000 in the army, 37,000 in the navy, and close to 12,000 in the air force. Mexico also possesses paramilitary troops numbering 11,000, while the reserve core of the armed forces is estimated at 300,000.

### *Chain of Command*

Chain of command in this country probably stands out the most in comparison with other Latin American states. Similarly to many other countries, the president of Mexico is the commander in chief of the armed forces. In contrast to many other countries in terms of the administrative structure is the fact that the president does not command the armed forces via one defense-related ministry or department, but through two institutions known as Secretariats (Figure 18.1). The Secretariat of National Defense (*Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional—Sedena*) supervises the Mexican Army (*Ejército*) and the Mexican Air Force (*Fuerza Aerea Mexicana*, or *FAM*), while the Secretariat of the Navy (*Secretaría de Marina Armada de Mexico—Semar*) is responsible for the supervision of the navy, naval air, and marines.<sup>2</sup> Thus, Mexico's governmental structure does not include a defense minister per se and, therefore, only Mexico's president has full command over the country's entire armed forces.




**Figure 18.1** Chain of command of the Mexican military.

The Secretariat of National Defense is headed by a four-star army general, while the Secretariat of the Navy is headed by an admiral. They are both selected by the president and they both perform two duties simultaneously: as cabinet ministers responsible to the president and as operational commanders of their respective forces. Because structurally the commander of the air force and his staff are located within the army headquarters, and because the army general has always been in command of the Secretariat of National Defense, it was he who was referred to as the Minister of Defense.

Due to the actual embeddedness of the air force within the army, air force officers were de facto excluded from assuming the commander's position in the Secretariat of National Defense. That situation, for obvious reasons, made the air force less than happy and this somewhat unbalanced, as some say, state of affairs between the services continues until the present day. Mexican military authorities formally stress, however, that the functions of the Mexican armed forces are fulfilled well with the present military organization. They rightly point out that the Mexican military needs to address the needs of the Mexican state and people and, therefore, there is no reason to structure its military differently just because military administrations in other countries tend to have a defense ministry or its equivalent overlooking all armed services. Hence, at present no changes to or reforms of the military structure appear on the legislative horizon of Mexico.

Traditionally, the commanders of the secretariats of National Defense and the navy were selected based on their seniority within their respective services. During the administrations of Presidents Ernesto Zedillo (1994–2000) and Vicente Fox




**Figure 18.2 Mexico's Secretariat of National Defense.**

(2000–2006), officers from lower ranks were chosen to head the services, which was perceived as a move towards letting more progressive and younger commanders take charge. However, the traditional isolation of the internal affairs of the military from the outside, public world did not change as a result of those personnel moves and the military remains rather cold about public relations.

## ***Structure and Organization of the Mexican Armed Forces***

### ***The Mexican Army and Air Force***

Structurally, the Mexican Army (Figure 18.2) is organized into three army corps, each with its own headquarters. Territorially, it is organized into twelve military regions, which in turn are divided into a total of forty-four military zones. As mentioned earlier, Mexico's air force is commanded by a commander embedded within the army headquarters. It is structurally divided into four aerial regions (Northeast; Northwest; Central; and Southeast).<sup>3</sup> Out of 144,000 men and women in Mexico's Army, 60,000 are conscripts and the army is organized around three Army corps, each of them composed of three infantry brigades.<sup>4</sup> Altogether, the Mexican army includes one mechanized infantry battalion, ten motorized cavalry regiments, forty-four air-mobile special forces units, and eighty infantry battalions.



**Figure 18.3** Structure of Mexico's Secretariat of the Navy.

The Mexican Army is armed with 264 reconnaissance vehicles, over 860 armored personnel carriers, 1,174 artillery pieces, and 80 air defense guns. The army's strategic reserve is composed of four armored brigades, one airborne brigade, one engineering brigade, and one military police brigade.<sup>5</sup>

Although formally the Mexican Air Force possesses 107 combat-capable aircraft, the main weight of potential fighting responsibility rests on ten F-5 and seventeen AT 33 Shooting Stars. Additionally, there are seventy-three transport aircraft, including three B-727, one B-757, six Beech 90s, one C-118, seven C-130s, four C-26 Metros, twenty Rockwell Commander 500s, and six Rockwell Turbo Commander 680s.<sup>6</sup>

### *The Mexican Navy*

The Mexican Navy (Figure 18.3), commanded by the secretary of the navy, is organized into six zone commands in the Mexican Gulf region and eleven zone commands on the Pacific coast. Navy headquarters are located in Acapulco and Vera Cruz.

The Mexican Navy is equipped with one destroyer, seven frigates, one hundred eighty-four patrol and coastal combatants, three amphibious craft, and nineteen

logistics and support vessels. Naval Aviation comprises eleven hundred personnel with eight combat-capable aircraft. Mexican Marines number eighty-seven hundred.<sup>7</sup>

### ***Related Facts and Developments***

In 2006, Mexico lost \$3.6 billion worth of U.S. military assistance because its government ratified Mexico's participation in the International Criminal Court. The United States, based on its *American Servicemembers' Protection Act*, does not provide military assistance to countries that do not offer special protection for the U.S. troops stationed on their territory.<sup>8</sup> Nevertheless, Mexico ordered two Spanish AS-565 Panther helicopters that were to be delivered in 2005, and another eight may be ordered.<sup>9</sup>

The Mexican military has been increasing its role in the Mexico–U.S. border control efforts, as the huge number of illegal migrants entering the United States annually (estimated at 850,000) is accompanied by a rising flow of illicit drugs.<sup>10</sup>

## **Colombia**

The Colombian armed forces total 207,000 active duty personnel and are divided into three branches. They include army (*Ejército Nacional*), navy (*Armada Nacional*, including naval aviation, marines, and coast guard), and air force (*Fuerza Aerea Colombiana*). The paramilitary force, mainly national police units, number 129,000,<sup>11</sup> and all military branches are under the control of Colombia's Ministry of Defense.

### ***Chain of Command***


The president of Colombia is the supreme commander of the Colombian armed forces (Figure 18.4). Directly responsible to him is the Minister of Defense, who oversees the General Command of the Armed Forces (*Comando General de Fuerzas Militares*). Subordinated to it are the respective commands of the army, navy, air force, and national police.

### ***Structure and Organization of the Colombian Armed Forces***


#### ***The Colombian Army***

The Army's structure (Figure 18.5) is closely linked with territorial responsibility. It is organized into seven divisions (*divisiones*), each of them responsible for one territorial region of the country. Each division is divided into brigades, which are





**Figure 18.4** Chain of command of the Colombian armed forces.



**Figure 18.5** The structure of the Colombian Army.

further divided into battalions. The commander of the army supervises the second commander and the chief of the Army General Staff. They, in turn, supervise seven division commands, responsible for their respective territorial areas.

The Colombian Army numbers 178,000, with almost one third (64,000) being conscripts, while the army's reserves are estimated at almost 55,000.<sup>12</sup> It is organized into seven division headquarters,<sup>13</sup> with the bulk of the force constituted by nine Mobile Counter Guerrilla Force brigades, six mechanized brigades, two air mobile brigades, nine infantry brigades, one special forces brigade, four mountain infantry battalions, two artillery battalions, one antiterrorism unit, and one counternarcotics brigade.<sup>14</sup> The army has 12 light tanks, 135 reconnaissance vehicles (mainly EE-9 Cascavel), over 190 armored personnel carriers, 639 artillery pieces, and 30 air defense guns.

### The Colombian Navy

The Naval Command supervises three naval forces and four commands (Figure 18.6). The naval forces (*Fuerzas Navales*) are responsible for their respective areas of operations: Caribbean, Pacific, and South. Three of the four commands are function-specific and responsible for marine infantry, coast guard, and naval aviation. The fourth is responsible for the protection of the San Andres and Providencia archipelago in the Caribbean. The Colombian Navy numbers 22,000, including 7,000 conscripts, with reserves of 4,800. It has one headquarters, which is located at Puerto Carreño. The Colombian Navy is equipped with four tactical submarines, four corvettes, and 179 patrol and coastal combatant vessels. Additionally, it





Figure 18.6 Structure of the Colombian Navy.



**Figure 18.7 Structure of the Colombian Air Force.**

possesses eight amphibious units and seven logistics and support craft. Colombian Marines number fourteen hundred.

### *The Colombian Air Force*

The commander of the air force (Figure 18.7) oversees the Second Command and the Air Force General Staff, which in turn commands six Air Combat Commands, Air Transport Command, Air Maintenance Command, Caribbean and Eastern Air Groups, and air force schools.

The Colombian Air Force totals 7,000, with an additional 1,200 in reserves. It is structurally divided into four commands: air combat command (twenty-two combat-capable aircraft), tactical air support command (thirty combat capable aircraft), military air transport command (twenty-four aircraft), and air training command (forty-one aircraft). Primary fighting aircraft include A-37B Dragonfly, IA-58A Pucara, OV-10A Bronco, and AC-47.<sup>15</sup>

### **Related Facts and Developments**

Colombia's turbulent history of civil war, virtually unending since the late 1940s, has had its impact on the culture of the Colombian military. Perpetual, albeit varying in intensity, fighting against leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (*Fuerzas Revolucionarias de Colombia*, or *FARC*) and National Liberation Army (*Ejército para Liberación Nacional*, or *ELN*) guerrilla forces made military personnel


skeptical of periodically aired ideas about conflict resolution, which would include partial integration of former guerrillas into the military. Mutual animosity, not infrequently on a personal level, does not bode well for potential cooptation of the former leftist guerrillas into the formal military structures, although such a possibility remains an option. The fact is that under the leadership of Colombia's current president, Alvaro Uribe, Colombian armed forces contributed considerably to the increase of governmental control over Colombia's territory and its fight against leftist guerrillas and drug organizations. To some extent, the success of the armed forces and Uribe's application of the concept of "democratic security" is measured by the re-election of Alvaro Uribe to his second term in May 2006.

In the course of the fight against leftist guerrillas, a serious problem has been reoccurring in recent years. While pursuing FARC forces near border areas, Colombian troops crossed international borders and entered into Ecuadorian territory, while on another occasion, they reportedly entered Venezuela, and yet on another occasion Brazil.<sup>16</sup> Colombian military claimed to be pursuing guerrillas, who set up safe havens in bordering countries. Although those claims are almost certainly true, military incursions into foreign territories lead to dangerous international incidents. It is, therefore, clear that in order for the Colombian military to be fully successful in cornering and eliminating the FARC or other illegal organizations, political international agreements must be reached, which will result in close military cooperation of bordering states and, potentially, in joint military operations against guerrillas. Otherwise, the refugee crisis in Colombia's border areas is likely to continue, with the present number of refugees outside of Colombia's frontiers estimated at three hundred thousand, while internally displaced persons now number between 3 and 3.5 million people.<sup>17</sup>

The fact remains, however, that the Colombian armed forces are engaged in combat against a mobile, well-trained, and well-equipped enemy operating in difficult mountainous and jungle terrain. The Colombian military has suffered significantly due to insufficient mobility, which is critical in combat against such an enemy. Thus, the United States has been helping to fix that deficiency by providing helicopters. Through an interagency assistance plan, as part of the "Plan Colombia," the U.S. government provided funds needed to procure fourteen UH-60 Black Hawks and thirty UH-1H Huey II helicopters, in addition to supporting the procurement of fifteen UH-1N helicopters.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, Colombia ordered two UH-60 A/L Black Hawk helicopters from the United States and the first four of twenty-five Brazilian EMB-314 Super Tucano planes were to be delivered in 2006.<sup>19</sup>

## Venezuela

Venezuela's National Armed Force (*Fuerza Armada Nacional*, or *FAN*) totals over 82,000, with 8,000 in Army reserves. They include ground forces or army (*Fuerzas Terrestres* or *Ejército*), naval forces (*Fuerzas Navales* or *Armada* [including Marines



**Figure 18.8** High-echelon chain of command of the Venezuelan military.

and Coast Guard]), Air Force (*Fuerzas Aereas* or *Aviación*), and Armed Forces of Cooperation or National Guard (*Fuerzas Armadas de Cooperación* or *Guardia Nacional*). They are under the control of the Ministry of National Defense (*Ministerio de Defensa Nacional*), which reports to the president of the republic.

### ***Chain of Command***

The President of the Republic is the commander in chief of the armed forces of Venezuela. Through the Defense Minister, he commands the Army, Navy, and Air Force (Figure 18.8).


## ***Structure and Organization of the Venezuelan Armed Forces***

### ***The Venezuelan Army***


The army (Figure 18.9) is organized into five divisions, responsible for five territorial areas of Venezuela. Their divisional commands respond directly to the commander general of the army. The army numbers 34,000, with 27,000 serving as conscripts. Its core comprises: one mobile brigade specializing in counter-guerrilla operations, two armored brigades (one of them light), one cavalry brigade, seven infantry brigades (including one mechanized infantry battalion, eighteen infantry battalions, and four artillery battalions), two Ranger brigades, one airborne brigade, two engineer regiments, one aviation regiment, and one military police brigade.<sup>20</sup> The Venezuelan Army is equipped with 197 tanks (81 AMX-30s, 36 AMX-13s, 80 Scorpion 90s), 30 reconnaissance vehicles, 290 armored personnel carriers, 347 artillery pieces, 7 transport, and 2 utility aircraft.<sup>21</sup>

### ***The Venezuelan Navy***

The Venezuelan Navy (Figure 18.10) is organized into seven functional naval commands, with Navy General Command having oversight of the Navy General Staff.




**Figure 18.9 Structure of the Venezuelan Army.**



**Figure 18.10 Chain of command and structure of the Venezuelan Navy.**

Responsible to the Navy General Staff is the navy's Inspectorate General and four function-specific commands:

- Operations Command
- Logistics Command




**Figure 18.11** Structure of the Venezuelan Navy's Operations Command.

- Personnel Command
- Education Command

The Navy General Staff controls the Directorate of Organizational Development and Human Resources, the Naval Intelligence Directorate, the Operations Directorate, and the Logistics Directorate.

Naval Operations Command (Figure 18.11) oversees two territorially based naval zones (West and East) and River Command, forces-specific administrative units (Naval Aviation Command, Naval Infantry Division, Coast Guard Command), and functional departments (Fleet Command, Coordination and Operational Control Directorate, Telematics Directorate, Hydrography and Navigation Directorate, and Armament and Electronics Directorate).

The Venezuelan Navy numbers over 18,000, including 4,000 conscripts.<sup>22</sup> The Venezuelan Navy is equipped with two tactical submarines, six frigates, and six patrol and coastal combatants. It also possesses four amphibious vessels and six logistics and support craft. Naval Aviation numbers 500 personnel and has three combat-capable aircraft. Venezuelan Marines total 7,800 with one amphibious vehicle battalion, two river battalions, six infantry battalions, one artillery battalion, one river marine brigade, and two landing marine brigades. Venezuela's Coast Guard possesses two corvettes and forty-three patrol and coastal combatants.<sup>23</sup>



**Figure 18.12** Chain of command and structure of the Venezuelan Air Force.

### *The Venezuelan Air Force*

The air force (Figure 18.12) is commanded by the Aviation's General Command. Subordinated to it is the Aviation's General Staff and the Second Commander of Aviation, who supervise four functional air force commands, including Personnel Command, Air Operations Command, Logistical Operations Command, and Air Defense Operations Command.

The Venezuelan Air Force totals seven thousand personnel with some conscripts. It is divided into three fighting groups, the air force training group, two special operations groups, and three transport groups.<sup>24</sup> It is armed with 125 combat-capable aircraft, including 38 fighters (16 CF-5 and 22 F-16) and 16 fighter/ground attack aircraft (Mirage 50DV). It also has 31 support and 49 utility helicopters. Moreover, Venezuela's Air Force operates ten surface-to-air systems and over 230 air defense guns.<sup>25</sup>

### *The Venezuelan National Guard*

Venezuela possesses, in the Latin American context, a considerably sized National Guard, which numbers 23,000 personnel. It is organized in eight regional commands and armed with 44 armored personnel carriers, 150 artillery pieces (mainly mortars), 52 various combat boats, 12 transport and 11 utility aircraft, and 26 utility helicopters.<sup>26</sup>



## ***Related Facts and Developments***

As a result of the political impasse with the United States, in late 2005 Venezuela began extensive recruitment to boost its military reserves. In early 2006, it moved to train its new recruits to increase its reserves and create a Territorial Guard, a large army of armed reservists. Plans called for an increase of reserves from 500,000 to 2 million, a state of affairs that would, according to Venezuelan military authorities, deter any potential invaders. Those moves indicate that Venezuela is to possess six military services, including army, navy, air force, National Guard, National Reserve, and Territorial Guard. The former four are to be directed by the Strategic Operational Command (*Comando Estratégico Operacional*), while the latter two are to be subordinated to the National Reserve and Mobilization Command (*Comando General de la Reserva Nacional y Movilizacion Nacional*).

Venezuelan armed forces' procurement plans have also been expanding, since Venezuela's president, Hugo Chavez, is officially concerned about potential U.S. intervention in his country. Thus, Venezuela ordered from Spain ten CASA-295M transport planes and two CASA-235 maritime patrol aircraft.<sup>27</sup> By the end of 2006, the Russian Federation was to deliver six Mi-17V-5s, three Mi-35Ms, one Mi-26T, and five Mi-17V helicopters.<sup>28</sup> The Venezuelan government also ordered three JYL-1 air defense radars from China.<sup>29</sup> Moreover, the Venezuelan Navy ordered from the Spanish Navantia company four corvettes and four patrol vessels.<sup>30</sup> The U.S. government tried to stop some of the acquisitions from materializing, claiming that U.S.-made technologies were used in them and that Hugo Chavez is threatening the region's stability. Due to the U.S. refusal to provide repair parts for Venezuela's F-16 fleet, Chavez started negotiations with Russia about possible acquisition of Mig-29s. Moreover, Russia will provide the Venezuelan armed forces with one hundred thousand machine guns,<sup>31</sup> which are badly needed to arm the huge reserve force.

## **Brazil**

Before the Brazilian Ministry of Defense was created, its three branches of armed forces were directed by three ministry-level departments dealing exclusively with the specific military branch. In 1999, the three departments were transformed into three military commands responsible to the Ministry of Defense (*Ministério da Defesa*), which was created on June 10, 1999. The Ministry of Defense oversees and coordinates the activities of the three branches of the Brazilian armed forces: the Army (*Exército*), Navy (*Marinha do Brasil*), including Naval Air and Marine Corps (*Corpo de Fuzileiros Navais*), and Air Force (*Força Aérea Brasileira*). Totaling 287,159 personnel, the Brazilian armed forces are the most numerous in all of Latin America. In addition, Brazil possesses significant reserves, estimated at over 1.3 million. Military police and state militia forces, or public security forces,

constitute a paramilitary wing of the defense system of Brazil and are estimated at 385,600.<sup>32</sup>

### Chain of Command

The chain of command within Brazilian military administration begins at the top level with the president of the Republic, who, according to article 84 of the Federal Constitution, is the executive commander of the armed forces and appoints commanders of the army, navy, and air force. Directly responsible to him is the Minister of Defense, who, via Defense Ministry and Defense General Staff (*Estado Mayor da Defesa*), oversees the army, navy, and air force commands (Figure 18.13). Ministry of Defense and Defense General Staff are responsible for strategic operations and their coordination. The three respective commands of the military services (army, navy, air force) are responsible for the component-specific, operational administration of the forces under their command through subcommands.

### Structure and Organization of the Brazilian Armed Forces

#### The Brazilian Army

The army command (*Comando do Exército*) oversees and administers operations of the army through seven regional military commands (Figure 18.14), which, in





Figure 18.13 The Brazilian armed forces: chain of command and organization.



**Figure 18.14 Structure of the Brazilian Army.**

turn, oversee twelve military regions. Regional military commands, responsible for tactical-level operations, include:

- Amazon Military Command (8<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> regions)
- Military Command West (9<sup>th</sup> region)
- Planalto Military Command (11<sup>th</sup> region)
- Military Command Northeast (6<sup>th</sup>, 7<sup>th</sup>, and 10<sup>th</sup> regions)
- Military Command East (1<sup>st</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> regions)
- Military Command Southeast (2<sup>nd</sup> region)
- Military Command South (3<sup>rd</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> regions)

The Brazilian Army numbers 189,000 personnel and is presently organized into eight Army divisions.<sup>33</sup> Approximately 40,000 of the Brazilian army are conscripts with the mandatory service lasting nine to twelve months.<sup>34</sup> However, an increasing number of conscripts remain in the army serving contractually extended terms of service in narrowly specialized niches. The bulk of the Army includes:

- one frontier brigade
- three jungle brigades
- three armored infantry brigades
- one armored cavalry brigade
- four mechanized cavalry brigades
- one special forces brigade

- ten motorized infantry brigades
- one air defense artillery brigade<sup>35</sup>

The army's main equipment comprises 464 tanks, 409 reconnaissance vehicles, 803 armored personnel carriers, over 1,550 artillery pieces, 79 helicopters, 54 surface-to-air systems, and 134 air defense guns.<sup>36</sup>

### The Brazilian Navy

The Navy Command (*Comando da Marinha*) oversees and administers operations of the navy through the Naval Operations Command responsible for nine Naval District Commands (Figure 18.15). District Commands have the role of tactical-level operational command centers and they include:

- 1st Naval District Command (Rio de Janeiro)
- 2nd Naval District Command (Salvador)
- 3rd Naval District Command (Natal)
- 4th Naval District Command (Belem)
- 5th Naval District Command (Rio Grande)
- 6th Naval District Command (Ladario)
- 7th Naval District Command (Brasilia)
- 8th Naval District Command (Sao Paulo)
- 9th Naval District Command (Manaus)




Figure 18.15 Structure of the Brazilian Navy.

Similarly to the army, Naval District Commands have territorial responsibilities for their respective theaters of operations.

The navy has nearly 33,000 personnel under its command and is almost entirely professional, with only 3,200 conscripts. The bulk of the Navy consists of five tactical submarines, an aircraft carrier (*Clemenceau*-class), nine frigates, four corvettes, six mine warfare vessels, three amphibious ships, and over fifty logistics and support vessels, including three hospital ships.<sup>37</sup> Moreover, the Brazilian Navy includes Naval Aviation, with personnel of approximately 1,200, with principal attack power of one fighter squadron of twenty-three Skyhawks in four different versions. The marines, organizationally part of the navy, number 14,600, with one amphibious division, a special forces battalion, an engineering battalion, and eight regional Marine groups.<sup>38</sup>

### *The Brazilian Air Force*

The Brazilian Air Force has over 65,000 men and women serving and is predominantly professionalized, with only 2,500 conscripts. The Air Force Command (*Comando da Aeronautica*) oversees four function-specific commands (Figure 18.16), including:


- Air Operations Command
- Support Command
- Personnel Command
- Air Space Technology Command

The Air Operations Command oversees seven Regional Air Commands responsible for tactical-level operations. The Brazilian Air Force is functionally organized into four air forces (1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 5th; the 4th is deactivated), as they are called, each of them equipped with aircraft reflecting a given group's specialization:

- First Air Force: training and support aircraft
- Second Air Force: antisubmarine warfare, marine patrol, and search and rescue aircraft
- Third Air Force: air defense, fighter/ground attack, reconnaissance aircraft
- Fifth Air Force: transport and communications aircraft

### ***Related Facts and Developments***

The Brazilian military is continuing with modernization, including foreign purchases. In 2005, it ordered twelve M-2000C Mirage fighters from France, twelve CASA C-295 transport planes and eight P-3A Orion planes from Spain, and nine F-5 Tiger E/F from Saudi Arabia. With the exception of the P-3A order, which is to be fulfilled in 2007, other deliveries are in progress.<sup>39</sup>



**Figure 18.16 Structure of the Brazilian Air Force.**

With the processes of democratization ending the Brazilian military's orientation towards internal politics and "return to the barracks," armed forces needed to reorient themselves towards new missions. And since Brazil does not face any tangible threats from its neighbors, law enforcement assistance and peacekeeping have become new challenges for the Brazilian military. Because of Brazil's territorial size and significant criminal routes crossing its territory, the Brazilian armed forces often appear to be best equipped, if not best suited, for crime-fighting duties, although the Brazilian military is skeptical about getting too involved in law enforcement-like activities. This may be difficult, as the Amazon jungle has for a long time presented a great refuge and a transshipment point for drug traffickers from Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia. Brazilian armed forces, therefore, are maintaining, if not expanding, their presence in the Amazon, thus helping civilian authorities and law enforcement institutions in controlling and supervising this huge and geographically challenging area. Of high significance in this endeavor is the Brazilian Air Force's Amazon Vigilance System Project Coordinating Commission, which is operating under the Air Space Control Department. The Brazilian military actively participates in United Nations assistance and peacekeeping operations. Presently it has contingents in six countries (Haiti, Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sudan,

and Cyprus), the largest one being deployed to Haiti and numbering approximately twelve hundred troops.

Brazil had the region's most developed nuclear research program and it possesses sufficient resources to construct nuclear weapons if it so desired, mostly due to significant uranium deposits. While civilian authorities conducted a nuclear research program in the 1970s and 1980s, the military secretly led parallel research with the aim of uranium enrichment. Yet the military program ended with the return of democracy in the mid-1980s and the decisive rejection of any nuclear weapons ambitions, signified through the signing of the Tlatelolco Treaty in 1967, establishing Latin America as a nuclear weapons free zone, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

Over the past two decades, military culture in Brazil has seen a considerable shift. The armed forces have been increasingly directing their attention away from individual political objectives inside the country and towards apolitical professionalism. That does not mean that certain legacies of political involvement from the past have been entirely eliminated, but the armed forces today serve their society, rather than primarily helping to control it, as was the case only two decades ago.

## Other Selected Latin American States

### *South America*

#### *Peru*

The Peruvian armed forces are organizationally divided into army (*Ejército Peruano*), navy (*Marina de Guerra del Perú*, which includes naval air, naval infantry, and coast guard), and air force (*Fuerza Aérea del Perú* or *FAP*). The military's branches are under the command of Peru's Ministry of Defense (*Ministerio de Defensa*).<sup>40</sup>

The Peruvian armed forces total 80,000. The Peruvian Army has 40,000 personnel and is divided into four military regions.<sup>41</sup> It comprises five infantry brigades, two motorized infantry brigades, two armored brigades, two mechanized cavalry army brigades, two mountain infantry brigades, a special forces brigade, an armored training brigade, an aviation brigade, an army regiment, a mechanized cavalry army regiment, a motorized infantry battalion, an infantry battalion, three engineer battalions, an engineer group, and three field artillery groups. The Peruvian Army is equipped with 386 tanks (90 T-54/T-55 and 110 AMX-13), 105 reconnaissance vehicles, over 276 armored personnel carriers, over 1,000 artillery pieces, 12 transport and 10 utility aircraft, 47 support and 4 utility helicopters, and 262 air defense guns. Peru's army also has 188,000 men and women in reserves.<sup>42</sup>

The Peruvian Navy has 25,000 personnel, including 1,000 in the coast guard. It is organized into three commands, responsible for the Pacific coast, the Lake

Titicaca, and the Amazon River area. Peru's navy is armed with six tactical submarines, a cruiser, six frigates, thirteen patrol and coastal combatants, four amphibious vessels, and nine logistics and support craft. Naval aviation numbers over 800 personnel and has one combat capable aircraft. Peruvian Marines number 4,000 and include one marine brigade, a jungle infantry battalion, two independent infantry battalions, one infantry group, and a commando group.<sup>43</sup>

The Peruvian Air Force totals 15,000 personnel and is organizationally divided into five regions: North, Lima, South, Central, and Amazon. The Peruvian Air Force has eighty-nine combat-capable aircraft, including eighteen MIG-29s, five MK 58 Canberras, twelve A-37s, twelve M-2000s, ten SU-25s, and over thirty SU-17s in different versions. Moreover, it has three reconnaissance MIG-25 aircraft and eighty-nine transport planes. The helicopter fleet includes sixteen attack choppers (Mi-24), twenty-three support (8 Mi-17 and 15 Mi-8), fifty-two utility, and eighteen training helicopters.<sup>44</sup> Peruvian paramilitary forces are comprised mainly of the national police, which numbers 77,000 personnel.<sup>45</sup> A key modernization event for Peru's armed forces in recent time was its 2005 order of two Italian *Lupo*-class frigates.

## Chile

The Chilean armed forces are composed of army (*Ejército*), navy (*Armada*, including naval air, Maritime Territory and Merchant Marine Directorate, and marine corps), air force (*Fuerza Aérea*), and *Carabineros* (uniformed, militarized police). Interestingly, the so-called investigations police (*Policía de Investigaciones*, a nonuniformed police force) is also responsible to the Ministry of Defense. All branches are commanded by the president via a civilian defense minister.

The Chilean armed forces total nearly 117,000 active duty personnel with the army comprising 47,700, the navy nearly 19,500, the air force 10,300, and *Carabineros* 38,000. Army reserves are estimated at 50,000. Nearly half (21,000) of the Chilean Army are conscripts serving one-year terms, although as of 2005, Chilean armed forces are heading towards a fully voluntary service. Chile's army is organized into six military regions in three theaters of operations (North, Center, South). It has six army divisions, comprising fifteen reinforced regiments (i.e., with diverse subunits, capable of undertaking diverse missions, a result of the reform and modernization process of the Chilean Army), three armored cavalry regiments, eight mechanized, motorized, and mountain regiments, one engineer regiment, two artillery regiments, and two telecommunications regiments.<sup>46</sup> They are armed with 260 tanks, 157 reconnaissance vehicles, nearly 1,100 armored personnel carriers, over 600 artillery pieces, 30 transport, logistics, and training aircraft, 40 helicopters, 67 surface-to-air systems, and 60 air defense guns.<sup>47</sup>

The Chilean Navy is divided into four naval zones, with headquarters located in Valparaíso, Talcahuano, Punta Arenas, and Iquique. The Chilean Navy is armed with four tactical submarines, two destroyers, six frigates, twenty-five patrol and



coastal vessels, five amphibious vessels, and twelve logistics and support craft. Naval aviation counts six hundred personnel, six combat capable aircraft, and seventeen helicopters. Marines count thirty-five hundred.<sup>48</sup>

The Chilean Air Force is organized into five air brigades, comprising twenty-one groups (eleven aviation groups, four antiair defense groups, five telecommunications and aerial detection groups, and an Antarctic exploration group).<sup>49</sup> The air force possesses eighty-seven combat-capable aircraft, including, among others: eighteen F-5s, eighteen A-37s, six F-16Cs, four F-16Ds, thirteen Mirage 50s, and sixteen Mirage 5s. It also has eighty-four training aircraft and fourteen helicopters.<sup>50</sup>

Carabineros are organized into 13 zones, 39 districts, and 174 commissariats. Carabineros possess about twenty armored personnel carriers, an estimated fifteen helicopters, and a small quantity of transport aircraft.<sup>51</sup>

The Chilean military is without question among the most professional and best-trained armed forces in Latin America. It is highly regarded by other countries' military administrations and has proven itself historically. The Chilean armed forces are also among the best-equipped in the region, making sure to constantly modernize their weapons. To that end, the Chilean Navy in 1998 ordered two Scorpene-class submarines from France, one of which has already been delivered while the second was due in late 2006 or early 2007. Two Karel Doorman-class frigates were ordered in 2004 from Holland and their delivery is expected to be completed by 2007, while two Dutch Van Heemskerck-class frigates were expected by mid-2006. Three British frigates are expected to be delivered by 2008. Moreover, in 2002 the Chilean Air Force ordered ten F-16C/Ds from the United States and all of them were to be delivered by the end of 2006. Additional eighteen F-16A/B Block 15 aircraft were ordered in 2006 in Holland with the delivery date set for 2007. The Chilean Army in 2006 ordered a hundred German Leopard 2A3 main battle tanks.<sup>52</sup> Moreover, six to eight Bell 412 helicopters are to be delivered in the near future.

The Chilean military remains active in international peace and aid operations, with present deployments to five locations, with the largest contingent (close to five hundred fifty) presently on a United Nations mission to Haiti (MINUSTAH). With the continued levels of professionalism, training, and modernization, Chile's armed forces are certain to retain the prestige they enjoy of being among the top military forces in the region and even globally.

## *Argentina*

The Argentine armed forces are composed of army (*Ejército*), navy (*Armada*, including Naval Aviation and Naval Infantry), and air force (*Fuerza Aérea*). They are responsible to the Ministry of Defense (*Ministerio de Defensa*), while the civilian defense minister is responsible to the president of the republic.

The Argentine armed forces total over 71,400 active duty personnel. The paramilitary forces include gendarmerie (18,000) and coast guard (13,240).<sup>53</sup> The Argentine Army includes 41,400 personnel. It has twelve functional commands (communications, health, planning, education and doctrine, arsenals, engineering, etc.).<sup>54</sup> It is organized into three corps, each with its own headquarters. The army's core is composed of two armored brigades, four mechanized infantry brigades, three mountain infantry brigades, and an airborne brigade.<sup>55</sup> Main army equipment includes 350 tanks, 74 reconnaissance vehicles, over 500 armored personnel carriers, 1,700 artillery pieces, 48 surface-to-air systems, 226 air defense guns, nearly 100 helicopters, and approximately 45 transport, training, and logistics aircraft.<sup>56</sup>

Argentina's navy totals 17,500 personnel. It is centered around three headquarters, including Atlantic (Mar del Plata), Center (Puerto Belgrano), and South (Ushuaio). The Argentine Navy is equipped with three tactical submarines, five destroyers, nine frigates, sixteen patrol vessels, two mine warfare ships, twenty amphibious craft, and fourteen logistics and support vessels. Naval aviation has personnel of two thousand, with eleven combat-capable aircraft. The Argentinean marine force counts two thousand people, with the principal combat force of four marine infantry battalions.<sup>57</sup>

The Argentinean Air Force numbers 12,500 personnel and is organized into four functional commands (air operations, personnel, air regions, and logistics), which supervise and coordinate the activities of eight air force brigades. The air force has about one hundred eight combat-capable aircraft in the Air Operations Command (including thirteen Mirage EA/DAs, thirty-four A-4s, nineteen Neshers, seven Mirage 5s, thirty-five IA-58 Pucarás), and eighty-three training aircraft in the Personnel Command.<sup>58</sup>

The Argentine military was at the rudder of state politics for considerable periods of time in the country's history. Military rule ended in 1982 with the failed attempt to militarily seize the Falkland Islands from Britain, which was the nail to the military rule's coffin. Since then, the Argentinean armed forces have undergone a major mentality transformation and, similar to most other military establishments of the Southern Cone, became a force serving civilian authorities in a democratic state. Recently, judicial moves have been made to reopen Argentina's dictatorial past and possibly try some of those military officers responsible for human rights violations.<sup>59</sup>

Argentina was the only Latin American state to participate in the Gulf War of 1991. In January 1998, the U.S. government recognized close ties with Argentina, designating it as a major non-NATO ally. The Argentinean military was supportive of governmental efforts at nonproliferation and regional stability in the Southern Cone, which helped smooth and considerably improve relations with Brazil and Chile, relations historically filled with suspicion and lack of trust.

Overall, the Argentine military is increasingly well-organized and undergoing transformation into a light, but rapidly responding force, which is a part of the so-called "Plan 2000." In 2005, Argentina ordered an Ouragan-class French landing

platform, which is to be delivered in 2007. The first such platform was delivered in 2005.<sup>60</sup> Argentina deployed military units internationally to European Union, United Nations, and NATO operations, with the largest contingents presently in Haiti, Cyprus, and former Yugoslav republics.

## ***Central America***

Central America, understood here as comprising the states between Mexico's southern frontier and Colombia's northern border, includes seven countries: Belize, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama. Their combined population is just over 40 million people, with combined territory slightly less than twice the size of Colorado. All of their military forces combined number close to 72,000.<sup>61</sup> Out of the seven countries, two, Costa Rica and Panama, do not maintain formal military armed forces, but paramilitary organizations. In the case of Costa Rica, there are 8,400 men and women serving in the Civil Guard (4,400), Border Security Police (2,000), and Rural Guard (2,000).<sup>62</sup> Panama's paramilitary force is constituted by the National Police Force, numbering 11,800.<sup>63</sup> Thus, Central America's national armed forces taken together with the paramilitary forces of Costa Rica and Panama number about 92,000.<sup>64</sup> As with the diversity in other realms in Latin America, the differences between national troop levels among Central American countries are considerable, with the most numerous force of over 29,000 in Guatemala, the smallest one of over 1,000 in Belize, and with no formal military in previously mentioned Costa Rica and Panama.

It is important to emphasize, however, that there is no *de facto* functioning organization or institution of common defense of Central American states, so the combined figures here serve only as a demonstration of relatively low levels of military strength of the individual member states, rather than as an indication of a combined strength of the region. However, there are ideas of creating what might become the basis of a more common regional defense structures. One of them was the meeting of all seven countries' defense ministers in Miami in October 2005 to discuss the possibility of creating one regional military headquarters and starting a joint counternarcotics battalion in addition to holding joint exercises, more coordinated multinational operations, and peace missions.<sup>65</sup>

As always, troop levels and armaments in the region are a function of the present geopolitical situation, internal and foreign policies of national governments, and, often most importantly, budgetary capabilities. Overall, presently Central America is fairly free of international tensions and internal conflicts. Civil wars that used to devastate the region during the Cold War, with the exception of Costa Rica, are now a part of history. New security problems are primarily focused around drug trafficking and organized crime activities, which are more pronounced in some countries than in others. The fact is that Central America is a logical path from South America's coca fields to the primary drug market in the United States.

Standing out on the map of nonstate security threats in the region is the increased activity of a predominantly Salvadoran mob, known as *Mara Salvatrucha* or *Mara 13* (also called “MS” or “MS-13”). The organization was started in the 1980s as a gang in Los Angeles, California, but has spread to the majority of U.S. states, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and possibly other Central American nations. It is involved in illegal migrants trafficking, drug running, and weapons smuggling. So far, however, there are no indications of military involvement in combating that threat. It is a possibility, though, if national police forces themselves become unable to root out this rising threat to the economic and political stability of the region.

### ***The Caribbean Basin***

Island nations of the Caribbean basin are predominantly states with relatively tiny populations, economies, and security forces. It is sufficient to mention that the Caribbean states' security personnel is mostly counted not in tens of thousands, but in thousands and, frequently, hundreds. For instance, Jamaica maintains 2,830 in its Defense Forces (its 2005 defense budget was \$57.5 million), Trinidad and Tobago has 2,700 personnel in its army and navy (its 2005 defense budget was \$32 million), the Bahamas maintains 860 troops in the Royal Bahamian Defense Force (with a 2005 defense budget at \$32 million), Barbados has 610 army and navy members (with a 2005 defense budget at \$14 million), and Antigua and Barbuda maintain 170 members in their army and navy (with a 2005 defense budget at \$4.8 million).<sup>66</sup> Clearly, these are miniscule numbers when compared with some other Latin American nations, not to mention certain European or U.S. armed forces, and for that reason they should be treated more as forces responsible for the maintenance of internal security and order, since their potential to engage in aggressive international combat operations is very low. However, on the Caribbean landscape of armed forces, two island states stand out: Cuba and the Dominican Republic.

Cuba maintains armed forces totaling 49,000, divided into army, navy, and air force. Cuba's paramilitary forces number 26,500 (they include 20,000 state security and 6,500 border guards), while the relatively considerable reserve force is estimated at 120,000.<sup>67</sup> Moreover, the so-called Territorial Militia is estimated at 1 million reservists.<sup>68</sup>

The Cuban Army is composed of combat and support units (organized into brigades, regiments, and battalions), which are under direct command of the central General Staff. Other units respond to the respective Regional Military Commands. Cuba's territory is slightly smaller than that of Pennsylvania, with a population of over 11 million people. It is, in the overall Latin American context, a relatively small country territorially, but maintaining a relatively sizable armed force, which is dictated by Cuba's political situation and lack of formal diplomatic relations with the United States. Since the fall of the Fulgencio Batista regime and communist takeover in 1959, Cuba has remained under the communist regime, led by Fidel

Castro, and presently is among the world's few remaining bastions of communism. During the Cold War, Cuba became the epicenter of international events in 1962 as a result of the so-called "Cuban Missile Crisis." In 2005, Cuba's defense expenditures were estimated to reach \$1.4 billion.<sup>69</sup>

The Cuban Army consists of one frontier brigade, up to five armored brigades, nine mechanized infantry brigades, one airborne brigade, one air defense artillery regiment, and one surface-to-air missile regiment. It is armed with mostly old, Soviet-made equipment, which includes 900 tanks (T-34s, T-54s, T-55s, T-62s, and some PT-76s), 700 armored personnel carriers (all of them BTR in various versions), over 1,715 artillery pieces, 300 surface-to-air missile systems, and 400 air-defense guns. The Cuban Navy numbers 3,000 personnel and is structurally divided into Western and Eastern Commands. It is armed with five patrol and coastal combat vessels, five mine warfare craft, and a logistics and support vessel. The Cuban Navy also includes the so-called Naval Infantry, composed of two amphibious assault battalions. Cuba's air force numbers 8,000 personnel and is armed with 127 combat-capable aircraft, but only 25 of them are believed to be operational. The key fighting aircraft include three MIG-29s, ten MIG-23s, and eight MIG-21s. Additionally, there are sixty-three transport aircraft, all of them old, Soviet-made (e.g., AN-2, AN-26, IL-62, TU-154). The Cuban Air Force also possesses close to forty attack choppers (Mi-24) and eighty-five support helicopters (Mi-8).<sup>70</sup>

Overall, Cuban military equipment is old and outdated and seriously suffering from the lack of repair parts. The Soviet Union, Cuba's primary weapons provider during the Cold War, basically cut off all military support at the time of its collapse in 1991. Since that time, the Cuban military has seen continuous degradation of its equipment and, by default, of its fighting capabilities. Thus, although the Cuban armed forces are comparatively numerous and with significant reserves, their combat capability on the modern battlefield is very low.

The Dominican Republic maintains 24,500 troops, divided into army, navy, and air force. National Police of 15,000 constitutes its paramilitary force. The country's territory is slightly more than twice the size of New Hampshire and its population a little over 9 million people. Its 2005 gross domestic product (GDP) was \$18.15 billion (in official exchange rate), while its 2005 defense expenditures reached slightly over \$190 million.<sup>71</sup>

The Dominican Army numbers 15,000 personnel organized into three Defense Zones and including:

- an armored battalion
- six infantry brigades
- one special forces battalion
- one mountain infantry battalion
- one artillery battalion
- one engineering battalion
- one Presidential Guard battalion

The Dominican Republic's army is equipped with twelve M-41 light tanks, twenty-eight armored personnel carriers, and fifty-six artillery pieces. Interestingly, there is a separate Airborne Cavalry Squadron equipped with forty-four helicopters. The Dominican Navy totals four thousand personnel and includes a marine unit and a SEAL unit. Its primary equipment includes seventeen patrol and coastal combatants, and four logistics and support vessels. An estimated fifty-five hundred men and women serve in the Dominican Air Force, which is tasked mainly with search-and-rescue (SAR), medical evacuation (Medevac), and transport missions. To that end, it is equipped with four transport aircraft (including 3 CASA 212-400s), seven training planes (T-35 Pillans), and fourteen utility helicopters.<sup>72</sup>

## Conclusion

This overview of the military organizations of Latin America serves as an indication of a significant variety of military potentials and tasks assigned to the region's national armed forces. Clearly, modernization levels and armaments strengths are mostly a function of a given country's economic performance, its political relations with other countries of the region, and the developments planned for the near future.

The most important lesson from present-day Latin America is that its armed forces have, by and large, been coming closer toward becoming a tool of democratic governments and are often used to maintain peace in the region and in faraway parts of the world. This orientation provides the armed forces of many Latin American states with noble goals and a new sense of mission, which helps them move away from the infamous interest in domestic politics. Peacekeeping operations have also helped in moving some of the former adversaries (e.g., Chile and Argentina) all the way from the position of a dangerous arms race towards joint operations. Such a course of events is a great way of enhancing regional peace and stability, in addition to increasing international trust and levels of transparency in military affairs.

Related to these changes have been administrative reforms within the military establishments of Latin American states. Most of them, although not all, have established civilian command and control as a permanent feature of their political systems and as an expression of democratic governance. The effectiveness of such control still is questioned in a number of cases, but gradual changes in mentality have been taking place. Transparency levels have been increasing and public insight into the operations of national armed forces in some countries is considerable, while in others it is slowly rising.

Nevertheless, critics rightfully emphasize that some military officers still manage significant economic resources in a number of countries, while former coup plotters operate on political scenes feeding on populist rhetoric. It is true that many military establishments in Latin America see themselves not merely as parts of the overall state administrations of ruling governments, but almost as their partners.

Some observers point out that even in the most democratic of Latin American states, certain unwritten agreements are still in place between civil and military authorities, agreements based on the principle of not intervening into the other's sphere of competences. It is often the result of the lack of formal settlements of civil–military relations, which, in turn, is a legacy of negotiated and difficult transitions to democracy. After all, changing the mentality and the structure from guarding the governments against their nations to actually serving their nations is a complex and time-consuming process. It must be understood that procedural reforms may not be able to revolutionarily change existing reality from one day to another and that homegrown models of democracy evolve over a period of time. In most cases, generational changes are necessary to mark an end of a particular era. Mentality-wise, such changes may be compared to the security analysts who spent most of their lives analyzing Cold War threats and now are simply unable to comprehend the new complexity of the post-Cold War environment. Similarly, those who spent most of their lives serving in militaries that were seen as the pillar of governmental security may not be able to understand the logic of democracy. But these issues, although highly important, are topics for a different work.

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## *Chapter 19*

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# National Defense: People's Republic of China

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Hans Stockton

### **Introduction**

At the turn of the twenty-first century, the People's Republic of China (PRC) is on the cusp of revolutionary changes in its global and regional strategic goals and capabilities. Although strategic modernization is several decades away from near-parity with powers such as the United States, China's party and military leaders have already begun the process of developing new defense and foreign policy paradigms. China's goal is to become the premier regional military power by 2015 and to be a global military power by 2050. In order for these goals to reach fruition, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has aggressively pursued a program of far-reaching reforms of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) since the 1990s.

The foreword of China's 2004 defense white paper states early on that (1) China's continued national prosperity requires a peaceful international environment, and (2) the country is committed to a foreign policy of peace and a defensive military policy. In order to accomplish this, the foundation of the CCP exercise of state power is "to secure a coordinated development of national defense and the economy, and to build modernized, regularized and revolutionary armed forces to keep the country safe" (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of

China, 2004; hereafter IOSC). The modernization of the PLA long took a backseat to China's economic modernization, but the last decade has witnessed a marked readjustment in doctrine and expenditures in order to rapidly move the PLA into the era of high-technology warfare. As stated in the 2004 defense white paper, "The role played by military power in safeguarding national security is assuming greater prominence" (IOSC, 2004, 2).

Modernization of the PLA is viewed as a comprehensive program of reform within the group. While the next defense paradigm is debated at the highest echelons of the CCP and PLA, the PLA aggressively seeks to purchase military technologies abroad, reform China's own domestic defense industry, and increase the education levels of officers and troops. Key knowledge gaps exist and were recognized in the U.S. Department of Defense's 2002 *Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China*. Three primary gaps identified were (1) the exact quantity and capabilities of PRC military power juxtaposed to Taiwan; (2) "intangible PRC capabilities," such as training, command and control, doctrine, and special operations; and (3) the ability to quantitatively assess how modernization of the PLA will affect "overall military competition" (U.S. Department of State, 2002 Annual Report, 2; hereafter DOS, 2002). The period of reform has been brief and complete information is often difficult to obtain, yet analysts frequently note that China's military ascendance is gaining ground.

This chapter will address several key issues that will continue to influence the PRC's rise to regional and, perhaps, global military power. After an initial overview, this chapter will address China's military doctrine, introduce the PLA's force structure and recent changes, military spending, command structure, and civil-military relations in the PRC.

## Overview

The PRC pursues a national development strategy based upon finding a balance between "comprehensive national power" (CNP) and a "strategic configuration of power" (SCP). Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the SCP, related to foreign and security policy, was guided by Deng's "24 Character Strategy." This strategy called for China to "observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership" (U.S. Department of Defense, 2005, 11). The "24 Character Strategy" was later amended with the phrase, "make some contributions" (U.S. Department of Defense, 2005, 11). Clearly, overarching strategy calls for China to build up its military capabilities quietly, avoid being drawn into conflicts or leadership positions too early, and wait for a time when the PRC is more on par with major military powers prior to becoming more active and outward oriented.

National military strategy since the 1970s has been further guided by the doctrine of "active defense," but there is some confusion as to the meaning of the term.

In its annual report to the U.S. Congress, the Office of the Secretary of State cites a PLA text, “The Study of Campaigns” published in 2000. “While strategically the guideline is active defense ... the emphasis is placed on taking the initiative in active offense. Only in this way, the strategic objective of active defense can be realized” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2005, 15). In 1998, Vice Chair of China’s Central Military Commission (CMC) and Minister of National Defense, Chi Haotien, remarked that active defense was principled upon “gaining mastery by striking only after the enemy has struck ... rather than a passive defense of suffering beatings” (Liu and Jingshi, 1998). Under the new “Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics,” information warfare calls for a “positive offense” in which conventional forces must rely on more aggressive information warfare prior to the initiation of armed hostilities.

Since the illustration of the might of high-tech weaponry and airpower in the Persian Gulf War and the Balkans Conflict, the PRC has devoted increasing attention to speeding up its own adjustment to the revolution in military affairs (RMA). In its 2004 defense white paper, the PRC acknowledges that the “forms of war are undergoing changes from mechanization to informationalization” and that “informationalization has become the key factor in enhancing the war fighting capability of the armed forces” (IOSC, 2004). As is typical, however, the Chinese have localized the broader meaning of RMA to that of “RMA with Chinese characteristics” to account for China’s inability to immediately capture the financial, logistical, and technological requirements of fully accommodating RMA.

Guided by the doctrines of “active defense” and “Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics,” the expressed goals of China’s national defense in 2004 are

1. To stop separation and promote reunification, guard against and resist aggression, and defend national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and maritime rights and interests.
2. To safeguard the interests of national development, promote economic and social development in an all-round, coordinated and sustainable way, and steadily increase the overall national strength.
3. To modernize China’s national defense in line with both the national conditions of China and the trend of military development in the world by adhering to the policy of coordinating military and economic development and improving the operational capabilities of self-defense under the conditions of informationalization.
4. To safeguard the political, economic, and cultural rights and interests of the Chinese people, crack down on criminal activities of all sorts, and maintain public order and social stability.
5. To pursue an independent foreign policy of peace and adhere to the new security concept featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and coordination with a view to securing a long-term and favorable international and surrounding environment. (IOSC, 2004)

Clearly, the most immediate concern for the CCP and PLA is the prevention of Taiwan's permanent political separation from the mainland. China's military modernization and military procurement have been heavily dedicated to (1) isolating Taiwan in case of a conflict; (2) quickly destroying Taiwan's stand-off capability and invading if necessary; and (3) creating stand-off capabilities to discourage or prevent effective U.S. military intervention on Taiwan's behalf. While cross-strait tensions escalated in the last years of former President Lee Teng-hui's rule, the election of the pro-independence candidate Chen Shui-bian in 2000 sparked constant tension between Beijing and Taipei. This tension and China's concern over Chen's perceived "splittism" have been highlighted in China's defense white papers since 2000. As Taiwan's security guarantor, the United States has remained highly sensitive to moves on either side of the strait that would spark armed conflict.

China has built up various military resources across from or near Taiwan. Such items include over six hundred short-range ballistic missiles, attack fighters, and a concentration of surface ships, submarines, and amphibious craft. Additionally, the PLA conducts periodic, large-scale military exercises modeled upon a conflict with Taiwan. These exercises are often near Taiwan. Although China has refused to renounce the use of force to reunify Taiwan, a variety of confidence-building measures with the United States have assuaged U.S. fears of an imminent military conflict.

The reunification of Taiwan with mainland China is an historic obligation of the CCP and much of the PLA's modernization has been devoted to equipping and training the PLA to be prepared to force a reunification if necessary. Should such a circumstance arise, the United States may very well be placed in a position to intervene. China's modernization program must then take into account the possibility of coming into conflict with the United States. Thus, China's modernization is a dual process of preparing for retaking Taiwan while also developing the stand-off capabilities that may be necessary to prevent an effective U.S. intervention.

In February 2006, the U.S. Department of Defense released its latest *Quadrennial Defense Review*. This document identifies China as having the "greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages absent U.S. counter strategies" (U.S. Department of Defense, 2006, 29). This report was not well received in China. An item published in the *People's Liberation Daily* days after the release of the report quoted PLA Major Peng Guangqian as saying, "The fabrication of 'foreign threats' by the United States reflected the Pentagon's deep-rooted style of 'making enemies' and that its real intention is to secure additional defense funds to help its arms industry fish for more profits" (*People's Liberation Daily*, 2006b).

## Military Doctrine

China's military doctrine has emerged from the competition of three primary doctrinal schools. During Mao's leadership, the PLA was prepared to fight a "People's War." The People's War school holds prominence with the oldest PLA cadre. Blasko wrote in 1999 that the People's War school was composed of "the vast majority of the PLA today" (Blasko, 1999, 260). However, Ji writes in 2002 that "the majority of PLA generals belong to the school of hi-tech warfare" or "fighting future wars under hi-tech conditions" (Ji, 2002). By the turn of the century, approximately 80 percent of China's ground, navy, and air forces were equipped to fight a People's War (Blasko, 1999, 260). The People's War school has relied upon the experiences of the United States in Vietnam and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan to bolster the utility of this strategy against a numerically inferior, yet better equipped aggressor.

The conflict scenario would involve an invasion by a major power such as the United States, Japan, and, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union. The envisioned scenario was one in which a technologically superior enemy would penetrate quickly into China, although due to a long supply chain, would be unable to penetrate deeply. The Chinese would be prepared to quickly move the political capital and military production facilities. Millions of Chinese militia members would be armed and sent against the invading forces to bog down the enemy and buy time. A long and protracted war would result from China's inability to quickly defeat an invader, but this would serve the ends of the Chinese leadership, as such wars of attrition would increasingly become costly and unpopular abroad.

Under Mao's successor, Deng Xiaoping, doctrine began to move away from a major war with probable use of nuclear weapons to one more localized against a nonsuperpower aggressor from within the region and possibly contain a nuclear exchange. Deng felt that a major war fought against a major power was not imminent and called for preparation against a "local, limited" war (Finkelstein, 1999, 127). As such, China would seek a quick outcome through the use of rapid reaction forces (Pillsbury, 1999, 112).

Operation Desert Storm highlighted the change (revolution) in military affairs that new munitions, targeting, and delivery technologies were introducing. In 1993, Jiang Zemin, in his capacity as chairman of the Military Affairs Commission, amended the Local War doctrine with the addition of "high-tech conditions" and instructed the PLA to meet a "new historical period" through appropriate reform. Thus, "Local (or Limited) Wars under Modern High-Tech Conditions" (LWUMHTC) initiated a major transformation in which emphasis began to shift toward an expanded battle space, high-tech systems, rapid reaction, improving C4I capabilities, and carrying out asymmetrical warfare.

Although active defense is the overall strategy, the asymmetrical approach calls for gaining the initiative through a first strike. Once an enemy is revealed and the massing of troops begins, the PLA should strike prior to receiving the first blow. In contrast to the traditional approach calling for a strike after an attacker



has committed himself, the asymmetrical approach allows for preemptive strikes. Such strikes are intended to “deal a mortal blow, winning victory with one strike” (Stokes, 1999, 9).

The third doctrinal school seeks to commit China’s military modernization more fully to accommodating the RMA and is still the smallest group of theorists. The steps that the CCP and PLA are taking to bring China in line with the RMA are fairly straightforward and are evinced in the country’s technology acquisition, domestic production, and resource allocation to the various branches of the PLA. Steps to bring China in line with the RMA are laid out in the 2004 defense white paper and begin with the adaptation of a “composite and leapfrog” approach to acquiring technology that will allow for the “informationalization” of military strategy. Second, the PLA is transitioning from mechanization to informationalization. Third, the PLA seeks to move away from emphasis on quantity (manpower intensive) and build qualitatively superior (technology intensive) armed forces. Fourth, restructuring and reform of the armed forces are intended to create more efficiency, integration, and improved decision making. Fifth, the PLA reform and training are to prepare for winning “local wars under conditions of informationalization” as well as for a “people’s war” scenario envisioning the invasion of China. This aspect places emphasis on improving joint logistical support and officer education. Finally, the PLA is to conduct military exchanges and cooperation under conditions of nonalignment, nonconfrontation, and not directed against any particular international third party. Beijing’s negative reactions to U.S. annual defense reports is largely driven by the fact that the United States has “singled” China out as a strategic competitor to be countered despite China’s claims of noninterference and nonexpansion.

## **The People’s Liberation Army**

The People’s Liberation Army is composed of the army, air force (PLAAF), navy (PLAN), and the 2nd Artillery Force (also known as the Strategic Missile Force). Historically, due to the People’s War doctrine of defending against an invasion, defense emphasis has been devoted to building a large land-based army. Given China’s large population, size, and scarce resources to commit to defense industry and technological development, this doctrine suited local conditions. This stance began to change with China’s rising acknowledgment of the challenges presented by the RMA movement and reinforced by events in the Persian Gulf and the air campaign during the Balkans conflict.

The role of the armed forces is enumerated in the People’s Republic of China Constitution in Chapter 1 (General Principles); Article 29 (Armed Forces). First, “The armed forces of the People’s Republic of China belong to the people. Their tasks are to strengthen national defense, resist aggression, defend the motherland, safeguard the people’s peaceful labor, participate in national reconstruction, and

work hard to serve the people.” Second, “The state strengthens the revolutionization, modernization and regularization of the armed forces in order to increase the national defense capability.” The current main tasks for the PLA are to (1) increase modernization, (2) safeguard national security and unity, and (3) ensure the smooth process of building a moderately prosperous society in an all-round way (IOSC, 2004).

## **Command and Control**

The Constitution of the PRC states that the armed forces are controlled by the Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China (CMC), as stipulated in Chapter 3 (Structure of the State); Article 93 (The Central Military Commission). The CMC is composed of the chairman, vice chairmen, and members of the CMC and individuals serve overlapping terms with the National People’s Congress (NPC). The chairman is elected by and directly responsible to the NPC and the Standing Committee of the NPC, as stipulated in Chapter 3; Section 1; Article 62:6. In reality, it is the Party Central Military Commission, not the state CMC that exercises the “equivalent of national command authority over most aspects of PLA operational, logistical, and support activities for war fighting and internal security operations” (Krawitz, 2003, 3).

Falling under the party and NPC Central Military Commissions are the four general headquarters. The General Staff Department (GSD) is the largest and most influential of the general headquarters. With offices in Beijing, the GSD maintains a mirror of its own bureaucratic chain in all military branches, military regions and districts, and within the People’s Armed Police. The GSD is empowered with overall command authority as “the command center of the army and the leading organ for military work ... [and] ... the ‘nerves’ that control the action of units” (Shambaugh, 2003, 128).

The General Political Department (GPD) is the primary organ responsible for the political work of the armed forces and since the 1990s has become active in rooting out corruption and factionalism within the PLA. The GPD, in part, maintains supervision and indoctrination through political commissars. Commissars traditionally held dual decision-making powers with the unit military commander, although in the post-Tiananmen period commanders have emerged as the preeminent decision makers (Shambaugh, 2003). The GPD also maintains records on all officers. As such, the GPD has considerable influence on promotions and reassignment.

The General Logistics Department (GLD) is charged with securing the necessary procurements an armed force needs, from clothing and medicine to weapons and ordinance. The GLD is currently struggling to keep up with the overall modernization of China’s armed forces and has been the subject of numerous new regulations and reorganizations. Some of the challenges faced by the GLD are building a logistical support system capable of moving the PLA into greater independence

from local resources, supporting joint operations, and standardizing and automating logistical services. Twice, since 2003, the GSD, GPD, GLD, and General Armaments Department (GAD) have formed joint working groups to coordinate inspections “of strict administration of the troops” (IOSC, 2004).

The GAD is the newest department, created in 1998. It is now responsible for managing the defense industry with departments dedicated to functions such as the research and production of armaments, equipment technology, and electronic and information base. Conventional weapons testing, nuclear testing, and satellite launches are also within the purview of the GAD.

The next link in the chain of command is found in the seven military regions (MR) of the PLA, each exerting control over military districts (MD) and garrison commands (GC). There are currently four levels of command, beginning with the MR. Each MR is subdivided into military districts distinguished by province. Each MD is further broken down into subdistricts at the county level and each subdistrict is divided into garrisons at the municipal level.

The Lanzhou Military Region is headquartered in Lanzhou, Gansu. The areas of responsibility for this military region are Shaanxi, Gansu, and Qinghai provinces, as well as Ningxia and Xinjiang autonomous regions. The Jinan Military Region is headquartered in Jinan, Shandong. The areas of responsibility for the Jinan military region are Shandong and Henan provinces. The Nanjing Military Region is headquartered in Nanjing, Jiangsu and is responsible for Shanghai and Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, and Fujian provinces. The Guangzhou Military Region, headquartered in Guangzhou, Guangdong, is responsible for Guangdong, Hunan, Hubei, and Hainan provinces, Guangxi Autonomous Region, Hong Kong, and Macao. Chengdu Military Region is headquartered in Chengdu, Sichuan. This region’s responsibilities include Chongqing, Tibet Autonomous Region, and Sichuan, Guizhou, and Yunnan provinces. Table 19.1 shows the group army strengths as of approximately 2004.

## **Force Structure**

The People’s Liberation Army is the largest armed force in the world, totaling approximately 2.3 million personnel at the end of 2005. As reported in *China’s National Defense 2004*, the distribution of personnel across the armed forces is the PLA (64 percent), PLA Air Force (16 percent), PLA Navy (14 percent), and the 2nd Artillery or Strategic Missile Force (6 percent) (Table 19.2).

Obtaining hard numbers for specific force structures is acknowledged as a difficult task due to a dearth of detailed reporting by the Chinese. Questions remain as to the composition of a squad or the number of tanks in a platoon. Blasko (2000, 2) writes that “though we may be able to see the green PLA forest, we have a difficult time understanding the individual trees.” With regard to the PLAAF, Allen (2005,

<b>Table 19.1 PLA Group Army Force Structures 2004<sup>a</sup></b>				
	<i>Shenyang</i>	<i>Beijing</i>	<i>Lanzhou<sup>b</sup></i>	<i>Jinan</i>
Army groups	3	5	2	3
Armored Brigade	3	3	1	1
Division	1	2	1	2
Motorized Infantry Brigade	6	7	3	2
Division	5	4	5	2
Artillery Brigade	3	4	2	2
Division	1	1	0	1
AAA Brigade	3	3	3	1
Division	0	0	0	0
Army Aviation Group	1	2	1	1
Regiment	0	0	1	0
Air Defense Brigade	1	2	0	2
Antitank Brigade	1	0	0	0
Infantry Brigade	0	0	1	0
Mechanized Infantry Brigade	0	0	0	3
Division	0	0	0	1
Amphibious Mechanized Brigade	0	0	0	0
Division	0	0	0	0
Amphibious Armored Brigade	0	0	0	0
Division	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0
	<i>Nanjing<sup>c</sup></i>	<i>Guangzhou</i>	<i>Chengdu<sup>d</sup></i>	
Army groups	3	2	2	
Armored Brigade	0	1	2	
Division	2	1	0	

<b>Table 19.1 PLA Group Army Force Structures 2004<sup>a</sup> (Continued)</b>				
	<i>Nanjing<sup>c</sup></i>	<i>Guangzhou</i>	<i>Chengdu<sup>d</sup></i>	
Motorized Infantry				
Brigade	5	0	1	
Division	1	3	4	
Artillery				
Brigade	2	1	2	
Division	1	1	1	
AAA				
Brigade	1	1	3	
Division	0	0	0	
Army Aviation				
Group	1	0	0	
Regiment	0	0	0	
Air Defense				
Brigade	2	1	0	
Antitank				
Brigade	0	0	0	
Infantry				
Brigade	0	0	2	
Mechanized Infantry				
Brigade	0	0	0	
Division	0	0	1	
Amphibious Mechanized				
Brigade	0	0	0	
Division	1	1	0	
Amphibious Armored				
Brigade	1	0	0	
Division	0	0	0	
Other	1	0	1	

<sup>a</sup> Except where noted, garrisons, units directly subordinate to the military region, and provincial military district forces are not included in the above.

<sup>b</sup> Lanzhou has two army groups, but also does the Xinjiang Military District, formerly the Urumqi Military Region. The Xinjiang Military District enjoys greater powers than provincial military districts.

<sup>c</sup> The Shanghai Garrison is included in addition to the three Nanjing Army Groups.

<sup>d</sup> The Tibet Military District enjoys greater powers than normal provincial military districts.

Source: Compiled from china defense today, "Ground Forces, Order of Battle," <http://sinodefense.com/army/default.asp>

<b>Table 19.2 PLA Force Structure 2004</b>		
<i>Force</i>	<i>Approximate Number</i>	<i>Approximate Share (%)</i>
PLA Army	1.41 million	64
2nd Artillery	130,000	6
PLA Navy	329,000	14
PLA Air Force	370,000	16
<i>Source: China's National Defense in 2004, Information Office of the State Council, People's Republic of China.</i>		

6) wonders about the number of hours pilots fly each year and the quality of their training.

The PLA ground forces are the largest branch of China's military and make up over 60 percent of total PLA forces. Under the People's War and "local war under information conditions," the PLA has not developed as a force for power projection, but preparing for defense. The largest troop concentrations, by estimated size, are found in the Beijing (capital defense), Shenyang (Manchuria), Nanjing (coastal/Taiwan area), and Lanzhou (western borders) MRs. These deployments date back to the Cold War period and have not changed a great deal since.

The PLA ground forces are structured into the following size units: group army (commanded by a major general), division/brigade, regiment, battalion, company, platoon, and squad. Functional units are divided into infantry, armored, artillery, antiair, antichemical, communications, and engineering units, cartography, electronic countermeasures, and army aviation. An expressed goal of the PLA is to create at least one rapid reaction unit within each group army.

PLA units are armed with a mix of low-, medium-, and high-tech weaponry. The majority of weaponry, however, is low tech and rather dated. Of approximately ten thousand main battle tanks (MBT) most are the T-59 variety (based on Russian T54s) and, while upgraded, have been in service for several decades. Newer variants are of Type 69 and 79, retrofitted for export. The T-62 and T-63 are smaller versions of the T-59 designed as light and amphibious models, respectively. Newer models of MBT are the Type 80, Type 85, Type 90, and Type 90-II. The Type 90, at forty-eight tons, is equipped with modular composite armor, stabilized turret, slaved targeting and gun, passive thermal imaging, and auto-loading, smooth bore 125 mm gun capable of firing armor piercing, high explosive, and high explosive fragmentation rounds. The Type 90-II is upgraded with reactive armor panels, an improved laser rangefinder, and increased mobility (Federation of American Scientists, 2006). There are an additional 5,500 armored vehicles, 25,000 artillery guns (towed and self-propelled), and multiple rocket launchers.

The PLA Navy (PLAN) is charged with maintaining maritime security and sovereign control over territorial waters. The PLAN is divided into three fleet commands (North Sea, East Sea, and South Sea) and headquartered in Beijing. The

North Sea Fleet is headquartered in Qingdao (Shandong Province) and responsible for the area south of the Yalu River to Jiangsu Province. This area corresponds with the Beijing, Jinan, and Shenyang MRs. The East Sea Fleet is headquartered in Ningbo and is responsible for an area south through Fujian Province. This corresponds with the Nanjing MR. The South Sea Fleet is headquartered in Zhanjiang (Guangdong Province) and is responsible for the South China Sea. All six of China's nuclear submarines are in the North Sea Fleet (Shambaugh, 2003, 165).

With the expansion of the battle space, the PLAN is increasingly expected to project defensive operations farther from coastal defense and to building a stronger amphibious assault capability. As such, the PLAN has experienced a gradual expansion from a "brown" water (coast out to one hundred nautical miles) to a "green" water (from one hundred nautical miles to the next major land mass) force. The next step would be to develop a genuine "blue" water navy. China's efforts to obtain technology to construct an indigenous aircraft carrier have resulted in the 1985 purchase of the decommissioned Australian *HMS Melbourne* and former Soviet carriers *Minsk*, *Kiev*, and *Varyag* in the late 1990s. China took delivery of two Russian Sovremenny-class guided missile destroyers, with another two on order.

The PLAN possesses fifty-seven submarines (fifty-one diesel and six nuclear), twenty-one destroyers, forty-three frigates, and fifty-one missile-equipped ships for coastal defense (U.S. Department of Defense, 2005, 44). There are an estimated twenty tank landing ships and twenty-three medium landing ships. The PLA Naval Air Force (PLANAF) holds nine aviation divisions with each division containing two or three aviation regiments.

The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) is charged with protecting China's airspace, yet in order to meet the challenges and demands of informationalized warfare, has shifted from territorial air defense to defensive and offensive projection capabilities. The PLAAF operates under four operational and organizational levels: headquarters air force, military region air force, air force corps/bases, and operational units. There are eight operational branches: aviation, surface-to-air missile, antiaircraft artillery, airborne, radar, communications, electronic countermeasure, and meteorological.

The PLAAF consists of approximately thirty divisions with twenty-two fighter divisions, three bomber divisions, three attack (ground attack) divisions, and two airlift divisions. Between the PLAAF and PLANAF, there are approximately 2,600 combat aircraft (Department of Defense, 2005). Of these, approximately 1,500 are fighters (J-6/MiG-19, 720 J-7/MiG-21, J-81, and J-11/Su-27SK). The PLAAF has purchased over 120 Russian-built Sokhoi SU-27 and Su-30 fighters and is producing third-generation aircraft such as the J-10, J-11, and JH-7. There are an estimated 780 bombers and ground attack aircraft. Bombers consist principally of the H-5/Il-28 (Beagle) and H-6/Tu-16 (Badger) varieties.

The PLAAF has increasingly focused on reducing the total number of aircraft and creating a slightly smaller, yet more technologically equipped force. The largest reductions have been in the oldest model fighter, the J-6, which entered production in the early 1960s and continued phased reductions of the J-7, which entered

production in the late 1960s. A goal is to strike a generational balance within the fighter craft with third- and fourth-generation fighters (models entering production in the 1990s and after) composing about 40 percent of the PLAAF fighters by the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century (Shambaugh, 2003, 262).

The PLA Second Artillery Force is China's strategic missile force. This force is charged with deterring a nuclear strike, conducting nuclear counterstrikes, and initiating precision strikes with conventional missiles. The Second Artillery operates as a service arm and is under the GSD and CMC. The Second Artillery headquarters is in Qinghe and there are launch bases found in Liaoning, Anhui, Yunnan, Henan, Hunan, and Qinghai provinces.

The missile force of the Second Artillery is composed of short-, medium-, and intercontinental-range missiles. The bulk of the force is composed of up to 730 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM), all of which are in Fujian Province across from Taiwan, with a range of 300 to 600 kilometers. China possesses approximately twenty-three medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) with a range in the neighborhood of 1,770 kilometers and up to forty-two intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) with ranges from 5,470 to 8,460 kilometers (U.S. Department of Defense, 2006).

Having long relied upon a large army to offset technological deficiencies, Beijing realized after the PRC's border conflict with Vietnam in 1979 that a smaller, better trained and equipped army would best serve China's defense needs. Since the mid-1980s, the size of the PLA has been decreased by over one million ground troops. The most recent reduction occurred by the end of 2005.

In the same year, the PLA announced that its two-year troop reduction program had accomplished a further downsizing of about 200,000 personnel, leaving a total of about 2.3 million troops. Between 1980 and 1987, more than one million positions were cut, bringing the PLA forces to about 3.2 million. Another 200,000 troops were cut by 1997. Further reductions were implemented after 1997, when the PLA cut another half a million troops, bringing the total to about 2.5 million. In the three years after 1997, the army was downsized by approximately 19 percent. This compared to the smaller decreases in the navy (11.6 percent) and air force (11 percent).

According to a report in the *PLA Daily*, the most recent cuts hit the Army the hardest, reducing its share of personnel to a historic low (Niu, 2006). Of the 200,000 reductions completed in 2005, about 170,000 personnel were officers. This was necessitated by the PLA's desire to "optimize the ratio between officers and soldiers" (Nei, 2006).

## China's Defense Spending

While a great deal of secrecy complicates assessment of China's military capabilities, this shroud is perhaps greatest in the area of China's military spending. As Bitzinger (2000) writes, "Few areas of Chinese military studies actually have access



**Table 19.3 Defense Expenditures 1994 to 2004**

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
RMB (10 millions)	934.9	1076.7	1207.5	1442.0	1694.4	1881.9	2100
USD (10 millions)	112.01	128.98	145.84	174.16	204.6	227.55	254
% GDP	1.19	1.31	1.35	1.48	1.62	1.63	na
Growth Rate	15.03	15.19	12.15	19.42	17.5	11.07	11.6

*Sources: China's National Defense in 2004, Information Office of the State Council, People's Republic of China; National Defense Report 2004, Ministry of National Defense, Republic of China.*

to less reliable data than defense budget analysis" (2). Without a doubt, the PRC's annual increase in military expenditures remains in the double digits, yet according to the 2004 China defense white paper, the growth in military expenditures has dropped significantly since 2002 (Table 19.3).

In 2003, China reported spending 1.63 percent of GDP on defense expenditures. This equated to 7.74 percent of the country's total financial expenditures. The distribution of expenditures was reported at roughly 33.6 percent for operations, 32.5 percent for human resources, and 33.9 percent for equipment. In 2000, this distribution was 35 percent for operations, 33 percent for human resources, and 32 percent for equipment. The rate of increase in spending has fluctuated throughout the 1990s, but leveled off at around 11 percent in 2003 and 2004.

Many estimates indicate that the reported figures are only one third of the actual spending. The official budget does not include expenditures on items such as those for the Second Artillery, the People's Armed Police, defense industry subsidies, and subnational units' contribution to the PLA (U.S. Department of Defense, 2006, 22). Excluded from the budget are foreign weapons procurement, a figure approaching \$3 billion annually just from Russia. On the other hand, Shambaugh (2003) notes that a large portion of spending has actually been dedicated to defense industry reforms such as those accruing from the decommercialization of the PLA and forced downsizing. China's *Defense White Paper 2004* indicates that military expenditures have been devoted primarily to increasing salaries, improving the social insurance system and education, along with "moderate" increases in equipment expenses (IOSC, 2004).

## **Civil–Military Relations and the PLA as a National or Party Army**

Traditionally, a discussion of civil–military relations in the PRC would best be termed a discussion of party–army relations. Due to the high degree of integration, or symbiosis, of the armed forces as the coercive mechanism behind CCP political

hegemony and its commitment to internal as well as external security on behalf of the CCP, the PLA has not been a typical national army. At the core of the symbiotic relationship is an interlocking directorate in which senior military officers serve in the CCP's Central Committee and Politburo. Retired officers also serve in important CCP leadership roles and while "civilians," continue close relationships with and act as advocates for the PLA. As a result of many of the changes discussed below, however, "it is now more analytically appropriate to consider civil–military rather than party–army relations in the PRC" (Shambaugh, 2003, 13).

The dual role of the PLA as defender of the CCP and the state is well documented. The PLA originated as the army of the CCP in 1928 and since the founding of the PRC in 1949, party and state political and military power has been highly integrated. According to Shambaugh, the PLA has experienced three basic stages in its development parallel to the CCP: symbiosis (until 1989), control (1989–1997), and relative autonomy (post-1997) (Shambaugh, 2003, 43).

Until 1989, the party–military relationship was characterized as one of symbiosis, in which the party and army were "fused due to a lack of functional differentiation and clear institutional boundaries" (Li, 2005, 1). After the Tiananmen Square Incident (1989), the party extended its efforts to ensure political loyalties of the military. Since the ascendance of Jiang Zemin, a new period of (relatively) increased professionalization of the PLA has transpired. Although the PLA has moved from a "party army" to a "party army with professional characteristics," the primacy of its role as protector of the CCP has not changed (Joffe, 1997, 109).

Others argue that the professionalization, institutionalization, and regularization of the PLA over the last decade are not minor, and while not completely ending the symbiotic relationship that has long existed, have introduced significant prospects for a long-term trend of further moving the PLA from a party army to a national or statist armed force (Shambaugh, 2001). Of concern are the potential frictions that this professionalization may produce. Would a professionalized armed force be more willing to clash with party control? Will the rising level of officer education in the PLA introduce a new class conflict within a military founded upon the peasant soldier? The PLA and the Party have long relied upon the support of the mass peasantry, and that support has been a bulwark of CCP control. The possibility exists that "modernization will introduce factors that could stimulate a reemergence of class distinctions and class frictions and subsequently alter traditional perceptions" within the PLA and between the PLA and society (Krawitz, 2003, 3).

The PLA's role *vis-à-vis* the CCP and the state is institutionalized in a variety of documents and recently in the new regulations on the Political Work of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, constituted in December 2003. The 2004 China defense white paper clearly states that this regulation "maintains that political work is the fundamental guarantee of the Party's absolute leadership over the armed forces and the assurance for the armed forces to accomplish their missions" (IOSC, 2004). Commitment of PLA cadres was reinforced in the Provisions on Strengthening

the Education and Management of High and Middle Ranking Cadres of the PLA, promulgated in February 2004. This provision refines the system of maintaining “correct” ideology of the officer corps at the regiment level and above and commits cadres to “do self-study and review, to receive thematic education, to take [sic] admonishment talks, to make ideological and political assessment” among other political duties (IOSC, 2004). A *People’s Daily* editorial on New Year’s Day 2006 praised the PLA as being instrumental in making the previous year one that “deepened the Party-wide education on maintaining the advanced nature of the Party members” (*PLA Daily*, January 1, 2006).

As reported in *China’s National Defense in 2002* (IOSC, 2002), the NPC enacted the Legislation Law in March 2000, which defined the legislative powers of the CMC and the CMC standing with regard to general headquarters and services. The fact that the NPC, rather than the CCP, is increasingly influential in matters related to regulating and funding the PLA is a positive step towards proper civil–military relations. The Legislation Law is important for the trend in moving the PLA toward a professionalized, state army and provides that

the CMC may formulate military statutes in accordance with the Constitution and laws. The general headquarters/departments, services and arms, and military area commands may, within their respective authorities, formulate military regulations in accordance with the law and the military statutes, decisions and orders of the CMC. Procedures for formulation, amendment and nullification of military statutes and regulations shall be stipulated by the CMC in accordance with the principles specified in the provisions of the said Law. (IOSC, 2002, 10)

## Conclusion

The PRC’s military rise has now gained prominence alongside the country’s economic ascendance and is clearly a major concern regionally and in the long term globally. Without question, China’s military planners are dedicated to modernization. Although such assessments are so common as to be cliché, there remain very real challenges to China accomplishing this feat as well as to our own understanding of the scale, quality, and speed of China’s ascendance to global military power. As well, due to the general lack of transparency in matters related to China’s military affairs, foreign scholars and planners will continue to rely on some degree of educated speculation for some time to come.

China’s ability to modernize its military at the same speed as its economy, however, is questionable. Two decades of concerted effort in economic restructuring have created a global economic dynamo, yet most estimates place China’s rise to the regional military power at another three to four decades. This begs the question as to whether regional or global power is the end goal driving PRC strategic

modernization. The immediate priority is preparation for a possible military action against Taiwan and, thus, resources will continue to be dedicated to information warfare, missile, blockade capacity, and amphibious assault capabilities. As long as the recovery of Taiwan remains a priority, a second aspect to this preparation is the improvement of the PRC's stand-off capabilities vis-à-vis the United States.

Of interest is a scenario in which the Taiwan issue was to be resolved peacefully and what the consequences of this would be for PRC security and defense strategy and policy. Dialogue initiated in 2005 and 2006 between the CCP and Taiwan's leading opposition leaders may hold potential for improved relations should the Nationalist Party in Taiwan win the 2008 presidential election. Should relations between Beijing and Taipei be demilitarized, to which theater would the PLA redirect its military modernization? Peaceful resolution of cross-strait tensions will most likely complicate U.S. planning to contain the PRC and provide the PRC a greater blue water projection potential.

Limitations to the scope and speed of modernization remain. Military modernization must compete for resources in an economic climate dependent upon foreign trade, growing socioeconomic inequality within China, and demands for improved health care, environmental protection, and education. Tending to these needs, providing the capital to continue double-digit growth, and increasing military spending all rely upon continued high growth in what some analysts see as a "bubble economy."

The challenges facing the PLA are numerous and costly. Raising the education levels of armed forces, paying pensions and health care for veterans, investing in indigenous arms development and production, purchasing hardware and technologies from abroad, and restructuring the civil-defense sector are costly long-term endeavors. Some debate within the PLA over its overarching military doctrine and long-term direction will continue, yet there is little question of a continued adaptation to the RMA.

In conclusion, China's military modernization poses more immediate challenges to the country's Asian neighbors: Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. Contentious territorial claims in the East China Sea and the South China Sea may also spark armed conflict and the PRC is increasing its preponderance of power. As neighboring states become increasingly reliant upon trade with China, the prominence of high politics that has bolstered the U.S.'s Pacific relations may dwindle. As security guarantor, the United States will find itself increasingly probed for weakness in political will and military capability.

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